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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
PIONEERS IN EXILE: THE CHINA INLAND MISSION AND MISSIONARY 
MOBILITY IN CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1943-1989 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  My	  dissertation	  explores	  how	  the	  movement	  of	  missionaries	  across	  Asia	  
responded	  to	  the	  currents	  of	  nationalism,	  decolonization,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  
producing	  ideas	  about	  sovereignty,	  race,	  and	  religious	  rights.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  
looks	  at	  how	  U.S.	  evangelicals	  in	  the	  China	  Inland	  Mission,	  an	  international	  and	  
interdenominational	  mission	  society,	  collaborated	  with	  Christians	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  
and	  Pacific	  worlds.	  While	  doing	  so	  it	  also	  details	  the	  oft-­‐neglected	  study	  of	  the	  post-­‐
China	  careers	  of	  former	  China	  missionaries	  by	  extensive	  use	  of	  oral	  histories.	  Forced	  
to	  abandon	  its	  only	  field	  by	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  the	  mission	  redeployed	  as	  
the	  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship	  sending	  agents	  to	  new	  nations	  such	  as	  Japan,	  
Indonesia,	  and	  Thailand	  and	  amongst	  the	  overseas	  Chinese	  populations	  scattered	  
across	  Southeast	  Asia.	  The	  last	  chapter	  looks	  at	  the	  OMF’s	  return	  to	  the	  People’s	  
Republic	  of	  China	  as	  tourists	  and	  expatriates	  as	  the	  means	  by	  which	  
“rapprochement”	  took	  on	  religious	  meanings.	  	  Ultimately,	  I	  argue	  missionary	  
mobility	  produced	  ideas	  about	  religious	  freedom	  as	  a	  human	  right	  across	  the	  
international	  community	  rooted	  in	  ambivalent,	  racialized	  attitudes	  toward	  Asians.	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Introductory Chapter  
 Mobility, Rights, and Race in Protestant Missions 
Background 
The slide show “Preaching Tour through Ningsia” begins with two Chinese 
evangelists walking behind a donkey on a country road and leads the viewer into the 
provincial capital, around through the city’s markets and temples to the government 
offices, and then across the province’s roads, waterways, and desert plains from the 
vantage point of a China missionary.  Audiences enjoyed a moment by moment 
recreation of the missionary’s journey as an itinerant preacher, from purchasing materials 
for the journey, loading mules with supplies, procuring ferries, and visiting Chinese inns 
in the countryside.1 For mission representatives, slideshows such as “Preaching Tour 
through Ningsia” were invaluable for showing supporters two critical dimensions of 
missionary work: movement and contact. 
For representatives of the China Inland Mission (CIM), an international and 
interdenominational mission society, slideshows such as a “Preaching Tour” were 
becoming an indispensable tool for capturing the imagination of their U.S. audiences in 
the 1940s. Filled with photographs of beautiful landscapes, architecture, and stock images 
of various groups in Chinese society, missionary slideshows like travel narratives found 
in print were informative, educational, and entertaining in nature, but also laden with a 
spiritual and political agenda. As fascination with China grew in the U.S. in the twentieth 
1	  “Preaching	  Tour	  through	  Ningsia,”	  China	  Inland	  Mission,	  February	  3,	  1948,	  Records	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  Home	  Council	  of	  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship	  (China	  Inland	  Mission),	  Billy	  Graham	  Center	  
Archives,	  Lantern	  Slide	  Box	  10	  
2	  
century these slideshows constructed for Protestant Christians in the U.S. an imagined 
China defined by Christianity’s potential pervasiveness via the free-roaming missionary.2 
Transportation and mobility were key themes in a “Preaching Tour” as the 
slideshow demonstrated the physical aspects the missionary’s travel and work. In the 
section entitled “We Take to the Road,” viewers saw photographs of different types of 
Chinese roads and various forms of transportation such as boats and ferries and canal 
bridges, giving them a picture of the terrain and difficulties encountered by missionaries 
traveling in China. The slideshow represented not just physical movement but the 
mobility of missionaries in social and cultural settings. The section of slides titled “We 
Meet People” included the various types of Chinese the missionary expected to encounter 
including: soldiers, Muslims, market traders, camel drivers, convicts, and fellow 
travelers. Photographs and the accompanying script showed the missionary in a number 
of different social settings spreading the gospel: preaching in the market, having tea in 
Chinese homes, and engaging fellow travelers in conversation along roadsides or on 
boats.3  
There were multiple messages within the show for Protestant evangelicals in the 
U.S. First, the show represented CIM missionaries as accustomed to and accepted in a 
wide variety of social and cultural encounters. The mission was also positioned as the 
means by which Christianity penetrated all aspects of Chinese life. Secondly, “Preaching 
Tour Through Ningsia” created an impression of the missionary/Christianity as ever-
22	  “Preaching	  Tour	  through	  Ningsia,”	  China	  Inland	  Mission,	  February	  3,	  1948,	  Records	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  Home	  Council	  of	  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship	  (China	  Inland	  Mission),	  Billy	  Graham	  Center	  
Archives,	  Lantern	  Slide	  Box	  10	  
3	  “Preaching	  Tour	  through	  Ningsia,”	  China	  Inland	  Mission,	  February	  3,	  1948,	  Records	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  Home	  Council	  of	  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship	  (China	  Inland	  Mission),	  Billy	  Graham	  Center	  
Archives,	  Lantern	  Slide	  Box	  10	  
3	  
expanding and limitless in its movement by showing the great distances CIM’s 
missionaries traveled in the interior. Stories of travel such as this allowed audiences to 
visualize the missionary traveling everywhere across China’s diverse landscapes: 
winding through busy cities, hanging around rural areas, on rivers, climbing mountains, 
and walking the nation’s roads. Lastly, “Preaching Tour” represented the CIM’s 
infrastructure of mission stations, hospitals, and Chinese churches associated with the 
mission as ubiquitous throughout the interior provinces of China. 
In essence, the slideshow provided U.S. Protestants with a geographic imaginary 
of a China roamed freely by missionaries, and populated by Christian communities and 
institutions with even the most remote villages and social groups accessible through the 
hard work of the CIM. The slideshows, the CIM hoped, also cultivated as strong sense of 
obligation and prayerful reflection on China with U.S. audiences. For the society, an 
essential purpose of the show was facilitating a desire to have spiritual contact with the 
Chinese through prayer. Beholden to an evangelical belief in the efficacy of prayer as 
spiritual intervention in the lives of Chinese, the CIM encouraged audiences to pray for 
the people and images they saw and names and places they heard about when listening to 
the missionary speak, imparting a sense that via prayer and the missionary’s movement 
U.S. Protestant churches were in direct contact with the images they saw. 
These messages about the missionary and their mobility were not unique to 
“Preaching Tour,” rather they were the hallmarks that defined the CIM’s relationship to 
China and the Chinese. It was no wonder then that the CIM was jokingly referred to by 
some members as standing for “Constantly In Motion.”4  In the nineteenth century, while 
4 Frank Houghton, China Calling, (London: Camelot Press, 1936), p. 153. 
4	  
most mission societies concentrated on coastal provinces, the CIM endeavored to take the 
gospel to every province of the Qing Empire. In fanning out throughout the nation the 
CIM missionaries were driven by the ideological imperative that “no one has the right to 
hear the Gospel twice until every one has heard it once.”5 Thus, the trajectory of the CIM 
missionary’s pathways around China were driven less by the desire to win as many souls 
to Christianity as possible but more so by the idea of taking the gospel as far and wide as 
possible.  
For the society’s supporters in the U.S., the CIM missionary’s mobility gave 
expression to a number of American ideals and desires. Firstly, complete and unhindered 
access to Chinese civilization expressed in foreign policies like the Open Door. Secondly, 
the expansive itinerations employed by the CIM missionaries to these ends—made 
possible by extraterritoriality rights—built the sense that missionary mobility embodied 
ideas about both freedom of movement and of expression, critical aspects of the concept 
of religious freedom in the twentieth century. And thirdly, international cooperation, in 
supporting the CIM, U.S. evangelicals joined together with Protestants from North 
America and Europe.  
Founded in 1865 by a British evangelical Hudson Taylor, by the mid-twentieth 
century the CIM was an international mission with members from eleven different 
countries including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. By the 
mid-twentieth century, within the U.S. the CIM enjoyed strong financial and ideological 
support from evangelicals across the nation and maintained offices in cities such as 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles.  Studying the mobility of CIM missionaries then 
5	  Frank	  Houghton,	  China	  Calling,	  (London:	  Camelot	  Press,	  1936),	  p.	  153.	  
	   5	  
suggests the ways in which the movement of missionaries in China produced ideas that 
were relayed to Protestant Christians through the international Christian community, and 
the concept of missionary mobility provides a transnational lens on the relations between 
U.S. evangelicals and the wider international community in Europe and Asia sharing an 
ideology of mobility and rights infused with meanings associated with the spread of 
American power and values. 
Missionary Mobility, Mission-Centric History and the Paradigm of “Indigenization” 
By focusing on mobility as an analytical framework, I contribute to the growing 
significance of transnational studies for Chinese and U.S. history in the twentieth 
century.6 In the late 1980s, historians such as Akira Iriye stressed the need to investigate 
the role that international non-governmental organizations and non-state cultural figures 
played in diplomatic affairs in the twentieth century.7 The field of transnational history 
took shape shortly thereafter and expanded upon on this inquiry to analyze a number of 
phenomena—for instance, transnational migratory populations and labor forces—that 
underscored the interconnectedness and interdependent histories of social and cultural 
groups across the world in the twentieth century. Historians of the U.S. such as Ian 
Tyrell, Kristin Hoganson, and Mary Dudziak have utilized this approach to emphasize the 
permeability of U.S. borders. Broadly stated, their work has demonstrated the infusion of 
cultural ephemera and consumer products from foreign locales within the daily lives of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Ong,	  Aihwa	  and	  Donald	  M.	  Nonini.	  Ungrounded	  Empires:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  
Transnationalism.	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1996);	  Liu,	  Haiming.	  “Transnational	  Historiography:	  Chinese	  
American	  Studies	  Reconsidered,”	  Journal	  of	  History	  of	  Ideas,	  Vol.	  65,	  No.	  1.	  2004.	  p.	  135-­‐153.;	  Hsu,	  
Madeline.	  Dreaming	  of	  gold,	  Dream	  of	  Home:	  Transnationalism	  and	  Migration	  Between	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  South	  China,	  1882-­‐1942.	  Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  
7	  Akira	  Iriye,	  “The	  Internationalization	  of	  History,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  Vol.	  94,	  No.	  1	  
(Feb.,	  1989):	  1-­‐10.	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Americans, but also the ways in which international events and groups or persons outside 
the U.S. exercised their influence over domestic issues and public opinion.8  
In a similar manner, historians of China have had much success in using a 
transnational framework to illustrate the ways in which distinctions between 
“international” and “domestic” aspects of the past in China are increasingly difficult to 
define and at times counterproductive to historical understanding. In particular, many 
scholars have explored the diasporic movements of ethnic Han Chinese, paying special 
attention to the ways in which movement, place, ethnicity, labor, and cultural heritage 
factor into the construction of subjectivity.9  
In using mobility, I intend to build upon the work of scholar Tim Cresswell.  Like 
Cresswell, I explore how mobility created notions about rights or race by tracking how 
the CIM’s missionaries practiced and experienced movement in nations like China that 
were then distributed by the society and its representatives across the U.S., Europe, and 
Asia.10 These meanings produced by mobility are critical to understanding the relations 
between foreign missionaries, who were at the start of the twentieth century primarily 
white westerners, and Chinese and later other Asians, of whom were increasingly 
prominent members and voices within the Protestant missionary movement by the end of 
the twentieth century. Lastly, mobility provides the means to create a transnational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak,	  Cold	  War,	  Civil	  rights:	  Race	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  American	  Democracy	  (Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  Kristin	  Hoganson,	  Consumer’s	  Imperium:	  The	  Global	  Production	  of	  
American	  Domesticity,	  1865-­‐1920	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2008);	  Ian	  
Tyrell,	  Transnational	  Nation:	  United	  States	  History	  in	  Global	  Perspective	  since	  1789	  (New	  York:	  
Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2007).	  
9	  William	  Kirby,	  and	  Mechtild	  Leutner,	  Klaus	  Mühlhahn,	  eds.	  Global	  Conjectures:	  China	  in	  
Transnational	  Perspective	  (Münster:	  Global	  Distributor,	  2006);	  Aihwa	  Ong	  and	  Donald	  Macon	  Nonini,	  
Ungrounded	  Empires:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Transnationalism	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  
1997);	  Xiaojian	  Zhao.	  Remaking	  Chinese	  America:	  Immigration,	  Family,	  and	  Community,	  1940-­‐1965	  
(New	  Brunswick:	  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  
10	  Tim	  Cresswell,	  On	  the	  Move:	  Mobility	  in	  the	  Modern	  Western	  World,	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2006),	  p.	  
3-­‐4.	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synthesis of two veigns of scholarship, histories that are mission-centric and those that 
focus on indigenous Chinese Christianity, to highlight the transnational connections that 
colored American religion, human rights discourse, and the development of Christianity 
in Asia.  
In the U.S., the history of foreign missions to China remained understudied by 
secular historians until the 1970s.  Early historians of Protestant missions such as 
Kenneth Scott Latourette’s A History of Christian Missions in China (1929) provided an 
impressive catalogue of empirical data and descriptions of missions, but exalted the 
missionary’s selflessness, altruism, and sacrifice in the same vein as mission 
publications.11  Publications by scholars such as Creighton Lacy, R. Pierce Beaver, Paul 
Varg, Paul Cohen, and James C. Thomson produced the first secular academic research 
concerning U.S. missions to China in the 1950s and 1960s.12 
 Encouragement from the well-respected John King Fairbank in his presidential 
address to the American Historical Society in 1969 prompted a number of scholars to 
explore the diplomatic and cultural impact of American missionaries on Sino-American 
affairs, historical subjects he believed to be understudied or “invisible” figures in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Kenneth	  Scott	  Latourette,	  A	  History	  of	  Christian	  Missions	  in	  China	  (New	  York:	  MacMillan,	  1929);	  
Dana	  L.	  Robert,	  “From	  Missions	  to	  Mission	  Beyond	  Missions:	  The	  Historiography	  of	  American	  
Protestant	  Foreign	  Missions	  Since	  World	  War	  II,”	  International	  Bulletin	  of	  Missionary	  Research,	  Vol.	  
18,	  No.	  4	  (Oct.,	  1994):	  146.	  
12Paul	  A.	  Varg,	  Missionaries,	  Chinese,	  and	  Diplomats:	  The	  American	  Protestant	  Missionary	  Movement	  in	  
China,	  1890-­‐1952	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1952);	  	  Paul	  A.	  Varg,	  "Motives	  in	  Protestant	  
Missions,	  1890-­‐1917,”	  Church	  History,	  Vol.	  23,	  No.	  1	  (Mar.,	  1954):	  68-­‐82.;	  Creighton	  Lacy,	  “The	  
Missionary	  Exodus	  from	  China,”	  Pacific	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  28,	  No.	  4	  (Dec.,	  1955):	  pp.	  301-­‐314.;	  R.	  Pierce	  
Beaver,	  “Nationalism	  and	  Missions,”	  Church	  History,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  1	  (Mar.,	  1957):	  22.,	  R.	  Pierce	  Beaver,	  
All	  Loves	  Excelling:	  American	  Protestant	  Women	  in	  the	  World	  Mission	  (Grand	  Rapids,	  MI:	  Wm.	  B.	  
Eerdmans	  Publ.	  Co.,	  1968,	  rev.	  ed.	  1980)	  and	  American	  Missions	  in	  Bicentennial	  Perspective	  (South	  
Pasadena,	  CA:	  American	  Society	  of	  Missiology,	  1977).;	  James	  C.	  Thomson,	  While	  China	  Faced	  West:	  
American	  Reformers	  in	  Nationalist	  China,	  1928-­‐1937	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  
1969):	  	  119-­‐121.;	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  “Patterns	  Behind	  the	  Tientsin	  Massacre,” Harvard	  Journal	  of	  
Asiatic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.	  3/4	  (Dec.,	  1957):	  480-­‐511;	  Paul	  Cohen.	  China	  and	  Christianity:	  The	  
Missionary	  Movement	  and	  the	  Growth	  of	  Chinese	  Anti-­‐foreignism(Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  1963);	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historiography of foreign affairs. In addition, the events of the Vietnam War encouraged 
scholars to interrogate the origins of U.S. ideological perspectives on East Asia. For the 
next two decades, scholarship on missions analyzed missions primarily through the 
paradigms of “western impact-Chinese response,” “modernization,” and “imperialism.”  
Within these paradigms historians explored the relationship of missions and foreign 
policy decisions, the work of missionaries as modernizers and social reformers erecting 
hospitals, schools, and rural or urban organizations, and, of course, the introduction of 
western religion and culture with its attendant response by Chinese society.13  
The mission-centric approach to studying missionary activities and socio-political 
roles in China largely explored their significance to modernization and nationalism in 
China. Histories of the twentieth century in the mission-centric tradition have explored 
missions as a catalyst in the transitions to “modernity” and nationalism, imparting 
western political concepts and educational training to Chinese socio-political leaders. The 
earliest scholarship suggested a link between missions and the Chinese nationalism of the 
early twentieth century. Fairbank, for instance, insisted that missions played direct and 
indirect roles in the “long revolution,” although he believed the societal forces missions 
had helped to set in motion eventually led to their expulsion from China.14 Additionally, 
William Hutchison and Lawrence Kessler suggest that social service and institution 
building for the purpose of secular activities such as education, medicine, and relief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  “Assignment	  for	  the	  ‘70s,”	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  Vol.	  74,	  No.	  3	  (Feb.,	  
1969):	  877-­‐879.	  
14	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  “Introduction,”	  from	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  eds.	  The	  Missionary	  Enterprise	  in	  
China	  and	  America	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1974):	  9-­‐11.	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efforts were the primary areas of emphasis for missions in the twentieth century, 
especially among institutions such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA).15  
Throughout the historiography, historians have shown a particular fascination 
with the exemplars of the Social Gospel wing of Protestantism in China such as the 
YMCA and YWCA and mission professionals such as John Mott, Frank Rawlinson, and 
John Leighton Stuart.16 For example, Social Reformers in Urban China: The Chinese 
Y.M.C.A., 1895-1926 by Shirley Stone Garrett used the YMCA archives to establish a 
narrative of the organization’s efforts to educate and reform through the introduction of 
ideas specific to the western sciences and associations for local youth and labor.17 Other 
texts, such as Mary Brown Bullock’s An American Transplant: The Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Peking Union Medical College and Yung-chen Chiang’s Social 
Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919-1949 have explored the export of 
American educational, sociological, and scientific theories through institutions founded 
by the Rockefeller Foundation.18  
Thus, historians have long considered the ways in which the missionary advanced 
phenomenon such as nationalism, modernity, and social reform. I argue that this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  William	  Hutchison,	  Errand	  to	  the	  World:	  American	  Protestant	  Thought	  and	  Foreign	  Mission	  
(Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1987);	  Lawrence	  D.	  Kessler,	  The	  Jiangyin	  Mission	  Station:	  An	  
American	  Missionary	  Community	  in	  China,	  1895-­‐1951	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  
Press,	  1996).	  	  
16	  Shirley	  S.	  Garrett,	  Social	  Reformers	  in	  Urban	  China:	  The	  Chinese	  Y.M.C.A.,	  1895-­‐1926	  (Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1970);	  Jun	  Xing.	  Baptized	  in	  the	  Fire	  of	  Revolution:	  The	  American	  Social	  Gospel	  and	  
the	  YMCA	  in	  China,	  1919-­‐1937	  (Lehigh	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Yu-­‐Ming	  Shaw.	  An	  American	  
Missionary	  in	  China:	  John	  Leighton	  Stuart	  and	  Chinese	  American	  Relations	  (Cambrdige,	  MA:Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1992);	  	  John	  Rawlinson.	  The	  Recorder	  and	  China’s	  Revolution:	  A	  Topical	  Biography	  of	  
Frank	  Rawlinson,	  1871-­‐1937	  (Cross	  Cultural	  Publications,	  1990).	  
17	  Shirley	  S.	  Garrett,	  Social	  Reformers	  in	  Urban	  China:	  The	  Chinese	  Y.M.C.A.	  1895-­‐1926	  (Cambridge:	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1970).	  
18	  Mary	  Brown	  Bullock.	  An	  American	  Transplant:	  The	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  and	  the	  Peking	  Union	  
Medical	  College	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1980).;	  Yung-­‐chen	  Chiang.	  Social	  Engineering	  and	  the	  
Social	  Sciences	  in	  China,	  1919-­‐1949	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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because though the meanings of the missionary’s mobility have been multiple and ever-
evolving throughout world history, inherently the missionary’s movement is ideologically 
understood by its proponents as a vessel of progress, however that is defined. Roughly, 
the missionary’s mobility has served as a rough barometer for the spread of global 
Christianity, and, to many Protestant Christians, it has also been seen as the dissemination 
of western values and modernity through the diffusion of lifestyles, technology, and 
knowledge to non-western civilizations.19 
Studying missionary mobility adds to this scholarship by considering the ways in 
the movements of missionaries symbolized to Protestant Christians the advance, and 
retreat, of such forces as modernity, against the back drop of the Cold War and 
decolonization. The majority of mission-centric histories ends in 1949 and fails to 
account for how such programs and resources were redirected in the 1950s and beyond. 
Missionary mobility can be a particularly important revealing lens on how the triumph of 
communism in China and subsequent expulsion of the Protestant missionary movement 
haunted the psyche of Protestant Christians in the Cold War. Philip King’s The Lost 
History of Christianity: The Thousand-Year Golden Age of the Church in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia—and How it Died states that in the popular consciousness 
Christianity’s global spread has seemed inevitable. He suggests… 
Usually, this history is presented as a tale of steady expansion, from the Middle 
East to Europe and ultimately onto the global stage. Christianity appears to have 
spread freely and inexorably, so that we rarely think of major reverses or 
setbacks. When we do hear of disasters or persecutions, they are usually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ryan	  Dunch,	  “Beyond	  Cultural	  Imperialism:	  Cultural	  Theory,	  Christian	  Missions,	  and	  Global	  
Modernity,”	  History	  and	  Theory,	  Vol.	  39,	  No.	  3	  (2002):	  p.	  301-­‐325.	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mentioned as the prelude to still greater advances, an opportunity for heroic 
resistance to oppression.20 
By fanning out and pioneering new fields for Christianity, the missionary’s mobility 
mapped the expansion of Christianity and progress and produced this sense that it was 
inevitable. Conversely, the missionary exodus from China during the Korean War created 
pervasive doubts that Christianity’s expansion was inevitable and western values, 
lifestyles and rights universal. Worse, regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party 
asserted control over the movements of missionaries within their borders, challenging the 
freedom of the missionary’s mobility and all that it signified.  
This dissertation details the oft-neglected study of the post-China careers of 
former China missionaries and the ideological meanings produced by their redeployment 
following the Korean War. Forced to abandon its only field by the Chinese Communist 
Party, the mission redeployed as the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF) sending 
agents to new nations such as Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand and amongst the overseas 
Chinese populations scattered across Southeast Asia. Using mobility as the primary 
analytical lens this dissertation explores how the movement of missionaries across China 
and later East and South East Asia responded to the currents of nationalism, communism, 
decolonization, and the Cold War. More specifically, it looks at how U.S. evangelicals in 
the CIM collaborated with Christians in the Atlantic and Pacific worlds to sustain their 
sense that Christianity was on the right side of history, a universal religion defined by 
universal rights such as freedom of movement and expression, amidst the pervading 
spiritual doubts produced by ideological rivals such as communism after 1945.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Philip King The Lost History of Christianity: The Thousand-Year Golden Age of the Church in the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia—and How it Died (New York: Harper Collins, 2008): p. 2.	  
	   12	  
A second major thematic concentration for many U.S. historians has been to 
question the nature of the interaction and cross-cultural contact between missions and 
their host society. At the heart of this discussion was the question of whether or not U.S. 
missionaries played a historical role as “benevolent modernizers” or “cultural 
imperialists.” While several scholars followed John King Fairbank’s lead in emphasizing 
the productive role of missions in founding modern social institutions and disseminating 
scientific discourses, the dominant trend has been to examine the role of missionaries as 
advancing imperialist interests of the U.S. One of the earliest volumes of collected 
scholarship, The Missionary Enterprise in China and America, contained an article by 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. adopted “cultural imperialism” as a conceptual tool for 
understanding the missionary as the vanguard of the American psychological assault on 
Chinese habits of speech, dress, sexual identity, social relations, and nearly every other 
facet of life.21 The paradigm of cultural imperialism remains integral to the historiography 
of missions although its efficacy has been greatly questioned.22  
In particular, attention to gender analysis has greatly refined the framework of 
“cultural imperialism.” In 1984, Jane Hunter’s Gospel of Gentility balanced the 
imperialist aspirations of women missionary’s ideology against their actual lived social 
relations with their Chinese neighbors. Hunter argues women missionaries experienced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Arthur	  Schlesinger,	  “The	  Missionary	  Enterprise	  and	  Theories	  of	  Imperialism,”	  from	  John	  King	  
Fairbank,	  eds.	  The	  Missionary	  Enterprise	  in	  China	  and	  America	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  1974):	  367-­‐370.	  
22	  Schlesinger’s	  specific	  articulation	  of	  the	  concept	  has	  largely	  been	  unused	  by	  U.S.	  scholars,	  but	  
“cultural	  imperialism”	  has	  proven	  a	  valuable	  analytical	  tool.	  Scholars	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  in	  the	  1970s	  
and	  1980s	  largely	  assumed	  that	  an	  imperialist	  ideology	  dominated	  the	  American	  mission	  movement.	  
Their	  method	  was	  to	  compile	  evidence	  of	  the	  cultural	  imperialist	  ideology	  from	  reading	  mission	  
correspondence,	  publications	  such	  as	  the	  Chinese	  Recorder,	  slogans	  of	  The	  Student	  Volunteer	  
Movement,	  and	  American	  Protestant	  theology	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  general,	  Schlesinger	  
was	  directing	  mission	  historiography	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  critical	  perspectives	  advanced	  by	  Next	  
Left	  historians	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  that	  exposed	  elements	  thought	  to	  be	  traditional	  to	  
American	  idealism	  such	  as	  Protestantism	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  criticism	  and	  interrogation.	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“imperial gratifications” from being empowered socially and professionally from the 
travel, employment as business managers and owners, and social roles in China that were 
unlikely to be experienced by American women in the United States. These new 
possibilities found within missions produced “extraordinary gratification” that were 
founded “on national, racial, and class inequalities and a radical misinterpretation of 
Chinese culture.”23 Kathleen Lodwick’s Educating the Women of Hainan: The Career of 
Margaret Moninger in China, 1915-1942 echoes Hunter’s arguments about the imperial 
gratifications and empowerment of missionary work for women, but also stresses the 
disorienting impact of culture shock and frustration of their newfound agency by the 
paternalist attitudes of male Chinese.24 Despite these valuable studies, criticism about the 
use of cultural imperialism as an interpretive framework has remained steady, scholars 
often questioning the issue of whether or not the framework inherently reduces persons 
subject to imperialism or colonization to a passive and powerless role in history and 
imparts a sense of a linear flow of cultural phenomenon from one nation to another.25 
Coupled with these critiques, in the mid-1980s and more dramatically in the 1990s many 
China historians in the U.S. embraced broader historiographical trends that sought to 
move beyond the emphasis on the imposition of the “West” upon Chinese history. 
Additionally, scholars from various disciplines such as sociology and cultural 
anthropology, journalists and political scientists in this period called attention to the 
continuation of Christianity as socio-religious force in the latter half of the twentieth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Hunter,	  The	  Gospel	  of	  Gentility	  :216.	  
24	  Kathleen	  L.	  Lodwick,	  Educating	  the	  Women	  of	  Hainan:	  The	  Career	  of	  Margaret	  Moninger	  in	  China,	  
1915-­‐1942	  (Lexington,	  KY:	  University	  of	  Kentucky	  Press,	  1995):	  212-­‐217.	  	  
25	  For	  a	  survey	  of	  this	  general	  debate	  see	  Jessica	  Geinow-­‐Hecht,	  “Cultural	  Transfer,”	  from	  Michael	  J.	  
Hogan	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Patterson,	  eds.	  Explaining	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  
(Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004).	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century, making Christianity seem less and less like the imposition of a religious system 
by a group of foreign cultures upon the Chinese.26 
 Altogether these trends produced a recognition among scholars that the use of 
cultural imperialism could obfuscate the shared socio-religious space of the Sino-foreign 
Christian community in the history of China by exaggerating the extent to which 
Christianity was the outcome of the actions of one social group (foreign missionaries)  
resulting in  creation of another (Chinese Christians). In response to these issues, many 
scholars since the late 1980s have invoked the more “neutral” terms of “cultural transfer” 
or “cultural transmission” to denote a greater sense of agency by Chinese converts.27 
Conversely, these terms have rarely been used in the mission-centric history and further 
revisions and qualifications to the concept of “cultural imperialism” have been made.28 It 
should also be noted that terms such as “cultural exchange” have also been well criticized 
for lacking analytical heft.29 For example, Carol Chin’s “Beneficent Imperialist: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Paul	  A.	  Cohen.	  Discovering	  History	  in	  China:	  American	  Historical	  Writing	  on	  the	  Recent	  Past	  in	  	  China	  
(New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1984).	  
27	  Carol	  Chin,	  “Beneficent	  Imperialists:	  American	  Women	  Missionaries	  in	  China	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  
Twentieth	  Century,”	  Diplomatic	  History,	  Vol.	  27,	  No.	  3	  (June,	  2003):	  328.	  
28	  Jessica	  Geinow-­‐Hecht,	  “Cultural	  Transfer,”	  from	  Michael	  J.	  Hogan	  and	  Thomas	  J.	  Patterson,	  eds.	  
Explaining	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  
2004).	  
29	  For	  an	  example,	  consult	  Dan	  Cui’s	  The	  Cultural	  Contribution	  of	  British	  Protestant	  Missionaries	  and	  
British-­‐American	  Cooperation	  to	  China’s	  National	  Development	  during	  the	  1920’s.	  She	  describes	  
missionaries	  as	  the	  principal	  cultural	  agents	  between	  China	  and	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  examines	  their	  
efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  modern	  educational	  system	  committed	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  individualism,	  
democracy,	  and	  international	  law.	  She	  submits	  to	  her	  readers	  that	  “mission	  cultural	  work	  was	  a	  
cross-­‐fertilization	  that	  few	  Chinese	  people	  understand,”	  blaming	  the	  imperialist	  critique	  of	  missions	  
for	  obscuring	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  missions	  contributed	  positively	  to	  the	  nationalist	  awakening	  and	  
increased	  the	  dynamism	  of	  Chinese	  culture.	  But	  her	  work	  seems	  dated,	  the	  sterile	  use	  of	  missions	  as	  
a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  transport	  of	  ideas	  from	  one	  nation	  to	  another	  as	  “cultural	  work”	  lacks	  the	  precision	  
and	  clarity	  of	  works	  that	  emphasize	  the	  exchange	  of	  symbols,	  discursive	  tools	  such	  as	  narrative	  
devices,	  or	  conceptual	  modes.	  The	  book	  also	  illustrates	  how	  the	  emphasis	  on	  reciprocity	  or	  
dialectical	  nature	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  engagement	  can	  obscure	  the	  tensions	  produced	  by	  the	  process.	  
Rather,	  one	  comes	  away	  with	  only	  a	  catalogue	  of	  how	  missions	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  Chinese	  
“idea”	  about	  education	  or	  British	  missionaries	  brought	  with	  them	  notions	  such	  as	  “democracy”	  with	  
no	  sense	  as	  to	  how	  these	  thoughts	  were	  translated,	  refashioned,	  or	  altered	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  those	  
who	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  them.	  My	  intention	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  imperialism	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	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American Women Missionaries in China at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” argues 
that American missionaries practiced “beneficent imperialism,” a specific form of 
cultural imperialism produced from the tension in the American ideological aspiration to 
transform Chinese society from within an understanding of the self rooted in anti-
imperialist discourse about the American past.30 Thus, there remains a tendency to divide 
the historical experiences of Chinese and foreign Christians into dichotomous categories. 
I argue that this attention to the missionary and their relations with foreign 
societies and peoples is a product of the inherent tension embedded within the 
missionary’s mobility. The missionary’s movement across borders is inseparable from 
the issues of imperialism, racialized attitudes, and paternalism because the movement of 
the missionary is also inherently rooted in ideas of difference—cultural, racial, spiritual, 
material, etc. It is the idea of difference—that the targeted groups and places are inferior 
in some way to the missionary who is a vessel of progress—that propels the missionary 
from one place of the world to another. And ideas of difference are inherently linked to 
power and inequality. In theory, then, mobility best reveals the meanings of the 
missionary’s project since it is the movement from one place to another which expresses 
ideas of attachment between places while also creating/reifying lines demarcating 
“superior” and “inferior” places and peoples. The missionary’s movement then is full of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
analyze	  power	  relationships	  in	  these	  sorts	  of	  contacts,	  but	  rather	  to	  suggest	  how	  in	  its	  absence	  
historical	  texts	  can	  lose	  their	  critical	  analytical	  edge.	  Dan	  Cui,	  The	  Cultural	  Contribution	  of	  British	  
Protestant	  Missionaries	  and	  British-­‐American	  Cooperation	  to	  China’s	  National	  Development	  During	  the	  
1920’s	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  University	  Press	  of	  America,	  1998):350.	  
30	  In	  sum,	  Chin	  argues	  that	  the	  American	  Revolution	  imparted	  an	  anti-­‐imperialist	  element	  to	  
American	  identities	  that	  made	  future	  expansionary	  projects	  by	  U.S.	  agents	  of	  economic,	  political,	  and	  
religious	  institutions	  fraught	  with	  ambivalence	  and	  contradictions.	  Notions	  of	  racial,	  cultural,	  and	  
national	  superiority	  were	  tempered	  by	  their	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  ideals.	  Carol	  Chin,	  
“Beneficent	  Imperialists:	  American	  Women	  Missionaries	  in	  China	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  
Century,”	  Diplomatic	  History,	  Vol.	  27,	  No.	  3	  (June,	  2003):	  330-­‐331.	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signifiers about progress and difference and its representations loaded with messages 
about the meaning of the missionary’s mobility.  
It is my contention that as missionaries moved about nations like China their 
experiences produced/reinforced a host of stereotypes about first the Chinese, and, then, 
later in the 1950s, after the mission’s redeployment, Asians in general. Historian Eric 
Reinders describes in Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies: Christian Missionaries 
Imagine Chinese Religion how missionaries in China experienced their foreignness and 
produced racist ideas about the Chinese as heathens, effeminate, duplicitous, backwards, 
and spiritually oppressed.31 I demonstrate that one primary way that this sense of 
foreignness from Chinese was experienced came from movement, and the mobility of 
missionaries came to be seen by Protestant evangelicals as free, civilized, and dynamic 
because Chinese as “the Other” were associated with stagnation, backwardness, or 
spiritual bondage.  
However, when considering the history of the CIM it is interesting to note just 
how much mobility was intended to demonstrate identification with Chinese and other 
Asian groups.  The society’s founder, British missionary J. Hudson Taylor, had famously 
adopted the Qing queue, dress, cultural customs, and language in the nineteenth century 
as a means to more effectively witness to Chinese in the interior. This desire to live a 
“real Chinese life” in part informed the society’s calling to the interior and attempts to 
belong with Chinese communities, as the mission prided itself at being the pioneering 
force taking Christianity far beyond the safety of the missionary compound’s walls in the 
coastal cities. In the twentieth century, “being Chinese” remained essential to the CIM’s 
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  Eric	  Reinders,	  “Preface,”	  from	  Borrowed	  Gods	  and	  Foreign	  Bodies:	  Christian	  Missionaries	  Imagine	  
Chinese	  Religion	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2004):	  p.	  xiii-­‐xvi.	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ethos of missionary work, and moving as Chinese critical to the missionary’s expression 
of their identification with the Chinese and deeply felt spiritual calling.  
This attention to missionary mobility can also contribute to current scholarship on 
the relationship of Protestant missions to American foreign policy.  Many other scholars 
have focused on missions as an external but influential group in the foreign policymaking 
of the U.S. Both James Reed and Michael Hunt have made important contributions to 
explaining the role of missions in disseminating representations of the Chinese and ideas 
about a mythic relationship between the U.S. and China. James Reed’s The Missionary 
Mind and American East Asia Policy, 1911-1915 explores the links between the 
conceptual imagining of a “Christian China” to the policies of the Wilson Administration.  
Reed argues that during the Wilson presidency a collective mentality inspired by foreign 
missions created an entrenched emotional attachment to East Asia through the 
propagation of grandly imaginative “social myths” infused with expectations for China’s 
future greatly out of proportion to the actual influence exerted by the United States and 
Christians.32  
Michael Hunt’s The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and 
China to 1914 investigates a loose coalition of missionaries, commercial interests, and 
American diplomats devoted “to penetrating China and propagating at home a 
paternalistic vision of defending and reforming China.”33 Increasingly, the U.S. 
government accepted the Open Door ideology fostered by this group’s mythic notions of 
a “special relationship,” which eventually resulted in the commitment of substantial 
American military assets and economic aid in the 1930s and 1940s to a vision for China’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Reed.	  The	  Missionary	  Mind	  and	  American	  East	  Asia	  Policy,	  1911-­‐1915:	  ix,	  10-­‐14.	  
33	  Hunt,	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  Special	  Relationship:	  xi.	  
	   18	  
future that was in reality far from suitable to that nation’s socio-political needs. 34 Again, 
little has been said on the resiliency of this mythic relationship in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This dissertation will examine how evangelicals in the U.S. maintained notions of a 
“special relationship” by redirecting the flow of Protestant missions toward ethnic Han 
Chinese outside the PRC in nations like Thailand and the Philippines.  
The few scholars who have studied the role of missionaries upon returning to the 
United States amidst the events of the early Cold War have focused rather narrowly on 
the political lobbying of ex-missionaries. Nancy Benrkopf Tucker’s Patterns in the Dust: 
Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 suggests that 
despite heavy lobbying from missionaries and U.S. commercial interests in China, the 
Truman administration took the realist approach toward recognition and avoided an 
ideological stance toward the PRC regime.35 Philip Wickeri’s Seeking the Common 
Ground: Protestant Christianity, the Three-Self Movement, and China’s United Front 
examines the divisions with the mission movement in the U.S. concerning recognition in 
the 1950s, and argues that there existed at least two discernable perspectives that 
dominated the discussion. The first was a conservative element stressed a fundamental 
opposition between Christianity and communism, and denigrated the Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement (TSPM), a movement of Chinese Christians professing loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party and vociferous in its criticisms of the foreign missionary. The second 
group Wickeri defines as “liberal,” being more open to discussing the question of 
diplomatic recognition, but also critical of the Chinese Communist Party’s policies and 
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  Benrkopf	  Tucker,	  Patterns	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  the	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  Chinese-­‐American	  Relations	  and	  the	  Recognition	  
Controversy,	  1949-­‐1950	  (Columbia:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1983).	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practices toward religious groups.36According to Wickeri, numerous missionaries penned 
firsthand accounts of their experiences in China, which served as a means to advance 
their political agenda and criticize the Chinese Communist Party and the state policies 
toward religion in China. Both liberals and conservative Protestant voices, however, 
shared an ideological stance “always situating events in China in terms of a struggle 
between Communism and Christianity” and evaluating church-state relations from a 
thoroughly western perspective.37  
Despite being an international and interdenominational mission, throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the CIM (later known as the OMF) was squarely 
within the fundamentalist-evangelical wing of Protestantism. The mission espoused a 
number of fundamentalist-evangelical beliefs such as the inerrancy of the bible, and 
within the world of missions preserved a strict emphasis on evangelism, not the 
propagation of the Social Gospel or humanitarianism. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
society joined evangelical Cold Warriors in the U.S. in condemning the Three Self 
Patriotic Movement and liberal-modernist Protestants, the latter for “compromising” with 
communism. Still despite their theological and political differences, as Miwa Hirono has 
shown, the CIM shared with liberal-modernist Protestant missions a core belief that the 
missionary spread a superior civilization ideology to the Chinese that would make 
improve their lives and the world.38 However, I argue that one of the essential differences 
between evangelicals and liberal-modernists was the ethos of mobility at the core of the 
evangelical’s faith and lifestyle.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Philip	  L.	  Wickeri,	  Seeking	  the	  Common	  Ground:	  Protestant	  Christianity,	  the	  Three-­‐Self	  Movement,	  
and	  China’s	  United	  Front	  (Maryknoll,	  N.Y.,	  1988):	  3-­‐4,	  8-­‐9.	  
37	  Wickeri,	  Seeking	  the	  Common	  Ground:	  10.	  
38	  Miwa	  Hirono,	  Civilizing	  Missions:	  International	  Religious	  Agencies	  in	  China	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  
MacMillan,	  2008):	  p.	  81.	  
	   20	  
Recently some scholars have begun to describe the relocation of secular non-
governmental organizational resources, personnel, and institutional capital following the 
severance of official ties between the U.S. and the PRC. For instance, Grace Ai-Ling 
Chou’s “Cultural Education as Containment of Communism: The Ambivalent Position of 
American NGOs in the 1950s,” suggests the redeployment of educational resources and 
financial aid by U.S. NGOs such as the Ford Foundation and Yale-China Association to 
areas surrounding the PRC borders, or within them in the case of Hong Kong, in the 
1950s. Chou argues that U.S. NGOs supported the construction of new educational 
institutions attending serving Chinese communities and fostering anti-communist 
ideology. Ironically, these organizations did so largely through promoting the cultural 
preservation of Confucian ideals and values, not through their previous commitment to 
promoting “western codes” to modernity. 39  
Scholarship such as Angela Lahr’s Millennial Dreams and Apocalyptic 
Nightmares: the Cold War Origins of Political Evangelism and William Inboden’s 
Religion and American Foreign Policy have discussed the connections among Protestant 
missions, religion, diplomacy, and the early Cold War culture of the United States. 
William Inboden’s Religion and American Foreign Policy shows that while Washington 
was most concerned with the European Cold War front, American Christians were 
fixated on the fate of the civil war going on in China. During the war, Inboden states that 
evangelicals and fundamentalists led the way in lobbying for U.S. aid to the KMT 
through letters to congressional leaders based “on the need to keep China open to 
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  Ai-­‐Ling	  Chou,	  “Cultural	  Education	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  Communism:	  The	  Ambivalent	  
Position	  of	  American	  NGOs	  in	  Hong	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missionary work.”40 Once the Chinese Civil War was over, the issue of recognition 
remained divisive within the Protestant community for over a decade.  Missionary 
experiences with communists in China were fashioned into valuable rhetorical firepower 
for the competing mainline, fundamentalist-evangelical, and Christian realist camps to 
use in arguing both for and against recognition of the PRC and bitter divisions within the 
Protestant subculture made policy decisions difficult for the U.S. government.41  
Within the context of the early Cold War, religion was a weapon to be used 
against communism and the cultural animosity between evangelicals and mainstream 
culture softened. Lahr asserts that “the Cold War made it possible for conservative 
Protestants to form a new relationship with the larger American culture by embracing 
nationalism.”42 Lahr argues that former missionaries returned to the U.S. as Cold War 
experts on communism, and used their new status to promote the Committee for One 
Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations and to lobby 
Congressional support for the Republic of China on Taiwan. The American public, 
according to Lahr, viewed missionaries as “unofficial diplomatic envoys” and “indirect 
spokespersons” for American values, and “conservative evangelical missionaries shared 
their methods and much of their message with American government propagandists.”43  
Therefore, while Lahr focuses on Protestant missionaries in facilitating the Cold 
War ideology of containment, Inboden exposes the fragmentation within American 
Protestantism and diversity of perspectives. And while not concerned solely with 
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missionaries, Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow 
Imagination, 1945-1961, suggests the role of missionaries in promoting of the twin Cold 
War ideologies of containment and integration, the first concept referring to bulwarks 
created to block the expansion of communism and the second embodying the idea of 
moving foreign countries into closer political, economic, and cultural ties to the U.S.44  
This dissertation adds to the work done by Lahr, Klein, Chou, and Inboden by 
tracing out the redeployment of missionaries to engage in spiritual warfare against 
communism along the periphery of the PRC. I examine how newly relocated missionaries 
contained the spread of Chinese communist ideology by taking the gospel and anti-
communism to ethnic Han Chinese traveling and working throughout South and East 
Asia. Simultaneously, the CIM’s redeployment suggests how new transnational ties 
forged spiritual integration with Asian evangelicals in areas such as Japan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong. Lastly, by looking at the return of former China missionaries to the PRC 
in the 1970s and 1980s the dissertation analyzes how diplomatic concepts such as 
rapprochement were given spiritual connotations by travelers, expatriates, and Chinese 
churches and Christians.   
Studying the CIM also complicates assumptions about how the missionary 
symbolized the extension of American values and power. Sarah Ruble’s The Gospel of 
Freedom and Power: Protestant Missionaries in American Culture after World War II 
explores American attitudes toward power and foreign relations after 1945 embedded 
within debates concerning the role of missionaries in world affairs. In her work, Ruble 
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argues that the missionary embodied America’s “Wilsonian paradox,” desires to both 
foster freedom and self-determination but also to retain a privileged position for deciding 
how both should be used by foreign societies.45 Within the CIM missionaries from 
different nationalities and races perpetuated a sense of unity in purpose and universality 
to the ideals embodied by this mobility. In this respect, I argue that evangelicals 
understood many “American” notions like the mythos of the pioneer or the Cold War 
ideology of containment to be ideals shared with the international community. 
Through mobility the dissertation will also confront and integrate the evolving 
scholarship using the paradigm of “indigenization” to explore Chinese Christianity. 
Beginning in the 1980s a small group of Chinese scholars began to cut through mission-
centered approaches employed by western scholars and the Marxist-Leninist framework 
that dominated the conversation for Chinese historians for thirty years by searching for 
the development of an “indigenous” Protestant Christianity in China. For this cohort, 
historicizing the events, figures, and movements of Chinese Christians was a part of an 
emotional and intellectual “search for identity.” Many of these authors were Christians 
themselves, and their scholarship critiqued the historical narratives produced by both 
mission-centric and Marxist-Leninist traditions for reducing Chinese Christians to a 
marginal and problematic place in Chinese history. Following the political and social 
reform programs adopted by the PRC leadership in the late 1970s, Chinese Christian 
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scholars explored the roots of “indigenous” leadership, theology, church organizations, 
and the resiliency of the Chinese Christian Church in the twentieth century.46 
This literature was facilitated by new opportunities to study abroad for young 
scholars and junior professors; the exchange of ideas, research, and methodologies with 
historians from various nations produced an international network of scholarship 
concerned with the growth of Christianity in East Asia.47 This work in conjunction with 
the recognition that Christianity has most of its current disciples in the non-western world 
has de-centered Protestantism as a western religion and challenged scholarship in the 
U.S. to re-evaluate previously held notions about the church-state relationship in the 
People’s Republic of China.48 Further, many U.S. historians began to adhere to Paul 
Cohen’s call for exploring aspects of Chinese history not refracted through the western-
centric paradigms of “impact-response, modernization, and imperialism.”49By the mid-
1990s, engagement with Chinese scholars and the increased availability of historical texts 
produced by mainland Chinese and Taiwanese scholars in English dramatically 
broadened the source material and historiographical literature available on missions. This 
literature primarily restored a place in the Chinese past for Chinese Christians.50  
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Since that time Chinese scholars and their counterparts in the U.S. have employed 
a range of interpretive frameworks for analyzing Christianity in China, but most research 
still devotes itself to the topic of an “indigenous” Chinese Christianity.51 In a manner 
similar to the development of women’s history in the United States restoring women to 
the historical record, scholars such as Daniel Bays began with contributions to this 
impetus in Chinese history by re-examining the sources of U.S. missions to complete 
biographical sketches of notable Chinese evangelists and pastoral leaders with his article 
“Christian Revivalism in China, 1900-1937,” for the text Modern Christian Revivals.52 
Other scholars focused on highlighting periods in which Chinese Christians increased 
their control and leadership within foreign dominated Christian churches and 
communities. For instance, Timothy Brook’s “Toward Independence: Christianity in 
China Under the Japanese Occupation, 1937-1945” demonstrates that the Japanese 
occupation forced political leadership to fall into the hands of Chinese Christians, along 
with a level of control over financing, evangelism, and community organization not 
possible before this era. These experiences provided the experience necessary for Chinese 
Christians to adapt to the church-state relationship formed under the Chinese Communist 
Party regime following the permanent removal of foreign missions.53 Whereas previously 
scholarship heavily influenced by theories of cultural imperialism tended to reduce 
Chinese converts to Christianity to a secondary, or often invisible, role in their 
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communities or impart the sense that Chinese Christianity represented merely an 
extension of the “west” into Chinese society, these portraits of prominent Chinese 
Christians contradicted these assumptions and redressed the over-emphasis on the 
missionary in the history of Christianity in China. The earliest works staked out a role for 
Chinese Christians as church leaders, theologians, and lay leaders and also repudiated the 
notion of an “irreducible” divide between western religious systems and the Chinese 
people, instead displaying the ways in which Protestantism proved a meaningful religious 
identity and belief system with the potential for social and political activism.54 
Overtime historians have probed much deeper into the question of what 
characterizes an “indigenous” Chinese Christianity, employing various forms of cultural 
theory and linguistics to address issues of authenticity, agency, and the power dynamics 
inherent within cultural transfer, and to produce a sophisticated historiography on the 
Chinese Protestant church. Critical for scholars interested in these queries is Ryan 
Dunch’s Fuzhou Protestants and the Making of a Modern China, 1857-1927, which 
investigates the indigenous church as an vibrant social institution essential to the 
formation of a nationalist ideology in Fuzhou province. Dunch illustrates the depth to 
which Chinese Protestants were active in social and political reform in the Fuzhou region 
as “patriotic and progressive” leaders, who despite their small numbers were 
disproportionately powerful in urban sectors, professional circles, and the provincial 
government. His analysis shows how U.S. missionaries played an important role by 
importing new concepts and symbols integral to a modern nationalist consciousness, such 
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as patriotic hymns, ceremonies, flags, and moral educational narratives found in the 
Bible, as well as associational and organizational forms central to the sort of “public 
sphere” or “civil society” many theorists have identified as essential in the construction 
of the modern-nation state. But ultimately, according to Dunch, missionaries were less 
and less integral to the Chinese Christian community once these nationalist tools and 
discourse were translated into the Chinese vernacular. 55  
One of the most important trends in the historiography has been to establish the 
extent to which Chinese Christians enjoyed intellectual autonomy within the joint Sino-
Foreign Protestant institutions and social. The theme of indigenization has challenged 
previously held assumptions about the incompatibility of Christianity and the Chinese 
intellectual heritage. Sumkio Yamato’s History of Protestantism in China: the 
Indigenization of Christianity is a richly detailed and expansive narrative linking 
twentieth century campaigns by Chinese Christians to gain control over the direction and 
philosophy of Christian churches in China to an attempt to eradicate the tendency toward 
fragmentation and infighting inspired by denominationalism or theological differences 
characteristic of Christianity in the West. Establishing Chinese Christian governance and 
independence, according to Yamato, had the explicit goal of unification of all Chinese 
churches, a project that was frustrated by theological and nationalist divisions with the 
foreign mission community. Coalition and interchurch organizations such as the NCC or 
CCC were not only formed in order to further social reform and modernization projects, 
as scholars have long suggested, but were a nationalist movement to overcome the 
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harmful western ascription to denominationalism.56 The movement was in part inspired 
by increased contact and engagement with the international Christian community outside 
of China at Christian conferences, but also the idea of “unification” or “supra-
denominational Christianity” was a sign of increasing Chinese Christian intellectual 
autonomy. Although the movement sought to first unify churches within the nation, its 
overarching vision valued the unification of all Christians.57 Especially in the 1930s and 
1940s, Chinese Christians expressed these ideas in a modern Chinese phrasing and 
verbiage, instead of western rooted concepts, and further rejected historically western 
theological concepts such as miracles, sin and salvation, or the redemption of Christ’s 
martyrdom.58 
A number of excellent studies of indigenous Christianity in China in the last 
several years have elaborated on such topics as church-state relations and Chinese 
Christian theology. For example, Lian Xi’s Redeemed by Fire: Rise of Popular 
Christianity charts the development of Christianity from its foreign identity and 
association with the missionary to its emergence as an indigenous, popular faith that 
reflects the aspirations of the masses in China. Additionally, The Religious Question in 
Modern China by Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer and Rebecca Nedostup’s 
Superstitious Regimes detail the challenges presented to Chinese Christianity in the 
twentieth century from secular modernity and the ambitions of the centralized state.59  
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Overall, the China-centric scholarship and the emphasis on the indigenous roots 
of Chinese Christianity has thus restored the significance and centrality of Chinese 
leadership, associations, and the Chinese lay community to the development of 
Christianity in China and their larger sense of historical significance in China’s past. 
Further, the incorporation of cultural anthropology to understand the adoption or 
reinterpretation of symbols, rituals, and narrative devices along with the emphasis on the 
dynamics of linguistic translation has also made this Chinese-centered approach much 
more precise and analytically specific about the cross-cultural exchange between foreign 
missionaries and the Chinese.60  
Missing from these studies, however, is an analysis of how ideas about an 
indigenous Chinese Christianity influenced the ideology of Protestant missions and their 
supporters in countries like the U.S. The notion that native Christians should assume 
authority over church governance, evangelism, and finance, commonly referred to as the 
three-selfs—self-governance, self-propagation, and self-support—was an ideal that was 
integral to the CIM’s philosophy of missionary work since the nineteenth century. The 
goal of making Christianity an indigenous faith in nations like China led to numerous 
reforms of missionary practices in the twentieth century. Conversely, I argue that for 
evangelical missions like the CIM signs of the missionary impulse among churches and 
groups in Asia were critical to their sense of respect and appreciation for the sovereignty 
and rights of the indigenous church. 
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Within the context of the Cold War and decolonization, the sovereignty of the 
indigenous churches in Asia and their self-determination were increasingly important 
factors in the world of Protestant missions. I demonstrate the ways in which missionary 
mobility was reimagined as support for the spiritual self-determination for Christians in 
Asia, contributing to the scholarship on the indigenous Chinese church by illustrating 
how missions like the CIM negotiated ideas like the sovereignty and rights of indigenous 
Chinese Christianity. This was especially important as the mission and its agents made 
audiences in the U.S. aware that “stagnant” Asian societies were rapidly mobilized by the 
currents of nationalism, communism, mass education, urbanization, and modernization.  
Secondly, the concept of missionary mobility teases out the meanings produced 
by the inclusion of Asian evangelicals within the international body of the Protestants 
missionary movement. Seeing groups such as the Chinese as increasingly mobile, 
modern, and educated, the mission gradually embraced racial integration within the 
missionary movement by opening its doors to Asian evangelicals.  Following the exodus 
of missions from China, the mobility of Asian missionaries and their assimilation into 
organizations like the OMF took on a number of important ideological meanings for 
Protestant Christians. Creighton Lacy, historian and former China missionary, articulated 
many of these ideas when referring to the “lessons” recognized by the missionary 
movement in the aftermath of their exodus from China in the 1950s. According to Lacy, 
Protestant Christians saw missionaries from countries like China, India, Indonesia, as 
well as African nations as “invaluable tokens” that were evidence of the “universal, 
interdependent nature of Christianity.” The flow of missionaries from these countries, he 
believed, “shows, in specific terms, that the Gospel is not a Western tradition and creed, 
	   31	  
carried only by white men as a vessel of cultural imperialism.” This was all the more 
important for Protestant evangelicals in western countries, as Lacy noted, as they argued 
with liberal-modernists over the necessity of self-propagation as the cornerstone of 
missions and the Christian faith.61  
Lacy’s comments suggest how significant the presence of non-white missionaries 
was to the Protestant missionary movement and hints at how the shared mobility of 
various races and nationalities as missionaries was seen as indicative of their unity and 
equality. Faced with divisions at home, white evangelicals in nations like the U.S. 
increasingly looked at racial diversity within the missionary organizations like the OMF 
as evidence that their values and ideals were universal in nature. Therefore, mobility as a 
historical lens offers the ability to weave together themes like imperialism while 
simultaneously considering the ways in the missionary’s mobility reflected aspirations to 
transcend national, racial, and religious differences. Not surprisingly, then, missions like 
the CIM following their departure from China devoted more resources toward the goal of 
inspiring Asian evangelicals to a calling as missionaries as a means to restore a sense of 
Christianity’s universality and free up the white missionary from associations with 
imperialism and racism.  
These meanings associated with the mobility of Asian evangelicals were critical 
to a larger Cold War debate on human rights taking place within the international 
community. Scholars such as Akira Iriye and Petra Goedde have shown how during the 
Cold War the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in a rhetorical battle over the definition of 
human rights; a debate that the CIM both participated in and was a focal point of as part 
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of the missionary movement.62 Once expelled from China, the CIM became an advocate 
agency for the rights of groups such as Chinese Christians in the People’s Republic of 
China and condemned communism for violating religious freedoms. Further, the society 
and its missionaries criticized numerous governments for restricting the missionary’s 
evangelism. However, the society and the missionary in general also confronted rising 
voices in the U.S. and Asia that condemned the missionary for facilitating imperialism, 
racial discrimination, and stifling the self-determination of groups in Asia.    
As Asian evangelicals were incorporated into the mission, the CIM and its 
evangelical supporters in the U.S. advocated that all Christians, regardless of race or 
nationality, retained the right to proselytize and move across borders as part of their faith 
and calling as missionaries. Ideas such as freedom of movement and expression, that 
were once apart of the privileged mobility of whites and rooted in extraterritoriality rights 
prior to the 1940s, were seen by U.S. evangelicals in the 1980s as human rights enjoyed 
by all Christians.  Racial integration then protected the missionary movement from the 
charges of racism and imperialism, while also asserting that the missionary’s freedom of 
movement and expression were rights immune to the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
 Conversely, I show how racial stereotypes about Chinese, other Asians, and even 
Chinese-Americans found within missionary discourse remained essential to the 
motivations of white evangelicals to be apart of the world of missions. Exhibiting the 
same “Wilsonian paradox” that Ruble attributes to the American missionary, the CIM 
promoted the idea that it was the duty of white evangelicals to guide “weak” or 
“immature” churches and Christians in Asia in their exercise of spiritual freedoms and 
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the missionary impulse. Old fears about the sincerity of the Chinese Christians or 
anxieties about the Sinicization of Christianity under the auspices of Chinese pastors 
continued to freight the mobility of white evangelical missionaries with meanings of 
surveilling Asian Christians and safeguarding the faith. Ultimately, I argue missionary 
mobility produced and disseminated ideas about religious freedom as a human right 
across the international community rooted in ambivalent, racialized attitudes toward 
Asians. 
Method and Chapter Outline 
 In analyzing missionary mobility I look at four distinct modes of missionary 
work. The first, referred to by the CIM as pioneer evangelism, was defined by the 
missionary’s expansive itineration in search of “unevangelized” areas with the goal of 
spreading the Gospel and planting churches. Under this philosophy of mission work the 
CIM missionary typically moved from place to place as soon as a community of believers 
appointed an indigenous pastor because of the mission’s emphasis on pioneering and 
aspirations to build an indigenous church. The second mode of missionary work 
concerned the idea of discipleship training and cooperation with established churches 
wherein the missionary was rerouted toward existing communities of believers as a 
means to aid their spiritual-self determination. Missionaries assigned to this form of 
mission work frequently worked as roaming bible teachers, educators at seminaries, or 
were assigned to positions that required skills in radio, publishing, administration, or 
medicine. But missionaries engaged in discipleship training also frequently worked in 
tandem with native evangelists on evangelism campaigns and the coordination of student 
movements. The third category of missionary work concerns the efforts of former China 
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missionaries and members of the mission to engage in evangelism and discipleship 
training as tourists and expatriates in the 1970s and 1980s following Sino-American 
rapprochement. The fourth mode of work refers to the circulation of CIM missionaries in 
the U.S. as deputation speakers, representatives of the mission, and considers the 
society’s influence on American evangelicals and the dissemination of the ideological 
meanings created by missionary mobility. 
By studying the correspondence, reports, and oral histories of missionaries, I pay 
attention to the ways missionaries’ experienced their foreignness but also expressed 
identification and unity with the populations they moved amongst.  By examining notions 
such as the China or Japan as “heathen” nations or the Chinese churches as “weak,” this 
research shows how ideas about difference were at the heart of the Protestant missionary 
endeavor. Secondly, in analyzing the movements of missionaries this work explores how 
the experience of foreignness reinforced racial and class discrimination between the 
missionary and native populations in Asia, including Asian Christians. But it also 
underscores how missionary mobility expressed ideas about equality, unity, and rights, 
and created targets for evangelicals in countries like the U.S. to focus their prayers on as 
spiritual weapons during the Cold War.  
To examine the ideological meanings produced by missionary mobility this 
dissertation studies the prayer materials, publications, and rhetoric of the CIM to reveal 
the ideas that propelled missionaries to the field. In addition, representations of 
missionary mobility in photographs, slideshows, films, and travel accounts are used to 
reveal the messages sent home to audiences in countries like the U.S. that were created 
by missionary mobility.  Beyond spiritual beliefs, I suggest how many times missionary 
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mobility was loaded with political desires such as the spread of self-determination, 
containment, and later advocacy for human rights. In this sense, the movements of 
missionaries engaged in missionary work such as pioneer evangelism represented their 
expansion. Secondly, I treat the effort of missionaries engaged in discipleship training 
and cooperation with native evangelicals in Asia as an endeavor to steer the spiritual self-
determination by groups like the Chinese away from rival ideologies such as communism 
or anti-imperialism which threatened the flow of missions. Lastly, by charting the 
institutional spread of the CIM in the U.S. and its expansion and movement in Asia the 
dissertation suggests the dissemination of an ideology produced by mobility through 
transnational networks connecting Christians across the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. 
The first chapter, “Mobility and ‘Pioneer Evangelism’ in China,” focuses on the 
methods of pioneer evangelism practiced by CIM missionaries, teasing out the ways in 
which mobility expressed the missionary’s identification with Chinese but also a sense of 
racial superiority rooted in the mobility produced by extraterritoriality rights. Within this 
context, I argue that mobility was racialized by the movement of CIM missionaries 
within a regime of movement created by the Chinese Exclusion Acts in the U.S. and 
extraterritoriality rights enjoyed by Protestant missionaries in China. Joining with other 
Caucasian evangelicals from North American, Europe, and Australia, CIM missionaries 
experienced an essential sameness as whites rooted in movement as pioneering 
missionaries that was fundamentally different than that of the Chinese. Among the many 
ideological meanings created by missionary mobility was the notion that certain rights 
such as freedom of movement and expression were immune to the control of non-white 
regimes.  
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The second chapter considers the missionary’s response to rising Chinese 
nationalism as the CIM routed missionaries through “Open Doors” to symbolize respect 
for Chinese spiritual sovereignty, a spiritual equivalent to the notion of political self-
determination. Confronted with challenges produced by variants of Chinese nationalism 
and the Asia Pacific War, the CIM abandoned the tenets of pioneer evangelism in 1943 in 
favor of missionary practices emphasizing integration with Chinese churches and 
discipleship training designed to facilitate Chinese exercise of the three-selfs— self-
support, self-governance, self-propagation.  
 The third chapter analyzes the missionary exodus to show how the CIM rallied 
evangelicals to engage in spiritual warfare against the Chinese Communist Party and 
Three Self Patriotic Movement while maintaining fellowship with Chinese Christians 
through prayerful intercession. Conversely, the immobilization and later expulsion of 
CIM missionaries produced profound spiritual and racial anxieties, challenging the 
evangelical’s belief in ideas like divine sovereignty and Christianity’s expansion in the 
context of decolonization and the Cold War. I put forward that while the CIM used 
stories of the missionary exodus to condemn the Chinese Communist Party in front of 
western audiences and rally spiritual aid to Chinese Protestants suffering religious 
persecution, the accounts of missionaries detained, interrogated, or denied departure by 
communist officials heightened the Cold War anxieties of U.S. evangelicals. Mainly, the 
CIM and its supporters feared that sovereign non-white regimes in post-colonial Asia 
would enact racial revenge, divesting the missionary of its privileged mobility by whites 
to the same forms of state power that circumscribed the mobility of Asian minorities in 
the West.  
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 Chapters four and five examine the mission’s redeployment in nations such as 
Japan and the Philippines under the new name of the Overseas Missionary Fellowship 
(OMF). The fourth chapter entitled “Redeployment and the New Fields: Pioneer 
Evangelism as Containment and Integration in East and Southeast Asia, 1951-1961” 
charts the OMF’s entry in Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Vitenam, and Laos, and return to pioneer evangelism as a means to prevent 
overseas Chinese from becoming a “fifth column” for communist revolutions. Expanding 
the mission’s commission to include evangelism to non-Chinese in these countries, the 
OMF raced to expand Christianity’s reach beyond the established churches and mission 
centers. The next chapter, “’Strategic’ Dilemmas and Integration in the New Fields,” 
looks at the 1960s as an era of crisis surrounding the OMF’s ambitions in the New Fields 
as well as Protestant missions as a whole. Faced with challenges such as communist 
revolutions and explosive population growth and modernizing societies in Asia, the 
OMF’s faith in the methods and ideology of pioneer evangelism once again waned. The 
society turned to a renewed emphasis on a church-centric focus to missionary work and 
integration with Asian Christians, in the U.S. and abroad, as the means to restore the 
evangelical missionary movement’s vitality and dynamism. My contention is that racial 
integration and the church-centric focus were motivated by a sense that the international 
evangelical community was “losing” Asia, but also in danger of losing the evangelical’s 
right to cross racial and national borders as an expression of faith.  
The last chapter, “Rapprochement: ‘Creative Access’ Missions in the People’s 
Republic of China, 1972-1989,” charts the OMF’s return to the PRC in the 1970s and 
1980s as tourists and expatriates to analyze the dynamics of “missions to creative access 
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nations.” While deferring to the sovereignty of Chinese Christians, the OMF utilized the 
growing currents of exchange and travel forming between the PRC and the world to aid 
Christianity’s revival and pressure the government into granting Christians, foreign and 
domestic, greater religious freedom in the 1970s and 1980s.  Conversely, the OMF also 
mobilized Christian professionals, scientists, teachers, and students to make contributions 
to China’s modernization and reforms, raising hopes that “liberal” elements within the 
Chinese Communist Party, the Three Self Patriotic Movement and society could be won 
over to greater acceptance and tolerance of Christianity, if not outright conversion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Copyright @Anthony Miller 2015) 
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Chapter 1 
Mobility and “Pioneer Evangelism” in China 
Introduction  
Building off the work of scholars such as Tim Creswell this chapter explores the 
theoretical underpinnings embedded within the mobility of the Protestant missionaries 
during the era of “pioneer evangelism.” Dating from the society’s inception in the 1860s 
to end of the Pacific War, “pioneer evangelism” refers to a period and philosophy of 
mission work in China that emphasized reaching out to areas uninhabited by Christian 
communities with the missionary “planting” churches as they moved about and guiding 
Chinese Christians toward spiritual maturity. Under this schema of missions to China the 
CIM espoused support for the concept of indigenous Chinese Christianity, but understood 
the foreign missionary as the exercising leadership and sovereignty over Christianity’s 
expansion and growth in society.  
In this chapter, I argue that that the missionary’s mobility and identity as a 
pioneer fulfilled American desires for complete and unhindered access to Chinese 
civilization. Secondly, the expansive itinerations employed by the CIM missionaries to 
these ends—made possible by extraterritoriality rights—built the sense that missionary 
mobility embodied ideas about both freedom of movement and expression, critical 
aspects of the concept of religious freedom in the twentieth century. Scholarship such as 
Matthew Frye Jacobson’s Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign 
Peoples At Home and Abroad, 1876-1971 has shown how American industrialization and 
expansionism doubly exposed U.S. society to foreigners simultaneously as colonial 
subjects abroad and marginalized immigrants at home, creating complex, layered notions 
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of “whiteness” and “Americanness.”63 This chapter suggests how religious expansion and 
cooperation with Europeans reinforced racial lines between Chinese and whites that were 
loaded with ideas about religious rights.  Consequently, as the relationship between China 
and the world changed in twentieth century and with it the relations between Chinese 
society and the missionary movement the image of the missionary as a “pioneer” was 
threatened by a number of historical events that altered the movement of missionaries and 
the meanings it produced. 
Occupying China’s Millions and Pioneer Evangelism 
What makes the CIM a fascinating study in mobility then among other Protestant 
missions was its institutional drive to test the limits of missionary’s movement within the 
Chinese interior and by extension its ideological meanings. While most mission societies 
concentrated on coastal provinces, the CIM endeavored to take the gospel to every 
province of the Qing Empire. Founded in 1865 by a British evangelical Hudson Taylor, 
the society had two unique agendas within the larger missionary movement. First, Taylor 
declared his intent to found a society to work only in China; no other country in the 
world. Secondly, the CIM claimed a call to work beyond the established centers of 
missionary work along the southern and eastern coastal provinces. Rather, the CIM 
dedicated itself to work within the Chinese interior zones in an attempt to leave no 
Chinese inaccessible to Christianity’s message.  Starting in the 1870s, Taylor and the 
society embarked upon a campaign to occupy every province within the Qing Empire so 
as to leave no region of China without at least fleeting contact with Christianity that was 
completed by the 1890s. From these posts, the society promised to always be moving in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Matthew Frye Jacobson’s Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples At Home 
and Abroad, 1876-1971 (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000).	  
	   41	  
the direction of villages or regions in China without established Chinese Christian 
churches. Following Taylor’s vision compelled succeeding generations of CIM 
missionaries to always be seeking “untouched” or “un-evangelized” areas of China. 
Through Taylor’s vision the society established an evangelical philosophy of mission 
work founded in an ethos of mobility.  
Inside China the society relied on a tirelessly mobile personnel. Taylor’s urgency 
to take the gospel to the “unevangelised millions” propelled the society inward to the 
interior even as converts and churches remained low in number. The CIM community 
began in the southeastern coastal provinces of China before slowly penetrating the central 
regions and scattering small groups of missionaries across the west and north. In the 
1860s, working from the province of Jiangsu the CIM first expanded in the province 
directly to the south, Zhejiang. By 1869, the CIM had spread to Anhui and Jianxi. In the 
1870s, the society moved inland much more rapidly as the financial support base and 
international prestige of Taylor and the mission grew in stature. By the late 1870s, the 
CIM field had ballooned to include Hubei (1874), Henan (1874), Shaanxi (1876), Gansu 
(1876), Szechuan (1877), Guizhou (1877), and Yunnan (1877).  Also, the society had 
grown large enough to devote personnel in areas like Shandong (1897) well-populated by 
the rest of the missionary movement, where it focused on building institutions such as 
schools, orphanages, and opium-refuges.  By the end of the century, the essential 
territorial borders of the CIM’s work had been established in the western and northern 
regions of the Qing Empire, with personnel working in Ningxia (1880), Mongolia (1886), 
Qinghai (1888), and Tibet (1897).64 By the end of the nineteenth century, the CIM 
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occupied a position to at least theoretically bring all Chinese within the bounds of “China 
proper” into contact with Christianity.    
By avoiding many of the coastal provinces like Guangdong or Fujian, the CIM 
missionaries laid claim to being the first point of contact between the Christian world and 
Chinese society. But building Protestant churches within these provinces was a slow and 
uneven process. Despite the society’s emphasis on evangelism, the number of converts 
remained modest while the institutional network the CIM constructed across China was 
impressive. By the twentieth century, the society became the largest Protestant mission 
operating in China and perhaps the world. In 1934, the society had over 300 mission 
stations, just under 2,000 out-stations or affiliated Chinese churches, sixteen hospitals, 
over 450 bible schools, numerous educational institutions for women, as well as 
leprosariums, orphanages, and opium refuges. In terms of resources, the CIM was 
invested most heavily in Shaanxi, home to over fifty mission stations, 200 outstations, 
and 140 missionaries managed by the mission. Other areas with similar investment to 
Shaanxi in terms of personnel, institutions, and Chinese Christian followers included 
Gansu, Henan, Szechuan, Guizhou, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi.65  
The CIM had also created a substantial network of voluntary and paid Chinese 
Christian workers. In Shaanxi, the CIM employed over 220 Chinese Christians as full or 
part-time workers, and enjoyed the services of another 230 volunteers. The area was 
home to one of the largest group of Chinese Christian communities affiliated with the 
CIM with the total number of communicants exceeding 8,700 members. In Shanxi, the 
numbers were similar. The society claimed over 270 paid workers, 130 volunteers, and 
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9500 communicants. In each province, the majority of paid workers, full and part time, 
and volunteers were Chinese men. But many women also served as full and part-time 
workers. In Shaanxi, for example, 114 men were full-time workers, forty-two part-time, 
and 233 Chinese males volunteered their services for the CIM. In contrast, fifty-four 
women were employed full-time, just twelve were part-time workers, and sixty-one 
female volunteers. Even though the total number of communicants for the CIM and 
annual baptisms were split fairly evenly between men and women, opportunities for 
Chinese men to be compensated for Christian work were greater, which may explain why 
the vast majority of volunteers for CIM work were men as well (nation-wide male 
volunteers totaled 1936 to just 411 women).  Either way, the preference for employing 
men reflected both the CIM’s and local Chinese gender values, while still offering a 
substantial number of women societal and professional roles in the churches. Altogether, 
the CIM had a considerable socio-economic impact on the local economies it inhabited 
through employment opportunities as well investment in schools, relief, and medicine.66 
However, the imperative to occupy the “Chinese frontier” of the missionary 
movement also meant the distribution of the CIM institutions and resources in many 
areas remained terribly humble. For instance, although the CIM sent missionaries to Tibet 
in the 1930s their work had barely created more than a single small community of 
Christians. The area occupied the work of six missionaries, but the Christians associated 
with the mission numbered only nineteen. In Manchuria, the work carried on by three 
missionaries had no mission post or geographic center, and was almost entirely a process 
of wandering itineration and distribution of tracts.67 In Hubei, the number of CIM 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Annual Report of the China Inland Mission, “In Season and Out of Season,” (Philadelphia, 1934) 
67 Annual Report of the China Inland Mission, “In Season and Out of Season,” (Philadelphia, 1934) 
	   44	  
missionaries, eight, outnumbered the sum of communicants, three. In Jiangsu, another 
coastal province and the area occupied by the CIM the longest, the institutional presence 
remained relatively small, only five mission stations and just over twenty outstations. 68 
As such, this focus on maintaining a presence in all of the provinces of seemed to be 
rather inefficient use of resources and personnel, but one that was necessitated by 
Taylor’s vision and the society’s priority of being pioneers for Christianity. The result 
being that the society was geographically widely dispersed and yet in some regions 
wholly irrelevant to the social and religious lives of the Chinese communities they 
encountered.  
The pocket of provinces inside China where the CIM worked also reinforced a 
growing rift with the liberal-modernist wing of Protestantism. In the controversies 
dividing the fundamentalist-evangelical and liberal-modernists camps of the international 
Protestant community in the twentieth century, the CIM institutionally was squarely 
within the fundamentalist-evangelical camp. Theologically, the CIM administration 
would not countenance a turn away from prioritizing China’s spiritual salvation. As other 
missions embarked upon the Social Gospel and its methods for mission work in China, 
the CIM remained solely focused on conversion and church-building. According to one 
of the earliest historians of Christian missions Kenneth Latourette, “by 1911, less than 
half the total missionary staff was engaged in direct fundamentalist work, and the 
proportion would have been still smaller had not the great majority the member of the 
China Inland Mission…been in that type of activity.”69 Increasingly, this fact left the CIM 
divorced from the ideological agendas of the national leadership of the Chinese churches 
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emanating from cities like Shanghai or Beijing and the liberal-modernist agenda of 
missions working in the coastal provinces. Far removed from the majority of missions 
and Chinese Christians, the CIM found itself among a dwindling number of voices in 
China advocating the principles of evangelism.  
This issue of distance, in terms of geography but also ideology and theology, was 
compounded by the process of church-building undertaken by the CIM in the interior. 
Although the CIM was interdenominational, the society’s principles of faith were firmly 
within the evangelical tradition.  Frequently, the CIM voiced criticism of the liberal-
modernist variant in the Sino-Protestant community. Beginning in the 1920s with its 
resignation from the National Christian Council the society remained aloof from 
coordinating its agenda with the national leadership of Chinese Christianity. Transfers of 
property or control over religious institutions to Chinese Christians codified that the 
congregation’s ownership was founded upon its future commitment to remain evangelical 
in orientation. This along with the leadership and direction CIM missionaries exercised 
over congregations initiated under their auspices meant that relatively few churches 
affiliated with the CIM had regional or national ties to other Christian groups. In essence, 
CIM affiliated Chinese churches were largely a “CIM denomination” which was 
theologically, geographically, and socially separate and distinct from organizations like 
the National Christian Council of China or YMCA.70    
The geographic focus on remote or un-evangelized areas of China along with this 
factionalism in no doubt impacted the number of the CIM’s followers among the Chinese 
as well. Despite having the largest missionary body in China, the membership in 
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churches founded by the CIM numbered only around 85,000 by the end of the mission’s 
work in 1949. Of the estimated 900,000 some Protestant Christians living in China by 
1949, the CIM was directly responsible for less than 10 percent of the Chinese Christian 
community.71 The concentration on moving on to form new congregations outside the 
centers of Christian strength along the coast most certainly kept the number of CIM 
communicants relatively low. Thus, the location of the CIM’s work and its emphasis on 
evangelism the smallest and newest congregations of Chinese Protestants contributed to 
the society’s isolation from the national leadership and luminaries of Christianity in 
China. 
The insularity of the CIM from the larger community was also a result of the 
society’s “in-house ethos.” Over the course of several decades, the CIM created network 
of schools, hospitals, and banks effectively allowed nearly aspects of life in China for 
members to be routed through the mission society. The construction of a school for 
mission children first in the city of Yantai, known then as Chefoo, and other resources 
such as will-handling were devised to keep cover nearly every aspect of the mission’s 
work.  The organization even went so far as to issue its own currency during periods of 
social and political instability in China.72 Even marriages were encouraged to be “in-
house” as single women and men were forced to either marry another CIM member or 
have their fiancés vetted by the CIM administrators.73 
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This is not to suggest that the CIM wholly separated itself from the larger 
missionary movement. The CIM continued to cooperate with many mission societies in 
several regions, but still mostly within the realms of preaching, distributing Christian 
literature, or training Chinese workers. And while the CIM leadership criticized much of 
the Social Gospel platform, the society shared with the dominant liberal-modernist wing 
of Protestantism a conviction that what it offered to the Chinese was superior to native 
values and ideas that would make the society and nation ultimately better, spiritually and 
materially.74 What the CIM resisted was any trend in mission work that put the latter 
before the former.  
In order to understand how meanings and ideas associated with mobility were 
produced, let’s first consider the missionary’s movement under the society’s principles 
and strategies of pioneer evangelism. The movement of Protestant missionaries within the 
CIM network can be broken down into several stages. The first stage of a movement 
revolved around the training and observation of missionary candidates by the CIM home 
centers staff in the U.S.  After applying via mail, Americans interested in serving were 
usually invited to meet with the nearest CIM representatives from the society’s offices in 
Philadelphia, Chicago, or Los Angeles. If approved, they were then invited to candidate 
schooling and training usually either in Toronto or Philadelphia. While at the mission 
home as prospective members, they studied the CIM training tools, completed interviews 
with the home staff, and underwent physical examinations as the society determined their 
qualifications and fitness for serving the mission. Once accepted as a member, the 
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missionary awaited their transportation to the field, often making their way to either San 
Francisco or Vancouver to travel across the seas to China.75 
During the second stage, the missionary left North America to arrive in China 
usually via Japan. During this stage, new members traveling across the Pacific Ocean in 
cohorts on transpacific steamships often visited Japan before arriving in Shanghai. Once 
in Shanghai, new members met the executive staff and General Director at the mission 
headquarters located on Sinza Road in the International Settlement in Shanghai and 
underwent an orientation lasting no more than a week. During this time the majority of 
members spent several days in Shanghai touring the international settlement, aiding the 
Shanghai staff in mission work and worship services, and purchasing supplies 
unavailable in inland China. After the orientation, new members were sent to language 
schools. For much of the society’s history in China, men and women went to separate 
language schools. Female members traveled over three hundred miles north to Jiangsu 
province to the city of Yangzhou. Male missionaries usually traveled to the city of 
Anqing in Anhui province. In both locations, CIM junior missionaries ideally 
concentrated only on study and examinations in Mandarin for a period of around six 
months.  Not until the mid-1930s did the CIM decide to combine the language schools 
into a single location in Anqing. Once the period of intensive language training was 
complete, CIM superintendents interviewed junior missionaries and assigned posts.76  
The missionary’s beginning his or her career as “pioneers” for the Protestant 
evangelical movement in China, then, marked the third general stage. From the language 
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schools, CIM members traveled across the interior of China to their posts in Anhui, 
Henan, Tibet, Shansi, Shaansi, etc. Assigned to mission stations typically in a provincial 
capital or large city, the junior missionary was placed under the supervision of senior 
missionaries for a period of two years as the senior missionary and district superintendent 
oversaw their training in evangelism and continued language study. Once in the field, 
they assumed the various tasks of what was known as pioneer evangelism prescribed by 
the CIM.  
Within each province, the society’s missionaries worked according to a biblical 
script taken from the New Testament that also maximized the exposure that trade routes 
and commerce could provide the Gospel. According to the CIM’s evangelical 
understanding of the life and teachings of the Apostle Paul, in each province the CIM 
missionary first established a mission station in the provincial capital. Beyond reflecting 
scripture, the CIM’s expansion located missionaries within provincial capitals first as a 
means to make existing trade routes and flows of Chinese to political centers expedite the 
spread of the Gospel. For example, in provinces like Sichuan, CIM missionaries first 
opened a station in Chongqing before moving on to larger neighboring cities along the 
Yangtze River.77 
Once assigned to a post, the institutional call to reach the “un-evangelized” 
Chinese and practices of pioneer evangelism kept missionaries moving about cities and 
roadways preaching, distributing literature, and counseling potential converts on how to 
worship, study the Bible, or establish a congregation. Within cities the missionary 
engaged in attracting converts by street preaching and distributing tracts. Following the 
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daily flow of commerce, usually missionaries started their days at the city gates, 
distributing literature or attracting interested onlookers. By the afternoon missionaries 
relocated to street chapels, storefronts converted to gospel halls located in city markets, 
where they worked to attract businessmen, merchants, and other Chinese frequenting the 
market for goods and services. In late afternoons, CIM missionaries typically either 
replenished their supplies of tracts and Gospels to wander the city streets again or 
frequented tea-shops and other establishments open to the public. House to house 
visitations also were a common daily activity and practice of missionary mobility in 
cities. 
Outside of the provincial capitals, CIM missionaries also worked at other methods 
of pioneering such as the practices of tent and wayward evangelism. Tent evangelism 
required CIM missionaries to set up tents near villages or along roadways to serve as a 
home base to hold worship services and distribute pamphlets and scriptures across the 
district. Moving ten to fifteen miles at a time, tent evangelists worked themselves farther 
and farther from the capital until they ran out of supplies. Wayward evangelism was far 
less systematic, but equally painstaking, since it required missionaries to set out from the 
mission stations and reach out to each and every person and home they encountered as 
they traveled to and fro. Ever more popular by the 1930s was the practice of using 
evangelism bands or teams of workers. Performing essentially the same tasks, preaching 
or distributing literature, the bands were usually comprised of Chinese workers 
accompanied by a single missionary. The goal with each method was to travel as far and 
wide as possible to build a “small nuclei” of Chinese converts that would grow into a 
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church that would be labeled an “outstation,” otherwise known as a CIM-affiliated 
church, that the CIM missionary visited frequently.78  
Once pockets of converts were formed in communities outside the provincial 
capitals, the work of CIM missionaries was devoted to church-building and discipleship 
training. In terms of church-building, the CIM missionary served as an advisor or was the 
authority in matters of governance, finance, planning, and worship for Chinese churches. 
As for discipleship training, the CIM missionary typically provided bible study courses 
and spiritual counseling to help converts mature in their faith and understanding of 
Christian theology. However, both of these activities kept missionaries constantly moving 
about from provincial capitals to the countryside as they were responsible for several 
congregations at once. In areas without Chinese pastors or established lay leaders, the 
missionary led worship services, established services such as bible schools or women’s 
programs, and directed the work of Chinese Protestants.79 Constant contact and 
correspondence with CIM-affiliated churches and neophytes then also kept the 
missionary on the roads and waterways of China.80 Thus, in each province missionaries 
flowed back and forth between the provincial capital and more rural, remote villages, 
between city and more densely populated areas and the countryside. And the society’s 
emphasis on pioneering and commitment to the ideal of creating indigenous Chinese 
churches according to the three-selfs kept CIM missionaries moving in search of forming 
new communities of believers and populations or areas to open to Christianity.  
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The fourth and final stage of missionary movement was typified by leaving China 
either on furlough or resignation and this pattern of movement that is much more difficult 
to describe. After several years in the field, generally no fewer than five or six years, 
missionaries became eligible for furlough and returned to their home countries, generally 
following much the same route as they had taken to their posts. After a period of two 
years, members were expected to return to the field sometimes to their previous posts but 
often to a new area worked by the CIM. But rarely did the missionary’s career and 
movement follow such a typical pattern. For many, special circumstances such as poor 
physical and mental health were occasionally grounds for the society granting 
missionaries furlough before such a time period had been served. In other cases, friction 
between junior and senior missionaries necessitated redeployment or reassignment to a 
new field before the first term had been completed. And a large number of missionaries 
resigned early into their careers for a variety of reasons such as disillusionment with 
mission work and life in the countryside; others who struggled as evangelists were 
reassigned to posts within the CIM’s schools and hospitals, or administrative work at the 
headquarters in Shanghai. In any case, the length of each missionary’s term varied greatly 
and his or her careers and paths out of China were diverse. 
In spite of these idealized stages of the missionary’s movement, there were a 
number of complications that profoundly impacted the movement of CIM members 
throughout their careers. First, CIM missionaries evangelizing China followed the 
pathways established by local and provincial commerce. Hopping from one nearby 
market to another miles down the road and often pushing wheelbarrows loaded with 
gospel tracts and hymnbooks, missionaries traveled along established commercial routes 
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to capitalize on the rotation of market days between neighboring villages and cities. With 
markets operating every other day, missionaries tried to time their arrival in one village 
on the day before its market opened, allowing them a chance to look for a suitable place 
to preach or hand out mission literature. A typical spot for CIM missionaries to set up 
were the village’s gates in the early morning hours to catch the Chinese traders, vendors, 
and shoppers at the market’s points of entry and exit. Using the crowded markets, the 
CIM was able to easily distribute thousands of copies of mission publications. By the late 
afternoon, missionaries usually moved their activity to some part of the market square to 
begin preaching utilizing the society’s large posters. In this way the daily routine of 
evangelism was also ordered by the social conventions of the Chinese market as well. 
When vendors and traders folded up their tents and moved for the day, the CIM agents 
did so as well, moving onto the next city. And like the vendors, the length of these 
campaigns lasted as long as the missionary had supplies, sometimes for just a day and 
other times for eight to ten days on the road. When out of tracts to hand out, the 
missionary teams returned to the mission station to rest and resupply before heading out 
in a different direction but again plotted along the market towns of rural areas. 81 
Although in its representational form the missionary’s movement was represented 
as “unrestricted,” there were practical matters that constrained the missionary’s 
movement within China. Although the missionary’s mobility was associated with 
freedom, it was in reality dependent upon a number of factors, foremost among them 
language. Rarely, did CIM members achieve a fluency that allowed them to evangelize in 
city streets or alongside country roads without the assistance of Chinese, making 
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movement rather dependent on local companions, guides, and fellow travelers. Because 
of this fact, the demands on the time and energy of Chinese Protestants were as great as 
on the demands on the time and energy of Chinese Protestants. As member Vincent 
Crossett recalls, junior missionaries still studying the language relied especially heavily 
on Chinese speakers. He remembers in his first five years of service, “we’d put up a 
poster, and just try to explain things and then….and then if someone showed an interest 
we’d try to get somebody to come up and explain what he understood we said.” The same 
was true for Crossett and other junior missionaries on their trips to the countryside, 
“often, any Christian going through we’d…we’d rope him in and get him to give his 
testimony and explain Scriptures and explain the posters.”82 Due to the linguistic barrier, 
the missionary’s movement was not free of Chinese control, but in reality dependent on 
Chinese aid and assistance. And the result was to place a heavy demand on Chinese 
Protestants’ time and energy. Additionally, the environment surrounding the missionary’s 
movement created difficulties and hindrances as well, especially in regards to safety. 
Political and social turmoil produced many periods when movement was unsafe for 
missionaries. Notable examples include the Boxer Uprising 1898-1900, Northern 
Expedition and Anti-Christian campaigns of the 1920s, Japanese Occupation, and 
Chinese Civil War. Work in Xinjiang and Sichuan was also disrupted in the early 1930s 
as political conflicts erupted and resulted in regional and local regimes barring CIM 
members from working in the region.83 
Lastly, the movement of missionaries was also structured by China’s seasonal 
climates and available transportation. In the mid-to-late 1920s especially, CIM 
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missionaries rarely traveled except in the company of an escort from their local 
communities.84 Much of the itinerant evangelism in the countryside in areas like Anhui 
was completed in the fall and spring as temperatures in the summer and winter were in 
most years too extreme for extensive travel. And transportation, or the lack thereof, 
greatly influenced the flows of CIM work. Sundays, as one might expect, were a 
highpoint of Christian movement and activity, as evangelism teams spread out to outlying 
villages and traveled to hold worship services at the CIM’s many outstations. Traveling 
by foot, many Christians walked around three to five miles to nearby outstations, while 
evangelism teams with bicycles traveled up to twenty or thirty miles to outposts of the 
CIM farther away from the provincial centers and established churches.85 In mountainous 
areas like Yunnan, the transportation choice for missionaries was between horseback and 
walking.86 
CIM member Jennie Fitzwilliam’s first year of mission work in 1927 is a perfect 
illustration of many of these issues. Her trip to the field took the Moody graduate from 
Chicago to Toronto to Vancouver, where she departed for China on the British boat, The 
Empress of Asia, with a layover of several days in Tokyo before she reached Shanghai. 
From there, she followed the typical route of the female CIM missionary, a several day 
orientation in Shanghai was followed by an over three-hundred mile trip by train to 
Yangzhou for language training before being designated for assignment. She would only 
be there for a few months before she and the entire CIM missionary force were evacuated 
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to the International Settlement in Shanghai to wait out the Northern Expedition military 
campaign of the Guomindang to unify the country. Not until 1929 did Fitzwilliam finally 
take her post in Yunnan, by way of travel through Singapore and Burma. Once there, 
however, she was largely unable to go anywhere without a member of the Lisu ethnicity 
to work as her translator and guide since her Mandarin was largely useless with the area’s 
largely non-Mandarin speaking communities.  
Eleven years later, her return to Yunnan from Shandong province was prevented 
by the aggression of Japanese forces in the region, forcing her to be reassigned to the 
CIM’s school for missionary children, the Chefoo School, in Yentai.87 Her work was 
again disrupted by the Japanese military two years later as Fitzwilliams and the rest of the 
Chefoo School faculty and student body were placed in an internment camp in the city of 
Weifang. She would be repatriated in a matter of weeks, leaving China through India to 
return to the U.S. where she worked in the mission’s youth hostel for the schoolchildren 
whose parents remained at work as missionaries in China. Her last post as a missionary in 
China would also be altered, this time by the Chinese Civil War. After serving the CIM 
as a deputation worker in the U.S. Fitzwilliam’s scheduled return to China in 1949 was 
canceled as a result of the CCP’s victory and increasing hostility toward missions. 88 
Fitzwilliams’ career illustrates the variability of the individual missionary’s 
movement, which is important since not all movement produced ideological meanings or 
signified the values of the CIM. Her career also illustrates just how much of the 
missionary’s movement was dependent on external forces beyond their control such as 
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language, political conflict, customs, climate, and cultural hospitality or indifference to 
foreigners. What should be noted then was that the movements that did produce meanings 
and signify values, going to China and evangelizing in society, were often represented in 
ways that often contradicted the missionary’s actual exercise of movement. 
Harvesting U.S. Evangelical Might 
Conversely, the society’s strong evangelical identity and association with the 
“frontier” in China gave it considerable influence within the U.S. However, as in China, 
the society’s stature and influence in the U.S. in the nineteenth century started out 
incredibly humble. Originally a British mission society in the 1860s, the China Inland 
Mission had been transformed into an international mission by the early 1880s thanks to 
its ever-expanding publications and the international popularity of its founder. The 
international scope of the society’s recruitment and presence within the world missionary 
movement steadily expanded over the next several decades. By the 1950s, home councils 
had been formed in North America, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa in addition 
to its councils throughout the United Kingdom. Coupled with the CIM’s associate 
missions throughout Europe, the mission society had built an expansive network of 
evangelism, publishing, and humanitarian work on four continents directed toward the 
salvation of Chinese. Additionally, the headquarters of the CIM were located in Shanghai 
since the 1870s, a fact quite unusual among the majority of Protestant missions during 
this era. Unlike most Protestant missions that drew personnel and resources from a single 
society to send to a number of foreign nations in South America, Asia, or Africa, the CIM 
drew upon an international body of Christian communities to minister to a single society, 
an exceptional expression of internationalism among the missionary movement.  
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The CIM then was an outlet for an internationalist vein among U.S. Protestants 
who desired to cooperate with evangelicals around the globe. As the U.S. Council 
Handbook stated, “The love of Christ overrules national and ecclesiastical boundaries, 
and the China Inland Mission is a living testimony to the fact that the born again children 
of God are truly one in Christ. As an outlet for men and means, the Mission is the servant 
and helper of all evangelical Protestant churches, especially of those who do not have a 
work of their own in China.”89 Through the society’s interdenominationalism and 
internationalism the mission made claims to represent the entire body of Protestant 
Christianity, not a particular denomination or region. 
 The character of the CIM and its internationalist credentials, however, was a 
gradual process. In the nineteenth century, Protestants in London and the British Isles 
dominated the institution’s outlook and finances with only modest contributions from 
members in North America or Australia. In London, the society enjoyed the support or 
membership of a number of leading Christian statesmen making its influence in the 
United Kingdom relatively greater than in the other home societies. And a number of 
U.S. members and non-members alike still identified the CIM as a “British” mission in 
terms of identity or structure or philosophy well-into the mid-twentieth century. This no 
small part also reflected that prior to the Second World War British politicians and 
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diplomats were a powerful force within the international community in China, a fact the 
CIM exploited many times to gather information and monitor the effect of political 
events on the missionary’s status in China.90 
 But overtime, the interests, ideas, wealth, and politics of Protestants in the U.S. 
and Canada increasingly pulled at the CIM’s attention and resources. The origins of the 
CIM’s spread in the U.S. lay in Taylor’s North America tour of Protestant churches and 
conferences in 1888. Taylor had been invited to take his message about the Chinese to 
U.S. audiences by Henry Frost, a Canadian businessman, in 1887. Along his tour of New 
York, Niagara Falls, Chicago, and Massachusetts, Taylor had a profound impact on 
Canadian and U.S. clergy, lay leaders, and especially Christian youth.  In response, the 
first contingent of fourteen missionaries from North America left to join Taylor’s mission 
in 1888. His writings like China’s Spiritual Needs and Claims and later autobiography 
would continue over the next few decades to inspire U.S. audiences…. 
Four hundred millions! What mind can grasp it? Marching in single file on yard 
apart they would circle the world at its equator more than ten times. Were they to 
march past the reader, at a rate of thirty miles a day, they would move on and on, 
day after day, week after week, month after month; and more than twenty-three 
years and a half would elapse before the last individual passed by…Four hundred 
million souls, ‘having no hope, and without God in the world’…an army whose 
forces, if placed singly, father more than four hundred yards apart and within call 
of each other would extend from the earth to the sun! who, standing hand in hand, 
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might extend over a greater distance than from this globe to the moon! The 
number is inconceivable—the view is appalling.91  
Through constant references to the Qing empire’s “millions” of non-Christians and vast 
population, Taylor made a powerful appeal to U.S. Protestants to envision China as the 
most urgent frontier for evangelical expansion and moral uplift. Against the imagery of 
Chinese as a “yellow-horde” as a racial menace to the western civilization found in 
American popular culture, Taylor inspired Protestants in the U.S. to think of the salvation 
of the Chinese masses as a profound spiritual crisis for Christianity to tackle as an 
international body by imagining them marching in unison to eternal damnation.  
 Taylor’s tour led to the creation of the CIM’s North American Council, composed 
of representatives from the U.S. and Canada in 1888. By 1901, the U.S.’s ascendance 
within the missionary movement necessitated moving the CIM’s North American 
headquarters from Toronto to Philadelphia to facilitate recruitment, training, and 
publicity for the society. In the 1920s, the CIM’s expanding work and reach in the U.S. 
led to additional mission offices “strategically placed” in Chicago and Los Angeles. And 
if not for the concerns about expansion of the North American Council during the Great 
Depression, it would have almost certainly led to a CIM center in Dallas by the early 
1930s to reach Protestant evangelicals in the South. Still, the mission somehow managed 
to thrive in the U.S. despite the crisis, sending 200 new workers to the field in the early 
1930s, and U.S. support remained critical to maintaining a force of over 1000 
missionaries in China throughout the decade.  
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To compete with the denominational missions of the U.S. required keeping the 
society’s message in constant circulation to reach U.S. audiences. To do so, participation 
in mission conferences was a critical tool for recruiting and promoting the society. From 
the early 1900s onward, the CIM cooperated with a number of U.S. evangelical mission 
societies in conferences each year. In addition, the society held CIM Mission 
Conferences in a large number of cities in several Eastern and Midwestern states annually 
and in many years twice a year. Particularly popular were the conferences held near 
Niagara Falls which attracted audiences from the U.S. and Canada to hear the CIM 
speakers in the 1910s.  During mission conferences, Protestant evangelicals gathered 
together for anywhere from one day to three days to hear stories of the work, travel, 
danger, and conversion in Chinese society. Overtime, the number of cities holding CIM 
conferences grew dramatically. In 1924, the society held conferences in around four 
major American cities. By 1930 the number of cities was over thirty.92 The society’s 
longer history among U.S. churches and Christian organizations on the East Coast meant 
that the majority of CIM Conferences were held in metropolitan areas like Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, New York City, and Washington, D.C.  
 In addition to the conferences, the CIM was able to disseminate a vast literature to 
the U.S. public about China and the society’s call to the Chinese from its home offices in 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles.  Popular among U.S. audiences were the CIM’s 
biographies of missionaries like Taylor as well as a number of books detailing the lives of 
leading Chinese converts. Especially after the Boxer Uprising, books on Christian 
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martyrdom, both Chinese and foreign, were widely printed and distributed by the CIM.93 
The CIM also produced a number of maps, posters, and audiovisual materials available 
for purchase as well.94 Available for order by catalogue or mail, the CIM donated many 
of these materials each year to libraries, Christian colleges, or handed them out at various 
conferences.  
Magazines and pamphlets were another facet of the CIM’s literature program in 
the U.S. Perhaps the most widely distributed was China’s Millions, the society’s monthly 
magazine, which contained photographs, illustrations, maps, stories, and reports from the 
CIM missionaries in the field “intended to present the CIM and China to the Christian 
public.”95 Through the magazine, missionaries contributed to the cultural knowledge of 
U.S. audiences on a vast number of topics including Chinese history, social and cultural 
conventions, and the progress of Christian missions. The society also focused on 
targeting specific segments in the U.S. like Christian youth with magazines like Young 
China. While subscriptions to certain publications like Young China remained incredibly 
modest (just over 500 total in North American in 1930), other publications such as 
China’s Millions grew to be a definitive source of information for the U.S. evangelical’s 
perspective on China. In the late 1940s, the CIM began distributing millions of copies of 
China’s Millions a month, with an all-time high of thirteen million in May of 1948. By 
this point, the CIM had also begun negotiations to make articles and editorials by staff 
and excerpts from China’s Millions available to a number of Protestant periodicals 
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including Moody Monthly. Printing of mission pamphlets expanded dramatically in the 
1940s, and during a stretch from January 1947 to May 1948 the society produced around 
a quarter million for distribution.96  
The society’s standing with U.S. Protestant evangelicals was also built through 
connections with many leading seminaries, bible colleges, and liberal arts colleges. 
Labeled “feeder” institutes since they often supplied the mission with candidates and 
prayer networks of support, the CIM relationship was strongest in areas immediately 
surrounding the centers in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, or Chicago. For example, in 
Chicago the CIM enjoyed close relations with the Moody Bible Institute from the 1890s 
onwards thanks to the friendship of Taylor and evangelist Dwight L. Moody. Nearby 
Wheaton College, alma mater of leading U.S. evangelicals Billy Graham and theologian 
Carl Henry, also became an important “feeder” in the 1930s and 1940s. Both Wheaton 
and Moody provided a fertile ground for recruiting future missionaries as many students 
later became members of the CIM.  
Excerpts from an oral history with former CIM missionary Jennie Kingston 
Fitzwilliam, a graduate of the Moody Bible Institute in 1925, illustrates the CIM’s 
networking on the campuses of Christian colleges and presence among the student body 
at Moody…  
When I got there (Moody) the Lord directed my thoughts toward China. I couldn’t 
tell you just how. I joined the China prayer group…became interested in China, 
Dr. Isaac Page, who was the China Inland Mission representative in the Midwest 
lived in Chicago, was a very great influence in my life. He was a great favorite of 
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all of us and he used to have us out to his home on Monday nights…and we had 
great times of fellowship and great times of fun. And he impressed on us…if we 
felt called to China, then we were called to China and nothing in this world should 
be allowed to distract us. 
Numerous other Moody and Wheaton students participated in the society’s monthly 
China Prayer Band exposing them to the CIM’s agenda in China. Activities organized by 
the CIM, praying and singing about China or listening to stories of missionaries on 
furlough, for Fitzwilliam became the dominant force in her social circle at Moody, “we 
had what you’d call a little China clique…. We were very, very close friends and that 
fellowship meant a lot. It was just like one big family.” Among Fitzwilliam’s “China 
clique” were John and Isobel Kuhn, and Hazel Williamson all of whom joined the China 
Inland Mission as missionaries. Another close friend of Fitzwilliam’s, Ethel Harper, 
applied for the CIM but was denied because of health concerns. Fitzwilliam remembers 
Page’s effect on Christian youth, “He was a former missionary of the CIM and he was 
just the kind of person young people are influenced by. He was warm, friendly, jolly. 
And we were all just very enthusiastic about him and his appeal for missionaries.”97 At 
Moody, Page’s efforts in the 1930s were amplified by Dr. Robert Hall Glover, professor 
of Missionary Principles and Practices and later Home Director for the North American 
branch of the CIM and a leading figure in the field of missiology in the U.S.98  
Through educators like Page and Glover the CIM built a powerful rapport with 
Christian youth in key evangelical institutions. While unusually well-connected to key 
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Protestant evangelical institutions in Chicago, the CIM presence was also strong in urban 
areas with Christian campuses in Baltimore (Faith Theological Seminary), Los Angeles 
(Fuller Theological Seminary and Bible Institute of Los Angeles), and Santa Barbara 
(Westmont College). But there was also efforts made to create relationships with more 
remote but important evangelical institutions in rural areas such as Asbury College in 
Wilmore, Kentucky.99Invitations from groups such as the Student Volunteer Movement 
were another way that the CIM strengthened its connections to college youth. From the 
CIM offices in Philadelphia, representatives like Dr. Robert Glover were well-positioned 
to attract support from branches of the Student Volunteer Movement at Princeton as 
well.100 
The creation of prayer networks was a critical facet of the CIM’s influence in the 
U.S. in the twentieth century. Throughout the CIM’s history, prayer was constantly 
championed as a critical force capable of channeling spiritual power from the home 
countries to the work in China. As Henry Frost stated the society had been “born in 
prayer and sustained in prayer,” and  “every soul won to Christ an answer to prayer, 
every difficulty overcome, every missionary sent,” to China was believed to be the result 
of prayers from Christians in the West.101 
 Since every aspect of the mission’s work from travel to preaching was envisioned 
as dependent upon prayer and God’s will, indexes of CIM personnel, statistical tables on 
converts and outstations, hospital work, and maps of the CIM field were used for prayer 
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devotionals. Through these materials, supporters of the CIM were encouraged to pray 
daily for the missionaries and progress of Christianity in China. Even the mobility of the 
missionary and CIM’s work in China was positioned as depending on prayer. By the 
1930s, prayer circles associated with the mission society were found in every state except 
for Wyoming, Louisiana, and Nevada. Conversely, the prayer circles were most densely 
concentrated around the offices in Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. 102 
 The last dimension facilitating the spread of the CIM was the deputation work of 
the U.S. council and home staff, missionaries on furlough, prospective candidates, and 
visiting personnel from the headquarters in Europe and China. Deputation work, speaking 
in front of congregations, youth groups, conferences, and voluntary associations, was a 
critical means of publicity, recruitment, and dissemination of the CIM’s agenda. For the 
society representatives working in the three home offices much of their energy and 
resources was spent organizing and traveling to speaking engagements. Invitations to 
speak on behalf of the mission were most often extended to the CIM by evangelical 
pastors or youth leaders, but also by voluntary associations and women’s groups like the 
Women’s Mission Society or the Maybeth Society. Assisting the U.S. Council and home 
staff in these duties were missionaries on furlough in the U.S. Visiting CIM personnel 
such as the General Director or members of the Home Councils in the United Kingdom 
and Australia assisted in deputation work, and even retired workers were called into to 
visit churches, youth groups, and potential donors to the mission. Cajoling retired 
missionaries into taking on speaking engagements, the North American Council 
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reminded members they were “retired from service not the interests of the mission.”103 
The CIM’s deputation work in areas surrounding the home centers in the U.S. and 
Canada was also greatly aided each year by new crops of candidates and prospective 
missionaries in training. As part of their application and training, the CIM took applicants 
and missionaries in training around to churches, youth groups, and Sunday schools in 
Philadelphia, Chicago, Vancouver, and Toronto and surrounding areas.104 
Meeting the demand for CIM speakers with the Protestant evangelical community 
of the U.S. required extensive travel. Responsibilities for representing the mission were 
divided geographically with each center designated a district of several surrounding states 
to cover. Covering these districts often taxed the staff’s resources and energy. Despite the 
assistance of other CIM personnel, the primary responsibility for responding to 
invitations to speak about the mission’s work fell to the mission secretaries in 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The result was that these officers fulfilled 
hundreds of speaking engagements a year in a wide number of states, sometimes 
thousands of miles from the home centers. In North America this necessitated 
coordinating work across the border between the U.S. and Canada. Canadian members 
from the Vancouver office often worked conferences and church meetings in 
Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Michigan in addition to covering meetings 
across the Canadian provinces.105  
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Exact statistics on the number of speaking engagements are difficult to find in the 
CIM records. But reports on deputation work in the North American Council’s records in 
1949 illustrate some of the logistical and financial challenges of this work. For example, 
over the course of that year the CIM staff in Chicago, just sixteen members working in 
small teams of two to three members, had over 390 meetings in front of churches and 
Christian groups in Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, Kansas, and 
Kentucky. To maximize the financial efficacy of traveling to each engagement CIM 
speakers typically held meetings two to three times a day before several different 
audiences at each location. The impact of deputation work is most easily measured in 
terms of donations. The year’s speaking engagements by the Chicago staff amounted to 
over $56,000 (around $550,000 in today’s currency). Considered by the staff to be its 
best year all around in terms of engagements and donations, this represents not a typical 
year but the apex of the CIM’s influence in the Midwest U.S. No doubt this work was 
buffeted by the U.S. public’s concern with the revolution in China and fate of missions 
and Chinese Christians. Still, in terms of donations and engagements there is no 
indication that the year 1949 was a dramatic increase from the other years in the 1940s.106 
Rather, it would seem that the CIM had gradually established an increasingly powerful 
connection to evangelicals across the Midwest.  
While the Eastern District around Philadelphia was characterized as similar in 
scope and geography to the Chicago Center, the presence of the CIM in the Western U.S. 
was slightly less impressive but still geographically expansive and financially sound. In 
that same year, the staff in Los Angeles responded to invitations from evangelicals in 
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California, Hawaii, Arizona, Texas, and Utah. And in each year since 1945 the CIM Los 
Angeles deputation teams had collected over 30,000 a year in donations for the society 
(around $290,000 a year). Meeting the obligations of deputation work could be 
exhausting and was a true test of a candidate’s determination to be a member of the 
society. As a candidate for the CIM, Marguerite Owen offered her personal testimony 
around forty times in a span of forty-two days. Led around by CIM home staff, Owen and 
the other four members of her candidate cohort spent five weeks traveling outward from 
Los Angeles to CIM prayer meetings to cites like San Diego or Escondido when not 
studying Chinese radicals or undergoing interviews with the home center staff.107 While 
the North American Council frequently questioned the efficacy of deputation as a 
recruitment tool, its ability to translate contact with U.S. Protestant churches into 
substantial financial support was undeniable.108 
Great efforts were made by the North American Council in the 1930s and 1940s 
to systematize the deputation work. But the reliance on missionaries on furlough meant 
that each individual member’s hometown and family networks determined the geographic 
contours of the society’s audience in the U.S. as well. Perhaps the most prolific 
deputation workers during this period were the Owens, Henry and Marguerite, CIM 
missionaries on leave from China from 1941 to 1947. Relieved from their work in Anhui 
in the spring of 1941, the couple spent their initial months on furlough visiting 
Marguerite’s family in Texas and Los Angeles and Henry’s parents in Montreal. While 
visiting Henry’s parents the Owens were called upon by the mission to accompany Dr. 
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Page and the General Director, Bishop Stanley Houghton, on a several-month long 
deputation tour of Protestant churches and conferences in Canada and the U.S. By 
December of 1941 the Owens were skilled public speakers and travelers accustomed to 
spending most of their days on buses and trains. By the later stages of the tour a decision 
was made to send Marguerite home to her family in Los Angeles while Henry continued 
to represent the mission at conferences in Minneapolis and Winnipeg. But Marguerite’s 
respite from deputation work would be short-lived, following the Japanese attack on the 
U.S. at Pearl Harbor invitations to the CIM from Protestant communities were greater 
than ever, especially in California. The Owens, reunited later that month, began a full 
schedule of deputation work on behalf of the CIM that would keep them busy for most of 
the war.109 
Their success and reputation as CIM representatives would lead to Henry’s 
appointment as the mission’s Southwest Regional Director and a steady stream of 
appearances before Christian audiences until their return to Yunnan in 1947. While 
Marguerite served as the Southwest Mission Home’s hostess, managing and maintaining 
the mission premises in Los Angeles, Henry led teams of furloughed CIM missionaries 
across California, Nevada, Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico to meet with the mission’s 
prayer support networks and donors. According to Marguerite, “we didn’t go anywhere in 
those days without being invited, because we had more invitations than we could fill 
anyway.” And even within Los Angeles responding to local requests kept her husband as 
the CIM regional director from having “a free Sunday in 1942, morning or evening.”110  
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The CIM’s growth then in both China and the U.S. relied on personnel traveling 
widely to build nation wide bases of support. Despite the CIM’s vast print media in both 
countries, direct contact with people and Protestant congregations was the touchstone of 
the CIM approach in the U.S. just as it was in China. Acting as evangelists in the latter 
and advocates for China’s evangelization in the former, by the 1940s the CIM was 
strategically placed in both countries to forge transnational spiritual, financial, and 
ideological networks connecting U.S. Protestant evangelicals and Chinese communities. 
The Ideological Meanings of Missionary Mobility 
During the era of pioneer evangelism, missionary mobility produced a number of 
ideological meanings for evangelicals in the U.S. and their counterparts in a number of 
countries. First, the missionary’s mobility within the CIM network reflected membership 
and participation in projects and values that were transnational. Mobility created a 
complex sense of belonging and identification with the international Christian 
community. Traveling from the U.S. to join other Protestant Christians from Canada, 
Great Britain, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand in China reflected the missionary’s 
participation in what scholar Ian Tyrell describes as the Christian moral empire at work in 
China.111 What bound these groups together across the international Protestant 
community was their investment in the CIM’s campaigns against sin, superstition, and its 
promotion of evangelical Christianity. All three of these agendas were seen as forms of 
“progress,” but as Protestant evangelicals they also saw these projects of moral uplift as 
solutions to China’s struggles with issues such as poverty, opium addiction, social 
disharmony, and political turmoil. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ian Tyrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire, (Princeton University Press, 
2010) 
	   72	  
Binding these groups together was the ethos and identity of the missionary as a 
pioneer. From the society’s beginnings in North America the CIM’s reputation as 
“pioneers” of the missionary movement in the interior of China resonated with U.S. 
audiences thanks to the popular mythology of the frontier in the American past. No 
doubt, this greatly appealed to many U.S. members. As Jennie Fitzwilliam recalls, 
“Nobody wanted to go just to the Chinese cities round about the coast.” The “virgin 
areas” worked by the CIM as she called them had an allure among the missionary 
movement, especially Tibet. Part of the “glamour” as she referred to it of this work was 
that CIM members, “lived very primitively but spiritually, it was a luxury.”112 Supporters 
in the U.S. participated in this “pioneering” through financial donations, and prayer, and 
a sense of cooperation with Protestants around the globe.  
As pioneers, U.S. evangelicals associated missionary mobility with ideas of 
freedom of movement, being at the forefront of expansion with unlimited access to 
Chinese civilization. Inside China, the society’s pioneering pushed the limits of the 
missionary’s freedom and expanding access in Chinese society. The geographic contours 
of the CIM’s work demonstrated Christianity’s right to roam the entirety of China free 
from interference or restraint. This mobility was also understood as constantly expanding. 
As one member for the CIM wrote in the 1934 annual report, through the mission’s 
campaigns “unreached towns and villages are constantly being entered.” This included 
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China’s most remote regions such as Tibet including various ethnic minorities such as the 
Lisu and Miao tribes in southern China.113 
The freedom of the missionary’s mobility was conveyed not just by its geographic 
expanse but also by its social and cultural range. In representations of travel and 
movement about China, CIM readers learned of China’s geography, history, cultural 
traditions, the language, and various social groups represented in abstract form as 
farmers, craftsmen, merchants, soldiers, women, and children. Increasingly important in 
the twentieth century was how mobility forged a sense of knowing and contact with 
Chinese Protestants and churches, both in their abstract and individualized forms. The 
geography of China was represented as areas “reached” or “touched” by Christianity and 
those “untouched” or “unevangelized.” The language reinforced ideas about the 
missionary’s contact as the driving force of change in Chinese society. The imperative to 
pray for these things, promoted by prayer calendars and directories, created a sense of 
spiritual contact and communion with diverse groups such as Chinese youth, 
geographical areas like the province of Sichuan, or social and political movements such 
as the Guomindang and the New Life Campaign. Through contact and its representation, 
the missionary’s mobility created expectations about these groups and places as targets of 
the missionary’s progress. 
Secondly, as the majority of Protestant missions shifted toward the Social Gospel 
in the twentieth century and emphasized social reform and modernization in China, 
pioneer evangelism became essential to the ethos and identity of Protestant evangelical. 
As evangelicals, CIM members cited scripture as the basis for the society’s methods of 
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evangelism and motivations. Passages such Mark 16:15, “Go ye into all the world, and 
preach the gospel to every creature,” served as the basis for the society’s drive to be 
endlessly mobile and expanding in its search for new audiences the Gospel.114 Metaphors 
comparing CIM missionaries to forms of transportation cemented the importance of 
movement to the society’s concept of evangelicalism. For example, the foreword to the 
society’s annual report in 1934, In Season and Out of Season stated that the cover’s life-
boat “cruising up and down in dangerous waters….engaged continually in the task of 
saving life,” was “a fitting emblem of the evangelist who is willing to spend and be spent 
in rescuing those who must otherwise perish.”  These practices of movement and ideas 
about movement as an expression of faith were hallmarks of the evangelicalism binding 
together groups in the U.S. with those in Canada, Great Britain, Europe, and Australia. 115   
Missionary mobility then reflected the CIM’s belief that “progress” was defined 
primarily in spiritual terms. The key to China’s salvation lay in Chinese conversion, not 
just to Christianity but also to an evangelical lifestyle characterized by piety, bible study, 
and proselytizing.  The CIM also measured progress by campaigns against “superstition” 
which included attacks on Chinese folk religions, Islam, Buddhism, Daoism, and a whole 
host of other conventional Chinese practices and beliefs. Spiritual progress was also 
marked by the mission’s institutional spread and geographic expanse. CIM directories 
published annually were organized by province with a date noting the year the society 
began working in the region. Underneath the provincial name and date were lists and 
statistics on the total square miles of the province, the number of missionaries working in 
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the region, stations and out-stations, and Chinese-workers.116 Quite literally, the 
missionary’s mobility mapped, geographically but socially and culturally as well, the 
borders of the moral Christian empire’s penetration of Chinese society. 
Not surprisingly, CIM members expressed a pioneer’s ambivalence about China’s 
transformation in the twentieth century from “frontier” or “heathen nation” to modern 
nation-state. For example, Dr. Robert Glover of the CIM US Council proclaimed in the 
late 1920s that “The China of thirty or even twenty years ago is no more, and the whole 
country and the people are taking on a completely new aspect.  Western goods and 
western ideas are being more and more adopted.” While this impact had once been 
largely limited to the southern and coastal provinces, Glover stated that China’s inland 
travel was in the process of being revolutionized as highways were built to connect 
villages to provincial capitals and within cities “old narrow streets converted into broad, 
well-paved thoroughfares lined with handsome stores displaying all kinds of western 
goods. Many a venerable city wall has been leveled and turned into a boulevard for motor 
vehicles.” These improvements led Glover to conclude that “Indeed, it can only be a very 
short time until overland travel throughout that vast country will be completely 
revolutionized—a prospect which has its very obvious bearing upon missionary work.”117 
China’s modernization was seen as creating greater opportunities for the missionary and 
technology a boon to evangelizing society. 
This theme was echoed in the annual report later in 1934 which measured China’s 
improving roadways and transportation services as increasing the rapidity with which 
evangelical Christianity was carried throughout society. The report mentioned that buses 
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were now traveling from Chongqing to Chengdu in just two days, formerly a journey 
completed in ten days by sedan chair or a month by boat. Airplanes were becoming 
common in Nanjing, motor road mileage “had quadrupled since 1929,” and plans for 
highways between Shanghai and Guizhou and railroads in Shansi were “important signs 
of progress.” The author declared, “little imagination is required to envisage the 
possibilities of these new roads and railways. Even if in many cases they are originally 
constructed to facilitate warlike operations….they may also become highways for the 
messengers of the PRINCE OF PEACE.”118The image of the missionary and donkey on 
the CIM’s prayer pamphlets of the 1920s was quickly being replaced by visions of 
missionaries on trains, plains, and automobiles. 
Conversely, Glover was ambivalent about the impact these changes would have 
on Chinese society. Along those new roads Glover saw flow “new dress, new etiquette, 
new social and moral ideas, new commerce, new industry, and new education” and 
“Queue discarded, foot-binding condemned, torture of prisoners on trial forbidden, in 
some districts even idols thrown aside and temples renovated and converted into schools 
or lecture halls, and their grounds into public recreation parks.” But he also saw new 
forms of sin and vice in the form of “foreign rum, narcotics, cigarettes, harlotry” He was 
also particularly worried about atheism’s growing popularity with Chinese readers. He 
challenged evangelicals in the U.S. to put China’s modernizing transportation services 
and infrastructure to use to ensure that these “emissaries” of sin did not circulate faster 
and with greater impact in society than the missionary. Glover warned that without the 
missionary’s evangelism these changes would only lead to “civilized 
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heathenism.”119Thus, the CIM did not equate transportation, technology, and modern 
forms of movement with “progress” rather they were excited by the ways in which they 
could be potential tools for evangelism or enhance the missionary’s mobility.  
The association of the CIM missionary with the pioneer in the U.S. appropriated 
many of the ideational meanings of the frontier mythology such as conquest and 
expansionism, democracy, individualism, and flexibility. Through their references to the 
pioneer/frontier the CIM benefitted through the appropriation of the lessons of the U.S. 
mythology of the frontier in American history and simultaneously flexed their meanings 
and interpretative value. The missionary’s movement then suggested the expansion of 
American political values into the Chinese interior but also that these ideals were 
Christian and international as well, making China a “frontier” that was not singularly 
American, but rather a shared project of the Christian moral empire. 
Most importantly labeling the missionary a “pioneer” built into representations of 
the missionary’s mobility a sense of conquest and triumph over his or her surroundings. 
The notion that China was a dangerous place to move about was critical to the 
missionary’s experience of movement in China. For example, Frank H. Meller’s account 
of his itinerancy in Sichuan lists a few of the problems missionaries encountered, “we 
were attacked at times by such enemies as bugs, burglars, bandits, and bombs, as well as 
disease, discouragement, and the devil, but God, who permits all for our good, brought us 
through.”120 And during the era of pioneer evangelism there were innumerable forces 
identified by the CIM as opposing the missionary’s mobility from delays and breakdowns 
in transportation, violent opposition from nationalist students or communist soldiers, and 
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hazardous weather and travel conditions. Members of the CIM understood overcoming 
obstacles in the missionary’s path from A to B, both minor and potentially violent, as a 
matter of divine intervention. For instance, C. Virgil Hook wrote of journeys in Qinghai 
in such a way “Snow on the mountains and heavy mud impeded my progress so much 
that I was not able to make the journey to Hwalung in one day. Rather than stop over in 
the usual place, I looked for Tibetans in each village as I passed, I prayed the Lord to 
guide, and He did.” All along Hook’s travel he stressed that his lodging, hospitality by 
Chinese hosts, and receptiveness of audiences was made possible by God.121  
This belief in divine sovereignty as expressed by the missionary’s mobility was 
more than just ideological belief it colored the experience of movement by CIM 
members. Fitzwilliam’s account of her feelings passing through China just after the 
events of the Northern Expedition reveals her faith in divine assistance, “we were the first 
to leave because we could go around and come in the back door of China…I don’t 
remember that we lived in fear and trembling. We were not uneasy about the situation 
because we knew the Lord was in control and in His own way. We didn’t feel that the 
Lord had taken us out there just to send us home again.” Thus, divine sovereignty was 
felt emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually through movement, and the exercise of 
missionary mobility was evidence of God’s will and intercession in the world. 
In the eyes of U.S. evangelicals, this sense that the missionary mobility reflected 
divine sovereignty and also the missionary’s own deeply felt love for the Chinese helped 
disassociate the missionary movement from imperialism. The CIM was more than aware 
of the controversial aspects of missionary mobility and presence in Chinese. And how 
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could they not be? Occupying interior provinces had not gone uncontested in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the CIM was exposed to violence and hostility from 
various groups in China from Confucian literati to Boxers to Guomindang to the Chinese 
Communist Party. The exercise of the missionary’s extraterritorial rights had also been 
the subject of frequent protest especially by college students in the 1920s and 1930s. For 
many Chinese, the missionary’s mobility was most often associated with the “gunboats” 
of western powers and equated with China’s humiliation and degradation. Increasingly, 
voices from within Chinese Christianity in the 1930s suggested the dominance and 
exploitation perpetrated by Protestant missions through the symbol of the missionary 
perched upon the sedan chair carried by Chinese servants.122 
That the missionary’s mobility signified foreign humiliation was not lost on the 
mission. As noted by CIM representative Frank Houghton in his 1936 book China 
Calling stated the “circumstances,” which led to extraterritorial rights “though they then 
appeared providential” in actuality generated hostility toward and resistance toward 
missions and were in fact “singularly unfortunate as we look back upon them to-day.”123 
And yet, like many CIM members he excused both the mission movement as well as U.S. 
and British governments from abusing their extraterritoriality rights, describing the 
missionary’s penetration of the interior thusly, “the missionary, but because his courage 
and energy carried him to districts where popular prejudices stirred antagonism to him 
and to his message, and, quite apart from any appeal on his part, the consular authorities 
felt responsible to protect him.” As an institution the CIM described the “circumstances” 
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generating the missionary mobility’s as the result of imperialism, but the missionary’s 
exercise of this movement a matter of “courage and energy.”124  
Overall, missioanry mobility signified a complex series of ideas about the 
missionary’s relationship to the Chinese. It is obvious that the movement of missionaries 
in China created a sense of “foreignness” and notions of difference with the Chinese. Eric 
Reinders excellent book Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies: Christian Missionaries 
Imagine Chinese Religion lists a host of ways in which foreign missionaries expressed 
and experienced their “foreignness” via the senses and the body which produced 
prejudicial and racist ideas about the Chinese.125 The CIM missionaries were no different. 
No matter the context, representations of the Chinese as “barbaric,” “heathen,” and 
“backward” are prevalent throughout the mission’s publications and representations. In 
addition, looking at the CIM publications and records it is clear that many of these ideas 
about China were experienced through movement.  
Through moving and evangelizing in China missionaries experienced ideas about 
difference and their own inherent sense of superiority that created and reproduced racial 
stereotypes. In contrast to the meanings associated with the missionary such as the 
advance of civilization or dynamic forces of change then Chinese mobility became its 
“Other” and was associated with ideas about stagnation and backwardness. Juxtaposed 
against pictures of the free roaming CIM missionary were images of Chinese “enslaved” 
by “sin and superstition.” Descriptions of Chinese folk festivals or religious processions 
by Buddhists spoke of these groups as in “bondage” or steeped in “heathenism.” The 
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CIM often compared the dynamism and modernity of the missionary’s mobility to 
transportation such as the bicycle, automobile, or airplane.  Chinese mobility drew 
comparisons to primitive animals such as yaks or modes of transportation such as the 
rickshaw that were labor intensive and associated with ideas of servitude. Travel accounts 
by CIM missionaries on the nation’s trains, buses, or steamships spoke of Chinese 
travelers engaging in “bizarre” social customs often implying that new forms of 
technological mobility failed to have the same “modernizing” effects as they had on 
westerners. Thus, even though the CIM endeavored to identify through mobility, the CIM 
missionary understood “becoming Chinese” as devolving to level of Chinese not meeting 
them as equals.  
 These notions about the differences between the mobility of Chinese and of 
westerners were perpetuated by Chinese voices as well. In the early twentieth century, the 
formidable Liang Qichao’s Observations on a Trip to America made a number of 
observations on the physical differences of Western and Oriental as well as their 
mobility. Liang wrote, “When westerners walk their bodies are erect and their heads up. 
We Chinese bow at one command, stoop at a second, and prostrate ourselves at a third.” 
Similarly, he contrasted the “hurried,” purposeful, cleanly, and orderly movement of 
westerners moving about U.S. cities with Chinese who “walk leisurely and elegantly, full 
of pomp and ritual—they are truly ridiculous.” The notions that were fundamental 
differences in the ways that westerners and Orientals moved and Liang’s comments were 
intended to illustrate the incompatibility of China with such American ideals as freedom, 
constitutionalism, and democracy. In doing so, Liang perpetuated notions about Chinese 
immigrants being inassimilable in American society, referring to their habits on 
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sidewalks or in passenger cars as proof they were “messy and filthy citizens, no wonder 
they are despised.”126  
What is striking, however, is how much the movements of missionaries were 
intended to signify belonging and identification with China and the Chinese. This was 
expressed by the missionary’s movement to China created by the idea of a deeply felt 
spiritual calling to the Chinese. Secondly, upon entering the field, the CIM missionary 
was supposed to shed the visible signifiers of difference in terms of dress and social 
etiquette divided the foreigner and Chinese. In the nineteenth century, Taylor had 
famously championed the adoption of Chinese dress, lifestyle, and diet of local 
communities the missionary inhabited, going so far as to fashion himself a queue. 
Shocking to some Christian statesman and clergy at first, overtime, this institutional 
philosophy garnered the CIM a favorable reputation in comparison to other societies who 
were criticized for living an opulent and comfortable lifestyle far removed from their 
local communities. Within the CIM members such as Fitzwilliam recalls missionaries 
such as James Fraser were “just all out for being Chinese,” and many members were 
enthusiastic about living a “real Chinese life.” 127 
 “Being Chinese” was also very much a matter of movement. Like dress and 
language, traveling and moving as the Chinese was a key signifier of the society’s 
spiritual attachment and identification with their local communities. By the twentieth 
century, the society’s commitment to “pioneering” inland also bespoke identification 
with marginalized groups in Chinese society. By the 1940s the U.S. Council explained 
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the mission’s endeavor within the inland provinces as a decision to “throw in our lot with 
the socially humble and financially poor, if only we could maintain spiritual and 
scriptural integrity.”128 Indeed, many of the CIM’s converts came from groups considered 
among China’s “humble” and “poor” including many rural women, the elderly and ill, 
and ethnic or religious minority groups. Further, stories of travel expressed the CIM’s 
commitment to lifestyles and movements according to the customs of their Chinese 
neighbors. For example, Ralph Tolliver’s “On a Yangtze Steamer” depicted the 
American missionary’s ride in a single class boat with all walks of Chinese society. 
Aboard the ship, Tolliver traveled in cramped quarters among his fellow travelers, 
sleeping on rugs or sheets laid along the floor of the ship in an area barely big enough for 
him to lie.129 Through travel accounts CIM members expressed a sense of fraternity and 
identification with local Chinese experienced in movement.  Many representations of the 
missionary’s mobility by CIM members demonstrated the society’s effort to identify with 
the Chinese by moving and traveling as Chinese did.  
In fact, representations of missionary mobility stressed that movement 
demonstrated deep love and spiritual concern for Chinese. Through enduring hardship 
and physical exertion, the missionary expressed their spiritual equality with Chinese and 
great love and concern for China. The actual experience of covering the districts for 
which CIM members were responsible could indeed be quite trying spiritually, 
emotionally, and physically.  CIM missionaries on their itineration routes from the 
provincial centers to the more rural churches commonly reached up to 170 miles, most of 
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it completed by walking or on bicycle.130 Treks could be much longer and expose the 
missionary to discomforts ranging from physical violence to the more trivial annoyance 
with delays or detour. In Ningxia, the CIM representative H.H.E. Knight covered over 
700 miles by bicycle just to contact the eight churches under his jurisdiction.131    
The great distances described in CIM publications, the hazardous weather and 
conditions of movement, and references to the danger of banditry or violence all 
accentuated the idea of the missionary’s love and commitment. In an article for China’s 
Millions, a female member described her work in Sichuan as “A Gypsy Life,” stating “for 
the past two years we have been leading gypsy life having not settled home but traveling 
around, trying to help the scattered-country Christians who so badly need instruction.”132 
Frequently, CIM members alluded to these difficulties, including social and cultural 
differences experienced while traveling, as a matter of love and spiritual opportunity, and 
suggested that their endurance demonstrated the great determination and affection of 
missionary’s for the Chinese.   
Hazel Waller’s account of her trip to Hwaining in 1947 illustrates many of these 
meanings. Waller described for U.S. readers her trip aboard a boat where Chinese laid on 
“dirty mattresses all over the deck,” and she and her two female companions had been 
expected to share a room with two men. Further, the women had slept with their clothes 
on for several days on the journey because “men frequently opened the door to look at us 
and the place was too dirty anyway to try to be comfortable.” Not to mention that each 
night she recounted “huge rats visited us and the number increased each night,” to the 
point that Waller was forced to try and kill many using her shoes, “Can you picture me 
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sitting at the foot of my cot beating rats down with my shoes,” she asked evangelicals 
back in the U.S.  On the other hand, her journey had left her elated, “my joy in being here 
is almost inexpressible. How foolish my feelings of reluctance to leave the States now 
seem.”133 CIM publications played up the missionary’s adaptability and yearning to 
connect with Chinese, fitting their identities as pioneers, by highlighting experiences that 
home audiences would find bizarre and threatening.   
Simultaneously, then, movement cultivated a sense of superiority to the Chinese 
among missionaries and their supporters. In the story of the Yangtze steamer, Tolliver 
had described his meal with passengers thusly, “around the rice the people squat on 
haunches or sit on hastily-crumpled bedding, eating like primitive man, except that 
chopsticks replace fingers.”134 In Tolliver’s account traveling as Chinese did meant 
devolving to the level of natives. In many other instances CIM members expressed 
derision and disgust with the accommodations and circumstances of travel in China. It 
may be safer to say that through movement CIM missionaries expressed a sense of 
belonging and identification with Chinese society but also contributed to its imagined 
exoticism. 
Missionary representations of travel and movement built associations between 
Chinese mobility with irrationality, disorder, filth, and anti-modernism.  Since the 
nineteenth century, Chinese mobility in the U.S. had been associated with immorality and 
viewed as a threat to American values.135 Similar associations were prevalent in CIM 
publications. Complaints about the quality, reliability, cleanliness or sophistication of 
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travel and transportation are ubiquitous in CIM publications and missionary letters. So 
are allusions to the absurdity of Chinese customs and social habits aboard boats, cars, and 
other forms of transportation. Additionally, the freedom of the missionary often found 
meaning in contrast to the image of the Chinese as “bound up in sin and superstition.” In 
these ways, these themes reified a host of prejudicial and discriminatory ideas associated 
with Chinese mobility. 
What about the mobility of Chinese Christians and evangelists? For example, 
CIM audiences were told of the efforts of Chinese evangelist David Chow in the mid-
1930s in terms similar to those of the CIM missionaries. In 1934 Chow had left “home 
and loved ones…to launch out by faith as a missionary to far-away Kokohnor,” where his 
preaching wrought “confession of sin and restitution, cleansing through the blood, the 
new life in CHRIST and the filling of the SPIRIT” led to “unconverted heathen” to 
convert and Chinese Protestants to revival.136 Similar stories of groups such as the Bethel 
Band and CIM books like Pastor Hsieh: A Wayfarer for Christ were lauded for 
“travelling throughout China from end to end” spreading the gospel. With greater 
frequency in the twentieth century Chinese evangelicals were featured in CIM 
publications and the subject of praise.137  
However, the CIM could be equally damning in its rejection of Chinese 
evangelists as false prophets. Reports from the field in 1934 told U.S. supporters, “as the 
fire of revival spread from heart to heart, and province, it is not surprising that the 
enemy…produces his counterfeit.” Frequently, in the 1930s and 1940s the society 
charged wholly independent Chinese Christian communities such as the True Jesus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Annual Report of the China Inland Mission, “In Season and Out of Season,” (Philadelphia, 1934), p. 26.  
137 Annual Report of the China Inland Mission, “In Season and Out of Season,” (Philadelphia, 1934), p. 25-
26. 
	   87	  
Church with being “counterfeits” or “pseudo-spiritual” and blamed these groups with 
causing social conflict, splitting congregations, and promoting heresy.138 The movement 
of Chinese Christians could be just as easily identified with the spread of heresy and 
groups or figures functioning independently of Protestant mission networks were 
frequently suspect.  
This no doubt reflected that despite persistent CIM declarations of spiritual 
equality and praise for Chinese evangelicals pervasive fears existed about the sincerity of 
Chinese Christians. Racial stereotypes about Chinese as effeminate, idolatrous, and 
duplicitous forced Chinese Christians to undergo an elaborate set of examinations and 
rituals to prove their knowledge of Christian doctrine and their commitment to Protestant 
values and lifestyle.139 Examination and surveillance of Chinese Christians was meant to 
verify sincerity in conversion, which according to scholar Webb Keane, is the lynchpin of 
Protestant modernity and identity in western countries like the U.S. and Great Britain. 
But sincerity as understood by western Protestants is a subjectivity performed through a 
linguistic style of speech and self-expression specific to English, individualism, and a 
self-understood “modern” subjectivity.140  
Thus, representations of the missionary’s mobility also implied its function as 
form of surveillance and safeguarding Christianity. The absence of missionaries from 
Chinese Christian congregations was equated with the potential for backsliding. As one 
CIM writer wrote in 1934, “because of our adversary the devil….the occupation of new 
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territory is invariably challenged by a counter-attack.”141 Declension among Chinese 
Christian churches in the absence of missionaries was a constant fear of the CIM. The 
annual report in 1934 relayed the report of a CIM member who had seen “startling and 
tragic backsliding of several well-known Christians.” In areas without a CIM presence 
the report suggested that without guidance from the missionary there existed “a sad lack 
of freshness and arresting power in the message, and the church seems to be making little 
impression on the not too friendly indifference of this large heathen city” while in another 
he witnessed “a church that goes to all lengths of compromise rather than give offence to 
the heathen society in which its is placed.” He had also seen in other cities “division and 
jealously amongst the Christians.” And the report stressed in general there was 
widespread “revival of idolatry.”142 The mobility of the CIM was not just about forging 
“progress” but preserving the integrity of Protestantism, making Chinese Christians less 
the equal of the missionary and more so their “ward” to be watched over. 
During the era of pioneer evangelism, these meanings produced by missionary 
mobility were colored by a regime of movement that both empowered and problematized 
the Protestant endeavor in Chinese society and the exclusion of Chinese from missions 
like the CIM. Following the end of the Second Opium War, the movement of 
missionaries anywhere in China was sanctioned and protected by both the Chinese central 
authority and western powers. Not only were physical safety and a right to proselytize 
guaranteed, but extraterritorial rights granted foreigner’s privileges which allowed them 
to avoid penalty or imprisonment by Chinese government. Thus, before 1949 Chinese 
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officials were by and large only able to confer privileges upon the missionary mobility 
and guarantee its protection, not set its limits.143  
These privileges of the missionary’s mobility defied the traditional control and 
regulation of religion by imperial dynasties in China. Additionally, such mobility, 
especially by foreigners, ran counter to political trends among modern nation-states in the 
rest of the world. During the twentieth century, governmental control over the 
movements of persons within borders became one of the most basic conventions of the 
modern-nation state through the creation of identity documents such as visas and 
passports, checkpoints, and the codification of laws regulating the movement of persons 
into and out of territories and particular spaces.144 And scholar Tim Cresswell has shown 
the “development of a worldwide system for producing and limiting mobilities on a 
global scale,” was initiated in the U.S. with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 due to a 
prevalent racial discourse which equated the immigration of Chinese “alien, 
inassimilable, uncivil, immoral, and unhealthy” movement of peoples in American 
society.145 While racist notions necessitating such restrictions have been contested 
through the world, in general, the state’s right to a monopoly on regulating the flow of 
persons, especially non-citizens, within their borders has by and large been accepted as a 
“natural” form of modern government. 
This tension inherent to the missionary’s mobility in China was at the heart of 
later debates about the role of foreign missionaries in society. While it was “natural” for 
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governments to license and control the movement of foreigners within national borders, 
Protestant missions could simultaneously view it as an obstruction of religious freedom to 
limit the movement of religious persons such as the missionary. Missionary mobility 
signified freedom of movement and when engaged in propagating the Gospel it was 
associated with the idea of freedom of expression. What is more is that the missionary 
signified the ability to take rights across borders.  In essence, the missionary’s mobility 
reflected the most controversial and problematic aspect of the conflict between 
sovereignty and human rights in the twentieth century: the question of whether or not 
certain rights are beyond the purview of the sovereign state.146 Thus, in China, the 
missionary’s mobility marked the unequal political relationship between China and the 
international community and was freighted with notions of cultural, racial, and spiritual 
difference between Protestant Christians in western countries and the Chinese. 
Missionary mobility was also loaded with ideas about freedom and rights and foreign 
dominance and subversion, and spoke to the sense that foreigner’s enjoyed complete and 
unlimited access to Chinese civilization as a right.  
In this respect, the missionary’s mobility won by imperialism and guaranteed by 
various Chinese regimes was a step in the direction of globalizing human rights since 
certain rights concerning movement and religion were made immune to national 
sovereignty. However, these developments had the added effect of racializing mobility. 
Due to these developments the missionary’s mobility was not so much a matter of their 
humanity as their “whiteness.” The fact that in the U.S. and then later Canada and 
Australia the mobility of Chinese was met by governmental and societal efforts to restrict 
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and prohibit the movement of Chinese while simultaneously missionaries from these 
same countries claimed the right to movement immune from a Chinese sovereignty 
ultimately created notions about mobility rooted in race. The privilege of unrestricted 
mobility became associated with “whiteness” and its immunity from control or regulation 
by non-white regimes and the right of governments to limit or prohibit the movement of 
foreign groups associated with Chinese. 
This color line created by the mobility of missionaries was further reinforced by 
the exclusion of Chinese and Chinese-Americans from membership in missions like the 
CIM. The meanings created by the dichotomy between the missionary’s mobility in 
China and that of Chinese in western countries like the U.S. was reified by the society’s 
membership and definition of Christian internationalism. Although the mission promoted 
itself as an international and interdenominational mission society, the CIM excluded all 
non-whites from membership including Chinese and Chinese-Americans as missionaries. 
In regards to Chinese, the CIM stated that all Chinese evangelists and Christians workers 
were the priority of the native Chinese church according to the principles of the three-
selfs.  Chinese Christians, although many times employed as evangelists or spiritual 
workers, were not eligible to be members as missionaries, and their employment was 
always temporary since according to the principles of an indigenous church Chinese 
Protestants were considered the responsibility of the native church.147 Thus, officially the 
CIM justified the exclusion of Chinese on the basis they were endeavoring to protect the 
spiritual sovereignty of Chinese churches to raise missionaries and propagate the faith as 
their right as fellow Christians. 
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The exclusion of all non-whites in countries like the U.S., including Chinese-
Americans, from joining the CIM, however, revealed the society’s belief that Chinese 
were neither citizens of the respective countries they inhabited like the U.S. or the 
international body of Protestant Christianity. Rather, all Chinese everywhere were bound 
by race to China and the Chinese churches, and, thus, ineligible as individuals to join the 
mission. This segregation of Chinese from the rest of Protestant Christianity was by 
reinforced by the society’s rules on marriage and adoption as the society prohibited the 
intermarriage of Chinese and foreign missionaries, or their adoption of Chinese 
children.148   Excluding Chinese and Chinese-Americans from membership in missions 
like the CIM amplified ideas about the Chinese as “unassimilable” in the U.S. or with the 
international Protestant community, and strengthened the sense of shared whiteness 
enjoyed by members of the CIM from different countries and socio-economic 
backgrounds. 
Pervasive fears about the sincerity of Chinese Christians’ faith coupled with the 
exclusion of Chinese from membership in the mission denied the mobility of Chinese 
Christians an ideological position equal to that of missionaries, at least in the eyes of 
Protestants in the U.S. While Chinese could be missionaries and evangelists, they could 
not make the same claims that contemporaries from the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, 
Australia, and New Zealand could to represent the international body of Christianity.  
Nor was their movement equated with such values as freedom, individualism, and 
evangelicalism. This key fact about the missionary’s mobility shaped the relationship 
between the international Christian community, reflecting clear lines marked by race 
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between areas and populations of the world that were the source of progress and those 
that were the target. While spiritual equality was stressed often and political equality with 
greater frequency, representations of mobility reserved for white, foreign missionaries 
certain values and meanings not associated with Chinese Protestants. 
Therefore, several key messages were laden within the missionary’s mobility in 
the decades leading up to the CIM’s last decade of work in China. The first was that the 
missionary’s mobility was bound up with the idea of its transformative power to create 
and spread progress through movement. Secondly, missionary mobility symbolized a host 
of values that resonated powerfully with U.S. Protestant evangelicals such as freedom, 
individualism, evangelicalism, and divine sovereignty that were given boundless access 
to the Chinese. Further, missionary mobility was represented as exceptional in way that 
Americans truly desired since it was exempted from imperialist attitudes by the ways in 
which movement was intended to demonstrate love, commitment, and spiritual concern 
with the Chinese. Conversely, movement also signified a number of paternalistic attitudes 
toward the Chinese marking them through movement as inferior and sites for expansion. 
Further, mobility communicated that the absence of missionaries brought with it the 
threat of declension and justified surveillance and examination of Chinese Christians.   
Lastly, the exclusion of Chinese on the basis of race from sharing in the 
ideological meanings of the missionary’s mobility reinforced pervasive associations 
about white mobility as progressive and free while Chinese mobility was suspect in 
numerous ways. However, the course of the Asia-Pacific War both the practices of 
movement and the ideology bound up in pioneer evangelism became untenable. By 1943, 
the CIM would announce the era of the pioneer evangelism was complete as the society 
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announced that a “New China” and a new philosophy of mission work and evangelism 
was underway.  
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Chapter 2 
Moving through “Open Doors”: Postwar Planning and the Indigenous Church, 
1943-1949 
Introduction 
  James H. Kane was among the most optimistic of the returning CIM missionaries 
ready to re-enter China in the postwar period. A Canadian citizen, Kane had felt the call 
to be a China missionary as a young man after listening to sermons from missionaries on 
furlough and reading China Inland Mission publications such as China’s Millions and 
Life and Work of Hudson Taylor. In the 1930s, he moved to the United States to attend 
Moody Bible Institute where he remained in close contact with the Chicago branch of the 
CIM. Shortly after graduating, Kane departed for China as a CIM junior missionary in 
1935. He spent much of the late 1930s and early 1940s traveling among the CIM-
affiliated churches of Anhui province. Due to the Asia-Pacific War, he and his wife 
Winnifred remained in China long past his expected furlough. Only in late 1944 was 
Kane able to travel back to North America via India.149  
Despite the short rest he was eager in 1945 to return to reconnect with the 
churches and evangelists of Anhui. When the news of the end war reached him, Kane 
remembered being overjoyed “we all sang the doxology. We say, ‘We’re going back to 
China to start and build again the things that were destroyed.’” The situation might have 
looked bleaker if it did not also appear to many missionaries as a matter of history 
repeating. Kane expected to do as members of the CIM had done in 1898, 1911, and 
1927, “the storm blew over, missionaries went back, picked up the pieces, put them 
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together, and carried on our business as usual.”150 CIM publications such as the society’s 
1945 book Rising Tide: The Story of the Year echoed his sentiments, comparing the 
missionary’s return to China to the inevitability of the rising waters of the Yangtze River 
in the spring.151 To Kane there was a cyclical nature to the missionary’s withdrawal and 
entry into China following political and social turmoil that was defined by God’s divine 
providence; a retreats by the China missionary always led to a greater advance upon their 
return.  
 But this time expectations were buoyed by confidence in China’s postwar future, 
and Kane was eager to play a part in the nation’s recovery. As he left for Shanghai from 
San Francisco for his second tour with the CIM in the fall of 1946 over four hundred 
other missionaries accompanied him aboard the ship Marine Links. It was perhaps the 
largest number of missionaries bound for China on a single vessel in history. Kane and 
his compatriots had “high hopes and great expectations” because “it’s gonna be peace, 
and the peace will lead to prosperity. And Chiang Kai-Shek has won the war, and they’re 
moving in the right direction, and democracy will be gradually introduced.”152 For Kane 
and many of his colleagues in the CIM the missionaries’ re-entry signaled the return of 
critical resources for China’s path toward peace, prosperity, and the movement toward 
democracy.  
 Indeed, most of the Protestant missionary movement was optimistic about the 
future of their work, the development of Chinese Christianity, and relations with the 
GMD, in part because the war had led to the end of the unequal treaties between China 
and the Allied Powers. According to scholar Oi Ki Ling, a minority of missionaries 
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feared that the GMD’s efforts to assert more governmental authority in areas such as 
education and the rising nationalism and anti-imperialist rhetoric of even Chinese 
Christians signaled a move to liberate Christianity in China from missionary dominance. 
The majority of Protestant missions, however, saw the GMD’s position as “favorable” 
and interpreted a number of actions by the government and leading Chinese Christians as 
signals that “their ‘imperialist’ stigma had now gone for good and that the abolition of the 
extraterritoriality would mean a wiping clean of the slate.”153 Before the end of the war, 
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) before an audience of the National Christian Council 
declared the missionary welcome in postwar China, and the government appeared to 
leave open avenues for missionary work in medicine, education, public health, relief and 
humanitarian services, but also opportunities to engage in proselytizing and 
evangelism.154  
The postwar reality of mission work turned out to be far less opportune and 
infinitely more complex than Kane originally thought. In part because Kane was not 
returning to the field as a “pioneer,” but rather as an ally of the indigenous Chinese 
churches. Responding to rising Chinese nationalism, the end of extraterritoriality rights, 
and new challenges to the missionary’s place in society, the CIM launched a renewed 
campaign for indigenization and declared the era of pioneer evangelism over.  
Studying the CIM’s program of indigenization and the missionary’s place within 
these programs reveals the material and ideological investment of Protestant evangelicals 
in China’s postwar state building and sovereignty. Many scholars have suggested the 
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ways in which postwar debates in the U.S. about emerging Asian nations were invariably 
shaped by the discourses of race, nationalism, and expansionism.  For instance, Odd Arne 
Westad has pointed to the prevalence of ideas within the traditional concepts of U.S. 
foreign policy about the obligations to provide guidance for non-white wards in their 
exercise of autonomy and modernity.155And recently Sarah Ruble’s The Gospel of 
Freedom and Power: Protestant Missionaries in American Culture After World War II 
shows that the figure of the missionary served as a symbol of U.S expansion and power. 
According to Ruble U.S. public debates after 1945 about the missionary reflected an 
“American paradox” in which critics and supporters of U.S. foreign policy alike believed 
in “freedom for all but with Americans as arbiters of how others should use their 
freedom.”156 Both scholars allude to the desire of Americans to facilitate the autonomy 
and freedom of foreign groups, but also their urge to determine the evolution of these 
expressions. 
This chapter then explores the shift in CIM mission work under the policies and 
strategies launched in 1943 analyzing the reimagining of the meanings found in the 
movement of missionaries in New China by explaining the ways in which the Asia 
Pacific War and rising Chinese nationalism led to the end of pioneer evangelism. 
Secondly, this chapter discusses the changes in missionary work initiated by the CIM in 
1943 and its intended ideological meanings to promote recognition of Chinese 
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sovereignty and equality. Lastly, the chapter considers how the language of “open doors” 
changed the meanings of missionary mobility during this era.  
Newly elected General Director Frank Houghton and the China Council approved 
the decisive shift in mission practices and ideology away from pioneer evangelism in 
October of 1943 in Chongqing. Not surprisingly, Houghton used tropes of mobility to 
frame the Council’s decision to embark on a new era. In the China’s Million article “The 
Pattern Shown,” he stated, “We have emerged, as it were, from jungle country, in which 
we could scarcely see a step ahead, on to an open clearing, above the level plain. There is 
a road on ahead—not an easy road, but it leads straight from the point where we are 
standing until it loses itself in the dim distance. God has shown us that this is the road by 
which we are to travel, and the chart is in our hands.”157 The days of “pioneering work,” 
in “jungle country” as it were was at an end and so too the leadership was in the process 
of phasing out the strategies and ideology of pioneer evangelism.158   
From 1943 until 1949, Houghton and the China Council led the society in 
launching indigenization as a means to resolve many of the problems surrounding the 
missionary’s return to China, including its postwar relationships with society, Chinese 
Christians, and the state. Indigenization was not a new concept, however. In fact, the 
CIM leadership had embraced the idea of an indigenous Chinese church since the late 19th 
century. The society adopted indigenous principles as guideline for mission work 
following the evacuation of personnel during the Northern Expedition in the 1920s.159 
Indigenizing mission practices were geared around the idea of creating Chinese churches 
that exercised the three-self principles of self-governance, self-support, and self-
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propagation. But by the society’s admission the efforts had largely failed in the 1930s and 
early 1940s.160 
Beginning in 1943, the CIM proposed a new era of wherein new practices of 
missionary work would be configured by the idea of the indigenous and sovereign 
Chinese church. By phasing out pioneer evangelism, the society acknowledged Chinese 
sovereignty and equality, and missionary mobility was reorganized to express these ideas. 
In promoting the indigenous principles the CIM also sold U.S. audiences and the larger 
international Protestant community on an image of Chinese Christian mobility that was 
sovereign, evangelical, and the driving force behind progress in the nation. 
 The concept of an indigenous church has interesting parallels with the American 
political ideal of self-determination. Within the same global moment as the Atlantic 
Charter committing the Allied Powers to the principle of self-rule and sovereign rights, 
the CIM’s new campaign for indigenization stated its recognition for the authority of the 
national churches of China. In many ways the CIM’s three-self approach to promoting 
the indigenous church and its rights—Chinese self-governance in church affairs, self-
propagation in evangelism, and self-support in finances—mirrored the U.S. led 
international order’s support for decolonizing nations’ pursuing self-determination after 
1945. I argue then that the idea of an indigenous, national church was the spiritual 
equivalent of the political ideal of a nation’s self-determination. In this era, Protestant 
evangelicals saw the Chinese churches as microcosms of society, and their exercise of 
spiritual sovereignty was emblematic of the nation’s political destiny. 161  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Collection 534, T4. Interview of Marguerite Owen by Bob Shuster, June 6, 1997. 
161	  Brad	  Simpson,	  “The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Curious	  History	  of	  Self-­‐Determination,”	  Diplomatic	  
History,	  vol.	  36,	  No.	  4	  (September	  2012):	  675-­‐678.	  
	   101	  
Just as Roosevelt and Churchill’s commitment to self-determination was partially 
a means to temper more radical currents of anti-colonial self-determination pacing the 
world, the CIM’s push toward indigenization was also an effort to avert more radical 
definitions of indigenous Christianity from coming to fruition.162 The theme of “open 
doors” conveyed that respect for Chinese spiritual sovereignty was dependent upon 
Chinese Christianity and society’s “openness” to cooperation and influence from the 
international community. Entering the postwar era, the CIM continued to reject any 
notion that indigenous might mean wholly independent and autonomous of mission 
Christianity, such as the forms found among the Jesus Family or Little Flock. The CIM 
also resisted concepts of indigenization that focused “Sinicizing” Protestantism or 
changing the theological and political characteristics of Christianity to be more “Chinese” 
promoted by clergy such as Zhao Yichen and Wu Yaozhong.163 Further, the mobility of 
the missionary under this concept implied that while the missionary’s movement was no 
longer immune from Chinese sovereignty, it was in no way restricted by this sovereignty 
either.  
The Asia-Pacific War and the Indigenous Church 
The Asia-Pacific War jeopardized both the actual movement of missionaries and 
the meanings of that movement in several ways. In terms of actual movement from the 
late 1930s until 1945 the Asia-Pacific War greatly disrupted the CIM’s work. Prior to 
1941 fighting between the Japanese Imperial Army and the forces of the Guomindang 
and Chinese Communist Party led to the evacuation of a large number of the society’s 
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personnel from the provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, and 
Shanxi.164 Many of these missionaries relocated to new positions in the GMD controlled 
“Free China” working in or near the wartime capital of Chongqing. After the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Imperial Army forced thousands of citizens of the Allied 
Powers into internment camps in cities such as Shanghai and Weifang. This included 
many members of the CIM. In Shandong, the society’s complete lack of preparation for 
this turn of events meant that both the students and faculty of the entire Chefoo School 
system, a boarding school for missionary children, became prisoners of war on the 
school’s campus by Japanese forces.  Later, the Chefoo School staff and student body 
were removed to a camp in Weifang until 1945.165  Thus, hundreds of CIM members 
were displaced from their regular assignments or imprisoned from 1937 to 1945. 
Other missionaries of the CIM struggled to continue their work under the 
conditions and pressure of war. In this period, continuing work in areas of China under 
CCP or GMD control was difficult as well. In the northern provinces controlled by the 
CCP numerous missionaries reported that they were unable to continue on their work due 
to restrictions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on missionary activity and worship 
among Chinese Christians. Even occasionally within “Free China” CIM activities were 
restricted by the GMD. Beyond tensions with government or military forces, there were 
the numerous complications in communication, funding, transportation, and safety caused 
by the war that greatly hampered mission work during these years.166  
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The ways in which the war threatened the ideological meanings of missionary 
mobility were also severe. In this regard, the impact of the Japanese occupation on the 
future of the Protestant missionary endeavor in China has been understated in previous 
scholarship.  In certain respects, Japan’s internment of foreign missionaries was a critical 
precursor to the shock felt throughout the international Christian community after the 
CCP’s founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 when foreign missions 
were first immobilized and then expelled.  As a result of Japanese invasion and 
occupation from 1941 to 1945, an Asian regime had asserted its total control over the 
movement of the European and American community along the nation’s coast. The 
association between the missionary’s mobility and its immunity from the sovereignty of 
Asian regimes had been crippled. Additionally, the prospect of a Japanese victory in 
China threatened the missionary’s signification of freedom, progress, and divine 
sovereignty.  
Certainly, the repercussions of these events were not lost on the CIM’s new 
General Director, Bishop Frank Houghton. He believed that only divine intercession had 
halted the late advance of Japanese forces in 1944 and early 1945 toward Chongqing, 
saving the Protestant missionary endeavor from a total collapse, “there was nothing at all 
to hinder the Japanese from making further advances….the deliverance was of 
God.”167To Houghton and like-minded evangelical Protestants it had been God’s will, not 
the Allied forces, which had ultimately saved the missionary from complete subjugation 
to Japanese control in China. 
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A second critical issue clouding the return of the CIM missionary to the field was 
the end of extraterritorial rights.  The GMD’s role as an Allied Power laid the basis for 
the end of extraterritoriality rights enjoyed by U.S. and British citizens in 1943. Although 
the majority of missions including the CIM supported the end of the unequal treaties as 
early as the 1920s, the loss of extraterritoriality rights called into question the freedom of 
the missionary from government licensure and regulation of mobility. Certainly, the 
GMD had sent a strong message in the 1920s and 1930s that Protestant missions were to 
conduct their business with a greater sense of respect for Chinese sovereignty, both 
politically and spiritually. Foreign control of key institutions in education and medicine 
had been points of contention between the GMD and the Protestant missionary force.168 
Within the missionary ranks cooperation with the GMD on a number of humanitarian 
political projects along with Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-shek) identity as a Christian left 
many Christians including the CIM’s General Director assured of the continued 
importance of Protestant missions.169 Even so the loss of extraterritorial rights and rising 
Chinese nationalism created uncertainty about the exact nature of the relationship 
between the government and Protestant missions.  
There were tense relations between Chinese Protestants and foreign missions 
concerning sovereignty and nationalism heading into the postwar era as well. In the 
twentieth century many Chinese Christians strove to erase the stigma of Christianity as 
“foreign” and to assert their authority within Protestantism by freeing churches and 
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Protestant institutions from foreign control. Nationalist and anti-imperialist 
demonstrations by Chinese Christians following the May Thirtieth Incident and anti-
Christian movements of the 1920s strained relations between foreign and Chinese 
Protestants. In response, embracing Chinese autonomy became an ideal guiding the 
practice of mission work, as more and more societies like the CIM spoke of “indigenous 
principles” as the guide for their work.170  
A minority of Chinese Protestants even lobbied for mechanisms of control over 
the operations of foreign missions. Chinese delegates at the International Missionary 
Council in Jerusalem in 1928 questioned the necessity of missionary councils to represent 
Christianity in China and further asked that all future work of missionaries be assigned to 
representatives of the Chinese churches. In addition, the delegates proposed that national 
representatives should allocate finances and personnel raised outside of China to the 
Chinese churches. Never enacted, such measures suggested a growing desire among 
leading voices of the Chinese Protestant community for absolute sovereignty in Christian 
affairs within their national borders.171 
The movement toward Chinese sovereignty over Protestantism would continue in 
the 1940s. In 1944, the National Christian Council (NCC) warned missions against 
working independently of Chinese leadership and instead championed programs for 
postwar reconstruction as a “great cooperative enterprise” between western countries and 
the Chinese Protestant community. To do so, missionary societies were encouraged to 
integrate themselves into existing Chinese churches and operate under their authority, 
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simultaneously transferring control of church governance, financing, and property to 
Chinese administration. In 1946, the General Council of the China Christian Council 
(CCC) proposed Chinese-foreign coordination and planning of the allocation of 
missionary personnel and distribution of financial resources. It was further suggested by 
the General Council that re-occupying areas abandoned during the war proceed under the 
authority of local churches. This emphasis on Chinese authority and Sino-foreign 
cooperation extended to evangelism, too. Another proposal of Chinese leadership was 
that responsibility for “un-evangelized areas” be considered the joint responsibility of 
Chinese and foreign missions.172 
The CIM’s indigenous program then was a not only the means to establish an 
indigenous church, but also as a response to the challenges of Chinese nationalism, 
sovereignty, and the loss of extraterritorial rights. Asian regimes such as the Japanese 
forces and Chinese Communist Party had not only claimed the power to regulate 
missionary mobility but also in reality demonstrated their power to prohibit, detain, and 
deny its exercise. In addition, even seemingly pro-missionary regimes such as the GMD 
and leading Chinese Protestants criticized its connections to imperialism. Both groups 
asserted the dominion of Chinese over Protestantism in China and its civilizing mission 
in society. And the relinquishing of the unequal treaties created uncertainty surrounding 
the movements of missionaries in postwar China and by extension its association with 
values such as freedom and progress.  
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Indigenous Church, Spiritual Sovereignty, and Chinese Pioneers 
The CIM’s plan for postwar work according to indigenous principles responded to 
these various issues in three critical ways. First, the CIM endeavored to promote the 
three-self principles as a means to strengthen the position of Chinese churches and their 
spiritual self-determination. Secondly, the CIM endeavored to reorganize evangelism 
based upon recognition of Chinese spiritual sovereignty and equality. Lastly, the 
meanings of Chinese mobility were altered as Chinese Protestants were ceded the right to 
lead China’s evangelization and assume the role of “pioneers.” 
To promote Chinese self-determination and sovereignty the CIM planned to 
increase Chinese authority over governance, finance, and religious activities within 
existing Christian institutions. For instance, to promote self-governance within existing 
Christian institutions the CIM transferred ownership and control of many mission 
properties and facilities to Chinese congregations across the nation. In areas where 
Chinese congregations were deemed to be self-governing, the mission deeded to Chinese 
Christians the property of the mission with two conditions: the property was to be used 
only for church and evangelistic purposes,(i.e., no political or civic programs were 
allowed to use the premises), and, secondly, the church promised to uphold the doctrinal 
standards of the CIM in perpetuity.173  
Promoting indigenization also required a rebalancing of the financial relationship 
between the mission and Chinese churches. According to the ideal of self-support the 
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CIM would also no longer employ thousands of Chinese workers. The responsibility for 
salaries of Chinese evangelists, pastors, bible schoolteachers, and colporteurs were to be 
transferred to Chinese congregations as a result of indigenization. Exceptions were made 
in the case of Christian workers laboring in Tibet or Xinjiang, areas still considered fit for 
pioneer work. In other cases, Chinese Christians were allowed “temporary” financial 
assistance from the CIM, particularly for “special projects” such as the founding of the 
Chongqing Theological Seminary. 174  
The more dramatic changes, however, came in promising to recognize the 
sovereignty of Chinese Christians in the realm of self-propagation. In 1944, Houghton 
announced that the Council had been moved by the events of the war to recognize that the 
Chinese Church was now God’s primary channel for evangelizing China, “the principle 
which must govern all our thinking, and planning, and action in the matter of evangelism 
is that, as soon as a Church has been brought into being in any country, evangelism is the 
task of the church, not merely individuals within it, still less of Christians from other 
lands.”175Chinese congregations were sovereign not just within their own communities, 
but posssessed the right to lead society’s evangelization. On an official level, the CIM’s 
spiritual mission, taking Christianity to its geographic and social limits within China, had 
been ceded to Chinese Protestants as their national right. And all evangelism within reach 
of existing Chinese Christians their sovereign right to initiate and lead. 
Conversely, Chinese Christian sovereignty and an indigenous church did not 
mean independence. In theory, from the local to the national level the CIM would seek to 
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work with Chinese in evangelism at their discretion and according to their vision. 
Houghton said, “We as missionaries are the contributions of churches in other lands to 
the Church in China, and our commission will be fulfilled as we work with, and under, 
that Church.”176 Further, under this new emphasis, missionaries were relegated to a 
“secondary” position and were at the “disposal” of the Chinese Church in its endeavors as 
the “central evangelist agency.”177 The main thrusts of this latest iteration of the 
missionary work were to make evangelism church-focused, utilizing existing bases of 
Chinese Christianity to advance the gospel, and integrate the missionary more fully into 
the Chinese churches. 
By specifying that the missionaries now occupied “secondary” positions the 
China Council hoped to revise the interpretation of indigenization as practiced in the 
1920s and 1930s. In these decades, support for indigenous principles led many 
missionaries in the field to work entirely outside of existing Chinese Christian churches 
so as to prevent violating their authority. This is certainly the image of Chinese Christian 
and missionary relations left when reading the oral history of Dr. John Chin, a Chinese 
Christian born in Kaifeng, Henan in 1911. Chin was born into a Christian home, his 
parents having already converted to Christianity before he was born, and attended CIM 
churches during his childhood and youth, even later working in the mission’s hospital in 
Kaifeng in the mid-1930s following his graduation from medical school. While in Henan 
at university and later as a doctor in the provinces of Yunnan and Shaanxi, Chin was an 
active lay evangelist contributing to student evangelism campaigns led by noted Chinese 
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Christians such as Watchman Nee and eventually even became a pastor and founder of a 
Lutheran Church in Xi’an.  
Despite the CIM’s considerable influence on his religious upbringing and Chin’s 
own commitment to evangelism, however, rarely if ever did he work in tandem with 
missionaries. In the case of the CIM, Chin states that although the organization held an 
“advanced” view of the indigenous church in the 1930s and 1940s the society’s call to 
fan out spreading the gospel in new directions and plant new churches meant that the 
congregations it founded in Henan remained small and its work with existing Chinese 
Christians rather limited. Contributing to this separation of missionaries and Chinese 
Christians was the fact that Chin as an evangelical found various opportunities for 
fellowship and evangelism within various sects of Chinese Christianity that were wholly 
independent of the missions that typically used the home as the focal point of planning 
and coordinating evangelism campaigns, a place that Chin recalls even CIM missionaries 
were typically reluctant to assemble in for fellowship.178 Houghton’s vision of 
indigenization sought to eradicate this social and spiritual distance between missionaries 
and existing Chinese believers by working in tandem with Chinese evangelists like Chin, 
especially in areas such as student evangelism.  
 A second issue in the era of pioneer evangelism was that many missionaries 
simply ignored the three-self principles and continued to dominate the life and activities 
of local churches.179 By the 1940s neither result was acceptable to the CIM. The Council 
believed that society, the GMD and Chinese Protestants would not tolerate missionaries 
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usurping their authority in the postwar era, nor would the mission and its followers 
support definitions of indigenous Chinese Christianity as wholly independent and 
autonomous from the international community.  
For the CIM then the key to the success of indigenization and Sino-Foreign 
cooperation in evangelism hinged upon establishing equitable relations between Chinese 
and foreigners. Ensuring equitable relations was in part the basis for jettisoning the 
methods and ideology of the pioneer. In fact, much of the ideological value of the 
missionary’s new role and place in society under indigenous principles found meaning 
through criticism of the pioneer era. According to Houghton under the practices of 
pioneer evangelism, CIM members all too often abused their positions in Chinese 
congregations by “condemning as unchristian what is, after all, only un-British or un-
American.”180 To combat this prejudice, the society announced that it planned to revise its 
recruitment and training procedures. It also promised to introduce backdoor channels to 
allow Chinese congregations and clergy to evaluate the performance of CIM missionaries 
in the field and voice their favor or opposition to the return of members to their areas.181  
More than just bureaucratic measures, the CIM promised to alter the rhetoric and 
ideology of the missionary force to generate equality. Under the new principles Houghton 
announced the missionary would “come to meet the Chinese as equals,” and the General 
Director promised that no longer would the CIM make “appeals based on abuses to be 
found, or on the backwardness of the people.” He stated that in the new era China’s 
standing and that of the Chinese church was on par with the west, “China’s spiritual need 
lies not in the fact that her millions are different from us or inferior to us, but like 
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ourselves in that apart from Christ they are ‘guilty, lost, and helpless.’”182 Here, 
Houghton was hoping to completely rewrite the meanings of the missionary’s call to 
China as understood in the pioneer era. Houghton proposed that under indigenous 
principles it would be recognition of equality and shared religious values, not difference 
that propelled the missionary to China.  
In this new era of Sino-Foreign Protestant relations, missionary mobility and its 
representations gave expression to notions of equality and unity. Accompanying 
Houghton’s article “The Pattern Shown” in February 1944 was the picture of four female 
evangelists, two foreign missionaries and two Chinese evangelists, with bicycles. 
Captioned “Working Together, Chinese and Foreign” the picture conveyed the new era’s 
emphasis on equality and unity established through cooperation in evangelism and shared 
practices of movement.183 During this period, through practices of movement and their 
representation Chinese Christians and missionaries demonstrated a shared ideological 
outlook and agenda, but also their essential equality with one another, and were a part of 
a larger series of events altering the meanings associated with Chinese mobility.  
Just as the loss of extraterritoriality rights contributed to the reimagining of 
missionary mobility, U.S. immigration reform opened up a cultural space for 
reinterpreting the meanings of Chinese mobility. In 1943, Congress repealed exclusionary 
laws barring Chinese immigrants following diplomatic pressure by the GMD regime, 
although the significance of the decision was largely symbolic since the quota for 
Chinese migration was set at an annual limit of 105. Nonetheless, immigration reform 
reflected greater recognition of Chinese sovereignty and the more general decline of 
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racism’s intellectual credibility in American life. Images in U.S. media such as 
Hollywood director Frank Capra’s The Battle of China showing Chinese as “heroic” 
defenders of their freedom and country against the “militant” and “fanatical” Japanese 
also played a part in altering public opinion of the Chinese.184  Similarly, the CIM and 
larger Protestant missionary movement lauded the heroics of Chinese Christians in 
maintaining worship and evangelism during the war while missionaries were forced to 
abandonded their posts or arrested by Japanese forces.185  These portrayals contributed to 
the U.S. public’s questioning of racial stereotypes about the Chinese as immoral, 
disorderly, and unassimilable, and larger discussion about the emergence of China and 
the Chinese as equals in the international community.  
New ideas about Chinese mobility were given expression by the CIM positioning 
Chinese as taking up the mantle of “pioneers” through adopting the methods of pioneer 
evangelism. Prior to the Asia-Pacific War one of the more dominant images of Chinese 
Christian mobility among U.S. evangelicals had been that of the “colporteur.” In the 
1920s and 1930s, the CIM employed hundreds of Chinese workers as colporteurs to carry 
the mission’s pamphlets and scripture books to distribute in rural villages and along 
waterways.186 Thus, the mobility of Chinese Protestants often evoked servitude as these 
workers labored under the authority and direction of the missionary. Referring to their 
translators and co-evangelists as “helpers” or “assistants” similarly conveyed a sense of 
the Chinese Christian’s secondary status to that of the foreign missionary. This equation 
of Chinese mobility with servitude was reinforced by representations of Chinese 
“coolies” carrying the luggage of missionaries or transporting them via sedan chair. 
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Overall, such impressions built the sense that Chinese mobility functioned as a means to 
facilitate the missionary’s mobility.  
In contrast, the Chinese “pioneers” of the postwar era inspired images of 
autonomy and authority and their mobility was associated with the spread of piety, 
progress, and national reconstruction. Prevalent throughout the CIM publications were 
images of Chinese Christians as “pioneers” taking the gospel to their country’s 
“unevangelized” or “reaching the heathen” in provinces like Guizhou and Yunnan. Other 
Chinese Christians were shown undertaking street and market preaching and district or 
provincial itinerations to combat idolatry and “superstition” in society.187 Similarly, CIM 
missionaries praised Chinese evangelists for their zeal, seriousness and “businesslike” 
approach to evangelism, and for fighting against “false doctrine” and guarding the 
“purity” of the faith.188 Lastly, metaphors comparing the Chinese churches to jet airplanes 
being “designed” and built in “factories” now ready to take flight in the pages of China’s 
Millions cast Chinese Christianity as mobile, modern, and sophisticated.189 
Hoping to cultivate a generation of Chinese pioneers, the most important new 
project the CIM undertook was the creation of the Chongqing Theological Seminary 
(CTS), presided over by Pastor Chen Chonggui, who was known to his supporters in the 
U.S., Canada, Great Britain and Australia as “Marcus Cheng. Chen was a nationally 
known Chinese evangelist and theologian, the sort of ally the CIM had been lacking in 
the previous decades, and had previously worked with the Swedish Missionary Society 
and   Founded in the fall of 1943, the CIM hoped that under Chen the seminary would 
provide an evangelical alternative to the colleges and seminaries in China dominated by 
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the theology and social ethos of the liberal-modernist Protestantism. Unlike those 
institutions, in Chen the CIM secured a Chinese evangelical to head a seminary that 
would train pastors and evangelists in the society’s methods of evangelism and provide 
theological education rooted squarely in the tenets of fundamentalist-evangelicalism.   
Like Houghton, Chen was an important voice urging that the age of the Chinese 
pioneer arrived. His book published by the CIM Lamps Aflame, Chen argued that 
Christianity’s success in the postwar hinged on the Chinese evangelists, “If China is ever 
to be evangelized, if its people are ever to hear of the Savior, it must be through the 
witness of our own Chinese believers. The medium must be the Chinese personality.”190 
While the foreign missionary still played an important role, Chen warned that within the 
context of state-building and China’s striving for equality with the world the fulfillment 
of the CIM’s ambitions rested on the shoulders of the Chinese evangelical. Not 
surprisingly, then, imparting the CIM’s vision and missionary impulse to Chinese became 
the focal point of the missionary’s work.  
Testimony from Chen in China’s Millions from 1944 to 1951 paired neatly with 
the picture printed alongside his articles. Cutting the figure of a professional and scholar, 
the small picture showed Chen standing, but not smiling, in a white suit coat and dark tie, 
his neat and flat hair cut and dark-rimmed glasses sitting just above his trimmed 
mustache. The image recalled the drawing entitled “Faces of Old and New China,” from 
the popular Compton’s Pictured Encyclopedia, reprinted in the pages of China’s 
Millions. Specifically, Chen’s appearance referenced the male Han Chinese in a western-
style suit labeled “Leader of the New China,” who was surrounded in the drawing by a 
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constellation of other figures meant to embody the elements of Chinese society. In total, 
there were ten faces drawn, but only three persons associated with “New China.” “Leader 
of New China,”“Young Lady of Hong Kong,” and “Boy Scout-Mission School”  were 
representative of “New China,”  and their figures were marked by their youthful 
expressions and dress in fashions influenced by western cultures, which were noticeably 
spotless and clean in contrast to the clothing of the “Faces of Old China.” The rest of the 
Chinese were known as the “Yangtze Fisherman,” “Peasant Mother,” “Mule Driver-
Shangtung,” “Shanghai Beggar,” “Mohammedan-Central China,” “Peasant-Old Style,” 
and “Visitor from Mongolia.” All were dressed in “traditional” garb, their clothing 
smudged with dirt and stains, but also marked by captions that suggested an ethnicity, 
religion, and occupation which clearly marked them as the faces of “Old China.”191 
The drawing’s message, much like the discourse surrounding Chen’s role in 
indigenization and Protestant missions, concerned the role of modern subjects and the 
social and cultural transformations taking place in Chinese society in the twentieth 
century. The future of Chinese society lay with the “New Faces” just as the hopes among 
evangelicals in the U.S. for creating an indigenous Chinese Christianity was placed in the 
persons such as Chen, who embodied the visible and invisible characteristics of a 
“modern” Protestant leader.  
Chinese Christians most commonly found in the pages of CIM’s China’s Millions 
before the 1940s had much more in common, however, at least in terms of occupation 
and social background with the drawings of the Chinese labeled “Peasant-Old style” or 
the weary, elderly and stooping “Peasant mother.” For much of its ninety year past, the 
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CIM operated according to the idea of “pioneering” missionary work according to its 
founder’s commitment to expanding and spreading the gospel to areas “untouched” by 
Christianity.192 This focus on “un-evangelized areas” and relative lack of involvement in 
formally educating and training Christians in the past meant that the CIM had few 
second-generation or third generation Chinese Christians working directly with the 
mission’s personnel. Located primarily in rural areas, the CIM attracted few converts 
with formal education and prestigious social standing in these communities, at least 
initially. The social background of Chinese Christians within the CIM flock tended to be 
rural peasants, the elderly, and many congregations initially formed through the initiative 
of Chinese women.193 As a result, the first converts attracted to the mission churches of 
the CIM were often illiterate or had little formal education, and knew very little English.  
The CIM’s work in untouched areas also concentrated on many ethnic and religious 
minorities deemed by the majority of Han Chinese to be racially, culturally, and socially 
inferior.194 Chen and the seminary’s students were envisioned as a response to the past 
issues in the CIM’s development of indigenization which had failed to establish a 
Chinese church that was both under the authority of Chinese and yet recognizably 
“modern” to foreigners by cultivating congregational and national leadership from the 
“New Faces” that now responded to the CIM’s brand of evangelical Protestantism.   
Conversely, the relationship between the Chen and the Chongqing Theological 
Seminary and the CIM perfectly illustrates how ideas about the sovereignty of Chinese 
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Christians were complicated by the missionary movement’s return to the field. Although 
from the start General Director Houghton and Chen had agreed that the seminary was an 
“independent” institution, the CIM and its support communities around the world were 
heavily invested financially in the seminary. From 1944 until 1951, the CIM provided a 
majority of the institution’s operational budget, donated the premises for the school’s 
campus, and raised funds and publicity for the seminary around the world. In addition, 
several CIM members served as faculty instructors and administrators at the CTS, and 
guest speakers such as General Director Houghton from the CIM were frequently present 
in the seminary’s classrooms, worship services, and youth rallies. Further, students and 
faculty preached in CIM churches, aided CIM missionaries in evangelistic activities 
around Chongqing in prisons and on college campuses, and joined the society’s members 
each summer break on itinerations across Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangdong.  Not to 
mention it was the China Council of the CIM that had concocted the plans for the CTS in 
the first place and selected Chen as the seminary’s first president. 195 
Through its influence and relations with Chen and the Chongqing Theological 
Seminary the CIM put forward an alternative to more radical, independent forms of 
indigenization coming from the broader Christian community. In particular, there were 
two variants of indigenization that the CIM remained ideologically opposed to: the first 
being a revivalist brand of various Chinese Christian movements that stood wholly 
outside the mission networks and the second a loosely connected cohort of Chinese 
theologians and social reformers who “sinicized” Christianity. The first group was 
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admittedly indigenous, but opposed by the CIM as “pseudo-religious” because its 
leadership had little to no official education in Christian theology and catechism.196 
Groups such as the Jesus Family and Little Flock also tended to form hybrid ontological 
systems that incorporated Christian symbols and messages into other religious structures 
like Chinese popular religion.  
The second category, the “sinicizers,” a group of highly-educated Chinese 
Christian theologians and clergy, was seen as the byproduct of liberal-modernist 
relativism, which from the perspective of Protestant evangelicals meant that Christianity 
was perverted into merely an ethical system, not a religion. Among this cohort, members 
such as Zhao Zichen and Wu Yaozhong rooted the intellectual foundations of Chinese 
Christianity in a blend of modern scientific rationalism and precepts of classical Chinese 
philosophy, each choosing to ignore such basic western Christian concepts like the 
miracles of God’s divine intervention or the role of sin and redemption in the Christian 
life. This “sinicization” of Christianity built on the new roles indigenous leadership had 
within Christian institutions to make both Christian theology and social activism relevant 
to the Chinese experience.197 
At the local level among rural Chinese congregations, the CIM evangelicalism 
found itself in competition for followers with the popular revivalism of revivalist groups 
like the Little Flock and other charismatic movements who remained wholly outside any 
contact or cooperation with foreign missions. And at the national level, liberal-modernists 
and “sinicizers” dominated the conversation with Chinese youth and intelligentsia. At 
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both levels, from the top and from below, the CIM’s opposition to these two broad 
strokes of indigenization demonstrated an evangelical wearisome attitude toward 
indigenization of Protestantism in the realm of culture. In the agreement with Chen, the 
CIM found a Protestant leader who agreed that indigenization’s main issues concerned 
race and nationality, not culture. Chen’s career and episodic disputes with missions had 
been about Chinese Christians having autonomy, economic responsibility and control of 
Christian communities, and a leading role in the propagation of Christianity.  
From the vantage of the CIM, indigenization was about the transfer of autonomy 
from foreign to Chinese, not about a cultural renovation of the faith itself. Chen’s 
presidency, his evangelical worldview and extensive education in western Christian 
theology, ensured that evangelicalism would cultivate a generation of Chinese pioneers 
from the “New Faces of China,” and safeguard against the “excesses” of indigenization. 
The founding of an evangelical seminary and its importance to indigenization was about 
creating a strong national rival to the liberal-modernist camp and creating an educated 
and classically trained rural Chinese clergy. A generation of Christian leadership that 
indigenization could be entrusted to carry forward without threatening the core principles 
of evangelical Protestantism as understood in western countries. 
There were also a number of ways that the CIM positioned Chinese spiritual 
sovereignty as limited and incomplete inside China. First, the CIM enumerated several 
circumstances permitting the continued practice of European or American pioneer 
evangelism. The China Council of the CIM declared that the society would continue its 
“pioneering efforts” among the nation’s “non-Chinese races” with greater intensity in the 
postwar era. The list of “Non-Chinese Races” included the peoples of Tibet, Muslims, the 
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“border tribes” of Sichuan, and various “aboriginals” in Guizhou and Yunnan.  In these 
regions and amongst these populations the CIM reserved the right to work outside of the 
Chinese churches.198 Thus, Chinese spiritual sovereignty was limited by geography and 
ethnicity, and various non-Han Chinese Christian groups were denied the equality and 
sovereignty extended to other Chinese Protestants in this period, leaving the foreign 
missionary with the prerogative to engage in pioneer evangelism. 
A second constraint on Chinese sovereignty was that the CIM reserved the right 
to sidestep the authority of Chinese churches. The CIM approached the possibility of 
Chinese reluctance to zealously propagate the faith cautiously. In 1944, General Director 
Houghton declared that “Where the Church is weak or lacking in vision, and the 
population of great cities, or of neighboring country districts, is being left unevangelized, 
it should still be our aim to work through the Church rather than apart from it.”199 He 
argued, however, that it might be necessary in such cases for CIM missionaries to 
evangelize in places or amongst groups without cooperation or approval of Chinese 
Christians. In doing so, Houghton stated that the CIM missionaries would be considered 
“temporary” and “representative” of Chinese Christianity, not of the international 
community.200 Oddly enough, this interpretation advanced the notion that missionary 
mobility could on occasion reflect the desire and intent of Chinese spiritual sovereignty 
even before any Chinese Christian had articulated or exercised this expression.  The 
qualification also functioned as a loophole for CIM missionaries to exploit in bypassing 
the Chinese right of self-propagation.  
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Most importantly, Chinese spiritual sovereignty was undermined by the mission’s 
rhetoric about the “infancy” or “immaturity” of the Chinese churches.  Such ideas were 
promoted by the CIM in articles such as the “Adolescence of the Church in China,” by 
prominent members such as D. Bently Taylor. In the March 1945 issue of China’s 
Millions, Taylor proclaimed, “Behold a nation-wide church emerging from its childhood, 
conscious of its freedom, impatient of restraint, eager for friendship and the kind advice 
of an equal, but sensitive to criticism and repelled by aloofness or assumption of 
superiority.”201 He warned that during such a period the “adolescent” Chinese Christians 
were “often prepared to try methods and ideas which we know to be dangerous and 
detrimental to spiritual health, and sometimes she is torn by sectarian winds of her own, 
or blown upon by varying winds of doctrine, of truth, of untruth and of ill-directed 
zeal.”202 Rather than fully sovereign or equal, Taylor’s metaphor suggested that the 
Chinese churches were in a period of transition. Further, that in exercising sovereignty 
Chinese Protestants would be prone to errors and perhaps threaten the integrity of the 
faith. This rhetoric about Chinese “adolescence” imbued recognition and respect for 
Chinese authority with a sense of paternalism. In particular it fueled the CIM and their 
supporters’ strong desire to shape the development and exercise of Chinese Christianity 
in the 1940s.  
The sense that Chinese Christians were sovereign and yet lacking the experience 
or qualities necessary to exercise their rights properly was also perpetuated by the CIM’s 
constant reminders that the Chinese Christian population was incredibly small and the 
number of its ordained and educated Christian pastors smaller still. In Jiangxi, the CIM 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201	  D.	  Bentley-­‐Taylor,	  “Adolescence	  of	  the	  Church	  in	  China,”	  China’s	  Millions,	  March	  1946.	  
202	  D.	  Bentley-­‐Taylor,	  “Adolescence	  of	  the	  Church	  in	  China,”	  China’s	  Millions,	  March	  1946.	  
	   123	  
advertised that by 1946 “not only are there no missionaries in most places, but no 
Chinese workers.” Even the CIM-affiliated churches in the cities of Nanchang, Kian, 
Kanchou, and Shanghjiao were without Chinese pastors.203 The General Director stated 
that it would be years, perhaps decades, before the Chinese had enough educated clergy 
and lay leadership to staff the nation’s bible schools, seminaries, and churches.204 While 
this impacted the Chinese Christian capacity for self-governance and self-support, the 
CIM was most concerned about how it influenced evangelism.  
 Therefore, the CIM acknowledged Chinese Christians as sovereign and equal, but 
also equally dependent on cooperation with the missionary to exercise their spiritual 
sovereignty. The CIM’s rhetoric about the sovereignty of Chinese Christians and 
partnerships with evangelicals like Chen and the Chongqing Theological Seminary 
officially elevated Chinese evangelicals to the status of ally and equal to the foreign 
missionary. Further, the CIM’s representations of Chinese pioneers disseminated images 
of Chinese mobility associated with as modern, pious, and critical to society’s postwar 
reconstruction. Simultaneously, the mission’s references to the dearth of Chinese 
evangelicals like Chen and delineation of the limits to Chinese authority spiritual clearly 
undermined respect for Chinese spiritual sovereignty and equality. Nor did the CIM 
accept the idea that Chinese spiritual sovereignty meant independence from Protestant 
missions, rather the CIM put forward a definition of relations between the missionary and 
indigenous Chinese Christianity that sought to integrate them further.     
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In referencing the limits to indigenous authority, Houghton and other members of 
the CIM argued time and again that mission-church cooperation was a buttress to Chinese 
Protestant aims and ambitions. From the vantage point of the CIM, the Chinese Christian 
community lacked the size and qualifications to evangelize China without the missionary, 
a problem that institutions such as the CTS were intended to solve, but not immediately. 
Further stressors on the churches such as the nation’s recovery and its own “adolescence” 
and lack of trained leadership and Christian the CIM argued demanded the Protestant 
missionary movement’s increasing investment in China, not a reduction in its efforts.  
New Roles, New Mobility 
Indigenous principles and the sovereignty of Chinese Protestants also led to a 
reimagining of the missionary’s role in postwar society. To promote Chinese sovereignty 
and self-determination, the CIM missionaries focused on a church-centric approach to 
evangelism, helped existing churches achieve the three-selfs, and reassigned many 
personnel to focus on disciple-ship training. In many other cases, missionaries were 
assigned to “specialized work” where members were loaned out to various evangelistic 
agencies, educational institutions, or government agencies. Lastly, the CIM planned to 
foster within China a nation-wide evangelical infrastructure of bible schools, seminaries, 
and evangelism agencies that would both promote and strengthen Chinese evangelicals. 
This reorganization of missionary work intended to alter mission work in a 
number of significant ways. The first major alteration was that the CIM planned to 
integrate missionaries within existing Chinese churches, and secure their approval to 
engage in work within their areas at their invitation and discretion. The indigenous 
program allocated the society’s personnel across the field according to entirely different 
	   125	  
priorities. Five years prior at the 1938 China Council Meeting the society had reiterated 
its focus on sending agents first to “unevangelized areas,” and then secondly to “partly 
evangelized areas.” Work in “Church areas” was deemed the lowest priority for the CIM. 
Conversely, the postwar indigenization program endeavored to “reverse that order, and, 
thus, to recognize that the Church is central to our thinking.” Now, missionaries were to 
be redirected away from the “frontier” and toward existing Chinese congregations in 
order to cooperate with and work under Chinese leadership.205 Ideally, the missionary 
would operate under the invitation and at the discretion of Chinese churches.  
Procuring these “invitations” from Chinese churches became essential to the 
missionary’s return to the field. To pave the way for the missionary, the China Council 
first sent circulars describing the mission’s new principles to Chinese evangelicals. 
Following in their wake in early 1945 another “vanguard” of missionaries was directed 
back to the abandoned fields in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Hebei, and Shanxi to 
work out agreements in person. It was largely up to these advisory commissions— 
composed of a provincial superintendent, and two missionaries, one to assess the costs of 
reoccupation and damages done to mission property and a female member— to convey 
the mission’s new principles in person and lay the groundwork for potential areas of 
cooperation for CIM missionaries under the authority of Chinese congregations. By 
November of 1945 the society had already laid out the basis for its cooperation with over 
1,000 communities of Chinese Christians nationwide.206 
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Within existing congregations many CIM members were reassigned to roles as 
bible teachers or other activities intended for discipleship training. Houghton predicted 
that as Chinese took up the call to evangelize Bible teaching would be the CIM’s “biggest 
contribution” to society.207 Within the interior provinces, the shift from “pioneer” 
evangelist to bible teacher, however, rarely resulted in less mobility for CIM 
missionaries. Instead of seeking converts or distributing tracts, missionaries trekked all 
over cities and the countryside to offer weekly bible classes, attend conferences, and aid 
Chinese evangelists. Additionally, CIM missionaries would make annual or biannual 
visits to every local church in their area to aid in bible schools, church conferences, or aid 
Chinese-led evangelism campaigns. Further, CIM members traveled with Chinese 
evangelists and bible teachers to accompany them as they fulfilled their tasks.208 Many 
missionaries then would be itinerant educators in scripture and Protestant morality rather 
than preachers and proselytizers. 
“Specialized work” covered a wide range of activities and posts taken up by 
missionaries. In some cases the society would loan members to “purely Chinese projects” 
such as the Holy Light School in Chongqing. Officially teachers and faculty members, 
the CIM missionaries would have “nothing to do with the actual school work,” but 
instead use their positions for “personal work among officials and students in the 
neighborhood.”  In another example, missionaries were assigned to the GMD Ministry of 
Education for use in medical training programs.209  
Other examples of “specialized work” referred to the CIM’s relatively small 
medical and public health programs, which increased in scope and importance during this 
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period. Prior to 1945, the CIM’s medical work in many regions had primarily been a 
function of providing basic medical care and services to areas to groups considered “the 
poor and needy” on the periphery of Chinese society.210 However, following the new 
principles, more efforts were planned for building connections with hospitals and clinics 
near strong churches. In areas like Lanchung, Sichuan the society would launch medical 
training programs for nurses.211 In these areas, CIM missionaries would establish close 
relations between hospital staff and local churches and encourage the participation of 
Chinese doctors and nurses in evangelistic services at the church. And, of course, the 
churches in these hospitals would be used for evangelism.212 
Within these assignments to “specialized work,” the missionary’s professional 
expertise was to be an entry point for attracting new converts and initiating evangelistic 
activities. In line with this tactic, the CIM joined the majority of liberal-modernist 
mission societies already employing English language classes to attract Chinese. Using 
the Bible as a text for their classes, CIM workers also organized weekly evangelistic 
services on their campuses for students. As opposed to a number of liberal-modernist 
mission societies, the ultimate goal of the CIM missionary’s assignment was far from 
secular in nature, it remained fixated on conversion and dissemination of Christianity. 
Since educating and training Chinese evangelicals was seen as a key contribution 
to strengthening the Chinese churches, “specialized work” also implied new posts as 
educators and administrators within the nation’s seminaries and bible institutes. This type 
of work was not altogether new. Prior to the 1940s, the CIM had established and operated 
bible institutes in Sichuan (Chengdu and Paoning), Shanxi (Hungtung, Yuncheng), 
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Shaanxi (Xi’An and Fengsiang), Henan, Yunnan, and Guizhou (Pingpa and Kopu).213 
Along with medical work, the importance and prominence of this work grew under 
indigenization.  
The CIM’s postwar justification for the emphasis on training and educating 
Chinese Christians was the idea that the Chinese Church was hindered in its sovereignty 
by a lack of professionally trained evangelical leadership. After the war, this led the CIM 
to loan more staff to existing bible institutes and seminaries and cooperate more with 
Chinese clergy and faculty at these institutions. By 1944, the CIM had loaned 
missionaries to work as faculty at the Hunan Bible Institute (Changsha), The China Bible 
Seminary (Shanghai), Pastor David Yang’s Bible School (Tianjin), The Northwestern 
Bible Institute (Fengsiang, Shaanxi), Pastor Wei’s Bible School (Henan), Pastor Kia Yu 
Ming’s Bible Institute (Chengdu), and the Chongqing Theological Seminary 
(Chongqing).  In addition to providing staff to these organizations, the CIM expanded its 
efforts to include financial assistance, understood as a temporary condition, to various 
seminaries and bible institutes in Shanghai, Beijing, Manchuria, and Shandong province. 
Plans were also approved for the CIM to build seminaries for evangelical students in the 
nation’s northern and central regions.214  
 Many of the assignments to “specialized work” and emphasis on education would 
have CIM members traveling widely but in much a different social environment than the 
pioneer era. As Beatrice Sunderland commented on her reassignment to a college 
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classroom in Lanchow, Gansu after the war “it was a big change, in many respects, from 
the little village…with its pigs and chickens, and donkeys and mud floors,” where she 
had worked previously for two years as a pioneer evangelist.215 Assignments to 
“specialized work” like Sunderland’s dramatically alter the contours of the missionary’s 
mobility to a greater degree by placing more them within urban settings, institutions, and 
on college campuses.  
The social classes targeted by CIM agents engaged in these projects changed as 
well. Much of the CIM’s plans for “specialized work” involved intensifying the society’s 
efforts to reach Chinese youth. During the war the CIM experienced great unprecedented 
success in student evangelism within the provinces of Gansu and Sichuan. After 1945, 
student evangelism became a top priority of the CIM. As a result the society collaborated 
with various Protestant organizations including China IVF and the Pocket Testament 
League to found evangelical organizations on the college campuses of Beijing as well as 
Central University (Nanjing), Chongqing University, Sichuan University (Chengdu), 
West China University (Chengdu), Hong Kong University, Lingnan Univeristy (Hong 
Kong), Jiangsu Medical College (Xuzhou), Guangdong Provincial College, Guangxi 
University, and Chongshan College (Taiyuan).216 In the student movement the CIM 
invested its hopes for the future of the nation and Protestant churches. In the cities of 
Nanjing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Chongqing the CIM and China IVF heralded the 
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creation of a “nucleus of young Christians with a definite experience of salvation” who 
were being mobilized and trained as evangelists to “reach the whole field.”217 
Evangelistic outreach to the government and armed forces were projects highly 
valued by the CIM in the postwar as well.  For example, in December 1945 China’s 
Millions asked readers to join Chinese Christians in the province of Jiangxi in praying for 
the conversion of Jiang Jieshi’s eldest son, Jiang Jingguo. Described by the magazine as 
“an earnest reformer” with a reputation for “justice and integrity,” he was lauded by the 
CIM for leading the government’s fight against corruption, opium abuse, and gambling in 
the region. Hoping for his conversion, the CIM offered special prayer services throughout 
the area and then expanded this effort to include the entire international community.218 
Even as more and more criticism of the GMD as a corrupt and inefficient regime surfaced 
in the U.S. in the late 1940s the CIM continued to conduct “specialized work” to reach 
soldiers and government officials. Noting China’s rising social ills and reports of “corrupt 
officialdom” around the nation, CIM missionaries such as Leslie Lyall called upon the 
CIM and its supporters to redouble efforts to “make supplication for ‘all who are in high 
station.’”219 Increasingly the CIM promoted the sense that the China’s fate was bound up 
in reaching elites.  
That the CIM’s faith in indigenous leadership rested upon transferring control 
over Christianity to elite Chinese Christians is revealed then rerouting of missionaries in 
China to college campuses, seminaries, bible institutes, military camps, and government 
offices. The transition of missionary David Adeney from church-planting and pioneering 
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in Henan to student evangelism in cities like Beijing and Shanghai reveals just how much 
the Asia-Pacific War and new emphasis on indigenization rerouted the life and career of 
many missionaries. Adeney left China on his furlough in 1941 after seven years in the 
field, passing through Japanese lines on his was to Shanghai just a few months before the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. With his home country of Great Britain embroiled in war, he and 
his wife Ruth went to her family in the U.S. On his way to California for furlough with 
the society’s new General Director Frank Houghton, Adeney was selected to fulfill the 
request of Stacey Woods, U.S. leader of the Inter-Varsity Fellowship (IVF), for a CIM 
member to be loaned to the organization to promote Protestant missions on college and 
university campuses.220 
 Adeney joined the Inter-Varsity Fellowship as a staff worker just in time to 
participate as the organization toured the West Coast holding Christian rallies at 
institutions such as Stanford University. He then settled for a time in the Midwest, 
traveling to engagements to engagements at institutions like the University of Michigan 
on behalf of the Inter-Varsity Fellowship and CIM from his wife’s family farm in 
Minnesota. Later, he relocated to the East Coast for the Inter-Varsity Fellowship and 
visited student groups at Yale, Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
Princeton and attended various conferences throughout New England.221 
Traveling back to China before the end of the war, Adeney once again was 
selected by General Director to be loaned to the IVF. This time, however, he was under 
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the auspices of the China IVF, formed out of the refugee student populations living in and 
around Chongqing during the war. The China IVF and CIM shared a strong belief in 
student evangelism as a key to the nation’s political and spiritual development and 
postwar reconstruction. He remained a member and still reported to the executive staff of 
the CIM in Shanghai, but in theory Executive Secretary of the China IVF Calvin Chao 
designated Adeney’s duties as a staff worker and set his itinerary as a speaker and 
organizer of China IVF chapters on college and university campuses.222  
Starting along the Burma Road to Chongqing, once he arrived Adeney wasted no 
time in beginning his campaigns among China’s student population meeting with various 
student groups in Chengdu and Chongqing. Following a summer conference for the 
universities in Chongqing in 1945, he set out to meet with students in nearby Beipei to 
visit the student body of Fudan University and then travel to meet with students living in 
the larger cities in Yunnan and Guizhou. As the war in China ended his target audience 
among the nation’s students and college faculty, most of them refugees, drifted back east. 
Adeney followed in the company of Chao and the small staff of the China IVF. Going 
first to Beijing for several weeks, he eventually was based out of Nanjing and 
Shanghai.223  
Adeney’s position with the China IVF reflected the hopes of the CIM that the 
return of China’s government and college youth to the coastal provinces would usher in a 
period of national rejuvenation and spiritual revival. At the time Adeney thought 
“government was about to return to the east, the colleges, universities were all going back 
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to their original campuses…there was a hope that now victory had been won China 
would become more prosperous…this is a day when people are extremely open to the 
Gospel.”224 Ultimately, Adeney’s work demonstrated the greater evangelical desire to 
turn the advances made by the CIM with students and elites during the war into an assault 
on the nation’s intellectual and academic centers. 
In cities like Beijing, Adeney oversaw the launch of local China IVF chapters as 
students and faculty returned from “Free China.” The work required that he first contact 
existing Chinese churches to find evangelists and pastors to assist him in his efforts and 
build nuclei of evangelical students on each campus. In addition, he led weekly bible 
classes on college campuses, organized prayer meetings and gatherings for the students, 
and conducted English-language courses to attract non-Christian students. He also 
reached out to the city’s high schools with many of the same services. The goal was to 
create a city-wide network of China IVF groups and evangelistic activities geared toward 
youth. By December 1946, his campaigns were largely successful and evangelical 
Chinese students in Beijing were planning a series of rallies to be headlined by noted 
evangelist Wang Mingdao.225   
Student evangelism with the China IVF was very different than Adeney’s first 
tour of duty as a missionary in Henan in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In terms of 
geography and demographics, the college campuses and rallies of Chinese urban youth 
were far removed from his first post in the rural areas of Siangcheng, Henan. What both 
positions had in common, though, was the sustained ethos of mobile evangelism and 
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dependence on a trusty bicycle. In Henan, Adeney along with fellow missionary Henry 
Guiness relied on bicycles to maintain fellowship with the provincial outstations, country 
congregations, and seek out “unevangelized areas.”226 In Beijing, he purchased a bicycle 
because as he explained to readers of China’s Millions, “pedicabs are very expensive and 
the buses and streetcars cover only certain routes.”227 The treks across the city to the 
various colleges kept him on his bicycle for an average of ten miles a day. In addition, the 
pattern of his work was similar to that of pioneer evangelism in Henan: bicycle to a 
meeting, preach, distribute texts, organize and coordinate the activities of Christians, and 
train workers in evangelism before moving on to a new campus to seek out another new 
cohort of interested Chinese.228  
Adeney’s career in the 1940s illustrates an extraordinary mobility while working 
for the CIM in this era, and the increasing significance of students and student 
evangelism to the society. Working primarily in just three of these nations, China, U.S., 
and United Kingdom, Adeney’s student evangelism led him to visit many of the leading 
higher educational institutions and their Christian student bodies in these three key poles 
of the Christian moral empire. Most especially in China and the U.S., Adeney physically 
stepped foot on the campuses of an incredible number of academic communities from 
Yale to Yenching University.  Further, student evangelism forced Adeney to travel to 
nearly every major American and Chinese city in this period, traveling from coast to 
coast in each nation, entering in the West (San Francisco, 1941 and Kunming, 1945) and 
then working his way back East (Boston, 1943, and Nanjing, 1946). And lastly via 
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representation in slideshows he also managed to complete two tours of the CIM’s support 
networks in the East, Midwest, and West coast of the U.S. 
Secondly, his efforts in student evangelism highlight the continuity in missionary 
practices between the eras of pioneer evangelism and the postwar, but also its new 
ideological meanings. Under the new emphasis on indigenization, the missionary’s 
postwar mobility marked certain classes and groups within China as more capable of 
exercising spiritual sovereignty and equality than others. Which oddly enough, meant that 
the society betrayed a lack of trust in its origins among the classes associated with its 
frontier history. Rural Chinese, women, the impoverished and marginalized carried less 
and less ideological significance as the CIM devoted more prayer and resources to “all 
who are in high station.” In many ways this attitude foreshadowed the dominant 
American and Western European reaction to decolonization in Asia, where these groups 
also searched for elites in these societies with common backgrounds or values to transfer 
power to as imperialism receded.  
These messages were relayed to U.S. audiences as Adeney and many of his 
colleagues in the CIM working at student evangelism were featured in slideshows shown 
to supporters of Inter-Varsity Fellowship and CIM. The slideshows recreated the 
movements of student evangelists like Adeney and his fellow CIM missionaries Henry 
Guinness, Eric Liberty, Leslie Lyall, and Frank Harris as they tramped from one of the 
nation’s college campuses to another. CIM deputation workers in California used 
slideshows written by Adeney about the China Inter-Varsity Fellowship and CIM 
building Christian student organizations on the campuses of Central University 
(Nanjing), Chongqing University, Sichuan University (Chengdu), West China University 
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(Chengdu), Hong Kong University, Lingnan Univeristy (Hong Kong), Jiangsu Medical 
College (Xuzhou), Guangdong Provincial College, Guangxi University, and Chongshan 
College (Taiyuan).229  
Like slideshows of the pioneer, these slides of student evangelism constructed an 
imaginary of the missionary’s mobility and the meanings of their work in postwar China. 
In the cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Chongqing the CIM and China Inter-
Varsity Fellowship heralded the creation of a “nucleus of young Christians with a definite 
experience of salvation,” who were being mobilized and trained as evangelists to “reach 
the whole field.”230 That Billy Graham’s postwar urban youth campaigns were buzzing in 
U.S. media and cities in this same period no doubt bolstered the excitement generated by 
the slideshows and buoyed Christian optimism to imagine China, if on smaller scale, 
awakening to a national evangelical movement.  
Overall, these slideshows created the impression of the CIM and China Inter-
Varsity Fellowship’s aggressive penetration of China’s academic and intellectual 
communities. Photographs from both slideshows depicted the missionary moving about 
in dormitories, cafeterias, reading rooms and libraries, conferences and rallies, teaching 
English and bible courses. Many photographs showed missionaries singing, eating, 
counseling, and training with Chinese youth. In addition the slides demonstrated how the 
CIM’s personnel as educators and teachers, such as Frank Harris, now a faculty member 
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at Sichuan University, had repositioned evangelical missionaries to capitalize on the 
surge in popularity of evangelical Christianity among the nation’s youth.231  
The slideshows conveyed a number of messages about Chinese Christians as well. 
Pictures of Chinese Christians bowing in prayer, zealously singing in choirs, studying the 
bible in groups, and traveling widely to attend evangelist meetings and student 
conferences displayed piety and spiritual sincerity. Simultaneously, images of students 
and Chinese evangelists creating flyers and posters for distribution, utilizing radio to 
broadcast Christian programs across college campuses, and leading evangelistic services 
demonstrated the competency, efficiency, and discipline of indigenous leadership. This 
was particularly true of the slideshows pictures presenting the leading “lights” of the 
China Inter-Varsity Fellowship and evangelical movement such as Calvin Chao, David 
Yang, Wang Mingdao, and Timothy Lin. All of the media represented Chinese 
Christianity as a mobile and powerful force in society through its able-bodied, energetic, 
and efficient evangelists.  
Another effect of the slideshow and script was to impart an imaginary of the 
evangelical student movement’s centrality in postwar society and their sweeping national 
appeal. The final image of the slideshow showed the conferences 350 delegates from over 
sixty universities and colleges across the country. The slideshow also credited the GMD, 
especially Soong May-Ling, wife of Jiang Jieshi, as a patron of student evangelism. 
Slideshows informed U.S. audiences that the National Conference of the China Inter-
Varsity Fellowship was invited by Soong to hold the meetings at her newly constructed 
orphanage for children of war veterans located near Zijin Shan (Purple Mountain) in 
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Nanjing. Various images displayed Chinese Christians and missionaries on the grounds 
enjoying the use of the buildings, parks, and gymnasium. Other images displayed China 
Inter-Varsity Fellowship meetings and activities in Nanjing Zhongshan Park and at the 
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. According to these images, at the behest of the GMD, student 
evangelism was seen occupying the heart of the nation’s political and cultural centers.232 
An equally revealing development after 1945 was that CIM missionaries were 
expected to work less on evangelism and far more at campaigning for evangelism 
amongst existing Chinese congregations. Warned against violating the Chinese right to 
self-propagation, CIM missionaries were advised to use various tactics to pressure 
Chinese Protestants into engaging in evangelism. These included the use of prayer, 
sermonizing, teaching examples, bible teaching, and “occasion” to persuade Chinese 
Christian communities of the “privilege and duty” of self-propagation. The result was 
that CIM missionaries were transformed from evangelists of Christianity to the 
“unevangelized” into zealous promoters of the ideology of pioneer evangelism among the 
converted. In sum, the CIM’s goal in discipleship training or strengthening the churches 
was to indoctrinate Chinese Christians in the missionary vision.   
In addition, CIM missionaries were to become tireless promoters of Christian 
associations and organizational methods. Teachers on college campuses and missionaries 
leading English language classes would counsel Christian students on how to form 
fellowship groups modeled after the Inter-Varsity Fellowship. From there, CIM educators 
would work to link student fellowship associations across cities and provinces together 
and oversee evangelistic campaigns and Christian conferences within their home cities 
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and provinces.233 Other CIM writers proposed that the society transplant the U.S. and 
British Christian infrastructure of “Sunday Schools, Christian Endeavor Societies, Bible 
Societies, Bible Institutes, theological colleges,” to China as a means to strengthen 
Chinese Protestantism.234  
CIM missionaries would also advise Chinese clergy and lay leaders to form 
church unions. Ideally, the church unions brought together representatives from various 
Chinese churches to share the burdens of finance, governance, education, and 
evangelism. Most unions were first organized at the district level before later evolving 
into county and provincial organizations. As an incentive to encourage the formation of 
unions, the CIM offered financial support for evangelists and Christian workers 
employed by the unions.235    
Unions were prized by the CIM as a means to maximize the resources of Chinese 
Christians in a given area and allow for greater coordination in evangelism. Kane, the 
architect of Anhui’s evangelical unions, described the development of evangelical church 
unions as the building blocks for progress and order, “Divine revelation, human history, 
and personal experience unite in teaching us that progress can be achieved only when 
order is maintained.” He compared the order wrought by the church union’s of Anhui to a 
“well-disciplined army…whether in camp, in battle, or on the march, they maintained 
perfect order among themselves, and presented a united front to their enemies.” 236 Many 
other voices within the CIM echoed Kane in stressing that the true utility of the unions 
was in their ability to plot and strategize evangelical Christianity’s expansion, and it is 
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clear that they were valued for imparting an aggressive and militaristic mentality to 
Chinese Christians.237 
The unions were also prized by the CIM and its supporters as means for Chinese 
leadership to grow accustomed to self-governance through participatory democracy. The 
unions were formed voluntarily by agreements between the Chinese churches to meet 
annually or biannually to discuss problems and projects of spiritual training and 
evangelism. Each church would elect officers, both Chinese or foreign missionary, to 
serve as representatives to the union. Additionally, unions were also encouraged by the 
CIM to draft Declarations of Faith or other constitutional documents declaring the area’s 
agreed upon tenets of faith and beliefs.238 Such measures were promoted by the CIM as a 
means to promote doctrinal integrity, but these declarations or constitutions also were 
prized as acts of spiritual self-determination evident of the Chinese church’s path to 
maturity.239  
Beyond recognizing sovereignty and addressing inequality, many of the proposed 
alterations to missionary work also were geared toward resolving older issues raised by 
indigenization. Debates about the necessity of continued mission work in China had 
existed since the early twentieth century. The CIM feared that too much emphasis on the 
primacy of native Christianity meant that financial support for the mission was sure to 
decline in the home countries. Secondly, among members of the CIM and home countries 
there existed pervasive doubts about the spiritual and cultural integrity of Protestantism in 
Chinese hands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the “sincerity” of Chinese 
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Christians was constantly perceived as suspect. Under the sovereignty of the Chinese 
churches, would the “progress” the CIM had invested in continue to transform Chinese 
society? Would the evangelization of China continue under the auspices of Chinese 
Protestant leadership? 
Ultimately, these new roles and assignments were intended to answer these 
questions by demonstrating that missionary mobility could both support Chinese self-
determination and ensure that the trajectory of Christianity’s growth and spread in society 
would not deviate dramatically from the path charted by missions under the leadership of 
Chinese Protestants. New roles as bible teachers, educators, and church builders were 
intended to mark the missionary’s mobility as a source facilitating Chinese sovereignty 
and growth. Although the CIM had ceded the right to lead evangelization to Chinese 
leadership, the mission planned to reorganize and relocate members to be placed within 
key areas in society to capitalize on the missionary’s greater social mobility and influence 
among the educated, urban, and official classes of China. Added to that the society would 
focus on transplanting evangelical organizations and structures to China.  
Either as bible teachers or evangelists under the authority of the various 
institutions and organizations, the CIM missionaries continued to enjoy a wide freedom 
to move about the nation. As educators the missionary’s mobility produced ideas about 
political and spiritual tutelage. The CIM emphasis on teaching, training, and equipping 
Chinese Protestants for leadership in the churches reflected more than just spiritual 
training but a desire to teach Chinese on how to use autonomy, freedom, and sovereignty.  
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From “Pioneers” to “Open Doors” 
The pervading symbol of this transition from pioneer evangelism to indigenous 
practices was references in CIM publications to “open doors.”240 This metaphor was often 
repeated by missionaries in the pages of China’s Millions and part of the title of the 
society’s yearly anthology for 1945, Wide Open Doors.241 Speakers such as J. Herbert 
Kane and U.S. Home Director Robert Griffin employed the rhetoric of “open doors” to 
explain “the New Era in China” at the society’s annual conferences in 1945 in New York, 
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington, 
D.C.242 From 1945 to 1949, this language of “open doors” covered a number of 
movements by the CIM missionaries in the postwar era: survey teams reaching out to 
Chinese congregations, reoccupation of abandoned posts, the return of missionaries from 
furlough and arrival of new recruits in the postwar years, and the missionary engaged in 
the activities of evangelism, church-building, and “specialized work.” 
Similar to the pioneer/frontier mythology, the metaphor of “open doors” 
appropriated U.S. political values and myths and yet again flexed these meanings to 
include various groups across the Christian moral empire. The Open Door Policy, a 
diplomatic agenda promoted by Washington Administrations since the late 19th century to 
argue for equal trade and commercial access in China, was understood by many 
Americans as an effort to safeguard Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity while 
advancing U.S. interests. Essentially, “open doors” was an expression of U.S. anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  Lily	  Snyder,	  “Children	  Open	  the	  Doors,”	  China’s	  Millions,	  August	  1945.	  
241	  China	  Inland	  Mission,	  Wide	  Open	  Doors:	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  Year	  1946	  (Philadelphia:	  China	  Inland	  
Mission,	  1947)	  
242	  Advertisement	  for	  CIM	  Annual	  Conferences,	  China’s	  Millions,	  October	  1945.	  
	   143	  
imperialism and a foundation of the belief in a “special-relationship” between the 
Chinese and Americans.243  
“Open doors” as deployed by the CIM produced a number of ideas about postwar 
China and the missionary’s mobility. First, the missionary now traveled at the invitation 
of many groups in Chinese society and with respect to the authority of both the Chinese 
churches and the government. Also the language conveyed a sense of “openness” to the 
missionary’s influence as well in the postwar era. This was stressed in the survey reports 
of the postwar era. Missionaries reporting on the conditions in Jiangxi stated that 
everywhere the CIM team went their arrival was met with celebration. In the city of 
Loping the CIM team was met by throngs of Chinese Christians, “we gave no warning of 
our arrival…but it was not long before Christians knew and, one after another, they came 
to great us. Then, because we couldn’t go from house to house to eat, they brought so 
much food in to us that they nearly destroyed our digestions!”244 By applying the 
language of “open doors” to the missionary’s postwar return, CIM supporters understood 
the missionary’s return and investment in the nation’s postwar recovery as almost 
universally welcomed by Chinese. Not only were the missions welcomed, but the 
Chinese eagerly anticipated the return of missions.  
This symbol of Sino-Foreign Protestant relations built the impression that the 
changes in the mission’s philosophy and the wartime experiences of the Chinese had 
eradicated the social barriers and hostility that had once limited the missionary’s 
mobility. Additional surveys stated that throughout the region the missionaries’ arrival 
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was met with packed evangelistic services. Opportunities to preach in military camps, 
hospitals, and prisons followed the CIM missionaries everywhere they went. The report 
concluded that “not only is the door wide open, but it even resembles the situation when 
Jericho’s walls fell down flat.” This particular missionary predicted that CIM 
missionaries returning to the field would find “they didn’t need to enter open doors; there 
were no more gates! Where they wished to enter they could. That seems to be the 
condition almost everywhere in the province.”245 This rhetoric also produced ideas about 
Chinese desire for and receptivity to evangelical and foreign influence. Frequently, 
missionaries made claims that Chinese society was far more “open” to Christianity than 
ever before, a claim that was frequently issued in past eras, but now seemingly had the 
added validation of the missionary’s reception by the state and general society. 
Rather than constrained by Chinese sovereignty then, the image of “open doors” 
produced the impression that the missionary’s mobility was augmented by its “special 
relationship” to the Chinese. Certainly, after 1945 the CIM frequently implied that their 
work was often facilitated by Chinese state power and the military. CIM publications 
credited the GMD with liberating “millions of souls” in Xinjiang and Tibet from 
“spiritual oppression” by allowing the CIM to work in these regions after 1945. This 
impression was reinforced by the correlation between the geography of GMD governance 
and missionary mobility. Evangelicals watched anxiously the race between the militaries 
of the GMD and CCP to occupy areas vacated by the Japanese Imperial Army following 
the conclusion of the Asia-Pacific War. CIM supporters equated the return of GMD 
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control to these areas as a “green light” for missionaries to re-enter these areas and 
resume mission work.  
This association between GMD control and mission work was also created by 
publicity given to the assistance of the GMD in returning CIM teams to their posts. CIM 
publications credited the GMD with aiding in their postwar return, “it was mainly owing 
to the remarkable courtesy of the Chinese government that, at a time when Government 
officials and others, in their hundreds of thousands, were seeking transport down-river 
from Chungking, our staff was allotted sufficient berths” on the very few airplanes and 
steamships headed east in 1945.246 As the CIM returned along to evacuated fields the 
GMD provide a powerful ally in securing transportation and repossessing property. Other 
reports stressed the role of military and GMD officials in clearing obstacles and preparing 
for the missionary’s return. In Zhejiang, two missionaries wrote that a church building 
returned to the mission by Chinese soldiers had been “completely cleaned, benches 
repaired, new posters and scrolls pasted up.”247 The mission thanked the GMD for 
continuing to guarantee the missionary’s privileged mobility and access to governmental 
support.  
This privileged mobility and “openness” included unprecedented access to the 
government and military. The GMD regime appeared as a partner in the efforts of the 
CIM and Pocket Testament League’s distribution of gospel tracts to the armed forces. 
The GMD was especially praised for helping the society evangelize to troops and among 
the nation’s youth in the Volunteer Army. Traveling in a U.S. army truck loaded with 
thousands of New Testaments and gospel tracts, the three man team of CIM worker John 
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Muir, U.S. evangelist and former football star Glenn Wagner, and Chinese evangelist 
Harry Liu visited scores of army camps, barracks, and military parades across the country 
at the behest of the GMD. 248 Where GMD forces swept across the nation after 1945, so 
followed CIM missionaries distributing tracts and preaching to troops and officers. Thus, 
evangelicals understood the GMD as a force responsible for making new areas and ethnic 
groups more accessible to the missionary on the frontier as well as the means by which 
the missionary received invitation to the nation’s official classes. This coupled with the 
CIM’s frequent references to the prominence of Chinese Christians within the GMD and, 
of course, Jiang Jiehsi’s well-known faith seemingly augured an era in which a Chinese 
sovereign regime augmented, rather than threatened, the mobility of missionaries.  
The idea of a “special relationship” forged via indigenous principles was 
especially important as the society traded in the geographic expanse of the “frontier” for 
the greater social mobility of “specialized” work. Houghton had expressed this idea in 
1943 when he claimed the pioneer spirit had led at times resulted in “lone missionaries, 
dispersed as widely as possible until the value of their work is in inverse ratio to the 
extent of the ground they cover!”249 In contrast, Houghton believed indigenization would 
be akin to the CIM functioning as a “Foreign Legion…by means of teams with bases in 
strategic centers.”250 Traveling amongst social classes previously associated with hostility 
to the CIM’s brand of evangelicalism: the educated, professionals, and elites, “open 
doors” communicated a sense that the CIM had found a foothold with those groups 
charting China’s future.  
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Numerous times CIM publications credited the success of their evangelistic 
activities to favors and social connections from Chinese Christians in positions of power 
and influence in the government and society in general. CIM publications credited 
Chinese printers and editors with helping the society expand its publishing and 
distribution of Christian literature. In other areas, leading Chinese Protestants in urban 
areas loaned the CIM buildings and spaces on college campuses for evangelistic services.  
The idea of missionaries moving through “open doors” then answered questions 
about whether Chinese sovereignty, political and spiritual, would constrain or alter the 
missionary endeavor. Although the missionary’s privileged mobility was no longer 
immune to the sovereignty of Asian groups, the rhetoric of “open doors” created the 
impression that the entire nation remained accessible to the missionaries and their 
agenda. If anything, the missionary had obtained a far greater mobility through the 
“special relationships” it would forge with the new classes receptive to evangelicalism. 
Lastly, the ideology of “open doors” created the sense that the mission could 
escape the imperialist past and errors of the previous era. Houghton was not alone in 
seeing the pioneer era as deficient in terms of respect for indigenous principles. 
Marguerite Goodner Owen recalled that in Chinese Christians in Honan in the 1930s 
often referred to missionaries as “kings” or “pharaohs” and she considered the mission-
church relationship to be “paternalistic” and “colonial” in nature. A common joke among 
the Chinese pastors in Honan had been that five missionary “kings” ruled all church 
affairs and evangelism across the province. When in 1947 she returned to Kunming, 
Yunnan she found her work to be far different than the “old colonial days.” Now, she and 
her husband Harry Owen received their assignments from the local evangelical church 
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board, pastors, and deacons, “why, whatever they wanted us to do, that’s what we did.”251 
Certainly, the changes enacted by the CIM after 1943 created the impression among its 
members that the “colonial” past had been left behind. 
This is not to suggest that the CIM was able to complete such a transformation. 
As scholar Oi Ki Ling notes about British missionaries, “Although pressures to hand over 
responsibility to Chinese Christians were too strong too ignore, the paternalism of the 
missionaries died hard…At the end of the war, missionaries were still arbiters of 
doctrine, the source of power, and paymasters of Chinese Christians.”252 From 1945 to 
1952, Ling notes that although numerous changes were proposed the actual 
implementation of indigenous principles was uneven, timetables for the transfer of 
authority or property rights were ill-defined, and some aspects of Chinese authority was 
directly opposed by missions.253  The same was true of the CIM, as there is evidence that 
in many communities missionaries and Chinese Christians struggled over many of these 
same issues.  
This was in part because missionary mobility, despite the CIM’s reforms and 
ideals, simultaneously undermined the authority of Chinese Protestants. While nominally 
missionaries such as David Adeney served under the auspices of Chinese evangelicals 
like Calvin Chao, conflicts arose as Chao charged that Adeney and General Director 
Houghton frequently usurped his authority within the China Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251	  Collection 534, T4. Interview of Marguerite Owen by Bob Shuster, June 6, 1997.	  
252	  Oi	  Ki	  Ling,	  The	  Changing	  Role	  of	  the	  British	  Protestant	  Missionaries	  in	  China,	  1945-­‐1952	  (Madison,	  
NJ:	  Fairleigh	  Dickinson	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  51.	  
253	  Oi	  Ki	  Ling,	  The	  Changing	  Role	  of	  the	  British	  Protestant	  Missionaries	  in	  China,	  1945-­‐1952	  (Madison,	  
NJ:	  Fairleigh	  Dickinson	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  p.66-­‐72.	  
	   149	  
making him a mere figurehead. 254 While Houghton and Adeney would deny that this 
specific struggle for power ever occurred, the missionary’s return to the field and 
integration with Chinese Christian churches and institutions undermined the authority and 
equality of Chinese evangelicals in a number of ways.   
Firstly, CIM surveys and reports on the conditions of churches produced by 
missionaries heading back to the field created a sense of Chinese Christian impotence in 
leading society’s evangelization without the aid of the missionary. In Zhejiang the 
superintendent’s report had also stressed that the province’s city churches were “very 
weak” and “vast majority of believers illiterate and spiritual truths scant.”255 Additional 
missionary surveys of Shanxi, Guizhou, and Anhui in the late 1940s referred to Chinese 
Christian leadership as “weak” and criticized them for making “little progress.” In fact, 
many of the evangelical churches were described as “mostly small and backward.” Other 
surveys blamed Chinese Christians for refusing to take on the financial burden of self-
support, while in Hunan many Chinese workers remained employed by the mission well 
into the late 1940s. That the provincial Chinese churches would not assume the financial 
responsibility for these workers led the CIM superintendent to conclude that Chinese 
leaders in the region did not take the concept of self-support “seriously.”256 
In fact, reports on the status of evangelism in many regions created a grave sense 
of concern for the future. In Sichuan steps taken toward Chinese self-government had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Interview with Paul Contento by Robert D. Schuster, December 9 1992, Collection 474, T2 from 
Records of the United States Home Council of the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (China Inland 
Mission), Collection 215, Billy Graham Evangelical Center, Wheaton, Illinois.; China’s Millions, February 
1952. 
255 China Council Notes, January 27 1945, from Records of the United States Home Council of the 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (China Inland Mission), Collection 215, Billy Graham Evangelical 
Center, Wheaton, Illinois. 
256 China Council Notes, January 29 1947, from Records of the United States Home Council of the 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (China Inland Mission), Collection 215, Billy Graham Evangelical 
Center, Wheaton, Illinois. 
	   150	  
seen “great progress,” but simultaneously the CIM worried that “the Church has hardly 
woken up to its responsibility for evangelization.”257 Across Sichuan survey reports in 
1945 indicated that eleven counties out of thirty were entirely “without witness,” 
evangelistic activities in most cities “sporadic,” and proselytizing in the countryside 
“almost negligible.” The lack of an effort in rural areas was especially worrisome since 
the report stated that though the countryside was “vast” it was also “thickly populated” 
with over 600 markets “unevangelized” by Chinese Christians.258 Ultimately, the 
expectations of the CIM ultimately became a source of dissatisfaction and tension with 
many Chinese churches as the society worried that Chinese failed to have the zeal 
necessary for pioneering the faith. 
Secondly, the CIM’s insistence upon the three-selfs meant that many of the 
expenses of the Sino-Foreign Protestant community were transferred to Chinese 
Protestants.  Achieving self-support as society and many Chinese families recovered from 
years of war, dislocation, and struggled with unprecedented inflation was an incredibly 
difficult task for Chinese congregations to undertake in the postwar years. To finance the 
church, some Chinese congregations were advised to introduce “special collections” 
designed to take grain offerings from members of the church.259 Scholars such as Ryan 
Dunch have suggested that the transfer of property and mission-owned buildings 
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burdened these communities by placing “heavy millstones tied to the necks” of Chinese 
Protestants.260  
What I would add is that the CIM’s insistence on Chinese churches maintaining a 
vigorous evangelism fastened an additional “millstone” to Chinese evangelicals at a 
vulnerable time. Evangelism required time, energy, planning, labor, and additional 
financial resources, often from very small communities of believers, that were already 
scare in a nation recovering from one war and entering another. Although it was hoped 
that evangelism would increase the size of congregations and, thereby, increase their 
resources and lighten their loads in terms of service, the extent to which the CIM pushed 
Chinese Christians to evangelize was just as likely to leave them exhausted, materially 
and physically. But for many Chinese Christian communities self-propagation was not 
seen as essential to Christianity or the evangelical identity.261 Thus, the CIM’s attempt to 
transfer the ethos and obligations of pioneer evangelism to Chinese evangelicals created 
numerous arguments and conflicts. And where Chinese congregations failed to meet 
these lofty and costly expectations, the CIM and its agents became increasingly 
pessimistic about the qualities and capabilities of Chinese Christian sovereignty and 
equality. 
Primarily, though, the society’s efforts at integration and cooperation with 
Chinese churches created direct challenges to both the indigenous program and Chinese 
evangelical leadership from within the mission. One of the most scathing critiques came 
from H.E. Knight, in an article for China’s Millions that proposed to offer readers “a 
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clear presentation” of the “more somber side” of the indigenous program. In China’s 
northwest provinces, Knight claimed that Chinese Christianity was plagued by the 
“shadows” of poverty, traditional culture, internal conflicts and disputes, and society’s 
“new worldliness.”262 From his posts, he had observed that these “shadows” led the 
churches in Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia to “shirk responsibility” for itinerating and 
evangelism.263 
Knight wrote that among the nation’s cities and youth nation’s he observed that a 
“new worldliness” had an even more powerful call among the nation’s youth than 
evangelical Christianity. Knight agreed that the war had changed the minds of many 
Chinese high school and college students about Christianity and acknowledged the 
emergence of a nucleus of “gifted, consecrated” men and women ready to serve as 
evangelists, pastors, and lay leaders. But he also felt it necessary to reign in expectations. 
Even among deeply religious Christian youth, few were willing to devote their lives to 
spiritual work. In the northwest, Knight suggested that only “three or four volunteers out 
of eighty churches” planned to enter into careers as clergy or evangelists. Instead, much 
of the CIM’s newfound appeal among youth and professional classes reflected that the 
“modern education” available from Christian missions and institutions was viewed as a 
means to greater status and wealth.264   
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He also cautiously addressed the expectations that the creation of “New China” 
bolstered the evangelical movement, pointing to how recovery and modernization was 
exhausting the resources and energy of its people in underdeveloped regions. He claimed 
the majority of men, women, and children “slaved” away each day working from before 
dawn until after sunset in order to survive. Worse, he saw society’s postwar rebuilding as 
a drain on the energy and resources of most Chinese families, not the source of its uplift, 
“the remaining men-folk and animals have been impressed for forced labor on the roads, 
railways, and airfields of New China, and for portage of military supplies.” Widespread 
poverty and illiteracy to Knight suggested that even the most vigilant of saints would 
have little time to attend church, let alone contribute to its growth and expansion through 
evangelism.  Overall, Knight did not see that “New China” as a place suffused by the 
evangelical spirit, and, worse, he thought the nation’s recovery and modernization left 
many Chinese without the energy to strengthen the churches. 
Knight was most critical of the Chinese churches and their leadership under the 
indigenous principles. He wrote that the Chinese cultural conventions of “face,” which he 
labeled “lying” and a “device of the devil,” was ubiquitous within Chinese congregations. 
The result was that “unspiritual men” manipulated self-government to rise to the head of 
churches as deacons and elders based on their wealth and status in the community. 
Equally troubling was that the sanctity of Protestantism was under attack from Chinese 
cultural traditions and rival religions, as he accused Chinese Christians of expressing 
their faith in a ritualistic and artificial fashion based similar to Buddhism. Further, 
traditional Chinese customs such as “extravagant” celebrations of Chinese weddings, 
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funerals, and church holidays dominated church financing and practices such as arranged 
marriages continued under the guises of the church.265 
Critics like Knight demonstrated a growing despair and disillusionment among 
the missionary force with Chinese Christian leadership and the promise of the indigenous 
principles. Deploying racialized tropes about Chinese as prone to corruption, deceit, and 
deeply susceptible to superstitious and idolatrous practices, he suggested that too much 
Chinese authority would lead to the ruination of evangelical Christianity. Consequently, 
Knight reified ideas about the missionary as a force policing and surveilling Chinese 
Christians, checking their autonomy and freedom when necessary, and giving voice to 
doubts about the readiness of Chinese for spiritual self-determination. 
These doubts were also reflected in CIM representations of missionary’s engaged 
in discipleship training that made it seem as if Chinese Christians were unaccustomed to 
exercising autonomy. One such report on the Chinese churches in Sichuan province near 
the city of Suyung illustrates this issue. Here, to facilitate church building among new 
congregations CIM missionaries passed along translated documents from a conference of 
missionaries in Sichuan that outlined general guidelines for doctrinal beliefs, 
administration, and structure of evangelical churches. When showing U.S. audiences how 
Chinese formed a church the CIM demonstrated that Chinese evangelicals simply 
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translated the document and held a congregation referendum on its adoption as the 
church’s charter. After the referendum, CIM missionaries then proceeded to direct the 
church through the election of its officers. In fact, Chinese churches like the evangelicals 
of Suyung appeared in CIM publications to lack the will, desire, know-how, and 
resources to exercise self-governance without the guidance of missionaries.266 Thus, 
Chinese spiritual self-determination was dependent on the missionary, not independent 
from him or her.  
Ultimately, the ideology of “open doors” continued to associate the missionary’s 
mobility with meanings about freedom, progress, and spirituality. However, it also 
remade the missionary into a symbol of support for Chinese spiritual self-determination, 
necessary to postwar recovery and nation building.  In the new roles and assignments, the 
CIM and its supporters equated missionary mobility with the expression and fulfillment 
of Chinese ambitions and desires such as societal recovery, spiritual growth, and nation 
building. But the society also deflected concerns about imperialism or foreign dominance 
of Chinese by labeling the missionary’s mobility as part of a “special relationship” which 
supported Chinese sovereignty. In return, the CIM reassured supporters that the 
missionary had not lost position or privilege or found its mobility constrained by the 
authority of the church or state, but in fact enjoyed even greater mobility and freedom 
under Chinese sovereignty.  
In the end, however, the return of the CIM missionary and his or her integration 
helped create the sense that Chinese Christians were incapable of exercising spiritual 
sovereignty, at least without the aid of the missionary. And ultimately, this perceived 
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failure colored the CIM’s response to the victory of the CCP in 1949, as the decision to 
remain in the field revealed that the society believed that Chinese Christianity could not 
weather the challenge of communism without the direct assistance of the international 
missionary movement. Instead, the CIM leadership decided in 1949 to model for Chinese 
evangelicals how to confront a communist state.   
Conclusion 
How then to make sense of the CIM as an international organization with a strong 
following among U.S. Protestant evangelicals? My analysis suggests that at least for the 
proponents and members of this society, this compulsion was not so much an “American” 
as a shared international paradox found within the international Protestant Christian 
community. And while Ruble argues the missionary was a symbol of American 
expansion and power after 1945, it is my contention that the CIM missionary was more a 
figure that portended the extension of an international order, religious in nature, and its 
power to shape the future of societies such as China.  
Second, the embrace of indigenization, even with its limits, displays evidence of 
the CIM’s trust in Chinese sovereignty and its exercise, spiritually and politically, as 
legitimate. These changes wrought by indigenization after 1943 also portended new 
meanings for Chinese Christian mobility. Essentially, the CIM promoted the idea that the 
missionary was increasingly in a secondary role, as the activities of Chinese as 
evangelists gained greater significance within the Christian moral empire. And the CIM 
worked to sell Protestant evangelicals on the idea that the mobility of Chinese Christians 
carried with it the same meanings as the mobility of the missionaries. Key to this project 
was the representation of Chinese as assuming and fulfilling the activities of pioneer 
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evangelism being phased out by the CIM. Through shared practices of movement as 
Chinese and foreign Protestants, missionary mobility was intended to signify cooperation, 
equality, and shared values across national and racial boundaries in the projects of moral 
uplift, progress, evangelism, and even postwar recovery and state building.  
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Chapter 3 
Immobilization and Expulsion: The Missionary Exodus and Sino-American 
Relations 
Introduction: Hope for China 
 In 1949 the CIM produced its first motion picture film, Hope for China, featuring 
footage from Dr. Ford L. Canfield’s tour of the field and prepared by the Moody Institute 
of Science. A popular deputation speaker for the North American Council, he arrived in 
Shanghai in December 1948 and set out for the west with an escort in a jeep to travel to 
various mission stations and outposts across the country. Canfield took footage of the 
CIM’s work in colleges and cities such as Nanjing, but also featured scenes from a 
lamasery in Tibet, “nomads” of Qinghai, the famed Burma Road and groups like the Lisu 
and Miao in Yunnan.267  
After it was finished, the film circulated audiences from the U.S. to South Africa 
and was made available in both English and Chinese. Largely bringing the pages and 
themes of China’s Millions to life, Hope for China portrayed China as a society riven by 
poverty and idolatry, steeped in superstition and facing immense geographic and social 
challenges to master on its path to modernity and nation building. Scenes of farmers 
working terraced rice fields, and laborers hauling bricks and stones on established the 
idea of Chinese as burdened both physically and spiritually and were accompanied by 
questions for the viewer, “How would you like to carry 160 pound so of salt up steep 
mountains all day or follow the water buffalo?” In contrast to the nation’s “unevangelized 
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millions,” missionaries working with Chinese Christians and churches were situated as 
virile, pious, modern, and progressive leaders in the nation’s spiritual development.268  
However, the meanings of the film were irrevocably altered by the CCP’s triumph 
in 1949. By the time Canfield arrived in China to start his tour Northern China was 
quickly coming under CCP rule, and when the film was released the narrative and images 
were revised to fit a tone of defiance to communism. Featuring images of the China IVF 
and CIM missionaries holding conferences at various colleges, the film urged Christian 
evangelicals to pray fervently or else “Will the opportunity of recent years be lost?” Hope 
for China warned that these students and their contemporaries were sure to be targeted by 
the CCP for indoctrination and would face great political and social pressure, as would 
the rest of society.269  
Ending with the scene of twenty-two CIM missionaries boarding a steamship in 
San Francisco, Hope for China insisted that despite communism’s victory the 
missionary’s commission from God was the same. Noting that there was “rarely a time 
when all that land at peace,” the film proclaimed a “soldier’s life is not his own, belongs 
to his king…that is why I am going to China.”270 As it had done in the past during times 
of political uncertainty and hostility toward foreign missions, CIM leadership in Shanghai 
opted to “sit-out” communism’s victory and keep missionaries at their posts. Thus, Hope 
for China staked out the CIM’s claim that only God, not the CCP, could force the mission 
to close its doors. Rather, the CIM missionary would endeavor to stand by Chinese 
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Christians during this crisis and encourage their resistance to any infringement from the 
state. 
As the majority of Protestant missions abandoned China in 1949 the CIM’s 
refusal to withdraw added to the prestige the society enjoyed among the international 
Protestant community. U.S. newspapers like the Portland Press Herald referred to CIM 
members in the 1950s as “the indomitable who stuck to their guns when the Red wave 
swept across China.”271 CIM speaking engagements in U.S. cities also featured the film 
Hope for China, a portrait of “the progress of Christian missions in the face of 
Communist advances,” pitting the CIM work against the CCP’s in a scramble for the 
hearts and minds of China.272 Indeed, for much of 1949 the CIM promoted the idea that 
despite the great challenges facing the missionary by staying the society hoped to prove 
God’s sovereignty over all nations. With its entire force still in the field throughout 1950, 
the General Director urged prayer circles on to even more fervent prayers, “Do your 
prayer helpers appreciate that our staying on at such a time is utter madness—unless it is 
at God’s command?”273 As an institution, the CIM embraced the crisis with a strong faith 
that God never allow the “loss” of China to the missionary movement. 
That Chinese Christians wanted the missionary movement to remain was an idea 
that received great attention from the CIM. In December 1948, Chinese Christian leaders 
gathered in Shanghai drafted an exhortation for the missionary to remain in China, a 
message sent to Protestant societies around the country. Spokesman such as Liang 
Xiaochu, general-secretary of the National Committee of the YMCA in China, went even 
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further in that same month stating that Chinese Christians were ready and willing to 
suffer to maintain the ecumenical principle with the missionary at their side.274 As the 
filmstrip for Hope for China traveled CIM networks outside China this was a prominent 
theme, and the film worked as an inventory of all the groups the CIM missionary 
identified with and stood alongside to face communism together. 
Much like the Truman administration, prior to the Korean War the CIM first 
sought accommodation with the CCP, and then turned to hostile defiance to its 
recognition and legitimacy. The society’s hold out in the CCP was short lived and by 
1951 the CIM was forced to issue a call to evacuate the field. The reversal had been 
forced by the CCP’s increasingly tight control over the activities of the missionary, most 
importantly their mobility, and an escalating societal and political pressure on 
missionaries as imperialists. With the eruption of war in Korea the missionary’s presence 
in China allowed the CCP a valuable tool for ideological mobilization of the masses 
toward anti-imperialism. Increasingly, Chinese Christian voices contributed to the 
missionary’s condemnation as an imperialist and a national movement known as the 
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) severed ties with the international community as 
a means to achieve independence and loyalty to the CCP. 
Forced to physically abandon China, the CIM worked to ensure throughout the 
1950s and 1960s that Chinese Christians would never be spiritually left behind by the 
international evangelical community. As scholars such as William Inboden have shown, 
debates about the PRC and diplomatic recognition or containment in the U.S. were based 
upon the experiences of China missionaries and their own personal relations with the 
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CCP, GMD, and the Chinese people.275 Conversely, the CIM’s activities in the 1950s and 
1960s demonstrate how the international evangelical community influenced many U.S. 
evangelicals to oppose the CCP and TSPM by focusing on the missionary’s 
immobilization and expulsion and concern for the fate of Chinese Christians in a 
communist state. 
After the exodus praying for Chinese Christians involved CIM supporters in a 
fraternity of anti-communist social and political organizations in the Cold War, making 
the ideologies of containment and anti-communism apart of daily religious expression.  
Angela Lahr’s Millennial Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares documents how in the 
1950s and 1960s prayer served as important expression of citizenship and religious 
identity in the U.S., especially as a means by which Protestants believed they could 
influence world events by imploring for God’s protection and guidance.276 In their 
commentary on the fate of Chinese Christians, the CIM became an influential member of 
the U.S.’s community of Christian anti-communist activists, which included the 
Committee of One Million, a large body of recently returned ex-China missionaries, and 
the infamous China Lobby.  Through prayer for Chinese Christians the CIM intended to 
mobilize spiritual resistance to communism in the international community and direct it 
toward the aid of Chinese Protestants. 
However, the missionary’s immobilization and expulsion by the CCP and the 
focus on the suffering and persecution of Chinese Christians gave rise to profound 
spiritual and racial anxieties. The missionary’s expulsion raised a host of spiritual 
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questions. Was the last hundred years of the missionary endeavor in China all for 
nothing? How could God be sovereign over all nations and yet seemingly allow millions 
upon millions of Chinese to die without a chance to hear the gospel? In confronting these 
questions the CIM tried to balance between heightening awareness of the plight of 
Chinese Christians in the PRC and sustaining the hope that evangelicals in China could 
keep the faith alive despite immense pressure and persecution.  
Adding to these anxieties were racial fears generated by the CIM’s telling of the 
exodus narrative. Studies of Cold War culture has discussed and analyzed a host of fears 
from atomic war and communist subversion and infiltration of American life produced by 
international events after 1945.277 I want to suggest another set of fearful fantasies 
produced by stories of the missionary’s immobilization and expulsion in China. Mainly 
that of a post-colonial world where white mobility was no longer privileged and 
unlimited but subject to intimidation, harassment, and control by non-white regimes and 
societies overtaken by hyper-nationalism. In sum, the exodus narrative gave flight to 
anxieties about the emergence of an Asia where whites were subjected to the same 
machinations of state power scrutinizing the mobility of foreign minorities that Asians 
experienced in the west. 
 
 
 
 
Immobilization and Expulsion 
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From Shanghai, the CIM Headquarters Staff watched in shock in 1948 and 1949 
as GMD resistance evaporated against the onslaught of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA). Correspondence between Shanghai and the North American Council in 
Philadelphia in late 1948 and early 1949 demonstrates the surprise and dismay of the 
Headquarters with GMD defeats at Kaifeng, Tianjin, and Shanghai. The society was 
particularly disheartened by the ease with which the GMD was ousted from its 
“impenetrable” position in Kaifeng and the largely peaceful turnover in Shanghai, a city 
the GMD had promised to defend “to the last man.” However, the headquarters did 
rejoice that in most major cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, and Shanghai the limited 
fighting and quick transitions had led to little loss of human life and a return to normalcy 
that allowed missionary work to resume shortly thereafter.278 
 Throughout 1948 and 1949 the CIM adopted a policy of neutrality and avoided 
commentary on the war as much as possible. Only infrequently did mission reports and 
publications feature references to the fighting with vague allusions to “serious 
environment” facing the Sino-Protestant Christian community.279 But the advance of the 
PLA startled the CIM into rallying its followers to engage in spiritual warfare through 
days of prayer featuring advertisements emblazoned with the word, “ATTACK!” in the 
pages of China’s Millions. Citing biblical stories of battle against overwhelming odds, the 
CIM proclaimed that prayer and faith in God could turn the tide of any battle. 
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Meanwhile, special tours of the U.S. in the fall of 1948 by General Director Houghton 
and ally President Chen Chonggui of the CTS rallied Christian evangelicals to the plight 
of the missionary and Chinese Christian facing a communist revolution. The tour was cut 
short as the GMD’s collapse and uncertainty surrounding the mission’s stay in the field 
forced the return of the General Director in December. 280 
 The advance of the PLA in the Chinese Civil War forced the question of 
evacuation first upon Protestant missions in northern China in the late 1940s. The 
adjustment to CCP control came first for missionaries in Manchuria, Shanxi, Shaanxi, 
and Shandong in the early months of 1948. By the fall of that same year, the decision was 
pressed upon groups in Central China, and the U.S. Consul was urging American citizens 
in Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian to leave while facilities and transport was still 
available. Especially after the fall of Tianjin in January 1949, a wave of missionary 
personnel from other societies withdrew from the interior provinces and gathered in 
Shanghai. By the beginning of 1949 the majority of Protestant missions were pulling 
personnel out of China, with over 2000 missionaries and their families departing in a 
span from late 1948 through the spring of 1949. Other societies planned to remove 
personnel from remote areas and gather their forces in larger cities or leave behind only a 
small skeleton staff to conduct operations.  
As the likelihood of a communist victory became more apparent General Director 
Houghton remained adamant in the CIM’s commitment to remain under communist 
occupation. Houghton wrote “evidence is multiplying” that the CCP will “show kindness 
to missionary and foreigner” and “whatever happens the people of China still need the 
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Gospel.” But the General Director argued against the idea “gaining currency” in the 
international community that any regime would be better than the GMD as the 
missionary movement would “lose great opportunities” in the arena of evangelism if the 
CCP came to power. He implored the home audiences to continue their prayers and 
insisted that God might intervene before the CCP could gain control over the whole 
country.281 
 The CIM remained steadfast in committing its forces to business as usual, keeping 
the society’s agents at their posts scattered across the nation. In fact, despite a number of 
popular leaders in the field like J. Herbert Kane and Dick Hillis resigning from the 
mission when the decision to stay in China was announced in 1949 the overall force of 
the CIM grew by a net gain of forty missionaries.282 Defiantly, the society even sent 
reinforcements to the field with declarations that the missionary went forth with God as 
its “Shield and our Defender.” This cohort of junior missionaries known as the “49ers” 
was hailed by the CIM as a nothing short of a miracle as the CCP made it clear that entry 
to China by foreigners would be limited primarily to experts in fields such as medicine or 
technical specialists.283 Even more controversial was the Shanghai administration’s 
decision to continue schooling for missionary children in Guling, prompting criticism 
from the society’s Norwegian and Swedish affiliates. Statements from the General 
Director to U.S. evangelicals reiterated that missionaries could not await political 
stability to heed God’s call. CIM missionaries were ready and willing for sacrifice, 
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according to Houghton, and he urged Christians in the home country to “Join the battle 
with us!”284 
Complicating matters for the society’s later withdrawal was that while other 
Protestant societies congregated their forces in major cities near the coast, the CIM’s 
forces remained at their posts scattered across the country. In early 1950, CIM 
missionaries occupied hundreds of different cities and rural village outposts in over 
thirteen different provinces mostly distributed across the northwest, west, and southern 
areas of the PRC. Of the over 700 CIM missionaries still residing in the PRC, the largest 
distributions of CIM forces were located in Sichuan (145 members and affiliates), 
Jiangsu (107), and Jiangxi (79). A sizeable portion of the CIM’s forces worked in the 
northwest, with over fifty members and affiliates in both Gansu and Ningxia. In addition 
to Sichuan, over 80 CIM missionaries were spread across territories in Qinghai, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Tibet, and Xinjiang. But the civil war and communist control in the early years 
of the war left many CIM stations in north and central China unoccupied.285 
 The CIM’s decision to remain was especially brazen considering its own history 
with the CCP since the 1930s. Of course, the CCP’s ideological tenets of communism, 
atheism, and anti-imperialism caused the CIM great alarm, but the society also feared the 
potential violence the CCP could inflict upon missionaries. In 1934 the society gained 
international attention when a young missionary couple, John and Betty Stam, were 
seized and executed by beheading by communist soldiers. Not long after, another CIM 
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member Aflred Broomhall was taken captive by the CCP and forced to accompany them 
along the Long March. Both episodes had become the subject of popular CIM 
publications in the 1930s and inspired evangelical hostility toward the CCP and 
communism in Asia. During the Second World War, there were occasional instances that 
called for alarm in areas occupied by the communist forces, and in northern China CIM 
missionaries reported that communist-occupied areas witnessed tightening restrictions or 
outright prohibition on Christian worship and evangelism.286 
 However, the society also hoped that the CCP had modified its policies toward 
Christianity and Christian missions. A small number of CIM missionaries involved in 
medical work actually found support for their work among Red Army officers and CCP 
officials.287 Further, the CCP’s United Front policy had created alliances with many 
prominent Chinese Protestants.288 At best, the CCP policies toward Christianity were 
ambivalent if not tolerant and varied greatly according to geography, but did little to 
change the CIM impression of the CCP as a danger to the Christian community.289 
The decision of the CIM to remain in China after 1949 was based upon on many 
different factors but ultimately grounded in the conviction that the CCP’s victory was a 
test of faith. As such the CIM would not leave the Chinese Protestant community alone to 
face the threat of communism and remained in China to work as long as possible as a 
matter of loyalty and identification with Chinese Christians. General Director Houghton 
was optimistic that the CIM could remain in China by complying with the CCP mandates 
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for Chinese churches to function independently from foreign finances and control, while 
simultaneously he hoped the CIM could lead Chinese Christians to remain defiant against 
any sort of “compromise” between Christianity and communism.290 The CIM would “sit 
out” the CCP occupation because ideally the communist regime would be only a 
temporary disruption to the evangelism of China as the Boxer Uprising or Anti-Christian 
Movement of the 1920s had been in the past.291  
Throughout 1949 the CIM claimed that the conditions in the field were still 
hospitable for missionary work. In many areas missionaries continued to practice the 
methods of pioneer evangelism, discipleship training, or itinerate as bible teachers and 
counselors to the churches. Even in the early months of 1950, CIM missionaries 
continued to work in many regions and have contact with Chinese churches without 
interference or restrictions from the new government. For example, at one point Ralph 
Tolliver traveled widely in areas around Chongqing, going over 250 miles by steamer, 
junk, and train, attending over sixty meetings with Chinese churches. In fact, many CIM 
missionaries continued to accompany Chongqing Theological Seminary students and 
faculty on evangelistic tours and itinerations in and around Chongqing with regularity. In 
Qinghai, reports in 1949 and 1950 suggested unprecedented success in converting 
Muslims.292 
By 1950, however, the evidence on the ground suggested that conditions for 
missionary work were rapidly deteriorating as a series of events inside and outside China 
turned the missionary into a focal point for the CCP’s foreign policy and mobilization of 
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the masses. In June of 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel, leading to the 
first major crisis of the Cold War in East Asia. U.S. forces quickly mobilized from Japan 
to rally to the defense of a weak South Korean regime led by Syngman Rhee. By that fall, 
the success of the United Nations forces led by General Douglas MacArthur in repelling 
North Korea prompted Mao to send Chinese forces into the fray, driving back the 
American led coalition to a stalemate not far from the 38th parallel. The Korean War 
proved the catalyst in a hardening of Sino-American relations, leading to an abandonment 
of any hope of accommodation between Mao and Truman. 
During the Korean War, open hostility and a frenzy of anti-American 
demonstrations took place inside the PRC, and caught in the crossfires of these 
campaigns was the CIM missionary and Chinese Christian. That a movement to purge 
Chinese Christianity of its foreign ties and influences was already underway placed even 
greater pressure on Chinese Christians. Early that spring a minority of Chinese Christians 
meeting Zhou Enlai helped lay the groundwork to cut ties with the missionary movement 
by producing what came to be known in the west as the “Christian Manifesto,” a 
document calling for the establishment of a three-self movement hoping to make all 
Protestant congregations completely independent of foreign financing, governance, and 
reliance on missionaries as evangelists. As part of this patriotic mobilization of the 
churches, the “Christian Manifesto” provided a litany of sins committed by the 
missionary movement against Chinese, both Christian and non-Christian. Against the 
backdrop of the Korean War, the signing of the Manifesto by Chinese Christians was 
accompanied by rallies and parades decrying American imperialism. Leading the charge 
was a body of Christians known as the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), 
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eventually forming the basis for the establishment of national regulatory agency to 
govern church affairs and mediate between Christianity and government. The Christian 
Manifesto and actions of the TSPM were hotly debated outside the PRC as many 
missionaries rejected both as instruments designed by the CCP to control and perhaps 
eradicate Christianity.  
As an institution, the CIM was an ardent critic of the TSPM. In declaring the 
society’s desire to remain in China under the auspices of the CCP, the CIM had pointed 
to voices from the Chinese Christian community asking the missionary movement to 
stay.293 In responding to the charges leveled by the TSPM, the CIM argued that the group 
was unrepresentative of the Chinese Christian community, especially evangelicals, and 
their charges against the foreign missionary coerced and illegitimate. With its agents still 
inside China, the society worked to prevent Chinese evangelicals from aligning with the 
TSPM or embracing communism. Internal correspondence within the CIM encouraged 
missionaries to circumspectly combat the authority of the TSPM and urge Chinese 
Christians not to sign copies of the Manifesto circulating as petitions in the fall of 
1950.294 Other directions asked CIM missionaries to lead prayers against the study of 
communist ideology and development of youth organizations.295 
In a number of areas, CIM forces fomented resistance on the part of Chinese 
evangelicals to the CCP and its campaigns. Among students, meetings and prayer groups 
were reorganized to strengthen the resolve of members to resist societal pressure to 
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abandon Christianity or join the ranks of Christians embracing communism.296 To 
facilitate student resistance nationwide, an editor for the China Inter-Varsity Fellowship 
compiled a list of questions that communist officials often used to interrogate Christians 
about their faith and published them as a pamphlet in Chinese and distributed it across the 
nation.297 By circulating the list the CIM hoped to prepare Chinese students to defend 
Christianity before CCP officials and remain steadfast in their faith against political and 
societal pressure. In other cities like Chongqing, CIM missionaries encouraged Chinese 
students to meet secretly in a rural farmhouse outside the city to carry on worship and 
continued bible study.298 
By staying in the PRC and engaging in such activities, the CIM was undoubtedly 
aware their presence would lead to increasing pressure on Chinese Christians and 
churches. In reporting to the agents in the field on Zhou Enlai’s meeting with Christian 
representatives and the creation of the Manifesto, the mission’s headquarters in Shanghai 
informed personnel that the document made it unequivocally clear that the CCP intended 
to force out the foreign missionary movement. Further, the administration warned if 
missionaries did not voluntarily abandon their posts the party would compel such a move 
by pressuring the churches. But it advised members not to “pack their trunk,” and 
reminded them “We believe we are in this country at God’s charges, and therefore we 
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have no right to assume that inevitably it will be put into effect.”299 Thus, throughout 
much of 1950 the CIM willingly risked the persecution of its members and Chinese allies 
based upon its unwavering belief that the missionary resided in the PRC at God’s behest. 
By late 1950, however, the society’s leadership in Shanghai faced mounting 
pressure to initiate at the very least a limited evacuation. Amidst the Korean War and 
TSPM mobilization campaigns the missionary increasingly became a target for public 
condemnation and ridicule, and more and more Chinese Christians expressed their desire 
for the missionary to withdraw from their communities. In provinces such as Gansu, 
Chinese church leaders expressed regret that CIM missionaries had stayed so long and by 
their presence damaged the reputation of the churches amidst the rising anti-Americanism 
of the Korean War.300  Other invitations to depart from Chinese Christians were issued 
with more subtlety. Arthur Glasser’s fellow evangelists within the Chinese church in 
Yunnan simply asked whether or not he planned to return to China should the opportunity 
arise. That they did so before he ever announced his intention to depart signaled that they 
wished him to leave.301  
Perhaps the biggest blow to the CIM’s hopes to rally Chinese evangelicals against 
communism and the TSPM came with the defection of the society’s stalwart ally at the 
CTS President Chen Chonggui. In December, Chen asked the CIM missionaries on staff 
to withdraw from the school, stunning the CIM senior leadership in Shanghai and causing 
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divisions within the evangelical churches and groups associated with the mission in 
Chongqing. 302 By 1952, Chen had become the most prominent evangelical within the 
upper echelon of the TSPM, and was known inside and outside of China as a fiery critic 
of the missionary and the U.S. In the winter of 1952 the CTS president published the 
article “How My Political Thinking Has Changed,” for the journal Tianfeng. In it he 
praised the CCP for awakening Chinese Christians to a spirit of patriotism and being 
moved to tears as his grandson tore photograph of U.S. President Harry Truman to 
pieces, writing, “What a happy day, when I could see what for many years I had looked 
for, the time when a three year-old child knew to love his country, and to strike an 
American devil.” Chen also credited the communist revolution with inspiring a watershed 
moment in the life of the Chinese churches, as they were emboldened to throw off foreign 
control and domination of Christianity.303  
His article for Tianfeng was a revelation to the CIM and its supporters and 
crippled the society’s hopes that the Chinese evangelical community would stand by the 
missionary in defiance of the TSPM and CCP. Rather, the society feared that Chen’s 
clout, which it had helped propel to new heights after 1945, would give the TSPM greater 
credibility within the evangelical community inside China. Not long after Chen asked 
CIM missionaries to leave the Chongqing Theological Seminary, another pastor in 
Chongqing followed suit.304 Indeed, reports from across the field suggested the growing 
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popularity of the CCP and its reforms with Christians. In Yunnan there were signs that 
Christian youth were leaving in droves to join the student associations and groups 
supporting the CCP. Student evangelism was taking a hit in cities such as Shanghai, too, 
and in Lanzhou, Otto Schoerner was dismayed to see so many Chinese won over by the 
CCP’s land reforms.305 
Compounding these issues was the fact that the majority of missionaries were 
becoming completely isolated, especially from Chinese Christians. In many cases, 
Chinese clergy and lay leaders asked the missionary not to attend services or socialize 
with members of the church in public, and by December reports from across China 
suggested that cooperation with Chinese Christians in most areas occupied by the CIM 
was impossible. Many CIM missionaries reported that the churches were intimidated into 
distancing themselves from the missionary, either directly by communist authorities or 
indirectly by the more general political atmosphere and anti-imperialism of the era. Other 
members suggested that the CCP had success in smearing their reputation with local 
communities by painting them as spies or even just potential spies. But many CIM agents 
also self-imposed their isolation fearing that appearing with Chinese Christians would 
lead them to be scrutinized by authorities. 
This fear of incriminating Chinese Christians greatly limited the extent to which 
CIM missionaries actually engaged in combating communism. In Yunnan, Mona Joyce 
felt a strong desire to warn the churches of “what communism was,” but was counseled 
against doing so by many missionaries. Especially as members applied for exit visas, they 
resisted the urge to say anything negative about communism or the CCP out of fear of 
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jeopardizing their departure.306 In fact, many CIM members seemingly developed 
paranoia, suspecting that even old friends and church members were baiting them into 
comments that could be used as charges against them by authorities.  
In addition, many CIM missionaries learned that their presence and cooperation 
with the churches caused authorities to doubts the churches’ compliance with the three-
selfs principles advocated by the TSPM and the government. In Tsinghui, for instance, 
William Saunders hardly noticed the turnover from the GMD to the CCP, going to bed 
one night and waking up to find the PLA in control of the city. Under CCP control, 
Saunders largely saw no real persecution or pressure placed upon Christians in his area. 
But officials were suspicious of how a church could be independent from a foreign 
mission society and yet have a missionary engaged in church activities and affairs. 
Ultimately, Sanders and Chinese Christians affiliated with the CIM struggled to explain 
how the missionary’s cooperation with an indigenous church was not a violation of the 
church’s autonomy.307 Similar reports from across the PRC in late 1950 led the 
headquarters to conclude that the mere presence of a missionary was evidence to local 
officials of the dependence of that the church on the foreign missionary movement.308  
In September, amidst rising public condemnation, the CIM decided that where 
Chinese Christians asked the missionary to leave, CIM agents could withdraw to avoid 
causing the churches further embarrassment and pressure from the government. But it 
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also emphasized missionaries could resist the authority of the churches and remain at 
their posts if they so wished. In deciding whether to heed the requests of Chinese 
Christians to depart from their assignments, the General Director asked that missionaries 
first consider whether or not such requests came from groups that were “unspiritual or 
over-timid.” If the missionary found Chinese Christians to be spiritually wanting in such 
a way, it was their duty the General Director insisted to refuse their plea.309 Such a 
decision spoke to the CIM’s belief that anti-missionary rhetoric was coerced by the CCP 
or TSPM, as well as the idea that Chinese Christian and missionary alike should weather 
persecution according to God’s plan. 
However, the sense that the missionary could aid Chinese evangelicals in their 
hour of crisis was quickly evaporating with reports indicating the missionary’s complete 
immobilization. Following the establishment of the CCP, a new regime of mobility was 
constructed, as all foreign missionaries were required to apply for a residence permit in 
order to remain in China. As a result, changing one’s residency proved near impossible, 
and travel outside one’s registered town or village required permits, too. Interprovincial 
travel became rare and rarer, and even inter-city itinerations infrequent or prohibited by 
officials.310  
By the fall of 1950 changes to government regulations concerning religion 
gradually reduced the missionary’s ability to engage in evangelism. In many regions, 
authorities banned the use of broadcasting stations, public meetings outside the walls of 
the church, and the distribution of texts and pamphlets. For example, throughout 1950, 
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communications from inland China suggested that missionaries were limited to a narrow 
range of social activities with Chinese Christians. In December reports from northwest 
China indicated that missionary work in the region was largely non-existent. In addition, 
these restrictions meant communications between junior and senior missionaries in the 
field and their provincial superintendents or the headquarters were also difficult to 
maintain. The result was that by the winter of 1950-1951 the majority of CIM 
missionaries were confined to their residences either by choice or by decree.311      
Further negating the missionary’s work was the society’s disappearing 
infrastructure, and repeated questioning and inspection by local officials. The CCP’s 
objectives of state-building and severing Christianity’s ties to the foreign community led 
Christian schools, colleges, hospitals, clinics, and church buildings to devolve into the 
hands of Chinese Protestants or the state. Many CIM members were forced to move out 
of mission premises or relegated to much smaller quarters somewhere on the mission’s 
former property.  In addition to the mission’s property, the missionary’s personal 
belongings were routinely inspected and many times seized by authorities. Regular 
interviews or interrogations by officials on everything from the missionary’s personal 
views on communism to the history of their travel whereabouts in China left many 
individuals feeling harassed and intimidated.  
Under these conditions CIM missionaries increasingly voiced a desire to evacuate 
the field, but the response of the administration in Shanghai to these changing conditions 
in the field was hindered by a number of factors including unreliable communications. 
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But the primary issue was that the General Director departed China for Australia in the 
fall of 1949, as he suffered from intense bouts of insomnia. In his stead John R. Sinton 
took over the day-to-day management of operations as Deputy Director in Shanghai for 
much of 1950 and 1951. It was unclear whether or not as Deputy Director Sinton had the 
right to issue a withdrawal. Houghton’s unflinching commitment to weather the storm 
and yet his own distance from events ongoing in China proved a problem, as more and 
more missionaries felt Shanghai and the General Director to be out of touch with the 
reality of the field. 
 A few members even charged that they were kept at their posts under “duress.” 
At issue was the fact that if any member decided to depart China without approval from 
Shanghai they were forced to resign and pay their own way out from the field. A few 
missionaries expressed anger that without the aid of the mission to navigate the 
bureaucratic channels of the PRC and pay the “exorbant sums” required for travel, 
amounted to keeping missionaries at their posts against their will. While denying these 
charges, Shanghai faced increasing internal pressure to order withdrawals from across the 
field in 1950.312  
By the winter of 1950 and 1951 internal reports from missionaries across China 
suggested that conditions such as the missionary’s immobilization and public ridicule, 
which had once been “localized,” were now evident nation-wide. In a matter of a week, 
areas that had been open to limited missionary work changed with CIM missionaries 
completely isolated and immobilized. In early January, the mission headquarters in 
Shanghai ordered the superintendents to withdraw all personnel to the provincial capitals. 
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By October all CIM personnel had left Zhejiang and property been relinquished to locals, 
and in January over 200 members were given permission to apply for exit permits. Not 
long after that Sinton ordered a total evacuation without seeking Houghton’s approval 
first, and by the end of 1951 all but 33 members had exited through Hong Kong.313 There 
the society established a temporary headquarters, securing two hundred cots and army 
blankets from the British government to house the society’s members as they awaited 
their voyages home.314 
The exodus from China proved even more humiliating for the CIM. Once it 
became apparent that a withdrawal was necessary, financial issues slowed the CIM’s 
evacuation. In December 1950 representatives from Headquarters warned that to grant 
leave from their posts to all the society’s personnel was impossible. Transportation in 
inside the PRC, such as steamships, was costly and hard to procure. Worse, the costs of 
pulling all personnel out to Hong Kong or Shanghai would deplete the society’s budget 
and leave them marooned there with no funds for the far more expensive voyage back 
home.  
However, the bigger obstacles came in obtaining permission to leave from 
government officials. As part of the new regime of mobility enacted by the CCP, 
missionaries were required to apply for exit visas. In many cases missionaries waited for 
several months without explanation before being issued to them.  Along with this 
application, authorities required missionaries to advertise their departures in the local 
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newspapers, allowing for community members to come forward with grievances or 
accusations against them before leaving. The missionary was also forced to find Chinese 
guarantors for their reputation and any outstanding financial debts.315  
Through these measures the CCP closely supervised and controlled the 
missionary’s departure, too. As missionaries traveled out, Chinese officials often 
accompanied them carrying their identification documents to each city along their route 
out to Hong Kong. In some cases, escorts occasionally even held onto the missionary’s 
identification, documents, and currency and were responsible for arranging tickets for 
boats, trains, or motor-car and lodging.316 Thus, the time, pace, route, and methods of 
transportation were in large part monitored at the local, provincial, and national level by 
Chinese officials. 
While the CIM struggled to finance the withdrawal and navigate these complex 
procedures, the few remaining members increasingly faced a hostile society and even 
imprisonment.  While all but 33 members had left by the end of 1951, the last two CIM 
missionaries would not leave China until 1953. These remnants of the CIM missionary 
force proved fodder for the TSPM and CCP’s anti-imperialist rhetoric in many areas 
throughout 1951. Accusation meetings in the churches and articles in local newspapers 
targeted CIM missionaries in Nanjing, Changsha, Kunming, and Sinning for a range of 
grievances from imperialism and espionage to medical malpractice. And members such 
as Charles Spring and Arthur Matthews were imprisoned and faced public trials. In the 
first few years of the PRC the missionary’s mobility went from privileged right immune 
to state sovereignty to completely immobilized and dominated by the state bureaucracy.  
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There were also growing fears that the events in China signaled a momentous 
shift in the fortunes of global Christianity. A prayer devotional citing the expulsion of the 
CIM in January 1953 lamented, “We may as well face the fact that the day of unrestricted 
movement of missionaries is past.”317 New regulations governing the missionary 
movement were anticipated by governments in India, the Philippines, Colombia, and 
regions in Central Asia.318 Amidst the rising tensions of the Cold War, the missionary 
exodus from the PRC elevated the fears of evangelicals that the spread of communism 
and decolonization threatened to greatly circumscribe the mobility and rights of white 
missionaries around the world.  
 These fears were produced in part through the society’s coverage of its exodus 
from China. Originally, the CIM advised missionaries arriving in Hong Kong to avoid 
speaking to the secular or Christian press. The society did not want to risk angering the 
CCP while members still remained in China. But increasingly after 1951, the society used 
stories highlighting the missionary’s persecution and humiliation during the exodus to 
support the Cold War containment and spiritual warfare against the CCP. Further, the 
exodus narratives contested the idea that Chinese Christians and larger society truly 
resented the missionaries and wanted them gone, as the stories featured accounts of 
Chinese weeping at their departure. 
Firsthand experiences with communism kept the now former China missionaries 
in high demand as speakers with U.S. audiences, and with over 600 missionaries still in 
China by the start of 1951 the CIM had the largest body of “missionary experts” on 
communism of any mission in the world. From the CIM branches in Los Angeles, 
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Chicago, and Philadelphia these stories were disseminated to the churches, youth groups, 
and social organizations of Protestant communities. Even in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, women’s missionary societies and prayer circles in Santa Ana, Long Beach, and 
Orange County were still eager to hear Marguerite Owen recount her experiences in 
Yunnan.319 
 Touring the U.S. as an expert on the PRC and communism in general became a 
facet of many China missionaries post-China tenure in the Cold War era. As one CIM 
author alluded to the missionary’s experiences were sought after as a “precious 
knowledge of what the Church is passing through.”320 Arthur Matthews, one of the last 
fourteen CIM missionaries to exit China after 1951, worked in the CIM offices in 
Chicago and Los Angeles during the 1950s and was constantly sought after as a speaker 
at Protestant churches, conferences, and youth groups to share stories of his 
experiences.321  Matthew’s popularity as a speaker had the added dimension of his story 
being rather unusual, because he was among the minority of Protestant missionaries 
whose exit from China had been delayed by criminal charges.322  
Various other members accepted pastorates or posts within American seminaries 
or bible colleges such as Arthur Glasser at Columbia Bible College or J. Herbert Kane 
who first accepted a pastorship in Quebec before moving to Rhode Island to work at 
Providence Bible College. A few, such as Dick Hillis, even formed their own mission 
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society, Orient Crusades, while David Adeney left the China Inter-Varsity Fellowship for 
a job in Illinois with the U.S IVF. In defiance of the CCP and TSPM, the China 
missionary in exile claimed to speak for the Chinese masses, particularly “true” 
Christians, allegedly silenced by the Bamboo curtain. 
And the U.S. public was eager to hear about their experiences and insights into 
life in a communist state. Outside of mission publications, media in the U.S. such as The 
New York Times, U.S. News and World Report, Time, Christian Century, Readers Digest, 
and Moody Monthly published accounts of various Protestant and Catholic missionaries 
and their experiences with communism. Many other missionaries went on to publish their 
own books describing their last years, days, or months in China.323 The detention of 
missionaries was but one of several international events contributing to fears about the 
treatment of Americans by sovereign Asian states. From late 1948 to the end of 1949, 
U.S. consul Angus Ward and his staff were detained on charges of espionage by the CCP 
in the city of Mukden. In response groups such as the American Legion decried the arrest 
as a violation of diplomatic norms and called publically for a military rescue. Media 
attention in December 1949 upon his release focused on Ward’s emaciated appearance, 
as he had lost over twenty pounds, a sign of his abuse and neglect.324  
The American public was equally fascinated and anxious about the psychological 
treatment of the individual in communist states. During the Korean War, the treatment of 
U.S. POWs created even more vitriol toward Beijing when signed confessions from U.S. 
pilots and naval officers admitted to the use of germ-warfare and later a number of 
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American GIs defected to the PRC, leading to various U.S. news outlets and spokesman 
to decry the use of Chinese “brain-washing” and torture.325 Before the release of the 
American POWs, U.S. journalists and intellectuals such as Edward Hunter had already 
introduced the concept of “brain-washing” into the lexicon of Americans with books like 
Brainwashing in Red China: The Calculated Destruction of Men’s Minds.326 Later 
accounts of “brain-washing” used against missionaries Olin Stockwell and Scot Geoffrey 
T. Bull proved popular reading for evangelicals in the 1950s. Americans were 
increasingly awestruck and terrified by communism’s power to isolate, confine, and 
remake the individual.327  
In this respect, the exodus gave rise to racial fears within the CIM about the 
control of Asian regimes over white mobility that were then reproduced and disseminated 
back in nations like the U.S. Building on the American mythology of the captivity 
narrative, the exodus narratives of the CIM spoke to fears of racial revenge by the 
“other.” By stripping missionaries of their freedom of movement and rights to evangelize, 
and perhaps much worse, the CCP induced evangelical fears of racial revenge by non-
white regimes and communist states.  
 Several experiences during the exodus created hardship for CIM missionaries. 
Some missionaries had reportedly been forced to leave wearing only the clothes on their 
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backs, which caused considerable hardship as they traveled across China.328 Many others 
had been separated from friends, family, or co-workers, which resulted in weeks, 
sometimes years of separation and uncertainty.329 In other cases, some missionaries 
believed that communist officials intentionally delayed their departure from China, 
eagerly exploiting the foreign missionary’s presence as a focal point for anti-American 
and anti-Christian demonstrations. In other examples, rumors abounded that plots had 
developed to hold certain missionaries until friends and families back home could pay a 
ransom.330 The circumstances of the exodus convinced the CIM that the CCP’s new 
regime governing mobility had been engineered specifically to degrade and intimidate the 
missionary and ruin their standing with local Chinese. 
The exodus induced fears of sexual violation, too. For example, in February 1951 
the society became concerned by the fate of a single female missionary living in western 
China who had been confined to her quarters by officials. Reports from her 
superintendent stressed that each day the young woman was “surrounded by men” 
holding “public trials in view of her quarters” as a means to intimidate and harass her. 
Authorities had already taken her typewriter and watch, and her superintendent was 
afraid that she would never be allowed to leave with “her body and clothes.”331 That a 
majority of the CIM’s missionaries in the field were women only amplified fears of 
sexual violation.  
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CIM missionaries relayed these fears to U.S. evangelicals by painting a picture of 
the CCP as denying the foreigner any rights or standing. Matthews later described his last 
years in China as learning firsthand “the irresistible might of the communist machine in 
action” which had made all aspects of life in the PRC contingent upon “the will and 
pleasure of the communists.”332 In the judicial system, he claimed “to compromise 
seemed plausible enough, whereas to resist could mean—anything!”333  Another CIM 
author described the withdrawal as a “school of learning to know no rights of our own, to 
have no confidence in any past experience or ability, to claim no superiority of race or 
rank…accepting humiliating experiences that were galling in the extreme.”334 Thus, the 
exodus fueled fears that the CCP denied the missionary not just rights but the sense of 
privilege and superiority bound in those rights as well. 
The account of the missionary’s exodus, filled with stories of immobilization, 
dispossession, interrogation, condemnation, imprisonment, and expulsion contributed to 
growing fears about the sovereignty of non-white regimes in a post-colonial era. 
Anxieties that white mobility would no longer be immune from the sovereignty of non-
whites, but subject to the same suspicion and restrictions that non-white minorities faced 
in nations like the U.S. Rather than roam freely about Asian societies, the exodus in 
China portended a future where whites might suffer segregation or isolation, be subject to 
harassment and scrutiny, and be denied the freedom to move freely in foreign cultures 
without approval from the state. Further, in those societies missionaries would experience 
segregation, isolation, and seen as outcasts, not as superior or privileged. 
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China Watching and Spiritual Warfare 
 Positioning themselves as the Chinese Christian’s advocates, CIM missionaries 
protested the treatment of Chinese evangelicals and their lack of a right to evangelize 
aggressively in society. The fundamental question confronting the CIM as it 
contemplated evacuation was whether or not the “loss” of China meant that the society 
should disband or evacuate personnel to establish work in new fields outside China. The 
decision in favor of redeployment was made principally at two meetings, the first in 
Australia at Kelorama, the second in Bournemouth, England in 1951. There a mix of 
executive personnel, home directors, and select missionaries voted not to disband, but 
instead to send survey teams to Japan, Thailand, Philippines, and amongst overseas 
Chinese populations in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.  
The responsibility of the CIM to Chinese Christians in the PRC, however, 
remained a vexing question as the society transitioned out of China and into the new 
fields in East Asia. The meeting of the mission’s executives at the Bournemouth 
Conference stressed that the society had “an enduring sense of responsibility to the vast 
population of inland China, and especially to the Christian church there…in their hour of 
testing.”335 The idea that the CIM was no longer just a mission was evident at the very 
beginning of its transition to fields outside the PRC. The yearly anthology of the CIM for 
1951 entitled The Hand That Guided, newly appointed General Director Arnold Lea 
clarified the mission’s guiding purpose as “the dual commission of upholding by prayer 
the Church in China, and of reaching out to those in Southeast Asia who still have not 
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heard the message of Redeeming Love.”336 Another writer for The Millions, the renamed 
monthly magazine of the CIM, stated that the CIM would “remind you frequently in the 
pages of our magazine of the needs of our brethren who cannot leave China because it is 
their home,” reminding U.S. evangelicals of the plight of Chinese Christians and 
maintaining spiritual fellowship despite political and cultural isolation.337  
Now committed to “China watching” from the periphery of mainland China, the 
CIM retained its authoritative position with many U.S. congregations. Turning the 
mission’s home audiences into “China watchers” was an organizational goal as well. 
CIM supporters in the U.S. and elsewhere were advised to read about China constantly, 
not just in mission publications, but in their daily newspapers. They were then asked to 
reflect on the information and offer prayer for Chinese churches, using spiritual 
fellowship to penetrate the “Bamboo Curtain.”338 Generating spiritual aid to Chinese 
Christians was in many ways the CIM’s primary agenda in the 1950s due to the 
widespread belief that the Christian community was under enormous social and political 
pressure. One CIM author described the lives of Chinese Christians as “almost 
impossible to understand the terrific strain—the onsets of temptation and terror,” as the 
CCP utilized “continued, relentless, subtle propaganda” to force Christians either to 
apostatize or “compromise” by joining the ranks of the TSM. 339 Through “China 
watching” the CIM hoped to keep mainland Protestants from being forgotten or isolated 
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from the international community and to maintain a semblance of its calling to evangelize 
to the Chinese. 
The CIM educated home audiences on what to pray about and how to engage in 
“spiritual warfare” primarily through the prayer devotionals found in the monthly 
magazine The Millions and various other CIM publications. In The Millions, readers 
found information on Chinese Christians in the sections entitled “Prayer Pointers” or the 
“Prayer Calendar,” which provided U.S. evangelicals with specific targets for prayer. For 
example, in January of 1952 the “Prayer Pointers” cited a letter received by an unnamed 
Chinese Christian, currently living in the U.S., from a relative in the PRC. The letter had 
declared that there existed “universal poverty” among the general population and that 
each citizen only received “four ounces of meat…every ten days.”340 The devotionals in 
The Millions then designated certain days of the week or month for Christians to focus 
prayers on “hungry Chinese.” Abstractions like “hungry Chinese” generated pity from the 
mission’s supporters and inspired anti-communism among Christian audiences in the 
U.S. and elsewhere in the networks of the CIM.  
The imagery of Chinese Christians in these prayer devotionals were critical to 
what might be termed the U.S. Protestant effort at “spiritual containment” in East Asia. 
Using prayer to combat communism was a constant theme in CIM publications. Marvin 
Dunn, a former China missionary relocated to the island of Taiwan in the early 1950s 
advised readers on the use of prayer to combat communism in his article for The Millions 
“Providing Spiritual Weapons.”341 The society’s new General Director, Arnold J. Lea, 
was especially fond of urging Christians to use prayer as a form of “spiritual warfare” 
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against various groups in East Asia seen as antagonistic to Protestant missions.342 And J. 
Oswald Sanders of the CIM called upon evangelicals to use the “’guided-missile’ type of 
prayer, with its loaded warhead,” which could be used by citizens of the U.S. to target 
“vital points in the battlefront,” in East Asia, even beyond the “Bamboo curtain.”343 The 
rhetoric of the prayer requests and their instructions on how to pray for missionaries in 
East Asia and Chinese Christians clearly lent itself to a militant cold war mentality. 
Following the exodus, the CIM also launched an assault on the TSPM and 
defended the reputation of the missionary against its charges. Prayer reminders called the 
TSM a tool for suppression of “true Christianity,” and equated joining the ranks of the 
TSM with submission to communism. CIM audiences were warned “increased authority 
in the hands of the government-controlled Three Self Patriotic Movement means 
increasing persecution and danger to all whose love for the Lord is greater than patriotic 
bonds.”344 Rather than liberation from foreign control, the CIM promoted the idea that the 
spread of the TSPM movement typified by Chinese Christians drafting confessions and 
anti-American or anti-missionary sentiments and ebullient praise for the CCP 
administration were the means by which the “enslavement” of Christianity was 
accomplished by the government. 
The “exodus” also became an emblematic point in the CIM’s institutional history 
and collective identity that made it the focus of numerous publications from the early 
1950s to the present day. Much like the prayer devotionals, the exodus narratives used the 
“knowledge” of what life was like in “Red China” to promote awareness about the issues 
facing the Chinese Christian community. The emphasis was again on the perception that 
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all “true” Christians suffered grievously under the CCP. For example, The Hand that 
Guided: The Story of the Year 1951 offered CIM audiences some of their first chances to 
read about the society’s withdrawal. Various stories of Chinese Christians described their 
lives under the CCP as “crushed, mutilated, and reviled.”345 Others like Elsie Bromley of 
the CIM described her Chinese Bible School staff and students as reduced to “trembling 
Christians” awaiting a period of trial and persecution by the CCP.346  Through the telling 
and retelling of the story of the missionary withdrawal, the CIM hoped to keep these 
communities of Protestants “visible” to the international community and remind the 
home audiences of their ongoing spiritual obligation to the Chinese churches.  
Other stories gave a first person account of the radical changes to Chinese society 
engineered by the CCP from the vantage point of the missionary on the ground. For 
instance, the article “During land Reform by a Missionary,” told of a Christian peasant 
farmer pressured to give up Christianity in order to secure a powerful position with the 
local cadres as they enacted the land reform policies. With a family to support, the 
peasant did so only to find that he lost most of the farmland he had before the revolution 
as had most in his community had discovered according to the missionary. His return to 
his faith led him to be removed from his job for being a “Christian and a capitalist.” 
Beyond the pressure to apostatize, the article also described how land reforms led to 
shortened or canceled worship services and drained the energy of congregations through 
mandatory political study.347 Another letter from a missionary couple described how the 
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state’s acquisition of the mission institutions such as hospitals, schools, etc. now turned 
the Protestant network into bastions of “anti-God, anti-foreign, and anti-missionary 
propaganda.”348 Such accounts from CIM missionaries mocked the CCP revolution as a 
farce in terms of social justice. 
From these sources, the CIM disseminated an imagery of Chinese Christians 
enslaved, executed, or imprisoned by communist forces. Christians who suffered 
imprisonment, such as the Chinese educator given the name “Esther,” were described as 
undergoing daily visits from local officials, who searched her home and interrogated her, 
and eventually imprisoned her for several weeks. The failure of her interrogators to 
compel her to “falsehoods,” as the author called it, had allegedly led to her execution.349 
Another article, “A Light Shined in the Cell: The story of a Chinese Christian,” told 
readers of the increasing pressure placed upon a man only identified as a “voracious bible 
student” and a “most zealous Christian,” who was arrested and then placed in solitary 
confinement and confined by metal chains. The inability of the prison system and his 
fellow prisoners to convince him to renounce his faith led The Millions to proclaim him a 
“modern Paul.”350 The accounts of the deaths of Chinese Christians, such as the story of a 
Chinese man singing joyfully as he was marched out to be executed by a firing squad, 
bordered on being works of hagiography.351 And, over time, the collective of Chinese 
Christians began to be referred to as “China’s saints.”352 
Society members further discredited the TSPM’s claims to religious liberty in the 
PRC by emphasizing the lack of a right to engage in evangelism. For example, Frank 
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Harris warned U.S. evangelicals “religious liberty” meant “liberty of worship, not of 
propagation, and includes liberty to decry, deride, and control it.”353 The only place where 
the Christians had the right to promote their faith was within the walls of the church, 
according to missionaries like Leslie Lyall. He compared the religious liberty of Chinese 
churches in 1958 to that of the “liberty of a lion in a moated zoo.”354 
However, in disseminating stories of the Chinese Christians’ persecution, the CIM 
was dogged by the questions of whether or not Christianity would be annihilated in the 
absence of the missionary, an issue with profound spiritual ramifications. Concerns for 
the more general non-Christian population of China raised grave spiritual doubts as well. 
Evangelical audiences also frequently asked the CIM missionary to answer why God 
would allow such an immense population to be isolated from gospel outreach and the 
opportunity of salvation. To combat fears that the missionary exodus portended the 
elimination of Christianity in China, the CIM worked to promote the idea that God was 
behind the exodus of the missionary. For example, J. Herbert Kane wrote that the 
evacuation was a “strategic retreat” where the “Chinese Church would be able to close 
ranks, don armor, and prepare to do battle with a totalitarian government.”355 To impart 
this meaning to the exodus, the CIM focused prayers on the idea of a resilient Chinese 
evangelical church, hardened and purified by persecution, but unyielding in its 
commitment to evangelism.  
The most common questions posed to CIM speakers and writers concerned the 
fate of Chinese Christians and the churches under the CCP. U.S. evangelicals habitually 
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asked the CIM missionaries if they thought the churches would be eliminated by the 
CCP. It was a question that angered many CIM members in the 1950s and 1960s. For 
example Otto Schoerner remembers being insulted by an audience at the Moody Bible 
School in Chicago as he felt the line of questioning suggested that most thought that with 
the missionaries’ departure nearly one hundred years of evangelism had been lost.356 
Early in the 1950s while the CIM still hoped a regime change might remove the 
CCP, CIM missionaries still described their work in China as the “great unfinished task,” 
and members like Frank Harris called the Chinese churches “independent” but also 
“pathetically weak.” He also admitted to U.S. audiences that there were hundreds of 
miles in northwest China without a single church or Christian.357 But as a return looked 
less and less likely, CIM speakers focused more on the idea that the missionary had left 
behind a mature, independent and strong evangelical body of churches. 
While at many times the prayers for Chinese Christians evidenced a bleak mood, 
they also expressed defiance and optimism, especially in regards to the ability of Chinese 
Christians to survive in the face of aggression. A prayer for Chinese Christians in 1952 
reminded U.S. evangelicals, “missionaries may be driven away from China, churches in 
China may be closed by force, but the Head of the church can never be closed out of the 
hearts of His true believers, nor His Spirit driven away from them.”358 That the almighty 
remained in China bolstered evangelical faith in the survival of Christianity in the PRC. 
During the exodus, a picture of the Great Wall featured the caption, “The Great Wall was 
built to keep out China’s enemies. In the end it failed. How much less can the Iron 
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Curtain keep out God’s Holy Spirit, even though it may exclude missionaries.” 
Communism could thus not triumph over God and extinguish Chinese Christianity 
entirely. That it was a minority struggling against societal pressure and the might of the 
government did not matter. Lyall wrote, “the Church in China is, without question, small, 
and the number of true believers smaller still; yet, it is undeniably true that there is that 
which Christ himself has built, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”359 
By 1953 CIM writers began championing the idea that Chinese Christianity 
would remain and even expand under communist rule. Mabel Williamson reassured CIM 
supporters that although “missionaries have left but God is still there,” with the “living 
church.” Williamson claimed that as a “living thing” it inevitable that the churches would 
grow and reproduce and “It may look to us as though he had cut everything away, but no, 
that was only dead, and unproductive wood. He prunes that abundant fruit may result.”360 
That Chinese Christianity was being purified, but would emerge stronger and multiply 
was a constant theme offered by the CIM in explaining the missionary’s expulsion. 
To this end, many CIM members like Arthur Matthews referred to the status of 
Chinese Christians in biblical terms, framing their sacrifice and persecution as a 
necessary part of Christianity’s global triumph. Matthews said that in the great spiritual 
struggle of the day various churches around the world would face “annihilation, 
liquidation, collapse,” but ultimately “through bitter struggles with world powers, 
represented by the most fearful symbols, the Lamb emerges, standing, conquering, riding, 
and reigning.”361 That Chinese Christians not only persisted but also were propagating the 
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faith through sacrifice and suffering fit the evangelicals’ popular and biblical 
understanding of Christianity’s inevitable spread and triumph.  
Reports in the mid-1950s suggested that following the exodus, restrictions on the 
Christian community had relaxed and the faith had rebounded. Former CIM missionary 
Henry Gould reported in late December 1955 that from his view of Christian life in 
Shanghai, Christianity was “healthier than ever.” Gould had resigned from his mission 
post in the early 1950s in order to accept a post with a British shipping firm, which had 
allowed Gould and his wife to reside in Shanghai until the end of 1955. When he left the 
firm, Gould moved to Australia and resumed working for the CIM.  His correspondence 
about the Chinese churches in the 1950s showed that congregations were not only 
“surviving” but also growing. Most especially in Shanghai, there was no need for 
Christians to go “underground.” Already by the 1950s the notion of “underground 
Christianity” was a growing fascination among the international Protestant community 
wherein Christians were believed to be covertly worshipping and gathering together. 
Shanghai Protestants, according to Gould, walked the streets with oversized Bibles 
tucked in their arms, handed out gospel tracts, and sat in packed churches nearly every 
Sunday. Churches in Southwest China spoke of evangelism campaigns carried out by 
Chinese missionaries. Although in other regions of China he conceded that churches 
worked under restrictions, overall, Gould’s vision of Chinese Protestantism was much 
sunnier than his contemporaries.362     
CIM publications in the late 1950s stressed that despite renewed campaigns of 
political study by the CCP, there were reports of conversions, baptisms, and regular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Harry Gould, “Letters from the Mainland,” The Millions,  December 1955, p. 172. 
	   198	  
evangelism carried on by evangelicals. The society also pointed to rising sales in 
Christian publications and claimed, “a great hunger for the Scriptures and for Christian 
literature is reported from all parts of China.”363   
The directions provided by the CIM on what to pray for when thinking of Chinese 
Christians provided by the CIM best illustrate this desire to have Protestantism survive in 
China without achieving compromise or co-existence with the CCP. According to the 
mission’s monthly magazine renamed The Millions, Christians outside the PRC were to 
pray that Chinese Christians demonstrate “boldness, love, and discernment” to keep them 
aloof from the TSM or the CCP.364 General Director Arnold J. Lea added to this list the 
imperative to pray that the Chinese church would remain “uncompromising.”365 
Additional directions from the CIM asked that prayer be focused on the “fear, ignorance, 
and weaknesses” of Chinese Christians which had led them to support the CCP.  Other 
times readers were asked to pray for “all in China whose faith in the Lord conflicts with 
the decrees of man.”366  
Sustaining the faith of the CIM and its supporters in God’s sovereignty over 
China was the idea of an “invisible” or “underground” church. As early as 1951 the CIM 
reassured readers that although the “visible” aspects of Chinese Christianity had “almost 
all disappeared,” the “invisible church grows stronger every day.” Later in 1963 one of 
the society’s most avid China Watchers David Adeney reported that recent accounts from 
Christians leaving the PRC had show “undoubtedly, a great amount of Christian witness 
is maintained secretly at considerable risk to those who take part.” These reports also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363	  Leslie Lyall, “Report out of China,” The Millions, March 1958; Leslie Lyall, “Mainland Chinese 
Maintain Testimony,” The Millions, May 1958.	  
364 “How to Pray For Chinese Christians,” The Millions, September 1952, p. 9. 
365 Arnold J. Lea, “Don’t Forget to Pray for China,” The Millions, August/September 1954. 
366 “Prayer Calendar,” The Millions, March 1957. 
	   199	  
fueled the sense that the general citizenry were still being reached and won to 
Christianity, potentially fueling a growing resistance to CCP rule. Adeney continued… 
When the communist first came to power, many were much impressed by their 
zeal to reform society. There was a feeling that the Christians had failed and that 
communism offered a great practical hope for the future. Today great numbers are 
disillusioned by the hatred and evil on every side and disappointed by the failure 
of the communists to fulfill their early promises. On the other hand they have 
been impressed with the love and sacrificial zeal of Christians who for the sake of 
the Gospel are prepared to risk their lives and freedom.367  
Other voices told of Chinese Christian parents and teachers battling against the state’s 
machinery of indoctrination in the schools and society for the hearts and minds of youth. 
 The CIM also tried to sustain evangelical hope in their continued fellowship and 
influence in the PRC despite isolation and Sino-American hostility. Letters from Chinese 
Christians published in the pages of China’s Millions urged U.S. evangelicals to join 
them in spirit, “praise God, although we live in different places, yet we can commune 
with our Saviour through constant prayer.”368 Other reports stressed that Sunday school 
lessons and texts originating in the U.S. continued to be popular with Chinese 
congregations.  
Among these legacies left behind by the CIM in the late 1950s giving hope to the 
international evangelical community was the student movement. Despite the society’s 
warnings that youth were among the most susceptible to indoctrination and the lure of the 
CCP’s brand of nationalism, the CIM claimed the student movement would persevere. In 
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the summer of 1958 Lyall reported that student witness carried on in cities like Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanchang, Changsha, Guilin, Nanjing, and Canton. Further, 
Christians in Wenzhou had reportedly held a rally with over a thousand youth in 
attendance.369 
 But maintaining evangelical hope in the idea of Chinese Christianity’s survival 
was difficult to hold onto during the Great Leap Forward and later the Cultural 
Revolution. CIM commentators interpreted the drive to collectivize agriculture and 
another series of anti-Rightist campaigns following the Hundred Flowers Movement as 
direct assaults on the Christian community and the bedrock of Protestant values: the 
home life of the Christian family.  In March 1959, the prayer calendar in The Millions 
claimed Christian families had been “broke and separated by the commune system,” and 
all Chinese youth were now raised by the state.370 
By the late 1950s, in the pages of CIM publications the entire Chinese population 
was represented as living in a state of exhaustive labor, intensive indoctrination, and 
immersion in communist political doctrines as society drove toward industrialization. The 
closing of hundreds of churches in cities like Shanghai fueled fears that the CCP had 
finally begun a campaign to “stamp out religion.” Leslie Lyall, a popular CIM author, 
referred to the communal life of rural Chinese as “dawn to dusk slavery,” noting the long 
hours of labor for both young and old citizens living in the countryside. Chinese were 
described as “living, working, sleeping, and eating in a collective, disciplined, semi-
military fashion.”371 From correspondence with refugees, Lyall warned the CIM audience 
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that laborers worked up to “fifteen or sixteen hours every day…seven days a week,” and 
in commune were given only two bowls of rice to eat daily. Since communal work 
carried on just the same on Sundays, Christian services had been greatly disrupted and 
only the strongest, spiritually and physically, still attended.  Lyall was told by a refugee 
Chinese the fate of all Chinese, not just Protestants, was “worse than a dog’s life,” and 
the trial faced by the churches Lyall called “more bitter than that which the Israelites 
suffered in Egypt.”372  
While the CIM suggested Christianity rebounded following the Great Leap 
Forward, the Cultural Revolution revived fears that the CCP could completely eradicate 
Christianity. CIM publications contributed to these anxieties with accounts of the Red 
Guards as zealous missionaries in their own right. In the spring of 1967 Adeney reported 
in “Turmoil in China” that the Red Guards took Mao and his little red book as “bible and 
savior” and used open-air meetings, demonstrations, house-to-house visits, and personal 
work to foment the Cultural Revolution. As part of their campaigns the Guards 
condemned and harassed Christians, burning their bibles, and turning Christian meeting 
halls into dens for their meetings and rallies.373 By the late 1960s most accounts in the 
secular and Christian press suggested that all visible signs of Christianity had been 
eradicated during the Cultural Revolution.  
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Conclusion: Soul Searching  
The missionary’s immobilization and expulsion created pervasive spiritual doubts 
for Protestants around the world and caused decades of debates within the world of 
missions concerning Christianity’s response to communism and relations with societies in 
Asia. Rather than “freely” spreading the TSPM and CCP accused the missionary of 
propagating the faith through imperialism and exploitation of the Chinese. Adding insult 
to injury, the CCP denied the missionary’s mobility and forced the movement into a 
retreat raising doubts about the inevitably of Christianity’s progress and faith in divine 
sovereignty.  
 The CIM, however, did not surrender its faith in divine sovereignty and belief in 
Christianity’s unstoppable spread. During the 1950s and 1960s, the CIM rallied the 
international evangelical community behind spiritual warfare and prayers for the heroic 
resistance of Chinese evangelicals to the CCP and TSPM. Promoting the exodus as a  
“strategic retreat,” the CIM tried to frame the meanings the missionary’s exile into the 
New Fields as the means for Christianity’s eventual triumph over the forces of 
communism. Despite trial and persecution, the CIM claimed Chinese Christianity would 
eventually emerge from its confrontation purified, strengthened, and vindicated in its 
opposition to the CCP and TSPM when the forces of communism were defeated in the 
Cold War. Ultimately, the idea of the missionary exodus as a “strategic retreat” leading to 
Christianity’s greater advance depended upon two factors for the CIM and its supporters, 
the continued existence of a defiant Chinese Christianity in the PRC and the progress of 
the mission’s representatives on the periphery of China in the New Fields.  
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By the mid-1960s, events inside and outside of the PRC undermined this belief in 
a “strategic retreat” as the missionary movement struggled against the backdrop of 
communist revolutions and Chinese Christianity was seemingly annihilated by the forces 
unleashed by the Cultural Revolution.  Simultaneously, the exodus narratives and 
experiences of CIM missionaries contributed to a growing cultural fascination and fear of 
life in communist regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. Colored by ideas of racial revenge, 
these stories of the missionary’s expulsion projected fears of an Asia where whites were 
divested of the privileges of the imperialist era, such as freedom of movement and 
expression. Thus, the strain of anti-communism propagated among evangelicals by the 
CIM feared not only the loss of Asia to communism but the loss of a particular type of 
mobility in Asia associated with religious freedoms, divine sovereignty, and racial 
privilege. 
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Chapter 4 
Redeployment and the New Fields: Pioneer Evangelism as Containment 
in East and Southeast Asia, 1951-1961 
Introduction 
 The exodus from China robbed evangelicals of their confidence in Christianity’s 
global expansion, creating a crisis in faith and instigating decades of debate within the 
Protestant missionary movement. An entire nation was ceded to the forces of 
communism, reversing Christianity’s once seemingly limitless expansion, and the spread 
of communism portended more expulsions. In first immobilizing and then expelling the 
missionary the CCP stripped the Protestant missionary movement of any sense that white 
mobility was exempt the sovereignty of non-white regimes. Adding to this sense of crisis 
were the currents of decolonization in Asia and Africa rising against western imperialism 
and threatening to throw Protestant missions into a rapid retreat around the globe.  
Redeployment responded to these political and spiritual reverberations by 
reclaiming the mission’s role in Christianity’s evangelization of the Chinese outside the 
PRC and staking a claim for the missionary in newly independent states.  The transition 
to the New Fields followed the Bournemouth Conference of 1951 where senior 
leadership voted to continue on as a mission by seeking out posts within the diaspora of 
overseas Chinese surrounding the PRC. As a result, the society was renamed the 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF) and carried the notion that the redeployment in 
the New Fields was part of the “strategic retreat” wherein Christianity’s triumph over 
would eventually triumph over communism.  
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The OMF’s decision not to disband but instead regroup and carry on the society’s 
commission amongst overseas Chinese in Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Laos was intended to signify that the missionary’s 
history in China had not been in vain and would keep alive the hope of global 
Christianity’s expansion among overseas Chinese on the periphery of the PRC. Referred 
to as the New Fields, the OMF insisted that its commission and purpose reflected God’s 
will to have Chinese Christians in the PRC face communism alone while missionaries 
prepared other societies for the spiritual warfare.  
Certainly, redeployment redirected the OMF to a number of the Cold War’s “hot 
spots” and rallied the prayers and contributions of evangelicals against communism. The 
OMF’s footholds in Vietnam and Laos were abandoned and reoccupied several times 
amidst prolonged wars between communist movements against first French and later U.S. 
armed forces in the 1950s and 1960s. In Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines the 
OMF entered societies where communist insurrections or coups were suppressed in these 
same decades. Even in Japan the society feared the postwar resurgence of the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP). The OMF’s focus on redeploying missionaries to pockets within 
these countries where overseas Chinese were concentrated meant the society devoted 
itself to a minority population feared by many of new governments, especially in 
countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, of being a potential “fifth column” for 
communist revolutionaries. While the society’s experiences in the PRC made the 
missionaries experts on communism and the lives of Chinese Christians in countries like 
the U.S., the OMF hoped its unique experience with Chinese would prove decisive in the 
Cold War contest for the loyalty of overseas Chinese in East and Southeast Asia. 
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Rapid decolonization in the region also meant the OMF missionaries relocated to 
societies consumed by nationalism and the potential for radical anti-western politics. The 
OMF arrived to set up work in many newly independent states recently free of direct rule 
by European powers, but also recently occupied by Japan and the U.S. such as the 
Philippines (1946) and Indonesia (1949). In other areas the OMF arrived as these nations 
underwent a gradual transition to independence from European rule such as Malaysia 
(1957) and Singapore (1959). In Taiwan the OMF entered a society in transition from 
colonial outpost of the Japanese to the last holdout of Republican China, accompanied by 
an influx of millions of mainlanders and U.S. aid, leaving many native Taiwanese feeling 
colonized by a foreign power. While Thailand had managed to remain independence 
from direct European control despite ceding territory in Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia to 
the French and British, the nation was certainly not immune from the politics of anti-
imperialism.    
As the U.S. moved quickly in the Cold War to strengthen ties in the region 
through an influx of massive amounts of military and economic aid, the redeployment of 
the China missionary force raced to consolidate its sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. 
The OMF’s post-China career in the New Fields paralleled the ambitions of U.S. cold 
warriors such as Henry Luce following the “loss” of China and stalemate in the Korean 
War. Both endeavored to halt the communist advance by creating bulwarks elsewhere in 
the region, and wining the loyalties of the population of overseas Chinese was a key 
battlefront.374 While redeploying the society’s members among overseas Chinese in the 
New Fields the OMF warned, “Many young Chinese from Indonesia and Malaya or other 
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countries are returning to their homelands to see and learn the wonders of 
Communism.”375 Infused within the OMF’s redeployment of missionaries was a desire to 
contain communism’s spread by challenging its influences over overseas Chinese.376  
The OMF’s redeployment then should be seen as the spiritual corollary of the 
Cold War ideologies of containment and integration. Scholars such as Christina Klein 
have suggested the growing fascination in the U.S. with literature and entertainment 
concerned with Asia featuring the ideology of containment and longings for integration 
and cooperation while denying an imperialist force behind U.S. expansion.377 I put 
forward that through redeployment the missionary’s mobility promised to contain 
communism by pacifying overseas Chinese populations and integrating other Asian 
groups into the international order led by the U.S. by expanding the missionary’s footing 
in these nations amidst decolonization and potential communist revolutions. But in 
addition to overseas Chinese and the various nationalities the OMF encountered, the 
society’s emphasis on pioneering expanded the evangelical’s aspirations for integration 
with “neglected” groups like the Hakka and native Taiwanese or Lisu in Thailand.  
Generally speaking the OMF was supportive of the non-communist nationalist 
movements in the New Fields and looked upon the various social and political 
revolutions associated as a potential boon to evangelism, just as it had in China. Most of 
the society’s concerns about politics pivoted on the questions of communism and 
religious freedom, especially any restrictions on mission evangelism. But the exodus 
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from China also fed fears that anti-western forces might close “doors” to the missionary. 
Much of the OMF’s focus on praying for these new nations was centered on keeping 
these societies “open” to the missionary and their populations accessible without 
restrictions. Redeployment was a race to occupy posts in East Asia and expand 
Christianity before such opportunities were lost. Consequently, the OMF also expanded 
its commission beyond the Chinese to include Asian “nationals,” i.e. Japanese, Thai, etc. 
Stressing that these groups were members of “new” nations only recently awoken from 
“heathenism” or “darkness,” the OMF’s expansion would preserve the spiritual influence 
of the West in these countries even as European and American direct control receded.   
During redeployment, however, the OMF was far less deferential than it had been 
a few years prior to the rights of the national churches and their spiritual sovereignty. 
Throughout the New Fields, the establishment of national councils of Protestant churches 
formed alongside political independence movements in these nations and like in China 
increasingly asserted the rights of indigenous groups to spiritual self-determination. In 
most of these countries, representatives from organizations such as the Philippine 
Federation of Christian Churches (1949), the Malayan Christian Council (1948), and the 
National Christian Council of Japan (1948) claimed sovereignty over Christian affairs 
within their nations. Simultaneously, as a latecomer to these nations the OMF was forced 
to negotiate the existing comity agreements and claims to these countries made by 
numerous other Protestant missions already working there.   
Conversely, upon arriving in the New Fields the OMF declared the forces of 
Christianity in Asia outside China, both missionary and Asian Christian, far “weaker” 
than in China. Anticipating more expulsions, the OMF endeavored to ingrain the ethos of 
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evangelism within Asian churches and train Christians to resist regimes that might restrict 
their religious liberty.  Forced to start over again and exiled in several countries outside 
urban areas and established Christian networks, the OMF reasserted the independence of 
the missionary to act outside the authority of Asian Christians. In addition, the OMF’s 
return to pioneering evangelism fostered integration in this era, not for elites, but for 
“needy” or “neglected” ethnic and religious minority groups in these nations. And in 
trying to expand OMF links to Christians in Laos and Vietnam, the society worked to 
maintain relations between local Christians and the international community in areas 
consumed by communist revolutions and U.S. intervention.  
 
Redeployment and Redistribution of the Overseas Missionary Fellowship 
The steps taken to transition to the New Fields occurred over the course of two 
conferences in 1951, the first held in Kelorama, Australia and the second in 
Bournemouth, England. During these conferences, the society’s senior leadership and 
delegates from the various Home Councils were assigned to conduct surveys of the 
current state of affairs among Protestant missions and indigenous churches in Taiwan, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines and evaluate the feasibility of 
the OMF beginning work in these countries. Entering new countries required the OMF to 
seek out government approval and obtain visas, but also to work out agreements with 
other Protestant missionary forces and representatives of indigenous Christian leaders in 
each country.378 In return, the OMF’s initial entry into the New Fields depended heavily 
on cooperating with these groups. In many countries, the initial OMF missionaries 
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depended on other Protestant missions for visas, living arrangements, and employment. 
In fact, OMF members primarily relocated to countries based upon invitations to work or 
serve with other Christian institutions.  
As a result the OMF relied on a number of partnerships with other Protestant 
groups in these countries. In Japan, OMF missionaries worked alongside Youth for Christ 
agents and the Pocket Testament League. In Thailand the initial OMF missionaries were 
sent to work in Presbyterian Mission Schools and several members were loaned to the 
American Presbyterian Mission, American Baptist Mission, and the Christian and 
Missionary Alliance. OMF members in the Philippines first joined American 
missionaries working in Grace Christian High School in Manila. And in Hong Kong the 
Immanuel Gospel Mission and British and Foreign Bible Society were integral to helping 
the OMF establish its print and literature programs and ministry to refugees from the 
PRC.379 In essence, the society had not yet established its own projects but was rather 
loaning its members to other agencies.  
In finding agents to begin the OMF’s work in these new areas, the retention of its 
current missionary personnel was essential to the society’s survival during transition. 
Following the conferences, Deputy Director J.R. Sinton was sent to Hong Kong to meet 
with society members exiting the PRC to discuss their future plans and receptivity to new 
assignments. Thankfully, for the society, a large number of CIM junior missionaries sent 
to the field in 1948 and 1949 had never got beyond the language school training in 
Chongqing. Of these cohorts, a great number were eager to engage in mission work after 
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years of waiting. Many missionaries left Hong Kong straight for posts in Japan, Thailand, 
or the Philippines.380  
For much of the 1950s, the majority of the OMF’s members were carryovers from 
the mission’s China days. Only in 1959 did the society finally have a majority of 
members who had not served in China.381 Further, as the society continued to gather 
China missionaries leaving the PRC, the temporary headquarters in Hong Kong 
established a ministry to the refugee populations amassing in Kowloon.  
Once conditions to the OMF’s entry had been negotiated, the society deployed 
missionaries into the New Fields as quickly as possible. Already by January of 1952, the 
OMF had 20 members in Thailand, 12 in Japan, 13 in Malaysia, and others stationed in 
the Philippines and Taiwan. By that summer the OMF totaled 30 representatives in 
Thailand, 37 in Singapore and Malaysia, 24 in Japan, and members in India, Vietnam, 
and Laos. By the end of 1952, the OMF had managed to place 199 missionaries in seven 
countries along with Hong Kong and Singapore. Nowhere near the peak level of over 
1000 missionaries attained by the society in China during its heyday, but still a 
remarkable achievement considering many of the society’s forces were still in the process 
of exiting the PRC.  Indeed, financing and managing the mission’s withdrawal from 
China and entry to so many other countries made the early years of the 1950s a logistical 
nightmare and incredibly costly. Of the OMF’s total expenditures in 1951, nearly half of 
the society’s operating budget for the year (276,000 U.S. dollars) was spent on travel.382 
By the end of 1962 the OMF had regained something of its pre-withdrawal stature in 
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terms of size and membership with over 800 members. Of those members, however, over 
200 worked for home staffs or were on furlough in North America, Europe, South Africa, 
Australia, and New Zealand. Just 576 missionaries occupied the New Fields.383  
The core of the mission continued to come from North America and the United 
Kingdom. British Protestants comprised the largest nationality within the mission (228 
members), with the U.S. still a major source of the society’s rank and file agents in the 
field (220 members). Canada (103 members) and Australia (108) also provided ample 
contributors to the mission along with the nations of New Zealand, Switzerland, West 
Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Ireland providing the rest of the society’s 
members.384 In terms of the assignment of personnel to specific countries, Malaysia 
(204), Thailand (198), the Philippines (95), Japan (72), Singapore (63) received the most 
attention from the OMF, while fewer agents were deployed in Taiwan (48), Indonesia 
(38), Laos (30), Hong Kong (17), and Vietnam (4). Thus, the OMF’s redistribution 
favored the concentration of its forces in areas gradually loosed from the British Empire 
and its holdover in Hong Kong and nations developing under the U.S. containment 
umbrella.   
But there were a number of other factors that influenced where and how the OMF 
redistributed its forces. As far as possible the OMF intended to repeat its system for 
advancing the Gospel as it had done in China, occupying posts first in provincial capitals 
and major towns, using transportation routes and commerce to “fan out” in ever greater 
distances.385 However, the OMF like many other international Protestant agencies had 
also agreed that one principle guiding the redistribution of China missionaries was to 
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ensure that a sudden influx of personnel and resources would not “trample” the authority 
of local and national churches. Further, the conditions of the OMF comity agreements in 
many countries like Thailand pushed the OMF away from major cities like Bangkok and 
toward rural areas.386 
Secondly, although the society initially set out to focus on overseas Chinese 
populations, the lack of a scriptural basis for targeting a distinct ethnic group while 
ignoring the “millions” of other Asian groups in these countries did not sit well with the 
OMF Overseas Council or its evangelical membership. In fact, in some societies such as 
Japan, the relatively low number of Chinese residents and prestige of participating in the 
nation’s postwar reconstruction led the OMF to focus its personnel almost exclusively on 
Japanese from the very beginning.   
Thirdly, the trajectory toward rural areas and the society’s work amongst Chinese 
developed into an institutional objective to reach other minority groups in these countries 
that the OMF considered “neglected” by the established missions and the national 
churches. Just as in China, many of these groups were known as “tribal” groups to the 
OMF and its supporters, while others were “minorities” by religion, ethnicity, and or 
language. This feature of the OMF was most prominent in Thailand. In Yunnan, China, 
the OMF had worked with the Lisu, Yaochia, and Miao, and continued to witness to these 
“neglected tribes” across the border in northern Thailand. By the 1960s the OMF had 
expanded its outreach to include the Akha, Shan, Karen, and Lahu. In central and 
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southern Thailand the OMF’s work included campaigns to Muslim Malaysians in the 
region as well.387 
This was a facet of the OMF’s program in the other countries as well, although to 
a lesser extent than in Thailand. In Taiwan, the OMF designated missionaries to conduct 
outreach to Hakka and Taiwanese. In Northern Malaysia, OMF workers evangelized the 
Tamil, and in Laos the OMF moved agents near the border with Thailand to reach Thai 
and Chinese groups. In the Philippines, the society sent missionaries to evangelize the 
Lowlands and encountered a number of “tribes” including the Iraya, Alangan, Batangan, 
Tadywan, Buhid, and Hanunuo.388 
The focus on “neglected” or “needy” populations reflected the survey’s 
assessment that the majority of Christian churches in the New Fields were “weak,” 
“immature,” and lacking in outreach to ethnic and religious minority groups. Surveys of 
Japan indicated that Japanese churches were “spiritually immature and weak in 
leadership.” Surveys on Thailand stressed that Buddhism was a far more powerful force 
in society and the “Christian church weaker than anywhere else in Asia,” and 
missionaries like Betty Schurman reported that other Protestant missions had failed to do 
much at all in terms of witness outside of the major cities.389 
Once OMF agents arrived in these fields they contributed to a growing criticism 
of established Christianity in these countries. Leonard Street wrote in his article “First 
Impressions of Japan” that the Japanese church was “riddled with liberalism and 
dependence on foreign missionary.” In the Philippines, OMF reports in the summer of 
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1952 wrote that earlier reports on the strength of Filipino leadership and churches had 
been “misleading.” OMF agents found the majority of churches “very weak,” and their 
efforts at evangelism not organized or methodical in approach. Ruth Nowack’s letters 
from her first church services in Taiwan lamented the “pathetic sermon” of Chinese 
clergy, and implored supporters of the need for more missionary “reinforcements.”390 
In 1952 Arnold Lea issued the definitive word on the “weakness” of Christianity 
in the New Fields. He wrote that in each country there were far fewer national workers 
and evangelists than in China, a “scarcity” of literature for study by Christians, and “even 
when there are churches, the comparatively low standard of Christian living make the 
spread of the Gospel difficult.” Christian communities were ridden with the “desire to 
make money” and lacked devotion to study, and the forces of “superstition more binding, 
Islam and Buddhism stronger” in almost every country.391 Altogether Lea stressed that 
OMF missionaries found Christianity far weaker than it had been in China, a sobering 
assessment of the immensity of the challenge faced in the New Fields. 
Redeployment then departed from the OMF’s policies on the indigenous church 
enacted in 1943. The OMF still spoke of the sovereignty of the indigenous church and 
need for Asian Christians to lead in evangelization, but it did not cede the right to 
evangelize these countries to Asian Christians. By seeking out “unevangelized” groups 
the OMF reasserted its independence to work outside local and national churches. 
However, the mission was also concerned that Asian evangelicals would suffer from 
association with the western missionary within the context of decolonization, 
nationalism, and communism. Working outside established Christian communities 
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allowed the OMF to both avoid “trampling” the authority of these groups and preserve its 
doctrinal integrity and desire for freedom from the authority of local and national 
churches.392 
Ultimately, these factors influenced the pathways of redeployment to allocate 
most of the OMF forces in areas outside the established bases of Christianity in Southeast 
Asia, and facilitated the OMF’s return to pioneer evangelism as its top priority. Comity 
agreements with local churches, national Christian councils, and other Protestant 
missions already established in these countries often arranged for the OMF to initiate 
work outside the bounds of existing Christian communities. Therefore, the OMF sent 
many of its agents outside of East Asia’s major cities and urban districts, even in the 
Philippines and Japan. Secondly, based upon mission’s history and commission, the 
OMF’s assessment of the “needs” of each country prioritized reaching the 
“unevangelized” populations within the New Fields and working in areas unoccupied by 
other missions.  
By the late 1950s, the majority of OMF (356) missionaries were devoted to the 
mission’s traditional methods of evangelism and church planting. In this same period, the 
number of missionaries designated to work specifically at training Christian disciples was 
far smaller and reflected the society’s more modest ambitions to evangelize through the 
churches and cooperate with Asian evangelists as colleagues and equals  (52). However, 
medical work as a means to evangelism had slightly more OMF personnel involved (92). 
Work requiring professional skills in print and media such as literature (42) and radio (4) 
made do with far fewer personnel. Increasingly the society’s logistical and financial 
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challenges required more OMF staff devoted to administrative work and training of its 
own members (77).393 
In its approach to mission work in the New Fields, the OMF insisted that both its 
commission and methods remained largely unchanged from its inception under Taylor in 
nineteenth century China. OMF missionaries would still primarily engage in its 
traditional “triad” of evangelism, church planting, and discipleship training. OMF 
missionaries sent to areas where no church existed would engage in pioneer evangelism. 
Their twin objectives remained to contact as many non-Christians as humanly possible 
and plant churches according to the three-selfs—self-support, self-governance, and self-
propagation. Other missionaries were assigned to “churches of like faith,” where they 
would concentrate their energies on discipleship training by educating or cooperating 
with “national Christians.” Missionaries loaned to seminaries or bible schools, along with 
bible teachers also worked in discipleship training. Ultimately, the various methods of 
discipleship training intended to create evangelists and missionaries from local 
populations and engrain a missionary outreach within the churches.394  
The use of technology and new media to evangelize became increasingly 
important as the society faced the task of covering immense territory and reaching such 
diverse peoples in many different languages. Several members of the OMF were loaned 
to the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBC) to help produce evangelical radio 
programming beamed throughout East Asia in over thirty languages. The OMF also 
created a “Portable Missionary Department,” which loaned radios, the “portable 
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missionaries,” as a means to maintain constant contact with the more remote rural 
villages in certain countries through Christian programming beamed from the radio 
stations operated by TEAM.395 
The publishing and distribution of literature, however, remained the most critical 
medium for evangelism other than the missionary. As the mission was expelled from 
China in 1951 the OMF set up a new program, the Christian Witness Press (CWP), in 
Hong Kong. Initially, the program disseminated gospels and evangelical tracts to 
mainland China, but such work became impossible in the fall of 1951. By January of 
1952 the CWP refocused its efforts on the Korean War and Chinese prisoners of war held 
by UN forces, sending over 400,000 gospel tracts to the camps.396 For the New Fields the 
CWP started by focusing on first on Mandarin-speaking populations in Thailand, using 
older versions of Chinese commentaries on the Gospels. In the summer of 1952, the CWP 
joined with the Scripture Gift Mission to produce evangelical literature in a number of the 
national languages of the New Fields.397   
By the early 1960s, the CWP had distributed over 52 million Gospels and tracts 
across East Asia, 311,000 biographies of leading Christians and devotionals, 357,000 
bible study booklets, and 116,000 gospel posters in thirty-five languages. In addition, the 
CWP supplied seventeen other missions with its materials for use in their fields.398 Fear 
of political instability in the New Fields favored decentralization of the OMF literature 
program so production and distribution dispersed among centers in Bangkok, Jakarta, and 
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Manila, with the literature superintendent and other staff residing in Hong Kong. 399 By 
the late 1960s these centers produced over 7 million books, pamphlets, and posters each 
year. In addition, in Malaysia and the Philippines, the CWP imported thousands of 
English language Christian books, with sales totaling over 200,000 in 1968.400 
One of the most important dimensions of the literature program was the 
development of Dengta, a magazine printed in Mandarin for non-Christian Chinese. 
Begun in the 1955, by the mid-1960s the OMF distributed the magazine in over seventy-
five countries around the world, advertising it as “A Magazine on which the Sun Never 
Sets.”401 It had its biggest impact in Hong Kong and Taiwan where OMF missionaries 
provided copies in military hospitals and detention centers like Stanley Prison.402  
There were also a number of alterations made to the OMF approach to the New 
Fields based upon the “lessons” drawn from the experiences of the China missionary.403 
First, having lost their entire infrastructure for mission work in China, the society enacted 
a number of reforms in the 1950s meant to decentralize the society in case of another 
expulsion. This also meant that the OMF endeavored to avoid creating the vast 
infrastructure of mission compounds, schools, clinics, seminaries, and other institutions it 
had erected in China. As far as possible, the society avoided owning any property, 
thereby preventing the necessity of having to transfer ownership to indigenous groups. In 
fact, the Overseas Manual warned against allowing “national believers” from “becoming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 “Facts and Figures,” East Asia Millions, August/September, 1963. 
400 “Using Christian Ink,” East Asia Millions, November 1968. 
401 Liu Yih-ling, “A Magazine on which the Sun Never Sets,” East Asia Millions, October 1965. 
402Ron Roberts, “Six Thousand Miles in Eight Minutes,” East Asia Millions, October 1965. 
403 Dr. Lloyd Canfield, “Prayer Cover Needed for Advance,” China’s Millions, November 1952. 
	   220	  
accustomed to missionary premises” at all.404 As one OMF writer described the policies, 
the society in the New Fields was “not building for occupancy,” but rather keeping their 
forces light and mobile.405Thus, OMF expansion did far less than it had in China to 
construct mission compounds, churches, schools, medical clinics, and hospitals, in part to 
make the missionary movement and its presence in these countries less stationary and 
more mobile.  
The other critical alteration was that the OMF adopted its tactics for missionary 
work to facilitate resistance to communism. Inside each country, then, the OMF 
missionary’s mobility was configured by the same two agendas as in China but with new 
intentions to fight communism. The first was the society’s traditional imperative to fulfill 
the evangelical commission to take the Gospel and their own witness to all nations and 
peoples in ever-wider itinerations and in ever-greater numbers. Inherently, this first 
trajectory of missionary mobility was about soul-saving and expansion of Christianity’s 
influence. The second pathway, discipleship training, reflected evangelical desires to 
integrate local Christians into the international community and facilitate their spiritual 
development. Through indigenous principles the OMF missionary hoped to facilitate the 
development of spiritual sovereignty, but to do so in a way that saw Asian Christians 
adopt the ideology and ethos of evangelism of the international evangelical community. 
The OMF’s experiences during the withdrawal, however, had also altered the 
meaning and intentions of pioneering and discipleship training. Now, the OMF intended 
to create and prepare local churches for isolation from the international community, and 
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forge communities that could withstand persecution or discrimination from government 
and society. Former China missionaries such as Paul Contento argued that experience 
showed that “the churches in China which have been able to withstand communist assault 
are those which have had well-trained laymen. Where the Christians were well 
established in doctrine and zealous witnessing, even though the leaders have been 
removed, the church has carried on.” Thus, in the New Fields, these actions were 
intended to facilitate the Asian Christian’s resistance to communism in the event of more 
expulsions.406  
During this initial phase the redeployment of the OMF favored a return to pioneer 
evangelism as the means of the society’s infiltration and expansion in these countries. 
The result was that the society’s ambitions in discipleship training were much more 
modest than its last years in China, and the experience of the exodus led the society to 
attempt to proselytize using far less infrastructure. Conversely, new technologies such as 
radio and print emerged as key instruments for evangelism, but the society’s commitment 
to “needy” and “neglected” groups living in rural or remote areas reflected the OMF’s 
belief in the missionary as the ultimate medium for progress. 
All of these changes to the OMF’s approach to the New Fields spoke to a need for 
the missionary to avoid inflaming potential hostile sentiments. The imperatives to adopt 
simplicity in lifestyle and work and the avoidance of institution building or grand projects 
all hoped to avoid the missionary being seen as a facet of imperialism or exploitation. 
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Most Protestant evangelicals believed that Chinese Christians affiliated with the 
missionary in the PRC suffered the worst discrimination and harassment by the CCP. By 
focusing primarily on pioneering, the OMF intended to limit the exposure Asian 
Christians in the New Fields faced in attacks from communist and anti-western groups. 
Seeing Chinese Christians condemned as the CCP and elements in society as the 
“running dogs” of the imperialism, the OMF endeavored to limit the fallout local 
Christians would face in the event of another expulsion and turn against the west in these 
countries. Mainly, the idea was that as pioneer evangelists the missionary working 
outside establishes Christian bases would be “expendable forces,” and their withdrawal 
would not cripple the forces of national and local churches, leaving the Asian evangelical 
better prepared to defend and carry on the faith than the Chinese Christian had been.  
 
Pioneering Evangelism, Containment, and Integration on the Home front 
 
Inside the U.S., the OMF Home Staff’s responsibilities remained the promotion of 
evangelical missionary interests and the recruiting, screening, and training of candidates. 
By 1956 in addition to the mission offices in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles the 
OMF established new outlets in Seattle to reach farther into the Pacific Northwest and 
Birmingham, Alabama to reach strongholds of evangelicals in the South.407 New 
expansion efforts in the South later led the OMF to open offices in Dallas and Florida in 
the early 1960s.  
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Just as it did within the New Fields, the society continued to place great value in 
personal contact with supporters. Certainly, there was no shortage of invitations for OMF 
speakers at evangelical conferences, student rallies, prayer circles, and on college 
campuses. In most regions, OMF workers had more invitations than could be met, and 
one especially zealous OMF missionary on furlough was described as “working himself 
almost to death” trying to meet the requests to speak the society’s supporters on the West 
Coast.408 Obviously, one of the great advantages the OMF held in promoting the society 
with U.S. audiences was the returning China missionary. OMF agents had been among 
the last foreign missionaries to live in China, and their claims to expertise on communism 
and the PRC made them popular figures within evangelical circles. 
In the 1950s the OMF also continued to benefit from strong relations with key 
evangelical institutions and agencies in the U.S. OMF deputation workers continued to be 
regular visitors to Wheaton College and Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, BIOLA in Los 
Angeles, and Bryan University in Dayton, Tennessee. In fact, the OMF’s reliance on 
cooperation with other mission agencies to enter the new fields seemed to create new 
opportunities back home. OMF workers like Cliff Paulson regularly traveled with 
speakers from the Sudan Interior Mission and South African General Mission in Canada. 
Particularly important was the society’s rapport with the U.S. Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 
which provided invitations to OMF speakers at campuses around the country and their 
Missionary Training Camp each summer in Michigan.409 But the OMF also emphasized 
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that the society’s expansion in the New Fields depended on expansion in the U.S. as well, 
and the Home Staff prioritized creating new outlets for OMF speakers and publications 
such as engagements at secular universities like Purdue and Duke.  
One of the most diligent public speakers for the U.S. from the mid-1950s onward 
was newly appointed Assistant Home Director Arthur Glasser, formerly a missionary in 
Yunnan before the society’s withdrawal. For much of this period he maintained an 
extensive travel itinerary across the U.S. and Canada. In particular, his first year on the 
job was marked by a strong commitment to travel in person to meet as many OMF 
supporters in North America as possible. From November of 1955 to February 1956, he 
visited OMF supporters across New York and Eastern Canada then flew west to Los 
Angeles to travel back across the country stopping in Denver, Chicago, Detroit, Boston, 
and then back to the offices in Philadelphia where he had several speaking engagements 
with local churches. It was not a job he enjoyed, describing travel in general as leaving 
him often “drained” physically, spiritually, and intellectually.410 
Many of his engagements provided Glasser an opportunity to lecture evangelical 
college students on the OMF program of missionary work and spiritual outlook on 
Southeast Asia.  He was a frequent guest of Wheaton College, the Conservative Baptist 
Seminary in Denver, Fuller Theological Seminary in Pasadena, Bryan University in 
Dayton, TN, and Philadelphia School of the Bible.411The OMF’s close relations with 
many colleges and seminaries afforded considerable contact with the student body. For 
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instance, at Colombia Bible College, Glasser was given the chance to lecture on eight 
separate occasions to the faculty and student body in a single visit.412 
Even the resignation or retirement of many of the China missionaries offered the 
OMF the opportunity to expand its contacts and influence among U.S. evangelicals. For 
instance, many of the former China hands that left the mission took pastorates or faculty 
positions at seminaries. J. Herbert Kane resigned from the OMF and became Dean of 
Providence Barrington College. The OMF Home Staff used Kane’s position and status as 
channels for increasing the society’s appeal in New England.413  
Furloughed missionaries continued to play a critical role in the OMF’s public 
relations in the U.S. too. The OMF’s Furlough Manual advised deputation speakers to 
have between ten to twelve messages prepared for various types of engagements.  In 
particular, the OMF urged missionaries to prepare messages for speaking to children or 
youth in Sunday schools, to communities through radio spots, missionary conference 
presentations, adult bible study lessons, the opening of schools or new churches, and to 
be prepared to provide a general overview of the entire OMF program in Asia. The most 
important element in each messages, the Manual declared, was to “put action into 
speaking,” by being descriptive “did he bounce up in a jeep, wade through mud, puff up 
the hill, lift his feet over the stones, or drag his feet through the dust?” 414 Thus, stories of 
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travel and ideas about mobility remained one of the OMF’s most effective tools for 
captivating audiences.  
Key to both Home Staff’s deputation and the distribution of OMF literature 
among U.S. evangelicals was the work of “introducing” supporters to the nations and 
peoples of the New Fields and creating a sense of how the society’s pioneering work was 
critical to the spiritual battlefronts of the Cold War. In particular, the mission’s surveys, 
completed by the missionary teams sent to assess the potential for OMF work in each 
area, played an incredibly vital role in educating its members and support networks 
throughout the international evangelical community. The surveys constructed mental 
imaginaries of these locations by describing each nation’s history, culture, demographics, 
indigenous religions, political and social landscapes, and status of foreign Christianity 
and native churches. Internally, selections and excerpts were disseminated and used as 
training materials. Externally, portions of surveys were reprinted in the pages of China’s 
Millions, later renamed The Millions in accordance with the society’s evolution. Lastly, 
the surveys were made into slideshows and deployed by deputation speakers traveling the 
U.S. on behalf of the mission.  
This aspect of the OMF’s public relations in the U.S. contributed to a larger 
cultural discourse on Asia and its importance in the Cold War. These materials were an 
important source of information concerning a region of growing importance as the U.S. 
greatly expanded its political, military, and economic power. As a result, the OMF and 
U.S. Home Staff shaped the meaning of the Cold War ideologies of containment and 
integration. The OMF pioneer was infused with the meanings of both as an adversary of 
communism and a force of integration between western countries and groups in East 
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Asia. Further, redeployment was intended to revive faith in the evangelical belief that 
God’s divine sovereignty was immune to and above that of the nation-state. Further, as 
prayer materials, these surveys and reports were critical to the OMF’s ideology of 
intelligent intercession, effectively serving as intelligence gathering on the New Fields 
for U.S. evangelicals to use in spiritual warfare. 
The most prominent feature of the OMF’s public relations in the U.S. in the 1950s 
was promoting the society’s return to pioneer evangelism. Operating again outside the 
bounds of established missionary forces and indigenous Christian churches, the transition 
to these new countries offered the society to become “pioneers again” in “virgin fields.” 
Slideshows and other promotional materials entitled “Virgin Fields” displayed OMF 
missionaries engaging in pioneer evangelism: tract distribution, market preaching, 
teaching young children, and presenting a constant personal witness to the “millions” of 
“untouched” or “unevangelized.”415  
In labeling these countries “new frontiers” the OMF disseminated a number of 
stereotypes about these societies and peoples as still primarily “heathen nations.” 
Advertisements for the OMF’s new work stressed that the “lands of the Far East are lands 
of darkness, lands of idolatry, lands without hope.” Further, pictorial calendars from 1953 
referred to “the millions” of Japan, Formosa, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia as peoples 
who “sit in darkness and bondage.” Various ethnic groups like the Thai were labeled 
“slaves of sin and Satan.”416 A number of surveys and publications in the 1950s referred 
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to “the millions of Asia” as “neglected countries and neglected peoples.”417 OMF 
publications also consistently exoticized these places and peoples as Taiwan was named 
“The Beautiful Island,” and Japan named “Cherry Blossom Land.”418 Through the OMF, 
U.S. evangelicals knew the majority of Asians to be heathens, exotic, beautiful, needy, 
and superstitious.  
Just as in China stereotypes about these groups and nations were partially 
produced by the missionary movement. As OMF missionaries moved about their new 
communities, their ideas about difference and inferiority—bodily, cultural, spiritual, 
etc—generated a host of experiences that reinforced racial stereotypes. For example, 
OMF missionaries such as Alan Cole arriving in Singapore spoke of looking at a “sea of 
yellow” populated by, “round-faced Cantonese, swarthy Hakka folk, lean-faced Hokkien 
merchants; and everywhere are Chinese children, solemn and gay, clean and dirty, rich 
and poor.”419 Hazel Carlson described the groups she met in Thailand as “Stubborn 
Buddhists, Haughty Mohammeddan, Emotional Hindus.”420 Such stereotypes were also 
affixed to the mobility of groups encountered by the missionary in the New Fields, too. 
 Carlson wrote of watching Singapore’s “multitudes of dark-skinned Eastern 
peoples,” such as the “golden-skinned Burmese, paler Karen, yellow Chinese, black 
Indian” moving along the city’s streets together… 
leisurely they go about their business or sit on the footpath and talk, or even lie 
down in the middle of the pavement and sleep if they feel so inclined. The noisy 
venders on the side, clanging pans together and shouting to make known their 
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various wares, cannot disturb these sleepers. The many beggars wend their way 
through crowds, bowing at the feet of the rich and stretching out their hands, 
unashamed, for the small pence that may be given.421 
Such descriptions of Asians contributed to a sense of a shared Oriental background 
amongst the diverse ethnic, religious, and national groups the missionary met in the New 
Fields.  
In addition, ideas about Asian mobility as stagnant, primitive, backwards, and 
even immobile were disseminated and reproduced by the OMF in slideshows, maps, 
pictures, and travel logs. Pictures and articles captioned “Travel in Java” juxtaposed the 
“modern” mobility of cars used by western missionaries with the “ancient” modes of 
travel practiced by Thai using yaks to pull carts.422 Prayer calendars contained 
photographs of Thai riding elephants labeled “Taxi in North Thailand.”423 OMF writers 
also flooded the U.S. evangelical imaginary with stories and illustrations highlighting the 
exoticism of river travel in Central Thailand. Pictures and articles describing various 
groups laboring across the New Fields featuring animals established ideas about Asian 
mobility as lacking sophistication and technology. In another example, the Negritos in the 
Philippines were described as being among the “most pitiable and needy groups” typified 
by their living a “nomadic, bow and arrow life.424”  
Stereotypes about Asian mobility were also disseminated by features and travel 
accounts that suggested the “bizarre” or “dangerous” ways in which Asians enjoyed 
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transportation modes, such as the train or automobile, associated with the west and 
modernity. Cartoons illustrated Thai passengers using trains in “ways uncommon in the 
West” with passengers selling curry and Buddhist charms from the windows. 
Missionaries wrote of the cars being “crowded” beyond belief with passengers and 
“mangy dogs.”425Dorothy Buegler wrote to readers for The Millions in 1965 that because 
“Thai love to race and passengers urge drivers on, travel by bus and by boat are almost 
certainly dangerous at times.”426 These modes of transportation were often symbols of 
modernity to western audiences. However, the consequence of missionary travel accounts 
was to imply that Asians typically did not experience the same “modernizing” effects as 
westerners from these technologies.  
Contributing to these stereotypes about Asian mobility were missionary accounts 
of religious festivals and customs in the New Fields. Missionary accounts of lunar New 
Year festivities such as the Feast of Lanterns spoke of “the horrors of heathenism” 
exhibited in the processions of Chinese and described the “devil dancing and singing” of 
the Lisu in Northern Thailand.427Prayer reminders for “tribes” in East Asia called upon 
U.S. evangelicals to “pray for these tribes that they may leave their heathen dances and 
dance for joy because of salvation.”428 In addition, missionary accounts of Asians 
performing dances and rituals for folk religions referred to their movements as “under 
control of demons” or dominated by “superstition.”429 In addition, the repeated references 
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to the “bondage” of such groups contributed to the designation of Asian mobility as 
stifled and unfree. 
As the OMF returned to being pioneers, these stereotypes of Asian mobility were 
often juxtaposed with the missionary’s own mobility as its “Other,” reproducing the 
ideological belief in the missionary mobility’s as inherently civilized and dynamic. 
Further, the return to pioneer evangelism reinforced the belief in the personal contact of 
missionaries with “heathens” as a potential source of liberation and freedom. Marie 
Barham’s missionary call declared that she was heading to the New Fields with the intent 
“to give hope to the exploited, courage to the fearful and unwanted, spiritual freedom and 
enlightenment to those enthralled by Satan’s chains, and the Word of God in their own 
tongue as a tangible antidote to the blinding power of heathenism and the insidious 
poison of Communism.”430 Thus, an inherent sense of difference remained at the core of 
the missionary’s mobility and the meanings it reproduced. 
 Redeployment as pioneers also resurrected the tropes of adventure, danger, and 
exoticism once typical of OMF rhetoric in China before the 1940s. Cole described his 
tour across Malaysia against the backdrop of the struggle between the British-led 
Commonwealth forces against the Malayan National Liberation Army of the Malayan 
Communist Party: “a jungle journey is full of surprises: here it will be an Indian bullock 
driver, with his team striving over a mighty fallen log, there it will be a gay group of 
Chinese rubber trappers, with black day-pajamas and orange head-squares. But 
sometimes it will be a patrol of lads in jungle green, with slouch hats and tommy guns, 
lads barely out of their teens, and we are reminded that within this green paradise may 
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lurk death.”431 Another account from an OMF agent in Thailand told of the missionary 
traveling on “wild elephant paths” roamed by “evil men and dangerous beasts,” and the 
group’s pig being killed by a tiger outside their tent while they slept.432Further, these 
accounts established that the traits of the pioneer—adaptability, courage, and vigor—
were the defining characteristic of the OMF missionary.  
In contrast, to Asians, the western missionaries were still represented as the 
masters of modernity through their strategic use of technological mobility to enhance 
their ministry and influence. The OMF advertised how missionaries used the 
technological mobility of trains, buses, and boats for expanding their witness, reaching 
fellow passengers, extending their coverage areas, and reaching new groups. Features in 
The Millions demonstrated how “mechanized missionaries” rode scooters and 
motorcycles and drove vans in the Philippines and Thailand.433 There were also many 
portraits of the OMF’s outreach in major urban areas; as The Millions showed 
missionaries working in Hong Kong using ferries, buses, and cabs and going door to door 
in multi-storied apartment houses to hand out tracts.434 
Not surprisingly, mobility still functioned as a signifier of the missionary’s 
integration and identification with the host society and people it sought to evangelize. 
The missionary’s movements demonstrated love and spiritual sacrifice for these 
communities through stories of endurance, exertion, and hardship in traveling to and fro 
among the “unevangelized.” Traveling as did the indigenous people was even more 
important as the mission’s policies were revised yet again to try and figure out how to 
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live and work in new societies without being perceived as imperialists. Policies set in 
place by the Bournemouth Conference in 1951 asked missionaries to adopt “simplicity” 
in accommodation, equipment, and the style of living of the communities they 
inhabited.435 Images and stories of the missionary traveling in the same fashion as locals 
did— on elephants, river launches, rickshaws, bicycles, or by foot— represented the 
society’s endeavor to identify with and live amongst the people. But now the OMF was 
fostering identifications between U.S. evangelicals and new abstract representations of 
“nationals” like the Filipino and Japanese convert, “tribal” groups like the Lisu in 
Thailand, and overseas Chinese minority groups in several countries. 
 Mobility also continued to be a critical marker of conversion to Christianity, and 
by extension the representations of Asian Christians were associated with many of the 
same meanings as the missionary’s mobility. Accounts of OMF converts repeatedly 
emphasized the vitality and energy of Christians. For example, OMF reports on the “The 
First All Student Retreat in Singapore” described evangelical students upon arriving for 
the retreat as “they tumbled out of cars, jumped from trucks, squeezed out of buses, or 
trekked in from the main highway.”436 Indian and Chinese Christians in Singapore were 
praised for their dynamic outreach and organization in utilizing public address systems 
and tract distribution in entertainment districts.437 But the OMF’s assessment that 
Christianity was far “weaker” in the New Fields than in China meant that few were ready 
to champion the churches and Asian evangelical work as equals in the missionary’s 
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project. Rather, the primary contribution the OMF intended to make to Asian churches 
and Christians lay in expanding Christianity’s influence and reach in society. 
The return to the ideology of pioneer evangelism was complicated from the start 
of the OMF’s entrance to the New Fields by decolonization and the Cold War. The 
portrait of these nations and peoples as “heathen” was undermined from the very 
beginning by increasing awareness of the profound transformations taking place in the 
region since the end of the Second Global War. Japan, in particular, was often singled out 
as an “advanced country.” In fact, OMF writers and speakers usually referred to Japan as 
a society where “civilization and heathenism exist together,” and OMF missionaries 
noted that the Japanese were already well familiar with western civilization and 
industrialization. Soon, OMF missionaries were reporting that “Japan is not the 
pioneering field that China was,” the general population already far more exposed to 
“progress” and “scientific development.”438  
That some fields occupied by the OMF were thus more advanced and less 
“heathen” gave the society greater hope for the region’s future. Optimistic voices within 
the OMF pointed to the potential of the Japanese becoming the leading source of East 
Asia’s evangelism. Noting the high degree of education of most citizens, OMF surveys 
characterized the Japanese as an “aggressive and dynamic race.” An anecdote in March 
1952 told of the introduction of American apples by an American missionary to Japanese 
culture in the recent past. The author stated, “This shows—everybody knows this—that 
when Japanese see a good thing and want it they soon get it and spread it far and 
wide.”439 Such descriptions implied hope for the OMF project if Japanese could be 
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converted to the missionary cause. Certainly, Japan’s once mighty imperial influence on 
many of the countries of the New Fields was not lost upon the OMF, rather the society 
aspired to have the missionary movement exploit the Japanese’s expansionist tendencies 
to their own ends.  
The OMF testified to indicators of “progress” and advancement” in many of the 
other countries as well.  Surveys told prayer supporters “the word ‘Thai’ means free, and 
this little country is one of the few free lands of Asia,” and the society is one of the “most 
prosperous and peaceful in Asia.” OMF missionary Dorothy Buegler described both the 
people and the government in Thailand as having “high ideals and modern ambitions.” 440 
Taiwan was also represented as one of the last “strongholds” of freedom in the region, 
and Indonesia called “the Youngest Republic.441 The Filipino people were characterized 
as “hungry for education.”442  
Increasingly, then OMF propagated the idea that decolonization and nationalism 
were “awakening” these “heathen” societies from their “stagnation.” For example the 
OMF superintendent of Indonesia George Steed describe Indonesia as “a new nation, 
ninety-seven million people, fourth largest nation in the world!” Similar to the OMF’s 
rhetoric about the New China emerging after the Asia Pacific War, these “new” nations 
were as dynamic as they were volatile. Steed alerted readers to the region’s growing anti-
imperialism and sensitivity to issues of race, “With all the vigor and explosive potential 
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of youth, they watch without regret the passing of the ‘invincible’ white man.”443 Such 
accounts both excited and troubled the OMF and its supporters and contributed to the 
sense that the OMF had arrived in these societies at a critical juncture in history.  
The OMF saw these various societies as ripe for evangelism, theorizing that rapid 
societal and political changes laid to waste indigenous beliefs and ideas creating a 
spiritual vacuum. In Indonesia OMF missionaries declared there were, “Ninety million 
people in a land of revolution and change, looking for something to hold on to, something 
constant, some rock on which to build their new national and individual personality. 
Ninety million people looking for God.”444  Into such contexts the OMF retained its core 
belief in the power of the missionary as a dynamic force capable of filling such needs for 
both the individual and the nation.  
In another example, OMF missionary Mac Bradshaw postulated, “Revolution 
makes people more open to change. It tends to loosen the iron grip of old religions on the 
masses. Thus the upheaval is creating an opportunity for evangelism perhaps unparalleled 
in the world today.” Even more promising was the ways in which these revolutions 
transformed the masses into dynamic movements. Bradshaw continued, “revolution 
makes people into activists,” and harnessing the “energy” unleashed by nationalism and 
decolonization toward the spread of the Gospel was the great missionary challenge of the 
era.  The missionary challenged evangelical Christians to imagine, “What if this 
revolutionary urge to do something—anything—could be channeled into consistent 
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Christian witness—and this in a country whose masses were susceptible to change?”445 
Similar sentiments existed among OMF agents in every country. 
And just as in China, the OMF propagated the idea that the forces “awakening” 
these societies had divided many nations into two distinct categories of “heathens,” one 
“modern” and another “primitive.” For instance, in a 1962 feature on “Training 
Nationals,” an OMF member wrote, “There is a wide gap between the aboriginal 
primitive of the Philippines jungles and the sophisticated Asiatic of Singapore’s 
suburbs.”446 Where the OMF encountered “modern” converts, the missionary’s priority 
was discipleship training, teaching them how to move as free and dynamic individuals of 
faith. And in areas dominated by “primitive” groups, the motive was to foster spiritual 
liberation from false religion through pioneer evangelism and church planting.  
But communism’s victory in China robbed evangelicals of their sense that the 
path to modernity lay with the West, and thus this same recognition of the nations and 
peoples of the New Fields as “awakened” caused as much dread and fear as it did 
excitement in the context of the Cold War. OMF publications stressed that the 
missionary’s work in many areas might be only temporary, “The door to many is open 
now. How long it will remain so, who can tell, but our responsibility is take the fullest 
advantage possible.”447 Testimony from the society’s China missionaries about their 
experiences in China fueled evangelical fears about communism’s dynamic 
organizational power and efficacy in mobilizing the masses. For example, Barbara Beck 
Longley wrote of the “tremendous things” she had seen the CCP accomplish in China 
during her tenure, “Young people carried away with a new ideology which is perhaps the 
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cleverest counterfeit of Christianity in the world today. A whole nation, almost overnight 
has become organized to an incredible degree.”448 Despite the evangelical’s belief in the 
primacy of saving individual souls, fears about communism’s power to transform the 
masses left the pioneering missionary at times seeming impotent by comparison. Further, 
the spiritual vacuum decolonization produced was just as ripe for communism, the 
“counterfeit of Christianity” to exploit, as it was for them. 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, however, the OMF championed the 
transition to the New Fields as proof of God’s divine sovereignty. The withdrawal and 
redeployment was a sign of the “tide turning” in spiritual war that raged inside and 
outside China. Slideshows stated that the entry into the New Fields signified that “month 
after month missionaries were coming home, forced out of China, now new and urgent 
doors are opened.” Pictures of missionaries setting out for Japan or Thailand from 
Philadelphia, Toronto, and London were labeled “reinforcements.” Deputation workers 
told U.S. audiences, “ejection has set free hundreds of new servants to meet the needs of 
East Asia.” In October of 1951 Deputy Director John Sinton declared his faith that in the 
spread of Christianity this “planned” withdrawal would “result in a greater advance.”449 
Just as evangelicals insisted that it was God, and not the communists who had closed the 
“door” to mission work in the PRC, the OMF advertised that God had opened the “doors” 
to the New Fields. Fred Mitchell called the withdrawal God’s giving the society a 
“passport to go into all the world.”450 
Keeping “doors” open for the OMF and aiding the society’s expansion became 
the top prayer objectives for the home audiences. Articles entitled “Prayer Cover Needed 
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for Advance” used the analogy of modern warfare’s use of aerial bombardments. Prayer 
supporters were invited to launch “barrages of prayer” on the New Fields and their 
diverse social and ethnic groups to pave the way for the OMF missionary’s spread of the 
Gospel.451 Missionaries such as Alfred Bosshardt wrote to evangelicals in the U.S. that it 
was their responsibility to pray “doors” to remain “open” in nations threatened by 
communist regimes like Vietnam.452 Despite the exodus from China, OMF missionaries 
claimed that evangelicals still possessed the power to influence the political and spiritual 
destinies of the rest of the region, “now is the moment when prayer can influence the 
future.”453 That a dramatic expansion of Christianity was needed in these countries to 
save them from communism was internal to such statements. 
The exodus from China and subsequent political and social revolutions taking 
place in the region in the 1950s and 1960s imparted an apocalyptic urgency to the 
society’s mission. The society’s yearly anthology for 1952, entitled Ready Sandals 
declared the missionary’s motto “pioneer or perish,” and throughout the 1950s the 
society’s top priority was to expand the evangelical witness as far and wide as possible.454 
The mission’s new General Director J. Oswald Sanders described expansion as the key to 
winning the spiritual war, “What we do we must do quickly. The times in which we live 
and the world in which we live demand it. We must throw everything we have into the 
warfare. We must be aggressive.”455 These declarations produced a zero-sum outlook on 
the missionary’s mobility in the New Fields, the missionary provided the opportunity to 
contain communism and integrate groups into the international order led by the U.S. 
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Where they could not go marked regions “untouched” by the spiritual antidote to 
communism. 
The OMF was redeploying missionaries as “reinforcements”  to create bulwarks 
against communism and provide much needed assistance to Asian Christians in societies 
threatened with isolation from the international community. By relocating to the New 
Fields the OMF also “reinforced” the local and national churches of Asia and authority of 
Asian Christians by furthering their reach and witness in society. Through pioneering, the 
OMF missionary was “planting seeds” in the form of converts and churches that could 
withstand communist revolutions. As bible teachers or through student evangelism, the 
OMF missionary trained Filipino youth or Lisu evangelists how to carry on witness and 
combat communist ideology. Other accounts of the OMF’s entry into the New Fields 
demonstrated the society’s contributions to fighting communism amongst urban youth as 
OMF agents participated in events like the Filipino Youth Conference on Christianity and 
Communism.456 And in Japan the OMF declared that missionaries battled with the return 
of hyper-nationalism and the Japanese Communist Party for the youth’s imagination.457 
For the OMF and its supporters the most important struggle was the contest over 
the CCP and PRC’s image among overseas Chinese. In the 1950s, OMF slideshows 
informed supporters of the mission that the popularity of the regime among overseas 
Chinese in many places ran high, according to the OMF, because of strong national 
loyalties and sentiments. Sending OMF missionaries to these populations reflected fears 
of these groups as a “fifth column” as mentioned earlier by combating communism 
through spiritual containment. For example, in Malaysia as the outgoing British 
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authorities suppressed communist revolutionaries in the countryside, the OMF’s work led 
the society’s missionaries directly into conflict with communism. Fear of Chinese 
populations as a breeding ground for communist guerilla movements also led the British 
to forcefully resettle over 400,000 Chinese in Malaysia beginning in 1950s into the “New 
Villages.” Much of the OMF program in Malaysia in the 1950s focused on Chinese 
forcefully moved to these resettlement camps, which the OMF labeled “battlefields for 
the souls of this country,” and surveys and reports from Malaysia suggested the value of 
missionaries in pacifying overseas Chinese and collaborating with regimes in containing 
them from communist influence.458 The OMF praised the camps for providing Chinese 
civilians with safety and protection from harassment by the Malayan Communist Party, 
and also for the ease with which it made evangelism, “praise God for taking scattered 
Chinese into compact settlement homes.”459 A frequent image disseminated by the OMF 
then was that of the missionary partnered with the resettlement officer, the latter hoping 
to convert Chinese into “ citizen” and the former hoping to mold new Christians.  
The society’s initial work in Indonesia was similarly geared toward containing the 
spread of communism amongst minority Chinese groups. In 1952 a map introducing 
readers to Indonesia countries paired with the article “A Race for the Souls of Men” 
suggested that “no area barred to missionaries” in the country.460 In fact, government 
officials had issued invitations for the mission to work in military camps, hospitals, 
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prisons, and radio programs geared toward Chinese.461 OMF publications also featured 
missionaries working in detention camps, attempting to rehabilitate combatants by 
converting them to Christianity. Missionaries reported teaching Chinese women to sing 
“Come and Believe in Jesus,” by using the popular tune “Kill the Englishman, Kill Him 
Now, and Kill the Spy, Kill Him Now.”462 Thus, the OMF shared with various regimes in 
Indonesia and Malaysia fear and suspicion of overseas Chinese populations as the 
breading grounds communist insurgencies and participated in their rehabilitation and 
assimilation into society. 
This effort to contain communism’s spread amongst overseas Chinese was made 
to seem all the more important to the Cold War and future of missions to Asia by the 
OMF since Chinese were a highly influential and mobile group. Within each nation, the 
OMF built the sense that overseas Chinese enjoyed a great deal of social mobility and 
influence. Surveys about the OMF’s work in Thailand overseas Chinese were singled out 
as being prominent within the business community and a major faction in the social and 
political life of cities like Bangkok, and the slides contained photos of Chinese doctors, 
pastors, and educators. In Malaysia, the OMF told U.S. evangelicals that many Chinese 
families were quite wealthy and enjoyed homes remarkably similar to their own complete 
with radios, refrigerators, and even American automobiles. And of course, OMF surveys 
displayed photographs of refugee classes of bureaucrats, educators, pastors, and students 
crossing “Freedom Bridge” for Hong Kong and Taiwan with OMF missionaries 
following in their wake. In fact, despite being a minority group the OMF stressed that 
throughout the New Fields many overseas Chinese in countries like Indonesia or the 
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Philippines as far more “cosmopolitan” than Chinese in the PRC and affluent with 
political and social clout that could influence the trajectory of each nation.463 
Secondly, the OMF made evangelicals aware of the transnational flows of 
overseas Chinese across these countries through connections to back to the PRC and their 
familial, racial, and commercial ties to overseas Chinese in other countries. Feared as a 
potential “fifth column,” their mobility was seen as a potentially threatening and 
subversive to the international order led by the U.S. and the Protestant missionary 
endeavor emanating from the West. However, the OMF also invited hopes among 
evangelicals that by winning overseas Chinese groups to the faith they could in turn be a 
powerful force for integration across the New Fields. If converted missions like the OMF 
could capitalize these transnational ties and the overseas Chinese’s mobility to advance 
the Gospel.  
 Communism and false religions were not the only enemies of the missionary. The 
OMF’s movement to the New Fields was also understood as an effort to stave of 
aggressive and anti-western forms of nationalism. In Japan, the OMF claimed the 
presence of the missionary contested the return of the sort of aggressive nationalism that 
led Japan to empire and war, and the expansion of evangelical Christianity portrayed as a 
partner in Japan’s reconstruction as a peaceful member of the international order.  The 
OMF participated in these projects by combating the “superstition” and “heathenism” of 
Shinto priests and temples that had contributed to emperor worship from returning to 
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prominence in society.464 In Taiwan, the OMF notified evangelicals that “explosive” 
currents of  “nationalistic ferment” meant “riots could break out against Americans at any 
time.”465  
 Return to the society’s roots in rural areas was also seen as a challenge to 
communism’s use of peasant mobilization. OMF members such as Cyril Faulkner 
claimed that the Chinese revolution proved that the missionary movement had 
concentrated too much time and energy in the cities, largely ignoring the rural masses 
that propelled the CCP to victory. In the New Fields, he envisioned the OMF’s return to 
pioneering as a chance to prevent communism from infiltrating and forming bases of 
support among peasants in Thailand and other nations.466  
As the 1950s wore on the occupation of nations stricken by civil war and 
communist insurgencies focused the attention of U.S. evangelicals on new groups of 
Asian Christians threatened with spiritual isolation. OMF publications reported on the 
deaths and arrests of missionaries in Vietnam in the 1960s and spoke of Christian 
gatherings “held in spite of bombs, bulldozers, and bullets.” In 1968, mission 
publications reported on Vietnamese Christians and western missionaries fleeing the Tet 
Offensive’s assault on Saigon, complete with pictures of fathers and children fleeing the 
violence in the streets. In Laos, in the late 1960s, the OMF rallied prayer requests for 
gospel campaigns, which the OMF advertised as “perhaps last to be held” in the “war-
racked” country.467 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Slideshow “Japan Survey,” in Folders 5-3 from Records of the United States Home Council of the 
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (China Inland Mission), Collection 215, Billy Graham Evangelical 
Center, Wheaton, Illinois.;  
465 J. Oswald Sanders to Arthur Glasser, May 28 1959. 
466 Cyril Faulkner, “First Impressions of Central Thailand,” China’s Millions, November 52. 
467 “Gospel Campaigns in War-racked Laos,” East Asia Millions, October 1968. 
	   245	  
By deploying missionaries to countries like Laos and Vietnam, the OMF kept 
U.S. evangelical attention focused on the spiritual ramifications of the Cold War in East 
Asia. OMF missionaries implored their evangelical audiences back home to ask for 
God’s divine intervention to restrain communist forces in both countries in order for the 
missionaries to continue their work.468 OMF coverage on Laos and Vietnam labored to 
keep a world consumed by the geopolitics of the Cold War aware of the spiritual 
consequences of these wars in East Asia. Missionary reports highlighted the difficulties 
of fledgling Vietnamese evangelical churches struggling to maintain fellowship in war 
torn countries.469 
Certainly there was a militant rhetoric to the OMF’s redeployment and a tone of 
spiritual conquest latent within the ideology of the pioneer. OMF publications frequently 
referred to the society’s forces entering the field as an “invasion” or missionaries as 
“soldiers of the cross.” 470The society’s survey of Japan declared that whereas the U.S and 
Allied forces had taught the Japanese the meaning of unconditional surrender politically 
and militarily, the OMF missionaries intended to show them the “spiritual” equivalent. 
In addition, publicity materials for the New Fields often framed the OMF’s entry 
within the context of each nation’s colonial past. A major emphasis of these histories was 
to educate OMF supporters that similar to China the OMF was entering societies where 
Christianity was associated with imperialism and many groups would meet the presence 
of the missionary with hostility. By describing each nation’s path to independence and 
anti-colonial struggles, the OMF redeployment suggested that in the wake of 
imperialism’s recession the international order emanating from the West would continue 
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to expand and exert influence on these nations. OMF authors noted that despite the 
removal of direct military and political control of nations like the U.S. in the Philippines, 
with OMF missionaries relocated to the area U.S. evangelicals retained the power to 
exercise prayerful intercession to advance evangelism and missionary influence in the 
country.  With the return of pioneer evangelism and repeated references to redeployment 
as an “invasion” and missionaries as “soldiers of the cross” the missionary’s mobility 
sustained notions of spiritual conquest even as political and economic hegemony was 
challenged.471  
However, by the early 1960s pleas that the forces of Christianity were being 
outgunned and outmatched were common from the OMF and its members. Increasingly, 
voices inside and outside the OMF were crying out that evangelicals were losing ground 
in the spiritual war in the New Fields but also at home. Certainly, the OMF contributed to 
an apocalyptic outlook and even a strong sense of defeatism among evangelicals. OMF 
reports stressed that missionary’s now worked in a “hostile world,” where they faced 
“atheistic communism, extreme nationalism, resurgent ethnic religions, secularism, and 
corrupted forms of Christianity.”472 There were also notes of resignation evident in the 
voices of OMF missionaries in the face of communism’s advance, as one member wrote 
following their withdrawal from Laos in July 1961, “Laos has been our Isaac. If God 
desires that it be offered up, we are prepared to obey.”473  
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Conclusion 
In leaving China and setting out for the New Fields the OMF missionary’s 
mobility took on new meanings, promising not just spiritual liberation but the creation of 
bulwarks against communism and integration of new communities into the international 
evangelical community. However, unlike in China the conditions of the OMF’s entry and 
work in the New Fields and anxiety over the possibility of more “doors” closing to the 
evangelical missionary led the OMF to abandon working as allies with elite groups of 
Asians, instead focusing again on reaching the “unevangelized.” While U.S. cold 
warriors like Luce allied with the likes of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, the OMF labored 
to forge ties between U.S. evangelicals and “neglected” groups like the Hakka and native 
Taiwanese.  
 But in returning to pioneering the OMF missionary’s mobility did not produce 
ideas about equality or desires to strengthen the spiritual sovereignty of Christians and 
churches in these countries. Rather, the race to pioneer and expand evangelical 
Christianity amidst the Cold War and decolonization reflected a desire to shore up and 
preserve the access of western evangelical Christianity to these societies before such an 
opportunity was lost. Instead, he missionary’s mobility symbolized a panic over the 
spread of revolutionary currents in the New Fields and potentially threatening mobility of 
classes such as overseas Chinese in the wake of the society’s exodus from the PRC. 
Taming self-determination, guiding its spiritual and political expressions toward the 
international community order led by the U.S and the Protestant missionary movement 
underwrote the missionary’s mobility.  
(Copyright @Anthony Miller 2015) 
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Chapter 5 
Strategic Dilemmas: Integration and Evangelism as a Human Right in the New 
Fields, 1961-1970 
Introduction 
 Donald Cook first felt called to being a missionary to the “Orient” during his time 
as an Air Force Navigator in the Asia Pacific War. He felt called to working with the 
OMF later while attending Wheaton College after reading the CIM’s publications like 
The Life of Hudson Taylor and listening to then General Director Houghton speak to the 
student body.  By the time he was ready for the field, however, the “Bamboo Curtain” 
had already been raised around China and the CIM expelled. Instead, Cook and his wife 
were bound first for Singapore to start language training at the new international 
headquarters of the now renamed OMF in 1956 and by late 1957 had arrived in Japan for 
their first assignment.474 
Despite the momentous shifts surrounding Protestant missions in the 1950s and 
1960s the methods of pioneer evangelism in the New Fields were remarkably similar to 
those once practiced in China prior to the 1940s When the Cooks arrived in Japan the 
OMF already had around forty missionaries engaging in work, primarily near Hokkaido. 
OMF agents went itinerating throughout the area by the standard means of tent 
evangelism or renting local theatres and public halls for evangelistic services.475 Working 
in areas “away from the mainstream” of the Protestant missionary movement centered 
around Tokyo, the OMF worked in very small towns in the north. As in China, the 
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seasons and weather were a major factor influencing the missionary’s work and life. 
During the winters little evangelism could be done, but during the summer months OMF 
missionaries like Cook went out on campaigns of tent evangelism and completed wide 
itinerations. On other days he spent his time “tramping” around the streets and busy areas 
in larger cities trying to make contact with non-Christians and win an audience. It was a 
very tedious and slow process, and the churches spawned by the OMF around Hokkaido 
were very small congregations.476 
 His work was limited in part because of his language skills. For an entire year 
after arriving in Japan, he continued to study language, but even then he never mastered 
enough Japanese to effectively preach. Mostly, Cook’s training helped him communicate 
enough to “get by for personal needs.” He relied on local Japanese Christians to 
accompany him and lead worship at meetings and services. But because they were 
working largely outside of established churches, there were very few locals available and 
willing to help. Japanese pastors and evangelists rarely visited the region, preferring like 
the “mainstream” missions to work in and around Tokyo.  
The linguistic barrier was a hindrance to many other workers as well. A colleague 
of Cook’s in the OMF had the same rudimentary language skills as he did, having spent 
twenty-five years working in China, the man struggled to acquire a new language in 
Japan. Mostly, Cook saw the former China hand rely on going house to house leaving 
tracts on the doors to carry the gospel to the Japanese.477 
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 According to Cook, the OMF’s approach to Hokkaido’s evangelization was at 
odds with the approach of most Japanese Christians. At various points throughout the 
OMF’s work in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s Japanese Christians advised the society that 
evangelism should first target cities, then work on cultivating Christians from urban areas 
to take the gospel to smaller towns and rural areas. “Country” Christians, these Japanese 
evangelicals stated, would arrive in cities as a “nobody” and would fail to win audiences 
and souls. Urban Japanese, however, would immediately be received in smaller towns 
with respect and authority. It was an idea that Cook said the mission ultimately realized 
as sound after twenty years, and thus reconfigured its approach.478 In essence, the OMF 
endeavored to evangelize from the “bottom-up” and going directly to the people, while 
Japanese Christians argued that the attention of urban-elites were the key to 
disseminating the gospel. 
 After two years, Cook was reassigned to work as an administrative agent in 
Tokyo. Due to his prior work experience in business, he was put in charge of planning 
and distributing the mission’s supplies. His relocation meant that his duties had little at 
all to do with preaching and he had very little contact with congregations. He found the 
lack of contact with the people and fellowship in worship frustrating. In contrast with the 
work of the pioneer, Cook believed that the administrative side of missions was not the 
most thrilling or spiritually gratifying work, but it was the sort of work increasingly 
necessary to maintain the OMF’s vision for East Asia.479 
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Cook’s relocation to Tokyo and assignment to administrative work spoke to larger 
shifts away from pioneer evangelism within the OMF and back to an emphasis on a 
church-centric approach to evangelism, and prioritization on outreach to youth and urban 
elites.  By 1962 the OMF was promoting the image of Asian evangelicals as the 
“Missionary of Tomorrow.” The society’s Overseas Director Arnold Lea wrote… 
God is moving—moving in the hearts of young Asian Christians. In the colleges 
of America, in the Chinese churches in London, Paris, New York, in the Overseas 
Christian Fellowship in Australia, in the Universities of Singapore and Hong 
Kong, and in many other places (besides) there are Asian Christians dedicating 
themselves to full-time service with the thought of missionary work uppermost in 
their hearts and plans.480 
The Asian evangelicals’ missionary impulse was also evident in their traffic across 
national borders as he saw, “already Japanese have gone to Laos, Chinese to India, 
Filipinos to Indonesia, Koreans to Thailand while more still prepare to enter other lands 
besides.”481 There would even come a day, he predicted, in which Asian evangelicals 
would lead campaigns in Africa and perhaps even “heathen England.”482 
Based upon this vision of the future of evangelism in Asia, Lea predicted the 
OMF would rebalance its forces to focus on “strengthening” Asian churches and working 
with them as allies. He argued “God still has a work for the western missionary, provided 
it is not done independently, but rather alongside eastern colleagues whom it is 
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recognized will increasingly be making the main thrust.”483 Just as in 1943 the OMF used 
the image of the Asian and western missionary moving together as the symbol of a new 
era of relations, “Missionary work of tomorrow we anticipate will see dedicated Asians in 
the vanguard but with many western colleagues shoulder to shoulder with them, pressing 
forward in the great task of bringing back the King.”484  But Lea also expected many of 
the OMF’s agents to transition roles like that of the Cooks in Tokyo, calling their work 
“out of sight” while as “strategic and vital” as the work of the Asian pioneers. Other 
OMF agents would focus much more of their time on generating and facilitating this 
missionary commitment amongst Asian churches through discipleship training and bible 
teaching. Lea expressed his “deep desire to see the Asian church reach maturity and 
fullness through spearheading its own ministry and outreach” and charged the OMF with 
creating a “wave of concern” among Asian evangelicals to take up the missionary call.485  
Underneath the OMF’s effusive praise for Asian churches and evangelicals as 
symbols of a new era and increasing recognition of their right to lead the region’s 
evangelization, however, was a pervading sense of crisis surrounding the Protestant 
missionary movement in the 1960s. On the home front Lea acknowledged the society was 
faced “with increasing volume voices which proclaim that the era of missions is over,” 
with “a mighty surge of nationalism” frequently opposed the western missionary’s 
presence in Asia.486 Lea argued that the assumption of leadership by Asian evangelicals 
was in part because of tightening restrictions faced by white, western missionaries in the 
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field, “Not many years ago the missionary from the west could travel freely where he 
wished. Today visas are essential and difficult to obtain, even impossible at times.”487 
Internally, the OMF also suffered in the 1950s and early 1960s from fears that 
amidst rapid social, economic, and political transformations in Asia, the return to pioneer 
evangelism had been a “strategic” mistake. The struggles of the OMF to enter and expand 
in the New Fields and debates about the “strategic” value of the OMF’s work revealed 
growing doubts in the missionary as a dynamic and progressive movement. The sense 
that pioneer evangelism was a tactical blunder stemmed from OMF anxieties that the 
forces of communism and revived “false” religions such as Islam were far more 
influential with the most modern, mobile, and dynamic Asian groups.  
Complicating this crisis were charges of racial discrimination and prejudice 
leveled as the missionary in general, but also specifically at the OMF for its exclusion of 
Asians from membership in the society. These charges were amplified by world attention 
to civil rights, segregation, and racial equality in the 1960s. Within this context criticism 
mounted in the home countries and in the New Fields against the OMF’s ideas about the 
indigenous church and exclusion of Asians from membership. Historian Mary Dudziak’s 
Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy discusses how 
international attention and criticism of racial discrimination and segregation in the U.S. 
challenged the nation’s power and leadership at home and abroad in the context of the 
Cold War.488 Similarly, the exclusion of Asians, residing in the home countries and the 
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New Fields, tarnished the society’s reputation as an “international” agency committed to 
racial equality. 
In response to these challenges, by the mid-1960s the OMF was once again 
championing the idea of a church-centric focus for missionary work and pushing for the 
integration of the western missionary and the Asian Christian. Integration and the church-
centric approach were the OMF’s solutions to the changing circumstances surrounding 
the missionary including industrialization, population growth, mass education, and 
urbanization. The return to a church-centric approach also led the OMF to revive the idea 
that the evangelical missionary contributed to nation-building and spiritual self-
determination. For example, Lea argued that it was increasingly necessary for the western 
missionary to make a “contribution” through his or her work that benefitted not just the 
churches of Asia but the peoples and governments as well.  For U.S. evangelicals, this 
goal paralleled the Kennedy administration’s elevation of financial and technical aid to 
promote state-building and modernization to a top priority in foreign policy, especially as 
OMF members like Cook primarily worked as missionaries in administrative offices 
rather than in public view as evangelists.   
In addition, the OMF gradually integrated the society with Asian Christians, both 
in the home countries and abroad. By late 1964 the OMF set upon a course to abandon its 
“western” identity and orientation and become a truly “international” force.489 Once again 
the OMF set about selling U.S. evangelicals, white and Asian, on the idea of cooperation 
and equality grounded in an ideology of mobility.   
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However, integration and the return to a church-centric focus was a reactive 
response to various challenges facing the OMF since the 1950s.  I argue these shifts in 
OMF policy and ideology were motivated by fear that the international evangelical 
community was “losing” Asia, a fear that scholars such as Christina Klein argue was 
prevalent in U.S. culture. At the same, I also put forward that the OMF feared that 
Americans and other white westerners were “losing” both the missionary impulse to 
participate directly in Asia’s transformation and the privileged mobility that went with 
this identity.  With the missionary increasingly held up by intellectuals in the Atlantic and 
the Pacific as the symbol of imperialism and naiveté in foreign relations, the OMF 
endeavored to keep alive the idea that the white, western missionary had a religious right 
to go anywhere and proselytize to anyone. Through integration the OMF sought Asian 
allies supportive of the society’s vision for evangelizing Southeast Asia and white, 
western missionary mobility. Further, by joining with Asian evangelicals and abandoning 
the society’s “western” orientation the OMF sought to overcome the  
A Strategic Dilemma 
By the late 1950s a number of factors had produced severe doubts about the 
evangelical missionary project in East and Southeast Asia. For one, the OMF no longer 
dealt with just one government but several and securing visas for missionaries from these 
regimes often proved difficult. Visa requirements in Thailand in the 1960s, for example, 
often forced OMF members to leave the country and then re-enter to renew their visas, 
disrupting the society’s work. At other times, OMF staff from the International 
Headquarters was delayed in conducting tours in several countries by the need for several 
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permits or visas from different governments.490 In sum, in the 1950s the logistics and 
politics of conducting missionary work were far more complicated and difficult to 
manage. 
There were also various governmental regulations on religion that limited the 
OMF’s witness and activities. For example, in Malaysia, proselytizing to the dominant 
Muslim population was largely prohibited in the 1950s and early 1960s. As a result the 
OMF also faced a number of restrictions that limited their dissemination of educational 
materials, radio, and literature in the public sphere.491Restrictions on missionary work 
were most stringent in Indonesia. There the Christian Witness Press, part of the 
publishing arm of the OMF, struggled in the 1950s to secure the facilities needed to 
produce Christian literature inside the country, and permits for importing the society’s 
materials were difficult to obtain for much of the decade.492 For several years in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, issues of Dengta were prohibited by the government from being 
distributed amongst Chinese in Indonesia, whom had years earlier accounted for over 
25% of the magazine’s subscribers in the New Fields. At other times laws barred the 
import of bibles.493  
And, of course, there was the very real hostility and even violence OMF members 
faced in many countries, at times forcing missionaries to abandon their posts. This was 
most prominent in Vietnam and Laos. In Malaysia in the 1950s many OMF members 
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were too fearful to travel on highways, busses, or venture outside the Chinese 
resettlement camps. OMF missionary Hayden Mellsop wrote, “Europeans, generally 
speaking, do not travel by bus, for no quarter is shown to such if they are caught by 
Reds.”494 Albert Grant later recalled in 1962 that for much of the 1950s, traveling was so 
hazardous that he refused to go anywhere without armed escorts.495 In addition, in the 
1960s, OMF agents were forced out of southern Laos and areas in Northern Thailand, and 
OMF reports from Saigon in the late 1960s highlighted the society’s efforts to build a 
student movement as the Vietcong’s Tet Offensive surrounded the city. Although the 
society had weathered and outlasted communist insurgencies in Malaysia, Philippines, 
and Indonesia, the OMF’s struggle to maintain a foothold in Laos and Vietnam again 
raised alarms that communism’s expansion was outpacing the missionary’s. 496 
Outside of logistics and the safety of personnel, the region’s volatility impacted 
the OMF financially, too. Fluctuating exchange rates and sudden crashes in the values of 
currencies impeded the OMF’s work in many nations like Laos and Thailand experienced 
coups and prolonged civil war. Even in relatively more stable nations like the Philippines, 
the society failed to secure the same preferential exchange rates enjoyed by other 
Protestant agencies.497 All of these factors greatly hindered the OMF’s expansion and 
limited the exercise of mobility by its agents in the field. 
But there were cultural and institutional factors slowing the OMF’s penetration of 
the New Fields as well. While the OMF had relocated to occupy many new regions 
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quickly in the 1950s, their lack of familiarity with the customs, languages, and social 
behaviors of various groups frustrated the society’s work and influence.  In many of the 
new countries, such as Japan, the language barrier forced OMF members to concentrate 
solely on language study for as many as two full years before being able to engage in any 
actual missionary service.498   
Even amongst the overseas Chinese populations, the society’s China missionaries 
found their years of experience far less valuable than they had hoped. Initially, the OMF 
expected that the society’s experiences in China would ease its penetration of the New 
Fields. For instance, Hayden Mellsop wrote that in Malaysia the OMF missionary’s 
Mandarin skills were “opening doors” and “forging friends,” and in northern Thailand the 
mission encountered members of the Lisu tribes from Yunnan who had been members of 
CIM-affiliated churches.499But their linguistic experience was far less helpful than the 
society planned. OMF officials were dismayed upon learning from their surveys in 
Thailand that despite large Chinese populations, 80% spoke Swatow and 15% Cantonese.  
Even in Hong Kong, the dominance of Cantonese and the OMF’s training in Mandarin 
left missionaries struggling to communicate with locals.500 OMF missionaries arriving in 
Thailand reported that life and work were “so different” than China as they faced new 
climates, people, languages, and experiences.501 Various missionaries in Malaysia 
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reported feeling “impotent” as they stood amongst “Chinese not speaking Chinese,” 
unable to understand a word being said by the groups around them.502  
Certainly, there was a sense that in the transition to the New Fields the OMF was 
“starting over” from “scratch.” OMF missionaries wrote about their lives in the new 
countries and struggles with references and comparisons to the missionaries of the CIM 
in the 19th century.503 But “starting over” meant that the OMF’s spread and influence in 
the New Fields was far more modest than the prestige it accumulated over a century of 
work in China. As one missionary who had relocated to Malaysia explained, “In China 
we went into stations where work had already been done and where in most cases there 
was a large or small group of Christians. Now we go where no work has ever been 
done.”504 Like Cook, many missionaries were sent to areas where they lacked native, 
fluent Christian helpers to aid their work. And without servants, OMF missionaries found 
too much of their day consumed by chores and errands from their daily lives, as one 
member wrote to home audiences, “This means doing our own shopping, cooking, 
washing, ironing, cleaning, and so on, as well as seeking to learn a new language and get 
out among the people.” The OMF reminded evangelicals that such activities kept the 
missionary bogged down inside their homes studying or taking care of chores that limited 
their hours to devote to evangelism or training converts, and prayer reminders asked U.S. 
evangelicals to pray for capable servants for the missionary to “free” them up for 
concentrating on spiritual tasks.505  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Arnold Lea, “Mountains of Difficulty,” The Millions, September 1952.“ 
503 D. Bentley Taylor, “Recommissioned,” The Millions, April 1952. 
504 D. Bentley Taylor, “Recommissioned,” The Millions, April 1952. 
505 “New Outreach: Malaya,” The Millions, April 1952. 
	   260	  
The absence of the infrastructure used by the mission in China slowed the spread 
of the OMF’s literature program too. In the early 1950s, printing and producing such 
literature far outpaced the ease at which the society distributed these materials. Without 
the established distribution networks it was accustomed to inside China the OMF 
struggled to forge new channels. That there was no uniform system or plan for 
distributing literature in these countries meant that the Field Superintendents in each area 
were forced to improvise their own strategies for marketing and disseminating literature. 
All of these factors compounded the OMF’s strong sense of “loss” in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Numerous missionaries referenced the “pain” or “hurt” of leaving China and 
their Chinese colleagues behind for new assignments. As Raymond Frame moved to the 
Philippines he felt his mind drawn back to memories of China, “It is almost like calling to 
mind the loved countenance of some dear one of whom we have recently been bereaved.” 
As he surveyed his work in Manila he thought of how another China missionary had 
described it as “like gazing contemplatively at some new young virgins before the earth 
has dried on the grave of one’s own wife.”506 Thus, while these “virgin fields” were often 
romanticized and gendered as the “other” to be conquered by the pioneer, missionary 
testimony also revealed a flagging spirit and enthusiasm for the work of spiritual 
conquest and aggressive expansion. 
This sense of “loss” stemmed from the OMF’s belief that China had the strongest 
and best-trained Christian churches and evangelists in all of Asia. OMF writers like Paul 
Contento argued that in “losing” China to communism, Christianity had lost the “light of 
Asia” and was dealt a huge blow to the expansion of Christianity in the New Fields. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506Raymond Frame, “From Vessel to Vessel,” China’s Millions, November 1951. 
	   261	  
claimed that a great majority of the region’s Christian churches and institutions had 
depended upon the services of pastors, evangelists, and bible-women coming from China. 
The isolation of the “Bamboo Curtain” had cut off this much-needed source of well-
trained and educated clergy from aiding in the evangelization of Thailand, Singapore, and 
Malaysia.507 
In general, then the OMF struggled to “fan out” as it had in China due to the 
absence of extraterritorial privileges that had accelerated its penetration of the Chinese 
interior in the 19th and 20th centuries. These struggles created a growing anxiety and doubt 
in the “progress” of evangelical Christianity’s expansion. Secondly, fears about 
stagnation in the New Fields grew from the lack of traditional signifiers of Christianity’s 
expansion. The OMF and its supporters openly acknowledged that in terms of territory, 
Christianity’s expansion had halted and even risked receding again and again due to 
decolonization and the Cold War. But this was also because in consciously avoiding the 
construction of schools, clinics, and churches, the OMF denied evangelicals important 
public and visible markers of Christianity’s influence on nations occupied by the 
missionary. 
More importantly, the belief in the missionary’s mobility as a signifier of divine 
sovereignty was challenged by the events in the Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. It was 
difficult for the OMF to reconcile evangelical beliefs in divine sovereignty and the ability 
of the individual to discern God’s will with the setbacks the society suffered in many 
regions like Laos. OMF writers encouraged readers to see that “by opening and closing 
and reopening doors, God is guiding us to concentrate our energies on work he knows to 
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be important.”508 But even the firmest evangelical faith would struggle to understand 
God’s design behind allowing OMF missionaries to enter nations like Laos only for them 
to be forced to leave a few weeks after arriving in the 1960s.509 OMF representatives 
faced U.S. supporters asking “why God allows such a state of affairs,” when discussing 
the violence, political instability, and hostility surrounding the missionary’s work in East 
Asia.510  
The OMF’s trials and tribulations in the field progressively eroded belief that in 
the missionary’s mobility one could ascertain God’s will. Debates about the ability of 
Christians to know and understand the almighty’s providence were among the most 
controversial in this era.  Within evangelical circles, books such as Elisabeth Elliot’s No 
Graven Image were popular and yet widely criticized for suggesting the inability of 
human beings to understand God’s will and by extension God’s desire for world 
evangelization in the sending of missionaries abroad.511 Scholar Sarah Ruble writes “By 
throwing God’s will into question, Elliot transgressed the limits of acceptable evangelical 
dissent. God, evangelical texts had declared throughout the 1960s, desired 
evangelization.”512 And yet, while it is certainly true of the OMF that it never wavered as 
an institution in its belief in God’s desire for world evangelization, the mission’s 
struggles did suggest the uncertainty of knowing the almighty’s design in how to do so. 
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For example, an OMF member reporting on the society’s departure from Laos wrote, 
“God has purposes in the world today we know nothing about.”513  
The idea that “planned” withdrawals such as the exodus from China created 
further “advances” for Christianity in new areas was waning. The uncertainty in seeing 
and understanding God’s plans behind the missionary’s mobility led to debates about the 
ideology, methods, and practices of the OMF. Because commentators suggested that the 
Cultural Revolution in China had eradicated Chinese Christianity in the PRC, the 
meanings associated with the missionary’s advancement were less clear.   
The problems encountered in the OMF’s expansion in the New Fields contributed 
to this crisis by exacerbating fears of Christianity’s retreat and communism’s advance. 
Despite rallying Christians to rise to the challenge of spiritual warfare in Asia, the OMF 
quite frequently perpetuated a sense of despair and defeatism among evangelicals. In the 
early 1960s, the OMF leadership acknowledged that anti-Christian forces in the region 
had grown “stronger and more militant” than when the OMF had first been redeployed.514 
Calls for increasing the OMF’s literature program in the early 1960s stressed, “literature 
is being so extensively used by the forces of evil that those who seek the true welfare of 
the people are at a loss to know why Christian forces are so far behind in seizing this 
valuable opportunity of reaching the people.”515 Lamentations about the lack of 
commitment of U.S. evangelicals to the Protestant missionary project contributed to fears 
that Christianity was outgunned and outmanned. 
Worse, recognition of explosive population growth in East and Southeast Asia 
made the missionary’s commission seem increasingly impossible to fulfill.  An OMF 
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writer in 1964 suggested in his article “One Billion Souls Lost?” that outside of 
Christianity’s confrontation with communism, recognition of the region’s population 
growth was perhaps the “great theological issue of the day.” OMF supporters were 
especially troubled by the awareness that there were more than twice as many Chinese 
living in the world in the 1960s than when the society was founded in the 1860s. As one 
OMF member wrote in 1962, “the solemn fact of the population explosion of our day—
with the continued cold war and the closing doors to mission lands—means that we have 
little time left to reach this generation with Christ.”516 Such statements reflected growing 
doubts about pioneer evangelism as the means to accomplish such a feat, and a need for a 
dramatic shift in tactics or ideology to fulfill the society’s commission.  
These problems in the field were compounded by issues on the home front in the 
relationship between the OMF and U.S. evangelicals. As the OMF transitioned into the 
New Fields, the society struggled to retain its preeminence in the U.S. among Protestant 
evangelicals. The Overseas Council feared that in the U.S. while “the possibilities for the 
Kingdom of God in this country are tremendous,” the mission suffered from “weaknesses 
in public relations and loss of confidence in mission leadership.”517 Further, the 
correspondence of Arthur Glasser, Assistant Home Director for North America, and J. 
Oswald Sanders, Overseas Director, reveals the OMF fretted that the society had lost the 
“public voice of the CIM” following the exodus from China, and feared that the OMF’s 
spiritual support networks and prayer circles in the U.S. were lagging. 
Signs of the society’s waning influence were evident in a number of crucial areas. 
While North America still provided a “tremendous reservoir for personnel and funds,” 
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reports in the late 1950s suggested the OMF’s revenues had stagnated and it was “losing 
ground” to other Protestant missions. When adjusted for inflation, in fact, the society’s 
support from North America had not grown since the 1930s. 518 Further, recruitment of 
missionary candidates was plagued by a number of defections, and there was a seemingly 
tepid response from U.S. evangelicals to the OMF campaign to send 184 new 
missionaries to Asia by 1959.519  
There were also suspicions that the OMF had lost its appeal to American men, as 
there was a growing disparity in numbers between male and female candidates and junior 
missionaries. For many decades, the number of women sent by the U.S. to the field had 
outnumbered men at a ratio of 2 to 1. But in 1961, the ratio in a new batch of junior 
missionaries climbed to 4 to 1 in favor of women. Glasser urged the Overseas Council 
that such a “dearth could create a real problem in administration and field work,” and 
advised that finding “men of finest quality” was a top priority.520  The society’s gender 
bias in favor of men for executive and administrative positions, and specialized posts in 
areas such medicine or radio, led the U.S. Home Staff and Overseas Council to fear the 
consequences of losing its appeal with men.  
Beyond operations, these were problems of great ideological significance.  For 
instance, as an institution the OMF believed that, “missionary candidates are very 
tangible evidence that, so far as God is concerned, the day of missions is not yet over.” 
Internally, many OMF members and supporters believed the reverse as well. Lagging 
financial contributions, difficulties in finding candidates and retaining them once they hit 
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the field, and a lack of virility and masculinity within the OMF from a dearth of male 
missionaries had unnerving spiritual implications. Within the context of debates on the 
“end” of the age of the missionary such issues were of even greater importance. In 
essence, the OMF’s expansion and progress toward evangelizing Asia was stalling in 
both the Pacific and the Atlantic, and why that was so was a question of profound 
spiritual significance.  
The Overseas Council and U.S. Home Staff also worried about how the society 
was perceived by U.S. evangelicals in this period. At various points the U.S. Home Staff 
faced accusations from leading Christian Cold warriors about the society’s anti-
communist and evangelical credentials. Hard-line ideologues like Fred Schwarz and the 
National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) pressured the OMF to be more aggressive in 
their anti-communist rhetoric.521 Worse, in 1962 Carl McIntire singled the OMF out as a 
“compromising mission” in The Christian Beacon and stated that the society had 
contributed to the CCP’s rise in China by failing to take a hard position against liberal-
modernism and communism.522 In essence, some U.S. evangelicals accused the OMF of 
being “soft” on communism and its “fellow-travelers” among the liberal modernist 
variant of Protestantism, who many evangelicals blamed for watering down the Christian 
faith and leaving foreign Christians more susceptible to leftist ideologies like 
communism.  
Occasionally, U.S. evangelicals attacked the methodology and practices of the 
OMF’s missionary work. One furloughed missionary, Ralph Tolliver, wrote to Glasser 
informing him that on his deputation tour, audiences had implied that the OMF’s methods 
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were not “contemporary enough” and lacked a “sanctified imagination.” Other U.S. 
evangelicals voiced fears that the society had sacrificed its independence and doctrinal 
integrity in depending on cooperation with the national churches and denominational 
missions to gain access to the New Fields during redeployment. Quite frequently the 
society’s supporters questioned the representatives of the Home Staff in the U.S. about 
whether or not cooperation had allowed “the threat of liberalism” to water down the 
mission’s evangelical creed.523 Such fears expressed concerns that the OMF was still 
solidly within the evangelical camp and doubts as to whether or not the OMF 
missionary’s work truly advanced containment.  
A greater concern for the U.S. Home Staff was that U.S. evangelicals no longer 
sensed the OMF was forging ahead in the New Fields. In 1956 Glasser reported to OMF 
senior leadership that U.S. supporters lacked a sense of an “advance” being created by the 
mission, and he feared Americans saw the OMF programs as “static” in their outreach to 
Asians. He implored the OMF to give greater publicity to the society’s planning, strategy, 
and progress in reports and publications and embody the principle that “missionary work 
must be dynamic in its outreach.”524 More troubling for Glasser to report in 1958 was that 
many U.S. evangelicals believed the OMF force in many nations was “melting away.”525 
These various issues all spoke to growing debates inside and outside the OMF 
concerning the “strategic” value of pioneer evangelism. By the early 1960s even the 
Assistant Home Director was among the evangelical voices calling for an overhaul of the 
OMF’s approach to the New Fields. Dating back into the 1950s in his letters to the 
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Overseas Council, he had argued for emphasizing areas of missionary work and groups in 
the New Fields that were of greater “strategic value.” This included doing far more 
student evangelism and outreach in urban areas. Particularly, Glasser was impressed by 
the “strategic significance” of cities and the importance of capturing the educated classes 
in East and Southeast Asia.  
He felt that a great obstacle to these objectives was the comity agreements 
arranged with the national churches and established missions in the New Fields following 
the exodus. In nations such as Thailand, the OMF had accepted limitations upon its work 
in cities such as Bangkok that made reaching the educated masses of urban areas largely 
impossible. This was especially troubling to Glasser since he believed that the best and 
brightest youth in rural areas worked by the OMF in nations like Malasyia and Thailand 
left for the cities, where greater opportunities for education and employment were found. 
In the late 1950s, he implored the Overseas Council to review such agreements and 
perhaps even violate comity if necessary to reach these key demographics. 
Glasser’s desire to re-evaluate the OMF’s priorities became public when the 
North American edition of The Millions featured an editorial he wrote called “February 
Theses,” in May 1961. The publication recounted a number of declarations issued at a 
meeting of the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship at Wheaton College that he had 
attended. Copying the tone and style of Lenin’s April theses, Glasser intended the piece 
to be an “evangelical response to the revolutionary ferment” facing Protestant missions.526 
Many readers, however, took his editorial as stern criticism of the OMF’s current 
operations in the field.  
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In the editorial, Glasser asked that Christian evangelicals recognize a number of 
“facts” that should guide the revitalization of the missionary project. Among them was 
that decolonization proved “the western orientation of the world is falling apart—and 
rapidly,” and Asia and Africa’s explosive population growth meant that it was 
“physically impossible” to think that the missionary force from western countries could 
“evangelize all the people of this generation.” Other important notions included that 
“there is the possibility of a future worldwide triumph of Marxist-nationalism prior to 
Christ’s return,” and that one of the most important developments in world affairs was 
the rapid spread of urbanization and industrial development in post-colonial states.527  
In all these points Glasser was largely in agreement with the OMF’s Overseas 
Council and outlook on the New Fields. But in the conclusions that he drew from these 
facts, Glasser appeared to break radically from the OMF’s official perspective. He argued 
“when strategic considerations are paramount, not all peoples overseas can be regarded as 
equally important.” Certain nations, linguistic groups, and ethnicities, he urged his 
readers, were of far less importance for evangelicals to reach than others.528 In essence, 
the Cold War and rapid transformations taking place in Asia made some souls of more 
“strategic” value to the missionary than others. 
As a result, Glasser argued for a renewed emphasis on a church-centric approach 
to missions and restructuring of evangelism to make a bid to capture the hearts and minds 
of elites in those societies most advanced in terms of technology and industry. The 
“primary central objective” of mission work, he insisted, was to create in “every country 
vigorous evangelical churches” in “those segments of society that culturally and 
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materially are capable of accepting responsibility for the rest of the people of the 
country.” By focusing on major urban centers, the evangelical missionary could allow the 
dynamics of urbanization to reach rural areas too, as he declared “country towns and rural 
areas witness their able, ambitious, vigorous young people moving forward to the cities.” 
Further, the development of mass education and rising literacy in these cities meant the 
missionary should devise strategies and messages to reach the masses, but more 
especially “the universities, the intellectuals, and even the communists” and various 
professional classes. Reaching these groups might require more emphasis on developing 
literature programs and mass media like the radio.529  
 In many ways Glasser’s editorial harkened back to the society’s ideology in 
returning to China post-1943. But he also hinted that “true” cooperation and integration 
had eluded the movement in the past, writing that, “missionaries must cease talking of 
working under national leadership and start practicing it.”  If evangelists were to succeed 
in their program to reach the world, then the missionary’s integration into the local and 
national churches was of vital importance, and training national leadership for outreach 
and missionary work of greater “strategic” value than pioneering or church planting. 
Rather than ignore or bypass “weak” churches in large cities, he argued it was far easier 
and faster to “strengthen existing” congregations than to plant and create a new body.530 
As a result, the editorial put forward a number of projects that should be 
considered “low” priorities including work with tribal groups, linguistic study, and work 
in rural areas. In explaining this to readers, he claimed that when missions worked in 
rural areas, these converts often proved ineffective in proselytizing amongst urban 
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populations because they were reaching out to their cultural “equal or superior.” Instead, 
he stated that urban Christians had a far easier time in reaching their rural counterparts, 
who was often a “cultural inferior.” Using the well-known “Auca” tribe of Ecuador as an 
example, Glasser made light of the thought that these “primitive” groups had the ability 
to succeed in modern and industrial urban environments as evangelists and Christian 
leaders.531  Thus, in arguing for a reform of missions, Glasser cast off rural and many 
ethnic minorities in the New Fiels as the social and cultural inferiors of elites and urban 
populations, who he believed were of greater “strategic” importance to the spiritual 
conflict in Asia.  
The editorial also claimed that current crises surrounding Protestant missions 
stemmed in part from the lack of planning behind missionary work according to these 
“strategic” priorities.  To a far greater degree, liberal-modernists, Roman Catholics, and 
even communists recognized these facts and had proven effective in disseminating their 
ideology and cultivating disciples. Where the evangelical had failed, according to 
Glasser, was that it had allowed “sentiments” to rule the disposition of its forces and 
thrown in its lot with the region’s most marginalized, and thus least influential, groups. 
As a result these rivals had outmaneuvered the evangelical missionary in the contest for 
the hearts and minds of Asia.532  
The response from U.S. supporters questioning the import of Glasser’s article 
prompted a reply that fall entitled “Strategic Centers” from Field Superintendent of 
Thailand John Kuhn and a short statement from Glasser clarifying the voice of his 
editorial. Backing away from the implications of his piece, he stated that his article did 
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not reflect the official views of either the ICVF or OMF, and instead Kuhn’s article was 
intended to reflect the mission’s outlook from “the vantage point of where he serves—on 
the front lines, in the thick of the battle in the Far East.”533 
 Kuhn’s reply reassured supporters that the OMF plan for evangelizing the New 
Fields was biblical and traditional based upon decades of experience in China, and yet 
sufficiently “strategic” and contemporary to face the challenges of the times. He further 
pointed to the society’s work amongst youth and urban populations in Kuala Lumpur, 
Bangkok, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Singapore, and Djarkarta. But he was 
adamant that “tribal” work was worth the time, energy, and focus of a missionary couple, 
perhaps even three or four individuals, even if the group numbered just a few thousand 
individuals. He implored readers, “for if the missionary does not take up this challenge, 
who will? Neighboring churches, not having the burden or vision, make it imperative that 
we accept the challenge.” Kuhn’s response then argued that the society had not neglected 
“strategic” types of evangelism or groups in the New Fields, while defending the idea 
that all souls were of equal importance even in the context of the Cold War.534 
However, after a decade of pioneering in the New Fields, Glasser’s “theses” and 
Kuhn’s response revealed deep-seated doubts within and outside the OMF in the efficacy 
of pioneer evangelism. By insinuating that the return to pioneer evangelism had been a 
“strategic” mistake, Glasser’s editorial contributed to fears that the OMF’s approach was 
increasingly outdated, haphazard, and lacking in the dynamism to compete with rivals 
like the communists. Undoubtedly, many supporters wondered how the most vocal and 
prominent face of the OMF in the U.S. could have ushered such a sweeping and negative 
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appraisal of his own society’s work, labeling many of the key features of the OMF’s 
pioneer work “low priority” in the grand scheme of Christianity’s spiritual struggle in 
Asia. Even as Kuhn and the OMF fought against such notions, evangelicals were 
increasingly anxious that the pioneering missionary was isolated from the societal groups 
likely to decide the post-colonial fate of the New Fields.  
The Racial Dilemma  
Another critical dilemma faced by the OMF in the mid-1950s was its position on 
Asian membership in the society. With few exceptions, the society refused to employ 
Asian Christians from the New Fields. The official position of the OMF was that Asian 
Christianswere the right and obligation of their respective national churches according to 
the principles of the three-selfs. The society defended the policy by citing the risk that 
employing “locals” in an age of decolonization risked the condemnation of such groups 
as the “running dogs” of western imperialism. Also of concern was that Asians would 
accuse the society of using its greater financial resources to pilfer leading evangelists and 
clergy away from the churches.535 However, Asian evangelicals increasingly challenged 
this policy and the society’s status as an “international mission.” 
The knowledge that Chinese-Americans and other Asians residing in countries 
like the U.S. were excluded from membership in the OMF contributed to these 
accusations. The OMF’s position on Asian-American membership in the Overseas 
Manual stated, “prejudice on the grounds of either racial or national differences must be 
regarded as sub-Christian and non-scriptural,” and pointed to “the fact that during the last 
few years of the Mission’s history in China (the society’s missionaries) worked not only 
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alongside Chinese brethren but also under their authority and direction was practical 
evidence that we entertained no thought of any intrinsic superiority of race over another.” 
However, though Chinese Americans were U.S. “nationals,” the society asserted “to 
receive nationals as missionaries or to send missionaries of the same race though born 
abroad, would be a policy difficult to reconcile with the accepted indigenous 
principles.”536 In essence, the society justified excluding Chinese Americans on the basis 
that the indigenous church’s sovereignty extended to racial brethren.   
In the eyes of the OMF, the Chinese-American’s racial identity trumped his or her 
national citizenship. The core of the OMF’s logic behind this position spoke to a belief 
that although at a political level groups like Chinese Americans were citizens of the U.S., 
culturally, spiritually, and racially they remained immigrants. Even more interesting was 
that the OMF’s position suggested that in the case of Asian evangelicals the priority of 
the indigenous church’s sovereignty over racial brethren took precedence over the 
individual’s choice to participate in the international community. That no such rules or 
principles governed the membership of white missionaries from a number of countries 
was further evidence of the position’s racism.  
In the mid-1950s, however, U.S. Home Staff workers faced questions from 
interested Chinese-Americans about applying to the mission. For many OMF 
representatives it was an awkward issue to confront, especially as delegates responded to 
inquiries of Chinese-Americans from traditional feeder institutions like Wheaton College 
and Faith Evangelical Seminary. That applicants with such backgrounds were denied 
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membership solely on the basis of race gave rise to vocal criticism of the society’s ideas 
about racial equality.  
Glasser, in particular, strained to explain the society’s position to audiences in the 
1950s. Faced with questions and applications from American-born Chinese, he could 
point to no biblical basis for denying “non-Caucasians” a place in the OMF. He wrote to 
the society’s Overseas Director, J. Oswald Sanders, “times are changing and the tides of 
feeling regarding Christian attitudes toward the racial problem are mounting rather than 
receding. I hate the idea of being backed into what can easily become an indefensible 
position.” He had just such an experience before a group of OMF supporters in Ontario. 
When asked if the OMF had ever employed Asian missionaries, Glasser awkwardly 
responded the society included Jewish, Eurasian, Italian, and American Indian members, 
but never an Asian missionary. Years later Glasser would again be mortified as his then 
colleague at the Fuller Seminary School of World Missions Professor Hoover Wong 
recognized him as the man who had denied his application to join the OMF in the 
1950s.537  
Increasingly, Glasser warned the Overseas Council that the OMF’s position on the 
“race problem” was behind the “times” and out of step with the other U.S. evangelical 
mission leaders. That same year at a Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies 
conference, Glasser watched Dr. Clyde Taylor lead a lengthy panel discussion of 
missionaries and American clergy on the same dilemma. Overwhelmingly, the group 
reached the consensus that any denial purely on the basis of race was unjust, and already 
organizations like the Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association were declaring 
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their societies open to and actively recruiting Chinese-Americans as missionaries in the 
U.S.538  
Acknowledging Glasser’s points, Sanders replied to the U.S. Home Staff that to 
admit Chinese and other Asians into the society would mean alterations to the society’s 
rules on interracial marriage. Sanders had strong reservations about such a change in 
policy, “It is not that we would consider them at all inferior to us but the tragic results of 
such unions is well known to us.” Cryptically, Sanders referred to the necessity of the 
OMF as an institution to discourage interracial relations and demonstrate to prospective 
candidates that such unions and their resulting “progeny” were “unwise.” But he also 
recognized that such issues of race were “more acute” in the U.S. than other home 
countries of the OMF. As a result, Sanders directed Glasser to investigate the policies of 
other missions for further review and debate by the Overseas Council. 539  
To Glasser’s annoyance, the society lost out on a valuable opportunity to recruit 
and train Chinese Americans in the U.S. Former missionaries Alfred and Helen Gould 
reached out to the U.S. Home Staff to find a mission that would allow Chinese-
Americans to serve as members. The Goulds were working with a Chinese Christian 
church in Detroit and traveled North America in the 1950s recruiting Chinese to serve as 
missionaries. As part of their outreach, the Goulds provided the OMF with a list of names 
and addresses of all foreign-born Chinese residing in North America and several surveys 
of Chinese American communities.540 
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Collaborating with the Goulds, the OMF urged Chinese in North America to take 
up the call as missionaries, but not as members of the OMF. From this information, the 
Home Staff prepared a massive registry and mailing list for the Christian Witness Press in 
Hong Kong who sent publications like The Life of Hudson Taylor to these Chinese 
individuals and families. In addition, OMF members used the lists as prayer materials, 
hoping to produce a movement of overseas Chinese trained in the west to flow back to 
Asia Pacific as missionaries. But the OMF officially declined working directly with the 
Goulds and Chinese American missionaries, instead, referring them to agencies such as 
the Latin American Mission.541  Ultimately, the society’s racist views still denied Asians 
the chance to partake in the OMF’s “international” community of evangelicals working in 
the Asia Pacific despite professing strong desires for Asians to heed the call to missionary 
service.  
 Glasser ultimately proved right in seeing the racial issue as only becoming more 
pressing in the U.S. as the OMF stalled and debated the question of Asian membership 
internally into the 1960s, a decade of intense political and cultural ferment surrounded 
issues of Civil Rights. By then the seminal contests of the Civil Rights movement were 
underway in the U.S. South, pushing the issue of racial integration to the forefront of 
American life. By 1965 the Immigration and Nationality Act would repeal the 
discriminatory quotas governing immigration policy since the 1920s that excluded Asians 
and Africans and provided pathways to citizenship for non-whites. Against mounting 
pressures across society for racial integration and inclusion, the OMF’s policies 
excluding Asians from membership smacked of a “separate but equal” outlook that many 
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such as Glasser pointed to as a critical factor retarding the society’s advance on both 
fronts of the spiritual battle. 
A New Instrument 
Confronted with revolutionary changes in nations in Asia and questions about 
racial discrimination in the U.S., the OMF returned to a church centric focus in the early 
1960s and gradually moved toward integration with Asian Christians at home and abroad.  
In 1962 following a tour of the fields by the Overseas Director, the Overseas Council 
announced a special report revaluating the mission’s priorities and tactics. The report 
concluded that redeployment had failed to develop and “strengthen” the churches and 
was revising the society’s plans for evangelism to once again be church-centric. 
Especially in urban areas, the OMF intended to use churches to launch mass evangelism 
campaigns and was investigating the successes of Latin American missions in utilizing 
such methods. To that end, the OMF announced that it would abandon some of the 
society’s original comity agreements that limited their cooperation with established 
churches and targeting of urban populations.542 
A top priority was to accelerate the OMF’s integration with Asian evangelical 
churches and organizations in the New Fields. Sanders wrote that the decisions had been 
motivated by the desire to make the mission “indistinguishable and inseparable” from 
churches of “like faith” and Asian evangelicals. Through integration and cooperation, the 
OMF hoped to inspire a missionary vision within the churches and among Christian 
youth in Asia. A church-centric approach meant that the OMF would devote more 
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resources to the priority of discipleship training by developing training programs for 
national workers as evangelists.543  
To do so required institutional expansion. In moving forward the OMF would 
cautiously go about constructing bible schools in various areas and accepting 
responsibility for the staff, premises, and employment of any “nationals” working for the 
institutions. In addition, the OMF revisited the idea of church unions or associations to 
promote expansion and training.544  
As a result, the church-centric approach to missions and emphasis on integration 
revealed growing recognition of the authority of Asian churches and their right to lead the 
region’s evangelization. OMF representatives spoke of “Helping Asians in the 
Missionary Task,” and promised U.S. evangelicals that Asian missionaries in the field, 
“may well prove to be the Judsons and Careys and Hudson Taylors of the future.”545 
Critical to the OMF’s relations with the U.S. then after 1963 was the promotion of the 
image of Asian “pioneers” as a popular symbol of the society’s new vision. OMF features 
highlighting the society’s efforts at discipleship training such as “Training Nationals” 
imparted the sense that the missionary’s primary role now was the mobilization of Asian 
evangelicals.546 
Gradual steps were taken toward racial integration on the home front the 
following year. In 1963 the OMF finally adopted a resolution to admit Asian Christians 
that were citizens of countries like the U.S. as members. Fears about interracial marriage 
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were resolved by limiting applicants to “acceptably married” couples. A further 
qualification of membership for Asian applicants was that they were “born citizens in our 
homelands, who are reared therein.”547 However, Asian-Americans that were single or 
born overseas were still excluded from membership.  The latter because they were 
considered the “right” of the churches in their home country, and the former to prevent 
the possibility of an interracial marriage among the OMF’s members.  
Glasser toured the U.S. South following the decision and found a mixed reaction 
among many evangelicals to the idea of full integration with “non-Caucasians.” He found 
churches in Alabama and Georgia had been for the most part positive and approving of 
the decision, but in Mississippi the society’s supporters were almost universally against 
the policy if it meant that the “Negro” would soon be among the OMF missionaries. 
While personally professing to despise racial discrimination, Glasser’s perspective on 
integration was also influenced by the interventions of the Kennedy Administration on 
behalf of African Americans in the South to fight segregation. The subsequent anger of 
Southerners riled by the presence of, in Glasser’s words, “northern extremists” showed 
that rapid integration was “unwise.” In light of these events he found the OMF’s first 
modest step, opening the society to “acceptably married” Asian Christians, prudent by 
comparison.548 
Despite’s Glasser’s approval of the “prudence” of gradual integration in countries 
like the U.S., the matter soon turned to the continued exclusion of Asian Christians in the 
New Fields. By November of 1964, the Overseas Council announced a plan to transform 
the OMF into a “new type of instrument” by pursuing integration with Christians in Asia. 
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Motivated by the various dilemmas facing the missionary movement and the “tide of 
missionary concern beginning to surge throughout the churches of East Asia,” OMF 
senior leadership had resolved, “Why not cease to be a western mission to the East and 
become a fellowship of men and women of like faith from East to West for any and every 
land throughout East Asia?” In allowing Asian Christians to join the society’s ranks, the 
OMF promised, “the New OMF is neither Western nor Asian.” That Asian applicants, 
from the New Fields or home countries, were also not limited to married couples proved 
it was no longer acceptable for the OMF to officially prohibit interracial marriages, even 
if it continued to discourage such relationships as “unwise.”549 
Another step in the direction of opening the OMF to Asian Christians was 
completed when in 1965 the North American Council added its first two Chinese 
members, Rev. Theodore Choy and Rev. Moses Chow. Both men had been born in China 
before moving to the U.S. and were founders of Ambassadors For Christ, Inc., an ally of 
the U.S. Home Staff. As representatives of the Chinese Christian community inside and 
outside the U.S., Choy and Chow reassured OMF supporters that these changes would 
enhance the influence of the society in the New Fields. Choy stated that the “no 
admittance sign on doors to Asians” had been an “embarrassment” and the new policies 
would “ease tensions, real or imagined” between westerners and Asians. Chow admitted 
that while undoubtedly the society would struggle with “harmonizing” westerners and 
Asians into a single organization, he declared the decisions a means for the OMF to 
overcome nationalist sentiments in Asia, “In a period when nationalism is so strong, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549 The New Instrument,” East Asia Millions, December 1964. 
	   282	  
move in the free air above it in practice as well as in theory is labeled radical.”550 As 
representatives of the Asian evangelicals, Choy and Chow reassured OMF supporters that 
integration would “free” the missionary from the accusations of racism impeding their 
progress. 
Concerns about the effect of the decision on the OMF surfaced from U.S. 
evangelicals almost immediately. Inquiries about the decision asked whether or not such 
a move to transform the mission was “too late” to have any effect on perceptions of the 
society and missionary in the New Fields. Others questioned whether or not employing 
Asian missionaries would stifle the “emerging, infant Asian missions” and churches. 
Many were concerned with the society’s revised stance on the “interracial problem.”551 
Some evangelicals held to the mission’s previous statements that interracial relationships 
were bound to cause controversy and lead to problems, while others were confused as to 
why single Asian candidates had ever previously been denied since scripture did not 
justify such a position.552 While OMF writers proclaimed their confidence in the decision, 
missionaries such as Alfred Broomhall’s framed these changes as unavoidable, stating 
flatly that the society “had to break bounds or perish.” In essence, the OMF declared it 
had no choice but to embrace racial equality to the fullest, or else risk becoming 
irrelevant as a missionary force. 
To achieve integration in the Asia Pacific, the OMF established advisory councils. 
Similar in purpose and scope to the home councils and staffs in countries like the U.S., by 
the spring of 1967 councils were in place in Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Hong Kong. Plans were in motion to form one next in Taiwan. These areas were chosen 
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because they represented the “leading lights” of Asia and areas where the society 
invested its greatest hopes to generate a surge in Asian missionary outreach. Soon the 
advisory councils were establishing prayer “cells,” the equivalent of the circles in the 
U.S., and engaging in deputation work, still believed by the OMF to be the “backbone of 
any promotional outreach,” to Asian churches and Christian societies. To aid the advisory 
councils, the OMF began distributing prayer calendars and other devotional materials for 
the society’s supporters in these countries.553  
Thus, the OMF set about expanding its institutional networks in the New Fields 
and changing the structure of its relationship with many of these countries to be similar to 
that of the other home countries in the west. In turn, institutional expansion improved the 
society’s ability to advance the missionary vision and ethos of evangelism amongst Asian 
churches and Christians. Via the advisory councils, the OMF deployed promotional 
methods popular and traditional in western countries. For instance, in Singapore the OMF 
sent representatives to the city’s first missionary exhibition attended by groups like the 
Sudan Interior Mission and Far East Broadcasting Company.554 Such conventions had 
become a popular tool for propagating missionary work in the nineteenth century in Great 
Britain and the U.S. With displays and entertainment featuring the peoples and customs 
of Asia, the missionary exhibition was a key instrument for filling the imperialist 
imaginary of Protestant Christians. 555 That such mediums were intended to recruit Asian 
missionaries suggests the OMF’s growing desire to integrate these groups into its vision 
of expansionist global Christianity. 
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Transforming the OMF into a truly international force, however, required the 
mission focus on recruiting allies and interested collaborators to join the ranks of the 
mission. The composition of the councils mixed western personnel and local Asian 
representatives, with the intention that each council would form a “wholly national 
council” with a Home Director appointed from each country. To cultivate Asian 
members, representatives of the Home Councils such as Howard Knight, the Home 
Director for the Australian Council, toured Asia meeting with Christian clergy, 
theologians, and evangelists. Also, circulating the New Fields were a series of pamphlets 
such as “What is the OMF?” and “Faith in Finance,” and copies of East Asia’s Millions 
in a variety of languages sent to thousands of churches, seminaries, and Christian 
organizations. In addition, OMF agents toured the New Fields showing two of the 
societies recent films, One Thousand Tongues and Millions of Messengers, to English and 
Chinese-speaking audiences.556 
Racial integration and a church-centric approach heightened the value of 
literature, too. Its efficacy in advancing evangelism increased in the eyes of evangelicals 
and OMF missionaries in the 1960s. Indeed, by 1963 the OMF boasted that “All Asia is 
Reading,” and the idea of reaching the educated masses tantalized the international 
evangelical community.557Proponents advocated that as literacy rates rose in Asia the 
gospel tract or pamphlet replaced the missionary as the first point of contact between the 
“unevangelized” and the Gospel.558  
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The society’s means of distribution and marketing varied in each country, but 
were increasingly sophisticated and business-like. In Japan and the Philippines the OMF 
developed “strategic placed” chains of Christian bookstores in major cities such as 
Manila and Tokyo and a few smaller cities, and used vans as “mobile bookstores” to 
conduct evangelistic “raids” on towns and rural areas. In Malaysia, the OMF distributed 
literature through an Evangelical Book Center in Kuala Lumpur and missionaries held 
book fairs on major universities and campuses. But in Laos, lower literacy levels among 
the general population and political stability discouraged the bookstore model, and like in 
Thailand OMF agents favored personally taking tracts with them door to door.559 OMF 
missionaries also maximized their time on trains, buses, steamers, and visits to markets 
by carrying tracts in a variety of languages with them, becoming their own colporteurs in 
contrast with the practices of the mission’s past in China. 
Literature, too, was reconfigured to advance discipleship training, and beginning 
in the early 1960s the OMF’s literature program focused on the “nationalization” of 
literature. To encourage the “nationalization” of literature in various countries the OMF 
launched programs to train Asians in writing evangelistic pamphlets, tracts, posters, and 
other literature. By the late 1960s the OMF had also developed programs designed to 
promote “Christian journalism” among Asians.560 In order to advance the three-selfs of 
the Asian Christian’s right to self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation, the 
Christian Witness Press abandoned the “primitive idea of free or mostly free,” 
publications so that indigenous churches could adopt the program’s organizational model 
as a revenue maker, not another financial burden for churches to carry. Additionally, the 
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OMF initiated training programs for Asian Christians on how to manage bookstores, 
printing presses, and distribution networks.  
In terms of staffing, integration was most successful within the field of literature. 
While the OMF only sent a handful of Asian missionaries to the field in the 1960s, 
already by 1962 over half of the CWP’s staff in Hong Kong was comprised of Christians 
from Asia. Also, the society began incorporating local Christians in Tokyo, Jakarta, 
Manila, and Hong Kong into the OMF operations, and gradually transferred 
responsibility over various tasks to these groups.561  
Besides “strengthening” the Asian churches of the New Fields, the nationalization 
of literature reflected beliefs that publications crafted by Asian Christians would be more 
favorably received than tracts written by western missionaries. Literature became another 
marker indicative of the “maturity” and sincerity of faith of Asian Christians. However, 
the OMF suggested that the development of literature for Asian evangelicals suffered 
from a paucity of qualified and talented Asian Christian writers.  
Justifications for integration stressed the vitality Asian membership would bring 
to the missionary movement. As a “new instrument” the OMF claimed this 
transformation would allow for the “speediest possible evangelization of East Asia,” by 
making the OMF into a “catalyst” combining “the growing vigor within the churches of 
East Asia and the untapped missionary potential of the churches in the West.” The OMF 
championed a vision of Asian and western Christian cooperation and complete 
integration as essential to Christianity’s progress. For example in December 1965 the 
society rejoiced in the visualization of “Occident and Orient, arm in arm, united in Christ 
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in the all-absorbing task of evangelizing, discipling, and gathering into congregations the 
redeemed of East Asia.”562  
Faced with these dilemmas and difficult circumstances dogging the evangelical 
missionary, the OMF hoped that through unifying with Asian Christians the society could 
leave behind its “western” identity and regain the vitality and dynamism the society 
feared the missionary movement had lost. In promoting the society’s restructuring, the 
OMF offered the “rocketship” as the symbol of this era in Protestant missions. In a series 
of articles in the pages of East Asia Millions in May 1967, OMF members described the 
missionary force as a “three-stage” rocket, wherein the missionary movement evolved in 
stages from that of the white pioneer to the national, indigenous church before finally 
transforming into an international body of Christians working together to spread the 
gospel.563 As a symbol, the rocket spoke to the OMF’s desire to convey that through 
unifying with Asian Christians and churches, the missionary movement would regain its 
lost dynamism and escape its association with imperialism and racial discrimination. 
In cooperating with churches and taking roles in administration that looked like 
that of Donald Cook’s in Japan, however, the OMF fought against the sense that the 
western missionary would sacrifice his or her sense of adventurism, independence, and 
freedom. Several OMF missionaries such as Raymond and Helen Nowack Frame, 
working among urban populations in Manila, acknowledged that at their posts they were 
“living very ordinary lives” enjoying all the creature comforts of modern cities back 
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home. They too at times missed the “excitement” of their days as pioneers.564 Inside the 
U.S. the OMF Home Council struggled to promote these new roles as many American 
evangelicals still longed to serve as pioneers. But OMF agents like Arthur Matthews 
chided that in such an age it was “selfish to look for a field without national leaders” so 
that the missionary could work “according to his own ideas and without interference.” 
Instead, the missionary should long to serve with existing churches, directing their 
outreach toward the “unreached,” and thereby reap greater “harvests” and wield more 
extensive influence.565 Ideas from the 1940s about trading in the pioneer’s independence 
and freedom to roam for greater social mobility and access to elites were revived.   
Via mobilizing and training Asian Christians for evangelism, the OMF gave U.S. 
evangelicals and its supporters a sense that nationalism in Asia could be harnessed to 
favor evangelism. For example, in the Missionary of Tomorrow the OMF claimed… 
Evangelism ought to be the passion of every Christian whether in the church at 
home or out in South East Asia and Japan. The missionary of today has the unique 
privilege and opportunity of helping to channel the nationalistic enthusiasm of the 
young people of South East Asia into the right channels; that of extending the 
kingdom of Christ.566 
In sum, the OMF hoped that by recognizing the sovereignty of the churches and 
embracing racial equality, nationalistic energies could be redirected to advance 
Christianity.  
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As a result, discipleship training and student evangelism returned to greater 
prominence within the OMF. While elevating the status of the Asian churches and 
evangelicals in the eyes of U.S. evangelicals, the OMF’s rebalancing and reform 
emphasized the western missionary’s role in mobilizing Asian Christians. The OMF 
advertised that through integration with Asian churches they sought to use “the 
mobilization of the Church for the evangelization of the world in this generation.”567 
Alongside this announcement in East Asia’s Millions were features on Asian missionaries 
already working for the OMF such as “In Singapore a Chinese Reaching Chinese” and 
“Indonesians Writing for Indonesians.”568  
This was particularly true of students. In the 1960s OMF missionaries pointed to 
several indicators that the region was on the cusp of a great surge in evangelism led by 
Asian Christians. Features in East Asia’s Millions advertised, “Asia is crammed with 
students.”569 In this respect, familiar voices like those of Paul Contento and David 
Adeney emphasized a greater devotion to discipleship training and student evangelism as 
keys to the future for missions in the region. Contento claimed that Singapore possessed 
the “finest and strongest national Christian leadership in all Asia,” and student 
evangelism had begun benefiting from the Asian students’ increasing willingness to serve 
as missionaries for the rest of Southeast Asia. He warned, however, that just as in China, 
the evangelical movement’s lack of witness to students on campuses like Nanyang 
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University risked allowing these places to become hot-beds of liberal-modernism and 
communism.570  
Adeney reinforced Contento’s claim that Christians in Asia were progressively 
becoming missionary-minded, but he also suggested the need to win the loyalty of youth. 
This generation was particularly important, too, since he asserted that students were the 
“most sensitive” to the revolutionary ferment of the times and would lead their societies 
in the future. Partnered with the International Fellowship of Evangelical Students, 
Adeney promised that student evangelism from the start turned youth into “the 
missionaries on campus” and they were “already playing a role in political 
developments.”571 Rerouting the missionary toward the college campus and classroom, 
Adeney and Contento believed that student evangelism offered the opportunity to capture 
the future of nations in Asia. 
In disseminating these images, the OMF also increasingly focused on Asia’s 
modernity. U.S. evangelicals were inundated with reports on the region’s increasing 
technological sophistication, industrialization, and modernity. OMF missionaries even 
railed against depictions of the New Fields as “ancient” in airline advertisements, writing 
“pagodas, lumbering oxcarts, and broad-brimmed junks with patchwork sails are merely 
incidentals in East Asia today. From Japan to Indonesia is booming.” While such imagery 
and references had not entirely disappeared from OMF publications and media, when 
speaking of the society’s Asian allies and members, the society made sure to highlight 
their modern and increasingly mobile traits.572 
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 As a result, the importance of certain nations and groups in the New Fields grew 
based upon their perceived potential for leading the region’s evangelization. For example, 
in April 1966 East Asia Millions featured an article entitled “The Philippines: Key to 
Asia,” proclaimed “the strategic position of the Philippines has not changed in four 
hundred years. Today it stands as a springboard into Asia for the Catholic, Protestant, and 
Politician.”573 Such sentiments mirrored the outlook of U.S. imperialists following the 
Spanish-American War in seeing the Philippines as a key strategic foothold for the 
penetration of Asia. 574 
But it was not just geography that made the Philippines valuable in the eyes of the 
OMF. Among the conditions OMF missionaries listed as benefitting the evangelical 
missionary’s evangelism as that the Philippines was called the “oldest and most stable 
democracy” in the region, with “complete religious freedom” for missionary and Filipino 
Christians alike. Additional factors favoring the Philippines as a “springboard” for the 
evangelization of Asia was that, according to the OMF, Manila was home to the largest 
student population in all of Asia and a Christian community of over 3 million, and a 
number of fine bible schools nationwide.575 The OMF looked to societies that were seen 
as “stable” and “modern,” in the sense that they were increasingly urban and developed, 
with relatively large Christian and student populations, as ripe with potential for building 
an evangelical Asian missionary force. The “openness” of these societies to Protestant 
missions and the West in general was an important condition as well.  
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Ultimately, integration and the church-centric approach in the 1960s was directed 
according to a hierarchy of groups seen as exhibiting great potential to lead Asia’s 
evangelism. The OMF referred to nations like the Philippines, Japan, Singapore, and 
Malaysia as the “leading lights” of Asia, and cited their large urban centers and growing 
student populations as proof of their “untapped potential” for sending missionaries and 
evangelists. Another factor favoring the OMF’s investment in these nations as allies was 
that each was seemingly more “open” to the west. To a lesser extent, Taiwan was 
included on this list since it possessed many of the same criteria the OMF valued, but the 
society saw many of the established churches as dominated by liberal-modernism. Thus, 
the missionary’s mobility marked various Asian classes, demographic groups, and 
nationalities into distinct categories: those who were rising equals and sought after allies 
and those that were still largely associated with “darkness” or “heathenism.” 
Overseas Chinese scattered across the Asia Pacific and the Atlantic were perhaps 
the most important group singled out by the OMF as key to the region’s future 
evangelization. In many of the New Fields, the OMF identified overseas Chinese as 
having great wealth and societal influence that could potentially be leveraged to advance 
Christianity. For instance, the OMF referred to Chinese groups in the Philippines as 
having “influence” that was “vastly out of proportion to its numerical strength,” along 
with great wealth and intelligence.576 Even in countries like Indonesia where the 
government treated the minority Chinese population with suspicion and occasionally 
violence and harassment in the 1950s and 1960s, the OMF saw great opportunities for 
evangelism. The OMF especially valued the transnational networks of culture and 
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commerce maintained by overseas Chinese in Indonesia across the country and 
connecting them to the rest of the diaspora as critical channels for the gospel to someday 
travel.577 
Beyond prayer, the OMF engaged in various types of outreach in the U.S. to 
encourage the missionary impulse among Asian groups. The OMF also lobbied U.S. 
evangelicals to evangelize as “colporteurs” in America, too. Advertisements for Dengta 
cajoled that readers “probably know of a Chinese student, professional man or woman, a 
neighbor or a laundryman” to whom they could gift a copy of the magazine or a year’s 
subscription for $1.50.578 By the mid-1960s, U.S. Home Staff frequently worked with 
organizations such as Ambassadors for Christ, Inc. to sponsor retreats and conferences 
for Chinese and Chinese-American students in the U.S. and Canada to encourage 
Christian service and recruit missionary candidates. At other times OMF representatives 
allied with the ICVF to hold rallies in Chicago among Chinese Christians, foreign born 
and citizens, to raise donations and prayer support for Christian youth organizations in 
Saigon, one of a select few cities in Asia where OMF missionaries like the Contentos 
concentrated on fomenting a student evangelical movement.579 In doing so, deputation 
speakers and OMF writers promoted the idea that overseas Chinese Christians had an 
obligation to their national and racial brethren living in the PRC to use their greater 
religious freedom and rights in the west as evangelists and missionaries.  
In many ways the lines between the roles and tasks of the OMF missionaries in 
the Asia Pacific and that of the society’s representatives in Atlantic World were 
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increasingly blurred in the 1960s. In both arenas, the OMF hoped its agents would inspire 
Asian Christians to feel the missionary call. And in reaching out to Asians to join the 
OMF and take up the missionary call, the society and its supporters invested their hopes 
that via equality, racial integration, and cooperation the missionary movement would 
regain its momentum. 
White Elephants  
As the OMF pursued integration, the society simultaneously fought against the 
notion that the white western missionary no longer had a role to play in the Asia Pacific 
region.  Against the backdrop of the global political and social revolutions taking place in 
the 1950s and 1960s, whether or not the “age of the missionary” had passed was a 
question posed in ever-greater frequency in both secular and Christian circles. More and 
more U.S. evangelicals feared that in going abroad, the white western missionary did 
more harm than good to both the cause of Christianity and relations between East and 
West.  
  Part of the controversy surrounding Protestant missions stemmed from critics 
labeling the missionary a conduit for exploitation.  Inside the U.S., an increasing number 
of voices, religious and secular, insisted that at its core the Protestant missionary 
endeavor was inherently imperialistic and racist. Within the U.S. academic community by 
the late 1960s, the missionary was fast becoming the dominant symbol of American 
imperialism. In his address to the American Historical Society in 1969 John King 
Fairbank, America’s foremost historian on China, pointed to the missionary as “the 
invisible man in American history,” and called on his colleagues to explore how the 
missionary had shaped the misguided foreign policy of the U.S. in East Asia that led to 
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the quagmire in Vietnam.580 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. later wrote of the missionary as the 
vanguard of U.S. cultural imperialism by building on the works of Frantz Fannon and 
Albert Memmi.581 Indeed, by the late 1970s and 1980s the missionary’s significant role in 
cultural imperialism was a dominant paradigm in the disciplines of history and 
anthropology.  
Meanwhile popular Christian authors warned Protestants that the missionary 
movement was alienating the non-western world from the West. Ralph E. Dodge’s The 
Unpopular Missionary and James A. Scherer’s Missionary, Go Home argued that the 
missionary movement’s past was defined by the perpetuation of colonialism and 
racism.582 These accusations gave greater credibility to voices suggesting that the full 
rights and sovereignty of the national churches in Asia meant that only “nationals” or 
racial brethren should propagate the faith. This notion also benefitted from Protestant 
spokesman proclaiming the “strength” and “maturity” of the national churches of various 
Asian countries and their enthusiasm for evangelism.  
Outside of this argument based on rights, there were many Christians who 
believed it simply more practical to leave the brunt of the region’s evangelism to Asian 
missionaries and evangelists, the assumption was for many U.S. evangelicals that the 
Asian missionary’s race and national identity were less likely to inflame and agitate other 
Asians than a white, western missionary. Or, based upon their “innate” understanding of 
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culture, language, or the mentality of their brethren, they were more effective than the 
white, western missionary. By the mid-1960s several organizations such as Ambassadors 
for Christ, Inc. comprised primarily of Asian Christians had been formed in the U.S. 
Leading some Protestants to argue that because of racial tensions and anti-imperialist 
politics, Asian missionaries were better suited for the challenges of the field than the 
white western missionary. 
Elements within Protestant Christianity responded to these issued by 
contemplating alternatives to the traditional structure of missions. Within the liberal-
modernist circles of Protestantism, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and 
proponents of the ecumenical movement explored and debated spiritual relations between 
societies without the missionary at the center of exchange. Another alternative preferred 
by some was for Protestant missions to focus on the large foreign student population from 
Asian and African countries in the U.S. Proponents of this concept of missions pointed to 
the more favorable political conditions and rights favoring open evangelism and witness 
for the missionary.583  
Other supporters of Protestant missions proposed that only missionaries 
possessing special training or professional skills should be sent abroad. Three critical 
factors favored a trend within the world of Protestant missions toward sending 
“specialists.” The first was that many critics accused Protestant missions of sending 
individuals with “mediocre” skills and intellectual abilities to the foreign field, which 
many assumed was a hindrance to foreign relations and the image of the missionary 
abroad. A second factor was that some nations such as Indonesia denied entrance to 
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missionaries without advanced education and the professional skills that were desired for 
development or state-building.584 
 The other factor was that during the Cold War the skill set of the typical 
Protestant missionary was becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. Almost all 
missionary societies introduced requirements for training in cultural sensitivity, advanced 
linguistic study, and ideological combat with communism. In addition, missionaries with 
advanced degrees and backgrounds in specialized areas such as communications, 
anthropology, medicine, and a number of other areas were increasingly the standard that 
many societies strove for in their candidates. The increasing rigors of the missionary’s 
training and skill set spoke to both a desire to be more effective as an agent of 
Christianity, but also the belief that through the right education and training one could 
transcend racist or imperialist attitudes. 
 The sum of these debates and trends within the missionary movement led the 
OMF to believe it was embroiled in a fight to keep alive the missionary impulse among 
white U.S. evangelicals in the late 1960s. For example, in the late summer of 1968 the 
OMF compared the controversy surrounding the missionary to the American War in 
Vietnam in an editorial titled “You’re Not Burning a Draft Card—Are You?” The article 
described the waning of the missionary impulse among U.S. evangelicals as the result of 
a two-front war against Protestant missions that paralleled the U.S. military’s conflict 
with the Vietcong and with politicians and dissenters among American youth. Both the 
OMF and American military forces were facing “an undermined home front and a limited 
war overseas.” The author equated the reluctance of evangelical youth to commit to 
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missionary service overseas with committing the spiritual equivalent of dodging the draft 
and burning registration cards, leaving the fighting along the front lines in the spiritual 
war in the New Fields to Asian Christians.585 
 Indeed, in the 1960s U.S. Home Staff workers and missionaries on furlough were 
asked to provide commentary on the Vietnam War. Especially among youth and college 
students, deputation speakers found their audiences wanted to know whether or not the 
OMF favored the U.S. military intervention. In one such instance at Wellesley College in 
Boston, Glasser tried to explain to students that because of his experiences in China he 
knew “what communists are like” and favored containment. But he also recognized that 
by and large he was forced onto the defensive to justify both the U.S and missionary’s 
role abroad with the evidence growing that their presence was not desired by many 
Asians.586   
 In another article, the OMF fought against the idea of the white missionary as 
more of a burden to Christianity’s expanse in Pacific Asia than a catalyst behind its 
advance. The January 1968 edition of East Asia’s Millions featured an illustration of a 
white, evangelical college student reading a copy of James A. Scherer’s Missionary, Go 
Home in his dorm room in Urbana, Illinois, captioned “Me? A White Elephant?” next to 
an article by Michael Griffiths entitled “Foreign Missionary This Century’s White 
Elephants.”587 Increasingly, the OMF was combating ideas that due to the Cold War and 
decolonization, missionaries should be limited to evangelizing within their own national 
borders or amongst their own racial and national brethren. At the very least, critics felt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585“You’re Not Burning a Draft Card—Are You?” East Asia Millions, August/September 1968. 
586 Interview of Arthur Glasser by Bob Schuster, April 17, 1995. Collection 421, T5 from 
587Michael C. Griffiths, “Foreign Missionary This Century’s White Elephants,” East Asia Millions, January 
1968.  
 
	   299	  
the white western missionary going abroad should possess an exceptional academic and 
professional background and not merely be profoundly devout and pious in faith.  
 Against these notions the OMF upheld the ideology of a missionary mobility 
unbounded by national borders or race, and insisted upon the rights of Christians to 
evangelize as a human right. Integration by ending the exclusion of Asian evangelicals 
from the missionary movement delinked ideas about freedom of expression and freedom 
embedded within missionary mobility from its association with whiteness. Spokesman 
for the OMF now championed these as the rights of all individuals, regardless of race or 
nationality. For example, Griffiths insisted “the church of Christ is people of different 
background, education, and nationality manifesting the harmony of Christ in a divided 
world.”588 Embedded within the OMF’s position then was the idea that the act of going 
abroad proved Christianity’s universality and openness to all races and nations. Further, 
implicit in this ideology of mobility was the OMF’s hope that in crossing borders, issues 
of race and nationality could be transcended. Conversely, the OMF also insisted that 
white evangelicals still retained the right to evangelize throughout the world as a human 
right that trumped the national and local sovereignty of Asians.  
 Part of the contest fought by the OMF concerning these issues was the call for 
more rigorous standards among missionary candidates. The movement toward recruiting 
missionaries with “special” qualifications was noticeable within the OMF as well in the 
1950s and 1960s. In addition to education at seminaries or bible institutes, and experience 
as an evangelist or pastor, the OMF sought candidates with degrees or studies in fields 
such as journalism, sociology, and anthropology. Missionaries on furlough were expected 
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to take college courses or pursue advanced degrees in areas such as religious studies. 
Candidates familiar with communist theory and the works Karl Marx, Vladmir Lenin, 
Mao Zedong, and Christian refutations of their writings were valued as well. 
 Consequently, OMF members were also advised to adopt a scholarly and 
academic approach to their work. For example, members interested in taking courses in 
linguistics were advised before returning home, “bring as much live data as possible from 
the field in the form of tape recordings, records, word lists, and rough drafts of 
translations” and then seek out the “secular linguists of our secular universities who are 
hungry for such data” for help.589 The logistical issues of missionary work in the New 
Fields required candidates with business experience and administrative duties like the 
aforementioned Donald Cook. This partly reflected the new media of work in print and 
media that required technological expertise and business savvy. 
In part, the OMF’s rising standards for missionary candidates acknowledged a 
waning belief in the white western missionary’s innate racial and cultural superiority to 
Asians. In 1962, J. Morris Rockness, the Associate Home Director for the U.S, wrote that 
in the past most believed “a homeland ministry preparation should be much more 
thorough than for service abroad.” This was because, “It was assumed that the peoples of 
the mission fields were less civilized, less sophisticated and therefore could be won to 
Christianity by those of lesser qualifications,” but in light of the political and social 
transformations around the world such ideas were no longer credible.590 As a result, he 
demanded that the “missionary of today be a skilled workman,” with training in 
medicine, theology, linguistics, journalism, and even electronics. In addition, increasing 
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opportunities for working with existing Christian institutions such as Christian 
seminaries, hospitals, and universities necessitated that the OMF find missionaries with 
advanced degrees and professional backgrounds.591 
But the society also insisted on the primacy of spiritual qualifications, and that 
missionaries without special skills or training could be among the most effective and 
powerful agents. “Spiritual maturity” and “temperament” were of the utmost importance, 
and Rockness argued that while the OMF increasingly sought candidates with some 
college education “many of our most effective missionaries are unlettered. But they are 
Spirit taught and are men and women of spiritual sagacity and of true intellectual 
sagacity.”592 Thus, the OMF held that spirituality, not intellectual qualifications or 
professional experience, still defined the most effective missionaries, and by extension 
their ability to transcend issues of race and nationality.  
Another qualification to the OMF’s trend toward setting higher standards for 
missionaries was that for the most part the work of the missionary “specialist” was 
associated with specific groups in Asia, such as students. For example, Paul Contento 
stated that since the society’s beginnings in student evangelism in China the OMF had 
recognized “work with students naturally required new methods of approach, new 
techniques, and above all new mental adjustment, for now the missionary was dealing 
with people of mental stature equal to himself—perhaps sometimes his intellectual 
superior.” Lea had expressed similar ideas in his prediction about the “Missionary of 
Tomorrow.” In explaining the need to work with the Asian missionary, Lea reflected that 
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“the crown is on the other head today and many a brilliant honors-student of some eastern 
country talks of things which many a western missionary knows little or nothing.”593 
However, such qualifications had not been necessary, according to Contento, for 
the missionary when dealing with “illiterate villagers,” common to the society’s work in 
pioneering or church planting in rural areas. 594 Thus, the OMF did not see it necessary to 
have such credentials to engage in other forms of missionary service such as church 
planting or pioneer evangelism. While the OMF no longer thought the average 
missionary inherently superior to elite Asians, they were perhaps still sufficiently 
prepared to reach the various groups still identified as “primitive” or “heathens” by the 
society. 
The society also resisted the impression that academic training and learning were 
more important to cultural understanding and equality than direct contact and experience 
with Asians. The Overseas Manual advised missionaries to “avoid a critical spirit, 
impatience or cynicism,” and instead cultivate a  “sympathetic understanding” by 
adopting many of the customs of locals as well as their lifestyles. The other key 
ingredient was spending much of their time conversing and engaging with “the people.” 
In doing these things, the missionary would “soon appreciate that the oriental mind has a 
different background than his own,” and “learn to see things from the oriental point of 
view.”595 Even as training materials and practices became more academic and 
sophisticated, the society still insisted that personal contact revealed fundamental truths 
about “Orientals” that could not be learned except through contact and fellowship. In 
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essence, “true” cultural understanding and fellowship required human interaction. 
Experience, not intellectual ability or training, mattered most.   
And while technological media like the radio and television were increasingly 
important, the OMF still maintained that the most powerful medium for Christianity’s 
expansion and relations with foreign societies was the missionary’s person. In 1963 the 
society allied with over forty different mission societies for a conference of the 
Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association in Winona Lake, Indiana, to testify 
that, “modern missionary methods can support but never supplant the missionary 
himself.” The conference concluded that while academic training and technical skills 
were important, the greatest needs were spiritual training and ministry.596 Again, in 1966, 
the OMF allied with hundreds of other evangelical agencies gathered at Wheaton College 
to draft a declaration that extolled the virtues of specialized ministry and technological 
media like the radio or television in advancing evangelism, but insisted that Christian 
missions should resist “over-dependence” on mass media at the expense of personal 
witness. Further, the document reaffirmed that the “primary method” for evangelism and 
“strengthening” existing churches remained the “ministry of spirit-gifted and empowered 
men and women preaching and teaching the Word of God.”597 Against the voices 
suggesting the substitution of technological media for that of the person of the 
missionary, the OMF joined forces with many other evangelical agencies to insist upon 
human contact as the critical core of the Protestant missionary endeavor. 
In essence, in the late 1960s, the OMF defended the ability of the white western 
missionary, specialist and non-specialist alike, to go abroad and evangelize as a universal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 “Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association,” East Asia Millions, August/September 1963. 
597 “The Wheaton Declaration,” Eat Asia Millions, June 1966. 
	   304	  
human right and symbol of international equality and fellowship. In doing so, the society 
resisted the increasingly elitist perspective that only individuals with advanced academic 
degrees and highly specialized skills were fit to engage foreign cultures, or that only such 
qualifications made it possible to engage Asians without perpetuating racism or 
imperialism. Embodying these ideas, the OMF rallied evangelicals to reassert that 
person-to-person contact remained the most dynamic force driving Christianity’s global 
expansion.  
In defending these ideas, the society’s publications featured the voices of Asian 
Christians as rebuttals to the critics of the white western missionary. For instance, The 
Millions featured the reply of Bishop Rajah Manikam of the Tamil Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in South India to the question of the passing of the missionary era. According to 
Manikam,  
The important question is not whether or missionaries are required in the East 
today. The day is practically gone for the missionary of a previous generation or 
two who was a superintendent, a director, or a boss. The day has now dawned for 
the missionary who is the friend, philosopher, and guide of a young church, who 
is willing to get behind the cart and push it along rather than pull it from the 
front.598  
In Manikam, the OMF found an ally proclaiming that what mattered most was the 
spiritual qualifications of the missionary and their intent and attitude. 
As evidence of Asian desire for the white missionary as a partner, the society 
marshaled invitations from Asian evangelical colleges, seminaries, churches, and clergy 
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as evidence of the relevance of the white missionary and trotted out the familiar rhetoric 
of “open doors.”  For example, the OMF highlighted invitations from institutions like 
Indonesia’s Christian University of Sataliga as evidence that there were no indications of 
a “Missionary, Go Home” attitude amongst the nation’s Christian populace.599 
The OMF’s new Asian members played a pivotal role in defending and inviting 
the white western missionary to work in Asia. Members such as Chua Wee Hian, member 
of the Fellowship of Evangelical Students and member of the OMF’s advisory council for 
Singapore and Malaysia, criticized the history of Protestant missions for a list of sins 
including dominance of the churches, but he also insisted that western missionaries were 
needed in Asia since “missions todays must have an international membership to be 
effective.”600 Leona Choy, missionary and wife of Ted Choy the Co-Director of 
Ambassadors for Christ and an OMF Council Member in the U.S., reiterated the call for 
white evangelicals to join Asian missionaries in her article for East Asia Millions in 1967 
stating, “No it is not taps for western missionaries. It is reveille—time to wake up and get 
involved in this exciting new revolution in spreading the Gospel to every corner of the 
earth.”601 Essentially, Asian evangelicals functioned as representative voices of their 
nations and races, and, in doing so, gave their approval to the prerogative of the white, 
western missionary to evangelize beyond his or her own national borders and race. 
However, OMF agents regularly contrasted the vitality of these “new” nations and 
mobilized Asian groups with the lack of such energy among churches and Christians in 
the New Fields. Another OMF missionary, Elaine Woods, wrote of “Japan’s New Mood” 
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in the late 1960s as characterized by highways, skyscrapers, and even computerized 
trains, “the computer-run 130-mile-an-hour trains, passing a given point every fifteen 
minutes in each direction, are symbolic, not only of a few progressive scientists, but of 
the spirit of all Japan.” This “mood” was evident everywhere Woods went except for the 
Japanese churches, “Although growing the church is small and weak… it gives little 
evidence of confidence in the power of Christ to revive or add to its numbers.”602The 
ambivalence of the OMF, stating its support for Asian churches and simultaneous 
criticism of their “weakness,” fueled concerns about leaving the project of evangelism 
entirely to Asian missionaries.  
In justifying the continued role of the western missionary in the New Fields, the 
OMF also continued to propagate a number of prejudicial fears about Asian Christians. In 
contrast to observations of the rising strength and vigor of Christianity in Asia, OMF 
agents also insisted that in many areas, such as Hokkaido, churches consisted of a “mere 
handful of believers, the majority young people, who rarely get more teaching from the 
Word of God than the hour-long sermon on Sunday.” While segments of Christianity in 
Asia were surging, the missionary insisted that the majority of churches at least in Japan 
were “untaught” and “static.”603  
 Older ideas about the susceptibility of Asian Christians to declension were 
directly linked to the OMF’s recruitment of white evangelicals in the U.S. In his article 
about the “Foreign Missionary as White Elephants,” Griffiths argued in Thailand “the 
church is still so small and weak that the country is almost entirely unreached with the 
Gospel,” and “even if a church grows in one generation, there may still be a recession in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Elaine Woods, “Japan’s New Mood,” East Asia Millions, July 1968. 
603 Elaine Woods, “Japan’s New Mood,” East Asia Millions, July 1968. 
	   307	  
the next.” The organization also continued to challenge established churches in many 
nations because of their association with “modern theology,” which OMF missionaries 
claimed “eroded the evangelistic concern of young pastors and seminary students.”604 
Guarding against declension and protecting the spirit of evangelism among Asian 
churches were regarded as necessitating the continued presence of the white missionary. 
The OMF utilized suspicions about the zealousness of Asian Christians in taking 
on the burden of evangelism to promote the missionary impulse among white 
evangelicals in countries like the U.S. For example, in October 1967 East Asia Millions 
featured a cartoon depicting a horse before a stream with the caption “Getting the Horse 
to Drink,” to illustrate the society’s struggles to encourage Asians to use literature for 
evangelism.605 This message about the white western missionary as the necessary driving 
force behind the Asian missionary was promoted by Asian voices, too. For example, in 
1967, Wu wrote that whatever assignment the white evangelicals took in Asia, whether it 
be in a seminary or as a bible teacher, their primary function was as “catalysts” who 
would “stimulate their Asian colleagues and congregations to adventure for God.”606 
The emphasis on discipleship training and student evangelism, with OMF 
missionaries espousing their commitment to training Asian evangelicals in the methods 
of taking the gospel far and wide, reinforced this sense of paternalism in having to foster 
and maintain the evangelistic ethos among Asians. In sum, fears about the sincerity of 
faith among Asian evangelicals remained critical to the ideology of the white western 
missionary’s unbounded mobility as a human right and vessel for progress. 
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Conclusion  
The OMF’s vision of itself as a “new instrument” did not resolve the dilemmas 
facing Protestant missions in the late 1960s. Pursuing racial integration and respect for 
the sovereignty of Asian evangelicals could not change the fact that OMF agents faced 
increasingly hostile environments in countries like Vietnam and Laos. Nor did these 
changes put to bed criticism of the missionary and its association with misguided foreign 
interventions in Asian societies. 
Secondly, the OMF’s rebalancing in favor of church-centric missionary practices 
was a slow process. By the spring of 1968 only 10% of the society’s agents were 
assigned to work with churches, while the largest percentage of the society’s missionaries 
(29%) were tasked with pioneering and church planting.607 While the OMF once again 
talked of the need to work with the churches, a great deal of OMF agents continued to be 
sent out as pioneers working independently of any Asian authority or partnership.   
Integration with the local and national churches as the focal point for evangelism 
in the New Fields proceeded lethargically as well. Declaring the society no longer a 
western institution did little to change the fact that most of the society’s personnel, 
finances, and outlook originated in western countries like the U.S. By 1973, of the 
society’s 859 members worldwide, the number of Asian members working for the OMF 
included just five missionaries from the Philippines, one from India, two Japanese, 
another from Singapore, and three members from Malaysia. The number of Asian 
evangelicals from countries like the U.S. remained less than a handful, and various 
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countries in the New Fields such as Thailand and Indonesia did not yet have home 
councils.608  
Ultimately, the OMF’s changes in the 1960s were both ideological and symbolic 
in nature as achieving balance between the countries in the West with nations in East and 
Southeast Asia was difficult to put into practice. Against mounting pressure, the OMF’s 
turn toward racial integration and cooperation with Asian churches was intended as a 
means to regain a sense of advance and progress. But even as equality and cooperation 
were pursued to a greater degree by the OMF, the society still propagated an ideology of 
mobility that saw progress as moving in circuits from west to east. Although Asian 
members now served as equal members and allies, they were not routed toward the 
“unevangelized” in the U.S. or Great Britain.  
 There was also the tendency of the OMF and its supporters to envision Asian 
evangelicals less as allies and equals and more so as critical vessels for the evangelical 
message. Mentions of the rights of Asian churches and evangelicals to lead evangelism 
were almost always balanced out by making allusions to the mounting pressures faced by 
white western missionaries. At times this contributed to the impression that Asian 
missionaries and churches were the society’s emergency plan in the event of another 
expulsion in areas where the OMF enjoyed “uncertain footholds.”609  In other cases, the 
OMF played up the dynamism of Asian societies and stressed how integration would 
greatly accelerate the Protestant missionary movement’s penetration of these nations. 
Frequently, OMF members like Glasser framed the decision to integrate as the means for 
the region’s “speediest possible” evangelization. These ideas along with the goal of 
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sending white, western missionaries to act as “catalysts” led the OMF and its supporters 
to embrace Asian evangelicals and churches less out of respect for their sovereignty and 
recognition of their equality than as the means to fulfill their ambitions.  
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Chapter 6 
Rapprochement: “Creative Access” Missions in the People’s Republic of China, 
1972-1989 
Introduction 
President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 unleashed feverish hopes among 
Protestant Christians the world over that a new era of missions to China was on the 
horizon. Almost immediately in the U.S. a number of Protestant missionary groups 
announced their intentions to plan for the return of the foreign missionary, with one 
particularly ambitious organization proclaiming that it would assemble and train over a 
thousand three-person “squads” to send to the PRC. The OMF was equally enticed by the 
potential of Sino-American rapprochement as the means behind resuming its calling for 
mainland China. 
But the society was among a number of organizations that thought any hope of 
foreign missions returning in the “traditional” sense was unrealistic. Worse, such 
statements by mission organizations risked alienating the CCP and Chinese society 
before missions could even begin. Speaking for the CIM-OMF Leslie Lyall stated “brash 
adventurism by Americans and Europeans would severely embarrass the Christians in 
China and do untold damage to the cause of Christ.” He warned, “1972 is not 1939, when 
foreigners forced their way into China at gunpoint; nor is it 1946, when foreigners 
returned to China right after the war, more or less expecting to restore the misguided 
paternal status quo of the prewar period. The approach to China in 1972, 1973, or 
whenever will be totally different.”610 Mindful of the imperialist past and hardships 
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brought on Chinese Christians by missionaries during the Korean War, particularly the 
scorn, suspicion, and harassment heaped upon them by the government and society for 
their association with the missionary, the OMF promised evangelicals that they would 
pioneer new avenues to evangelism and restoring ties with Chinese Christianity without 
alienating the CCP or society. 
By the mid-1970s the OMF was already well into the process of transitioning 
back into being a China mission again. On an official level, the society launched a 
number of programs in research, publishing, radio, prayer, and discipleship training for 
Chinese in the PRC. For much of the 1970s, however, travel accounts did little to buoy 
the Christian evangelical’s spirits. During the 1960s, the majority of China watchers had 
claimed that the Cultural Revolution had annihilated institutionalized religion. Such 
reports along with Chinese Christianity’s almost complete isolation from contacts outside 
the PRC caused the OMF and its members profound spiritual turmoil. Members such as 
Sylvia Houston described the “long periods of silence” produced by the Cultural 
Revolution as “deafening.” The early 1970s proved equally maddening as most travelers 
reported seeing no traces of Christianity in society.611 While some of the first visitors to 
China in 1971 and 1972 attended church services in cities such as Shanghai and Beijing, 
accounts in the New York Times referred to most of the churches as “derelict and boarded 
up, others in use as community centers, still other converted into workshops.” Most 
reports indicated few churches were open nation-wide and attendance for worship 
incredibly modest.612  
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Initial tours by foreigners saw only the complete eradication of Chinese 
Christianity and by extension any traces of the Protestant missionary’s past in the PRC. 
Former China missionary and then professor emeritus with the Duke University Divinity 
School Creighton Lacy toured in 1977 with the US-China Peoples Friendship Association 
and announced, “in short, I can find no evidence (from extensive reading or from limited 
observation) that any visible, organized, institutional Christianity exists in the People’s 
Republic.”613 Among Protestant evangelicals such accounts contributed to the sense that 
the exodus in the 1950s had been a judgment upon the failure of the missionary 
movement.  
For much of the 1970s the slow pace of normalization, particularly the limits of 
travel and exchange, stymied some of the initial political and religious exuberance of 
rapprochement. Domestic turmoil in both countries as Mao and Nixon gave way to their 
successors sidetracked improving relations between Beijing and Washington. What was 
accomplished largely dealt with issues concerning the geopolitics of the Cold War.614 For 
many Americans, their impatience with Sino-American rapprochement focused on the 
limitations of travel. By the end of the 1970s, travelers and exchange groups grew 
resentful of the CCP’s scripted tours of factories, communes, and limited number of cities 
and vistas open to tours. At the heart of their criticism were charges that travelers in the 
PRC lacked the “freedom” necessary to see and experience the “real China.” These 
complaints were even more common among Christian travelers and ex-China 
missionaries, who especially took issue with the lack of liberty to distribute Christian 
literature or contact Chinese Christians in the PRC. In many respects, these tensions 
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reflected an ideological principle at the core of American perspectives on China, what 
historian John King Fairbank has called the U.S. desire for complete and unlimited access 
to China and the Chinese.615  
Following agreements by the Carter-Deng administrations, however, Sino-
American relations entered a watershed era and renewed hope in the prospects of 
normalization for reviving missions to China. Firstly, trade and the number of cultural, 
educational, and scientific exchanges grew steadily between the PRC and the 
international community. In this respect, tourism played a critical role. Following Deng’s 
rise to leadership, tourism became a critical component of the nation’s Four 
Modernizations and mass tourism bloomed in the 1980s. Following the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, tourism policies 
were revised to reflect Deng’s belief that tourism was a powerful form of economic 
exchange that could also be used to lure foreign investment. In 1978, the PRC’s share of 
international tourism was of no consequence, but by the early 1980s, it was already 
among the top ten destinations in terms of international arrivals and receipts.  Across the 
nation many provincial governments, private enterprises, and tourism officials capitalized 
on foreign investment and revenues to fund the creation of thousands of hotels, leisure 
services, tourist attractions and historical sites.616 An increasing number of Americans 
began to take advantage of these various opportunities.  
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Not only were relations between the two countries expanded, Carter directly 
addressed the spiritual content of rapprochement by asking Deng to reopen Christian 
churches, promote the printing of bibles, and allow missionaries to return. Because of the 
Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights in foreign policy and the president’s 
own Christian beliefs, issues of religious toleration and freedom became integral to 
normalization.  
 On the first two matters, Carter received Deng’s prompt agreement, and the 
international community witnessed Christianity’s resurrection in Chinese society, as 
gradually seminaries, churches, and Christian presses returned to public life in the late 
1970s and 1980s.  Subsequently, spiritual relations between Chinese Christians and the 
outside world mirrored the normalization of Sino-American diplomacy in the form of 
official Christian delegations and exchanges. By the 1980s, official Christianity’s 
resurrection was symbolized by the return of the Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) 
and newly created China Christian Council as both groups welcomed a number of 
representatives from the international Christian community to the PRC. In the early 
1970s much of this engagement revolved around a single man, Bishop Ding Guangxun of 
the Anglican Church, received numerous Christian delegations from North America and 
Europe. Although evangelicals often opposed organizations like World Council of 
Churches (WCC), the participation of Chinese Protestants in international conferences 
made them optimistic of improving relations. Bishop Ding’s presence at the sixth WCC 
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Assembly in Vancouver in 1983 was the first by any delegate from the PRC. Later, the 
newly organized Chinese Christian Council (CCC) made visits to India and Japan in the 
1980s. 
More importantly, there were signs of Christianity’s revival outside the TSPM 
within the “underground” or “house churches.” As scholars such as Lian Xi have shown, 
the 1970s and 1980s were a period of dramatic expansion for many different independent 
Protestant movements that were familiar to the OMF such as True Jesus Church and 
Little Flock, but also new groups such as the Narrow Gate in the Wilderness and the 
Three Grades of Servants. These groups, along with countless other house churches, 
thrived in rural areas in provinces such as Henan, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shaanxi. Rather 
than churches struggling to survive, the OMF found groups swelled with evangelistic 
energy by the state’s new policy toward religion. Churches were reopened, public 
worship tolerated, and numerous imprisoned leaders and evangelists were released, 
leading to a groundswell of Christian activity that was beyond control of the state.617  
On the matter of missionaries, Deng was firm with Carter in stressing that the 
nation’s history with Christian missions and Chinese Christianity’s emphasis on self-
reliance and independence forbade their return. While disappointing in many regards to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617	  Xi	  argues	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  new	  government	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  religion	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
1980s	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  with	  economic	  reforms	  brewed	  a	  potent	  recipe	  for	  revival.	  According	  to	  Xi	  amidst	  
groups	  like	  the	  TJC	  or	  Narrow	  Gate	  filled	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  state’s	  evaporating	  social	  safety	  net	  and	  
crumbling	  socialist	  ideology.	  Many	  Protestant	  groups	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  services	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  healers,	  exorcists,	  or	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  “quasi-­‐magical	  pursuits,”	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  Chinese	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  this	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  and	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  Lian	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  Redeemed	  By	  Fire:	  The	  Rise	  of	  Popular	  Christianity,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  2010).	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Protestant evangelicals and the OMF, reports of Christianity’s revival and new avenues to 
participate directly in Sino-American normalization such as travel to mainland China 
restored the evangelical’s belief in divine sovereignty and the exodus of the 1950s as a 
“strategic” redeployment. As one former China missionary visiting a church founded by 
the CIM in Lanzhou, China, wrote, he had “longed” for this return since he flew over the 
tents of the People’s Liberation Army decades ago. His return trip to the PRC 
“reinforced” his “belief in the sovereignty of God over nations.”618 Before 1989, flows of 
people back and forth between the PRC and the larger international community produced 
greater and greater optimism about the prospects for both political and spiritual 
rapprochement.   
These developments—Deng’s various reforms and Chinese Christianity’s 
recovery and restoration of ties with the international community—greatly influenced the 
OMF’s approach to resuming missionary work in the PRC in the 1970s and 1980s. Like 
scholars such as Christopher Endy, I explore how diplomatic concepts like 
“rapprochement” were given spiritual and cultural meanings by the social practices and 
ideas of Christian travelers and expatriates. In these decades the OMF expanded its work 
in China as a “creative access nation,” areas where Christians were denied entry as 
religious workers, and used other means to gain access to society to evangelize. The 
OMF publicized and facilitated for evangelicals in the U.S. and around the world a 
chance to engage in evangelism through prayer and financial support, but also more 
directly via travel, study, expatriatism, and a number of other avenues for contact with 
Chinese made possible by Sino-American normalization.  
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  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	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  Monthly	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Thus, rapprochement was primarily a spiritual process for many evangelicals, and 
one grounded in various forms of mobility.  I argue the idea of a “creative access” 
missionary work was key to the evangelical’s ideas of spiritual rapprochement with the 
PRC, since the OMF promoted accommodation to both the CCP and TSPM, but also 
more generally to Chinese spiritual leadership. Largely abandoning the idea of spiritual 
warfare against communism, the OMF promoted spiritual détente with both the CCP and 
TSPM. Not wanting to risk provoking the state or society into “closing the door,” the 
OMF self-censored its anti-communist rhetoric in return for access to mainland China 
and promised to engage in limited forms of evangelism that respected the authority of the 
church, the state, and primacy of Chinese in evangelism within their national borders. 
Ultimately, the allure of access to Chinese civilization softened the OMF’s anti-
communist ethos and the agenda of spiritual warfare against the CCP.   
However, the OMF continued to engage in missions by recruiting and mobilizing 
Chinese evangelicals inside and outside the PRC, while white evangelicals were relegated 
to a number of “secondary roles.” In the process of respecting Chinese spiritual 
sovereignty, the mission propagated the idea of Chinese evangelicals as a “dynamic” and 
“revolutionary” force in China’s “Opening Up.” Their mobility was essential to the 
evangelical’s notions of progress and was a barometer for religious freedom in the PRC. 
And while the OMF resisted directly criticizing the CCP or the TSPM, the society 
remained a vocal proponent of the Chinese Christian’s religious rights, especially for 
propagation. An equally important facet of the OMF’s China Program, then, was its focus 
on educating evangelicals outside the PRC on the “truth” about Chinese Christianity via 
the Pray for China Fellowship and China Awareness Seminars. Through the creation of 
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China Awareness Seminars, OMF missionaries like David Adeney turned Christian 
tourism into a form of advocacy for the religious rights of Chinese evangelicals. 
Ultimately, the OMF sought to make travel and exchange the means by which the 
international evangelical community accepted Chinese spiritual sovereignty but also 
pressured the government into granting Christians, foreign and domestic, greater religious 
freedom and rights. 
By the late 1980s, this process showed the evangelical’s willingness to abandon 
the moniker of missionary and contribute to China’s campaigns in the Four 
Modernizations. Using “friendship” as a means to engage in “discreet” evangelism, the 
OMF promoted the sense that by making contributions to society the “creative access” 
missionary gained both governmental and societal approval to evangelize. Hoping to 
purge Christianity’s stigmatization among elites and youth, the OMF invested in 
Christian professionals and especially scientists working in the PRC to enhance its 
appeal. Even more ambitious was the OMF’s desire to send Christian professionals to aid 
“liberal” elements within the CCP and TSPM in a bid to keep China “Opening Up.” 
Chinese Sovereignty and “Creative Access Missions” 
Within the narrow scope of interaction between the PRC and countries like the 
U.S. afforded by normalization in the 1970s, the OMF promoted accommodation with the 
CCP and moved away from the idea of spiritual warfare that had dominated the society’s 
perspective in the 1950s and 1960s. Dropping the defiant anti-communist ethos of the 
1950s and 1960s, the OMF encouraged establishing forms of ministry that would avoid 
conflict with the CCP or risk creating hardships for Chinese evangelicals.   
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Prior to Sino-American rapprochement, the OMF had promised in the event of an 
opportunity to return to China to bring a militant approach to missions aimed at toppling 
communism.  Calling the PRC a “serious threat” to the world as a nuclear power, OMF 
writers such as Leslie Lyall promised that if evangelical missions were ever to return they 
would match “the dedication and enthusiasm of China’s Red Guards.” Missions would 
perhaps have to employ “cell type meetings” similar to cadres or the Communist Youth 
League and success would depend the sacrifices of Chinese Christians. Triumph over 
communism, Lyall proposed, would require “the Christian churches must be prepared to 
beat the Communists at their own game—to out-do them, out-dare them, out-live them 
and, if necessary, out-die them.”619 In the context of China’s ongoing Cultural 
Revolution, the OMF still planned to continue its spiritual battle with the CCP and 
mobilize resistance to communism, perhaps to martyrdom, amongst Chinese Christians. 
These defiant and militant attitudes, however, softened dramatically after the Nixon visit. 
Instead, the OMF approached the opportunity to return to the PRC by seeking out 
opportunities for missionary work that would not be defined by opposition to the CCP. 
While elements within the Protestant missionary movement chafed against the limits on 
religion set by the CCP, the OMF argued that it was necessary to first “exhaust” all legal 
options available to work with mainland Protestants and promote the faith. Despite 
growing impatience with the limited religious tolerance and freedom for Christianity in 
the 1980s, the OMF still favored “moving cautiously and praying fervently” while 
“seeking appropriate channels” to evangelize and “build up” the Chinese church. Most 
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  Lyall,	  Confrontation:	  Christianity	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  (Moody	  Press,	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especially, the OMF railed against unilateral actions taken by groups that could threaten 
to “close” China to the entire foreign community.620 
The OMF’s definition of what constituted “appropriate” channels for resuming 
work as a China mission was influenced by a number of factors. The first was, of course, 
the well-known hostility of the CCP, TSPM, and Chinese society in general to the 
western missionary as a symbol of the imperialist past. While CCP leaders like Deng 
made clear their opposition to the missionary’s return, leaders within the resurrected 
national church and institutional Christianity in the form of the TSPM and CCC made 
their opinion known on this matter equally clear. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
TSPM and CCC spokesman consistently and strongly opposed the resumption of 
missions to China, warning against foreign intrusion in Chinese Christianity. Spokesman 
such as Bishop Ding Guangxun counseled the international Christian community that 
their desires to aid Chinese Christians were best limited to prayers, a channel of spiritual 
support that he saw as “free” from political accusations. Numerous times Ding and other 
TSPM spokesman warned and even condemned foreign intervention in the country’s 
religious affairs.621 
In response, the OMF consistently communicated its support for the position of 
the TSPM and many of the principles it espoused. Like the TSPM, the OMF praised the 
idea of Chinese Christianity’s independence from the foreign community and expressed 
its desire to engage in relations without “interfering” with the rights of Chinese, 
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  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	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  Leona	  Choy,	  “China	  Inland	  Mission	  and	  the	  Church	  in	  China,”	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  Asia	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especially in regards to evangelism.622 Further, OMF spokesmen celebrated Chinese 
Christianity’s complete achievement of the three-selfs in the absence of the missionary 
movement, and generally accepted the role of the TSPM as a mediator between Chinese 
Christians and the government. Indeed, throughout much of the 1980s, OMF publications 
praised the TSPM for its efforts to re-open churches and seminaries, publish bibles and 
Christian materials, and provide religious training and instruction. Far less inclined than 
in 1950s and 1960s to see the TSPM’s expansion as a threat to Christianity, the society 
encouraged U.S. evangelicals to be hopeful that the TSPM’s success in reopening 
churches and building new offices across the nation was evidence of Christianity’s 
progress and devoted prayers for their support. 
In contrast to the OMF’s strong opposition to the TSPM in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the society now avoided direct criticism of the institution or its members. That TSPM 
leadership suffered publically for their faith during the Cultural Revolution many in the 
OMF to sympathize with them in the 1980s. Altogether, the OMF position on the TSPM 
in the 1980s was much more nuanced. Even during periods when the TSPM was accused 
inside and outside China of aiding the government in restricting religious freedom, the 
OMF China Program usually refrained from engaging in direct public criticism. In part 
this was because the OMF feared that too harsh criticism of the TSPM, or the CCP for 
that matter, would risk “closing” China to the foreign community. As a result, the OMF 
issued orders to members and spokesman to refrain from printing anything too 
provocative or directly critical of the TSPM or CCP.623 
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  1981);	  Pray	  for	  China	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  “Guidelines	  for	  China	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  China	  Research	  Center,	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Another factor in these debates on renewing missions to China was that they 
occurred in the wake of the Bangkok World Mission Conference and rising hostility to 
the sending of missionaries from colonial powers to Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 
the 1970s. In Bangkok, representatives from a number of Asian churches proposed a 
moratorium on missionaries from the “North” and funds being channeled to areas of the 
world long the focus of Protestant missions. In addition, the Bangkok conference restated 
the sovereignty of the national and local churches within their borders and promoted the 
concept of non-interference as a means to protect their independence.624 These currents 
gave further impetus toward the OMF’s embrace of the national or local church’s right to 
lead evangelism. The conference further inspired the OMF to exercise caution in 
asserting the rights of white evangelicals to engage in missionary work, especially when 
Asian Christians were so publically opposed to these ideas.   
All of these factors heightened the OMF’s concern for the effect of the foreign 
Christian’s actions and words on the Chinese Christian. Conscious of the society’s own 
failures in the 1950s, the OMF China Program warned against engaging in any form 
outreach that would be “adding to their pressure by being insensitive to their situation.”625 
As a result, the OMF decried “unilateral” actions by international groups such as 
“smuggling” bibles in large numbers into the PRC. In 1981 the Pray for China 
Fellowship, a prayer society formed by the OMF focused solely on China, warned that 
reports in western media that foreign groups had exported over 1 million bibles to China 
had led to a nation-wide campaign by government officials and the TSPM to seize and 
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destroy the “contraband” and to the arrest of many Christians.626 Such activities subjected 
Chinese Christians to the wrath of the state, and necessitated the exercise of both caution 
and discretion in planning evangelism to the PRC. 
There was no more important factor considered by the OMF, however, than 
reports of Christianity’s explosive growth and recovery in the 1980s. Through travel and 
renewed correspondence made possible by normalization, OMF contacts established 
relations with various house churches and testified to Christianity’s revival. In provinces 
like Zhejiang, the OMF estimated Christianity’s followers to number over 700,000 or 
maybe even more. In Henan, a field once dominated by the CIM, OMF members 
encountered an impressive underground church network with thousands of followers and 
itinerant evangelists roaming widely. Over the course of 1980s video tapes taken during a 
tour of Honan that were relayed to the OMF China Program showed “far more Christians 
than imagined” singing hymns that were popular during the society’s past in China. Even 
more surprising, a few reports indicated that in certain regions in the PRC entire 
communes or cadres were composed of Christians.627  While the TSPM and government 
sources often projected much lower numbers, the society claimed enough evidence 
existed from both the TSPM and contacts with the house churches to suggest that the 
“overall picture” across the nation was “spectacular growth” to the extent that it “puts 
western churches to shame.”628 Christianity’s growth in the absence of traditional 
missions reinforced the society’s tendency to urge recognition of the Chinese right to lead 
evangelism. 
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Thus, for a number of political and spiritual reasons, the OMF espoused respect 
for Chinese authority in evangelism and sought accommodation with both the TSPM and 
CCP in the 1970s and 1980s. The OMF was cognizant of both the missionary’s troubled 
place in the Chinese past and the unlikelihood of the state to ever issue visas for 
missionary work. The resurgence of Christianity within the PRC in the late 1970s and 
1980s and apparent growing religious tolerance and freedom assuaged evangelical fears. 
That white, western missionary’s increasingly signified exploitation and inequality to 
Christians in Asia added further pressure to recognize the Chinese spiritual sovereignty. 
All of these factors contributed to the OMF’s sense that engaging in traditional missions 
endangered Christianity in mainland China and was a potential spoiler to Sino-American 
normalization. 
The OMF championed the mainland evangelical’s right to lead evangelization by 
an increasing number of references to the “strength” of the churches inside the PRC. 
OMF allies like Leona Choy argued against the notion that Chinese churches were 
“emaciated or weak” and pointed to their evangelistic activities and growth as signs of 
their “surprising strength.”629 Such reports assuaged any fears among the OMF’s 
supporters of the need to promote a missionary vision within the churches. In contrast, 
letters from Chinese evangelicals received by the OMF referred to the “pioneer spirit” 
within the churches, and numerous travel accounts from OMF members testified to 
evidence of mainland Christians evangelizing aggressively.630  
Tours like Choy’s showed that there was no desire amongst even underground 
Chinese Christianity for the return of the “traditional” missionary. In rural areas, Choy 
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found congregations alive with worship, study of the bible, tract distribution, and witness 
across districts and provinces. Based on her trips, she disabused U.S. evangelicals of the 
notion that missionaries should be sent to the rescue of Chinese Christianity. Choy 
concluded that the reports from Christian visitors to the PRC in the 1970s on Chinese 
Christianity’s “weak” and “emaciated” condition had been greatly exaggerated. Rather, 
she saw communities with “surprising strength” still actively evangelizing despite lacking 
the traditional infrastructure— schools, church buildings, publications—and broad rights 
to public propagation and worship. And while these communities “rejoiced” at contact 
with the foreign community, the churches she visited never broached the subject of the 
missionary’s return. Most communities, she relayed to the OMF, were highly resistant to 
the idea as foreign intervention.631 
There were certainly still aspects of the OMF China Program intended to 
undermine the authority of the TSPM and CCP. For one, the OMF resisted any attempt to 
completely prohibit the flow of foreign literature and radio to the mainland. At several 
points in the 1980s, the TSPM denounced the distribution of foreign literature and even 
radio programs as violations of Chinese Christianity’s independence. In defense of its 
own China Program, the OMF claimed it had “no desire to divide or interfere” with 
Chinese Christianity “but while we recognize the right to evangelize China rests with the 
Chinese church, we must as fellow members of the Body of Christ, respond to any 
requests that come from them.”632 While the society supported the TSPM leadership’s 
and the necessity of Chinese Christianity’s independence, the OMF challenged its 
interpretation that the sending literature or engaging in radio witness was imperialistic. 
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  Leona	  Choy,	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  Asia	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Most mainland Christians, the OMF argued, did not see such activities as a violation of 
their spiritual rights, and the society thus did not see them as “illegal.”633 Thus, the OMF 
reserved the right to bypass the authority of both the TSPM and Beijing. When faced with 
letters from Chinese Christians and pastors requested bibles, hymnals, or materials for 
evangelism, the OMF decided in favor of the individual’s right to religious freedom or 
the right of the local church to speak for Chinese Christianity over the state and national 
church’s sovereignty. In doing so, the OMF still ultimately reserved the right to choose 
which Chinese were legitimate expressions of spiritual self-determination and which 
were not.  
In extreme cases, the OMF even announced its willingness to work outside the 
bounds set by the CCP and TSPM. The OMF China Program did not rule out the 
possibility of engaging in “illegal” activities, but it advised such measures should only be 
done after long and intense prayerful consideration and in such cases when “legal” 
cooperation was impossible.634 And although the OMF promoted accommodation to the 
CCP and TSPM, a critical component of its return to mission work in the PRC was to try 
and pressure both groups into granting Christians, both foreign and domestic, greater 
religious rights. To this end, much of the Pray for China Fellowship and China 
Awareness Seminars were devoted to monitoring religious freedom and tolerance in the 
PRC. The result was that although the OMF recognized each group’s political authority, 
the society’s acceptance was predicated on the idea that controls were gradually being 
loosened and resisted the government’s claims to narrowly circumscribe the rights of 
Chinese Christians.      
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These developments and the society’s embrace of integration and the Asian 
evangelical’s right to lead missions prior to Sino-American normalization made the 
society an ardent proponent of the Chinese evangelical’s authority in evangelism within 
the borders of the PRC. Conversely, the OMF resisted the notion that the foreign 
community was unable to engage in any form of ministry or evangelism. OMF 
publications insisted that Hudson Taylor’s “mandate” for missions to China and the 
Chinese the mission was still at the heart of the society’s calling. Rejecting the notion that 
any form of evangelism in the PRC was “narrow-minded,” or represented the return of 
“gunboats and cultural imperialism,” the OMF established that there were a number of 
legitimate ways for the foreign community to be involved in ministries to mainland 
China.635  
The most important among them was inspiring overseas Chinese to a missionary 
vision for the PRC. While the OMF largely accepted that the return of the white 
missionary would never be officially allowed it also joined a host of other international 
evangelical organizations in arguing Sino-American normalization would allow overseas 
Chinese to return. In the late 1960s, Leslie Lyall’s book Red Sky at Night: Confrontation, 
Christianity in China predicted that in the near future opportunities could occur for 
overseas Chinese and other Asian Christians to function as missionaries in the PRC.636  
Such ideas were founded upon the notion that overseas Chinese possessed a racial 
right to engage in cross-border evangelism to the PRC. In the 1970s publications like 
East Asia Millions touted that the “primary responsibility” for the evangelism within any 
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  Leslie Lyall, Red Sky at Night: Confrontation, Christianity in China (Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd. 1970)	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country lay with “its own people,” which in the case of China included all overseas 
Chinese. In the 1980s the society’s new International Director, James Hudson Taylor, III 
referred to overseas Chinese as “the bridge between American evangelicals and the 
church of China.” Taylor argued that Chinese evangelicals would “make the initial 
penetration” in the PRC because they had the “correct race and the correct language.” 
The society’s position on these matters was echoed by a number of evangelical missions 
and Chinese churches. For example, in 1975 Ed Torjesen of The Evangelical Alliance 
Mission also referred to Chinese Protestants as the “most effective vessel” for 
evangelizing because they were not troubled by the same racial or linguistic barriers 
faced by non-Chinese evangelicals.  
With the Chinese Christian playing a central role in the return of Protestant 
missions to the PRC, recruiting overseas Chinese became critical to the OMF’s ambitions 
in Asia. However, the OMF’s commitment to sending overseas Chinese as the “first 
wave” was complicated by the organization’s lack of diversity. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s the OMF’s integration with Asian evangelicals continued to proceed slowly. In 
fact, the OMF’s expansion on the European continent in Germany and Switzerland 
proceeded at a faster pace than in any Asian nation. In 1985, the combined number of 
OMF missionaries from Germany (45) and Switzerland (63) outnumbered the total 
number of missionaries from the nations of Taiwan (4), Philippines (9), India (2), Hong 
Kong (11), Indonesia (2), Korea (2), Malaysia (9), Singapore (7), and Thailand (1). Even 
within nations like the U.S., the OMF continued to be composed almost solely of 
Caucasians, and only added its first African-American members in the mid-1970s. 637  
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After the “opening” of China, the OMF intensified its efforts to recruit overseas 
Chinese to Chinese churches in the 1970s and 1980s. To do so, the OMF loosely allied 
with a number of international organizations. Among them were a number of 
organizations led by Chinese evangelicals such as the North America Congress of 
Chinese Evangelicals, the Fellowship of American Chinese Evangelicals, and the Chinese 
for Christ ministry of noted evangelist Calvin Chao.  
Another critical partner in these campaigns was the newly founded Billy Graham 
Center’s (BGC) China Program and the OMF’s longstanding feeder base at Wheaton 
College. Along with groups like Campus Crusade for Christ and professors from Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, the OMF advised the BGC on the creation of its own China 
Program in the 1980s. James Taylor, III, the OMF’s International Director, provided the 
BGC with insights into the strategy of missions for China, and OMF collaborators like 
the Far East Broadcasting Company, Trans World Radio, and Christian Communications 
Ltd. provided research materials and consulting for radio and literature programs. As a 
result, the OMF exercised a great deal of influence on the BGC’s China Program and its 
outlook toward the Chinese churches and evangelism. 
The BGC China Program then joined the OMF in labeling the mobilization of 
overseas Chinese as a “strategic” weapon in the return of the missionary movement to the 
PRC. The BGC China Program’s top priorities were providing literature and training 
materials to Chinese churches, but also “equipping and training Chinese students, 
graduates, and professionals to carry the Gospel to China.” The BGC China Program 
shared the OMF’s view on overseas Chinese as a potentially revolutionary force, stating 
“revolutions in China always have been logistically supported by overseas Chinese, and 
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usually started and spread among the grass-roots by students. The Chinese students in 
North America meet these two criteria.”638 Despite its own lack of Chinese missionaries, 
the OMF succeeded in forming institutional alliances and disseminating ideas about 
overseas Chinese as a dynamic and potentially revolutionary missionary force.  
Continuing the OMF’s strong relations with Wheaton College and the BGC 
enhanced the society’s access to the heart of the evangelical community in the U.S. and 
promotions among the Chinese American community in nearby Chicago. In addition to 
the college’s reputation as the nation’s most respected evangelical higher educational 
institution, the town of Wheaton was considered by many to be the “evangelical center of 
the world” home to the offices of Christianity Today, Scripture Press, Tyndale House 
Publishing, and the National Association of Evangelicals. Only thirty minutes from 
Chicago, home to the third largest Chinese American population and several large 
Chinese Christian churches, the BGC China Program helped groups like the OMF in 
cultivating a generation of Chinese evangelicals for service. In addition, the BGC China 
Program sent delegates to campuses like the University of Illinois, creating bible studies 
groups, distributing publications and advertisements for programs like the Christian 
Communications Ltd., and holding Chinese Christian conferences attended by OMF 
representatives.  
Deputation work was also routed in search of greater access to areas of the U.S. 
densely populated by Chinese churches. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the OMF 
maintained offices across the United States in Illinois, Washington, California, Florida, 
South Carolina, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oregon. From these areas the organization’s 
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  Billy Graham Evangelical Center, Wheaton, Illinois.	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presence was felt through deputation visits and outreach on college campuses in states 
like Arizona, New Mexico, North Carolina, Alabama, Wisconsin, Colorado, New Jersey, 
Georgia, and Kentucky as well. However, the drive to inspire and recruit Chinese 
missionaries made states like California even more critical to the OMF. With regular 
deputation engagements, prayer circles, and conferences in cities such as Los Angeles 
since the 1940s, the OMF had a strong reputation among evangelicals in the state. In 
general, the OMF’s reach in the southwest had increased since the 1950s as the society 
built relations with churches in Los Angeles, San Jose, Glendale, Pasadena, Tucson, 
Phoenix, and numerous smaller cities in California, Nevada, and Arizona.  
Inside California, the need for the mission to expand its contacts with Chinese 
Christians drove the OMF to find new “openings” among Chinese Americans. Mission 
representatives such as George Kraft, an OMF missionary with decades of experience in 
both mainland China and Taiwan led the society’s efforts to expand contacts with 
Chinese churches in California’s Bay Area. Returning from the field, Kraft first helped to 
form an “embryonic” Chinese church in San Jose, and worked regularly with Calvin 
Chao and Chinese for Christ at meetings across California. As a local representative of 
the OMF, Kraft built on these connections and opportunities to witness to Chinese 
Christians and attempted to expand OMF relations with Chinese groups in Oakland and 
San Francisco.639 
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  to	  Ernest	  Heimbach	  from	  George	  Kraft,	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  Kraft	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  to	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Heimbach	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Outside of Kraft’s work in the 1980s, the OMF employed a number of members 
as “ministers-at large” to expand its influence on Chinese and Asian evangelicals in the 
American southwest. In the 1980s these included George Steed, Will Bruce, and Frank 
Harris. Among his duties for the OMF, Steed contributed to the society’s Pray for China 
Fellowship, regularly visited Chinese churches in the Southwest, and met weekly with 
students from Hong Kong at the Fuller Theological Seminary for discipleship training as 
future missionaries. Harris also focused on ministry to the Chinese churches encouraging 
them to found Sunday schools and discipleship training activities to recruit Chinese 
American youth for the OMF. While Bruce handled the majority of the OMF deputation 
work at Christian conferences and churches, all three men regularly preached before U.S. 
evangelicals on missions to the PRC and expounded on the missionary vision.640 
Driving the OMF’s campaigns for the mobilization of overseas Chinese were 
criticisms that a missionary vision was not prevalent among Chinese churches. In July 
1985 the OMF reported that outside mainland China there were an estimated 4700 
Chinese churches worldwide, but of the 50,000 missionaries working worldwide, there 
were less than 500 Chinese.641 The OMF urged supporters to pray for this vision to 
evangelize aggressively to take hold of Chinese Protestants. Further, the mission 
encouraged that the right to lead evangelism in the PRC was also a duty, one that it was 
afraid Chinese evangelicals were in danger of shirking. Within this schema of Protestant 
missions, then, it was the responsibility of white evangelicals to aggressively propagate 
the missionary vision to overseas Chinese, an idea that was further reinforced by the 
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  for	  China	  Fellowship,	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mobility of OMF agents across the U.S. as a means to more aggressively promote this 
vision within Chinese churches.  
Much of the rest of the OMF’s campaigns to send overseas Chinese to the PRC, 
however, concerned prayer. Prayer warriors and supporters of missions such as the OMF 
like Peggy Weston had been investing their hopes in a generation of Chinese missionaries 
entering the PRC long before Sino-American rapprochement. In the mid-1960s, Weston 
wrote, “And I pray for overseas Chinese, especially in the countries of Southeast Asia, 
that they might be prepared—when God opens the door to China again—to return with a 
strong Gospel witness.”642 In the event of a return to China, OMF supporters had long 
believed Chinese Christians would lead the return of the missionary movement. 
Prayer materials from the OMF in the 1970s and 1980s gave evangelicals a 
greater sense of agency in China’s evangelization by using prayerful intercession to direct 
a variety of movements by Chinese Christians. Commonly, prayer materials asked 
evangelicals to focus on travelers so that “contacts made when travelling…may count for 
the Kingdom,” and also to focus on the daily encounters Christians in the U.S. and 
elsewhere in the West had with Chinese studying overseas. This included requests for 
prayers for groups flowing back and forth between the PRC for sporting competitions, 
musical performances, and scientific and economic exchanges.643 In another example, on 
Thursdays, the Pray for China Fellowship focused on praying for businessmen, 
academics, English teachers, and tourists visiting the PRC.644  
A critical component of the OMF’s China Program was praying overseas Chinese 
to the PRC as missionaries. Almost all prayer materials of the OMF China Program 
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featured a reminder to concentrate on overseas Chinese visiting friends and relatives in 
the PRC to facilitate evangelism. In these hopes Chinese Americans figured prominently. 
In 1985, the OMF notified supporters that there were over 1 million Chinese-Americans 
in the U.S., who could potentially exploit their familial networks and friends in the PRC 
to advance the gospel. Hong Kong Christians, however, were seen as just as important, if 
not more so, to the OMF’s ambitions and the society’s ministry to mobilize evangelicals 
in that city for missionary work were expanded dramatically as well. 645  
Prayer reflected the OMF’s desires to influence the movements of Chinese 
Christians inside the PRC as well. Despite the official limitations set by the CCP and 
TSPM on proselytization, OMF contacts with underground churches suggested that the 
missionary vision among Chinese Christians was flourishing in the 1980s. While 
protecting their anonymity, the OMF provided numerous accounts in the 1980s of 
Chinese taking up the call to evangelism. Prayer materials featured accounts describing 
the journeys of “Brother X” as he crossed rural areas stopping in numerous villages to 
preach and engage in home visits with many fellow believers.  In Dalian, OMF agents 
reported seeing Christian messages on wall posters distributed by village churches, and 
rural homes in Zhejiang and Fujian displaying crosses on their doors.646 A visitor to 
Lanzhou, a former China missionary, recounted the rural itinerations of a factory 
worker.647 In many areas, the OMF claimed that lay Christians walked for three hours just 
to hear evangelical preachers, or traveled for over a day in areas around Kunming to 
attend Christmas services at a former China Inland mission church.648 
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These accounts of Chinese evangelicals were used by the OMF to keep Christians 
outside the PRC focusing their prayers on mobilizing Chinese evangelicals to spread the 
gospel far and wide. Nearly every monthly prayer letter featured requests to support 
China’s house church leaders and “traveling evangelists” roaming the countryside. Thus, 
via prayer, evangelicals outside China invested in the mobility of Chinese evangelicals as 
a source of progress and hope for the nation’s future. Particular patterns of mobility came 
to signify Christianity’s re-emergence in society and growing acceptance and toleration 
of religion in the PRC. As a result, evangelicals outside China prayed fervently for 
Chinese evangelicals engaging in propagation beyond the walls of the church, circulating 
between rural and urban churches, and taking up cross-city or provincial itinerations. 
Additionally, the OMF pointed to these movements as signs of Chinese Christianity’s 
spiritual sovereignty and fitness to lead the nation’s evangelization.649 
Signs of Chinese Christianity’s organization skills in evangelism equally 
impressed evangelicals outside the PRC. OMF visitors testified to the creation of training 
centers and conferences for evangelism established in Shandong and North Central 
China.650 In other cases, the OMF observed efforts at cross-provincial training and bible 
teaching to enforce orthodoxy.651 Increasing organization and networks of cross-
provincial evangelism were praised by the OMF as signs of underground Christianity’s 
vitality, missionary vision, and maturing leadership. At the same time, prayers reflected 
the OMF’s desire to push Chinese evangelicals to ever-greater lengths and efficacy in 
evangelism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July	  1985).	  
650	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (August	  1985).	  
651	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (June	  1986).	  
	   337	  
Tours of the PRC by OMF members also produced longings to see Chinese led 
evangelism directed toward the “frontiers” once inhabited by CIM missionaries. As OMF 
missionaries visited the PRC in the 1980s, their tours produced accounts of areas or 
ethnic groups underserved by Chinese evangelism. Prayer requests featured numerous 
exhortations for the Chinese to take up witness to Hui Muslims across China or to remote 
regions in Inner Mongolia and Tibet.652 Visits to Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan in the 
late 1980s led the OMF to call for the establishment of the missions to the nation’s 
“Mountain people.” Through these tours, OMF spokesmen cemented the idea that despite 
Christianity’s revival, large regions and demographics remained “unevangelized” inside 
the PRC, particularly China’s minority populations. Transferring that sense of obligation 
to carry evangelism to the extents of the nation’s borders and across racial barriers to 
Chinese evangelicals through prayerful intercession became a prime motivation in the 
OMF’s China Program. 
By the late 1980s there were a number of evangelism networks inside the PRC 
that gave the OMF hope for Christianity’s penetration of the “frontier.” In 1984 the Pray 
For China Fellowship discovered groups heading from Hebei to Tibet and Shandong to 
Xinjiang, they responded, “Praise the Lord! Believers in mainland China are spreading 
the gospel across the border lines of provinces.”653 The churches of Henan were seen as 
especially robust evangelists and credited by the OMF with sending agents to Tibet, 
Xinjiang, and Heilongjiang.654  
The OMF’s hopes were primarily invested rested in Han Chinese to take up 
“pioneer work.” For instance, one of the first OMF member’s to visit Xinjiang reported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (October	  1984).	  
653	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (October	  1984).	  
654	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	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  Monthly	  Bulletin,	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that no churches existed amongst the minority Uighurs or Kazakahs, and called the 
Uighurs “one of the largest unreached today,” prompting the OMF to begin providing 
Christian literature in Uighur. But ultimately though the OMF’s desire to take the gospel 
to Uighurs and Kazakahs lay in inspiring Han Chinese to do so. The Pray for China 
Fellowship asked groups to hope that “Han Chinese Christians in Xinjiang will catch the 
vision to share the Gospel with their Muslim neighbors, despite formidable cultural, 
religious, and political barriers.”655 And by 1985 the OMF Prayer Directory advertised 
that “67 million minorities occupy more than 50% of China’s land,” and “Christian Han 
Chinese living among them have difficult but strategic opportunity to reach them for 
Christ.”656 
 While such hopes continued to create a dichotomy between Han Chinese as 
equals and partners of the international evangelical community and minority groups 
associated with the frontier, the OMF also praised a number of minorities for leading 
cross-border and inter-ethnic evangelism in the south and west. Maps produced by the 
Pray For China Fellowship showed Lisu groups evangelizing Burma and North Thailand, 
Yi traveling to Sichuan and Guizhou, Miao proselytizing in Guangxi and Guizhou, 
Zhuang moving across Guangxi to Yunnan, where they were joined by Tibetans. The 
OMF pointed to the expansive evangelism of these minorities as signs of their equality 
and leadership. In other cases, OMF supporters prayed for exiled Christian Tibetans in 
India and Nepal who were reportedly sending missionaries back to the PRC.657 Beyond 
fulfilling the OMF’s aspirations, these movements gave a sense that the OMF’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	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  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship,	  Prayer	  Directory,	  (March	  1985).	  
657	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	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  Monthly	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pioneering ethos had left a lasting legacy on underground Christianity and the minority 
populations of the PRC.  
Lastly, OMF prayers for Chinese gave U.S. evangelicals the sense that the 
currents of Sino-American rapprochement such as cultural exchange favored 
Christianity’s revival as mainland Chinese became increasingly mobile. That Chinese 
civilians, particularly professionals, intellectuals, and youth were taking part in 
exchanges with western countries gave the OMF great hope that new points of contact for 
outreach were being forged inside and outside of China. The OMF rallied evangelicals to 
outreach with declarations that “China’s Best are Here!”658 To capitalize on these 
opportunities the OMF opened ministries targeting international students in the cities of 
Dallas, Pasadena, and Portland.  
The society also promoted a greater sense of responsibility amongst all 
evangelicals to play a role in missions by proselytizing to Chinese traveling abroad. 
Inspired in part by the house churches, OMF prayer conferences and deputation workers 
followed the goal of getting “every Christian involved in missions.” OMF textbooks such 
as “A Mini-Conferette in Your home? Involvement in Asia at Home,” encouraged 
Christians to hold their own prayer meetings with friends and family on behalf of 
missions with guidelines on how to pray for missionaries, along with recipes for 
Malaysian curry. Increasingly, the ways in which the OMF asked white evangelicals to 
participate in missions went beyond the traditional emphasis on prayerful intercession by 
encouraging Christians to act as missionaries by befriending Asians inside the U.S. and 
opening their homes. 
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Inside the PRC, reform and modernization were seen as increasing the mobility of 
average civilians and bringing them into greater contact with outside influences. The Pray 
for China Fellowship noted that in areas like Wuxi county many generations of peasant 
families had lived and died in the same village, but now they were chasing new 
opportunities in cities and far off regions and forming travel agencies. By the mid-1980s 
the OMF was reporting that China’s campaigns had created rising incomes and consumer 
affluence for millions of citizens. Along with these changes went rising expectations and 
desires, framed by the OMF as Chinese dreams of “bicycles today, but motorbikes 
tomorrow,” that spoke to their increasing socially and technologically mobile lifestyles.659  
In rural areas, the OMF saw market reforms as freeing up the Chinese Christian 
for itinerating. In the fall of 1985, the OMF noted “the government’s free market policies 
now allow farmers to travel to different areas for buying and selling,” potentially 
allowing Christianity’s strong rural base greater freedom to travel simultaneously as 
evangelists. The society encouraged its members to pray for these reforms and hoped that 
they would rural Christians could use commerce to “speedily” evangelize.660 In another 
example, the OMF pointed to urbanization as strengthening the relations between urban 
and rural congregations.661 Amidst all these socio-economic changes, the OMF asked that 
“as people move around China in greater numbers, pray that Christians amongst them 
may ‘gossip the Gospel’ to those who have not had the chance of hearing in their isolated 
villages.”662  
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  1985).	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  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (December	  1985).	  
661	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July/August	  1987).	  
662	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (April	  1985).	  	  
	   341	  
Even the Chinese government’s policies and attitudes toward minority groups 
were viewed positively by the OMF since they seemed to make these groups more 
accessible to evangelists by promoting assimilation. Greater opportunities for minority 
populations to study at universities in cities like Beijing were promoted as opportunities 
for Han Chinese Christians and foreign Christians to have fellowship.663 But the most 
important reform concerned the CCP’s promotion of the use of Mandarin among ethnic 
minorities. While these policies were met with resistance from groups in areas such as 
Tibet and Xinjiang as attacks on the religions of Buddhism, Islam, and ethnic identities, 
the OMF praised the campaign proclaiming “The Gospel Benefits from a Unified 
Language.”664  A unified language would allow the nation to avoid the costs of translating 
pamphlets and bibles into the numerous minority languages and Mandarin’s spread 
among minorities would thus greatly increase the society’s witness in these regions. As 
the OMF became aware of separatist movements in regions such as Tibet inside the PRC 
in the late 1980s, the society asked evangelicals to pray “true unity may be restored 
between Tibetans and Han Chinese.”665 While protective of the religious rights of 
Chinese Christians, the OMF supported the CCP claims to maintaining the bounds of 
imperial China by forging political unity and cultural integration against the religious 
rights of non-Christian minority groups.  
However, a form of Chinese mobility that troubled the OMF was the idea of 
“brain drain.” Media reports in the late 1980s suggesting that a majority of Chinese youth 
and professionals sent overseas after 1978 had not returned to their motherland. Such an 
outflow troubled the OMF since ideally converted elites would return to advance 
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  China	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evangelism and elevate Christianity’s status.666 These fears were heightened by similar 
reports that many doctors, lawyers, and business executives in Hong Kong planned to 
emigrate in response to the city’s handover to Chinese authorities.667 The OMF created 
prayers especially for Chinese participating in exchange programs or studying in western 
countries would return to positions of authority and influence.668 The OMF asked 
evangelicals to “pray God will raise up those willing to stay…to face privation and even 
persecution by staying in China to lead the church.”669 
The issue of “brain drain” was connected to OMF concerns that Chinese 
Christians would be less willing to make material and professional sacrifices to advance 
the Gospel in the future. Pointing to rising per capita incomes, the society warned “as 
Christians get richer their love for God may decrease.”670 Such concerns spoke to the 
OMF’s theories that the basis for Chinese Christianity’s revival was its purification by 
trial since the 1950s. Other prominent mission spokesmen such as David Wang of Asian 
Outreach espoused this theory as well. He argued that, “The church in China is stronger 
than many churches in the free world because of her struggle and suffering.”671 Thus, 
increasing social and religious freedom were a potential boon to evangelization, but 
materialism and affluence raised concerns that the Chinese Christian’s missionary zeal 
would wane in the coming years. And OMF publications lamented the rising 
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consumerism in Chinese society and the yawning gap between the “haves” and “have-
nots” in many areas.672 
The sense that Chinese rural women were among the “have-nots,” left outside the 
increasingly mobile classes in the PRC, drew many prayers from the OMF. The OMF 
advertised that women comprised as much as 80% of the church’s membership in many 
areas, especially in underground congregations. In returning to mainland China, the OMF 
revived its campaigns against Chinese women being “enslaved by feudal ideology” that 
kept them confined to the home and deprived of education. The OMF asked evangelicals 
to intercede through prayer on behalf of women, to make sure that reforms and 
modernization improved their lives and liberated them from these constraints.673 
The goal of mobilizing Chinese evangelicals inside and outside the PRC shaped 
the OMF China Program in a number of ways. With a dearth of Chinese members in the 
1980s, the society adjusted resources and outreach to focus more on Chinese churches 
and students in the U.S. and pockets of Chinese evangelicals, such as in Hong Kong for 
recruiting and promoting the missionary ideology. Secondly, the OMF built respect for 
Chinese spiritual sovereignty by creating the sense that Chinese evangelicals, both 
overseas and citizens of the PRC, were a dynamic and potentially revolutionary force 
within the world of missions.  In part, this image was produced by China’s 
modernizations and reforms. OMF agents witnessed the transnational flows of Chinese 
leaving and entering the PRC and improving socio-economic conditions inside the nation 
as harbingers of greater and greater opportunity for evangelism.  
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The OMF’s prayers and fellowship revealed the evangelical’s desire to harness 
and direct the transnational flows of Chinese mobility to fulfill the society’s traditional 
ambitions in China. In this era, the OMF and its supporters employed prayer to direct 
Chinese evangelicals to adopt the missionary vision and ambitions of the OMF by willing 
them to China’s boundaries in Mongolia or amongst minority groups such as the Lisu in 
Yunnan. This included willing Chinese Christians to resist restrictions on propagating the 
faith publically, as well as the temptations of affluence or lure of remaining abroad. In 
this sense, the OMF’s prayers against “brain drain” revealed then the society’s fears that 
Chinese evangelicals would shirk their racial right to lead the PRC’s evangelization. With 
their own role as catalysts, impelling Chinese Christians to become missionaries and 
directing their movements through prayer and discipleship training, white evangelicals 
still understood their own mobility as the catalyst behind missions to the PRC. 
However, the OMF’s China Program periodically flagged in confidence in the 
authority of house churches and the emphasis on aid and discipleship training spoke to 
paternalistic attitudes toward Chinese evangelicals. There were numerous aspects of the 
“underground” Christian revival that the OMF found worrisome as well. Thus, while 
noting the “strength” and zeal for evangelism of Chinese Christians, OMF publications 
also still on occasion referred to churches in Shandong as “scripturally hungry, very 
weak.”674 These “weaknesses” included a number of fears based on class and race 
concerning Chinese spiritual sovereignty. Firstly, many independent Chinese evangelical 
movements openly rejected western theology or the emphasis on official training and 
education for clergy and leadership. As Lian Xi has shown, a fundamental characteristic 
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of many underground Protestant Christian groups in China was their rejection of “formal 
theological education as mere human contrivance and therefore devoid of divine 
sanction.”675 At various points throughout the 1980s the OMF’s anxieties over these 
currents within underground Christianity were expressed in prayers concerned that 
underground Christianity featured a faith that was too “simplistic” or was prone to 
heresy. Correspondence from the OMF China Program noted the society’s fears that 
“false teachers” were rampant throughout the house-churches. OMF publications noted 
“a problem in rural churches is the inability of some to separate Christianity from rural 
superstitions. Even Christians of many years get confused.”676 
Secondly, many of these groups and evangelists such as the Shouters (Huhanpai) 
featured intense emotional displays of spirituality evident in dancing, prophesy, faith 
healing, or exorcisms that were suspect in the eyes of the OMF. Concerns about 
Christianity becoming tainted by the “superstitions” of Chinese continued to suffuse the 
mission as the Pray for China Fellowship warned, “sorcerers and wizards” were still 
active and influential in certain areas.677 In this respect, the OMF efforts at discipleship 
training through radio ministry and distribution of foreign publications reflected fears 
about the doctrinal integrity of Christianity. The society’s programs for training clergy 
and lay leaders and providing bible study were important, the OMF argued, because “if 
Christians mix their beliefs with superstitions, how much more will those who hear the 
Gospel without any previous knowledge of Christianity be muddled in their thinking.”678 
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The OMF tried to use discipleship training through radio and literature as a means to both 
aid underground Christianity but also to rehabilitate Chinese evangelicals. 
Recognition that Christianity thrived amongst some of the nation’s poorest and 
least educated groups contributed to the OMF’s desire to “strengthen” Chinese 
congregations. Fears about widespread illiteracy among Chinese Christians also 
contributed to the OMF’s support for the CCP’s campaigns in modernization. Prayers for 
expanding mass education in rural areas reminded OMF followers, “Spiritual literate 
leadership is critically important if the Church is to be scriptural in faith and practice.”679 
By funneling literature and radio programs from outside China to these communities the 
society hoped to influence beliefs. This was made even more problematic by the racial 
tropes about Chinese found within materials stressing the need for discipleship training 
programs for Chinese evangelicals. For example, an OMF slideshow produced by the 
society’s Disciple Training Center used by deputation speakers and representatives in the 
U.S. justified the society’s efforts at training Chinese Christians by featuring depictions 
of two Chinese pastors described by an OMF agent as “ignorant, boring, and totally 
inept,” and even “lecherous” in their lustful “eyeing” of young women. In the 
slideshow’s script, the OMF warned that such “uneducated” Christians would fail to craft 
messages that could win elites and college youth in Asia.680  
However, there were also a number of signs that the OMF’s respect for and 
commitment to Chinese spiritual sovereignty was greater than in decades past. While the 
concept of prayerful intercession was still infused by a militant mentality to evangelize 
China, the society also counseled against using prayer in ways that would undermine the 
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  1985).	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authority of Chinese Christians. The OMF produced a number of new books and 
materials guiding evangelicals in their use of prayer to advance the gospel in the PRC 
including Prayer Power Unlimited, Born for Battle, and God’s Powerful Weapon. These 
titles contributed to the OMF supporters’ sense of contribution and involvement in 
shaping normalization to aid Chinese Christians and the missionary movement. These 
books employed the concept of “saturation praying” with the idea that through prayer 
“we share, unite, and zero in on the target with specific and full coverage.”681 However, 
accounts of OMF members in the 1980s publicized the fact that certain leading Chinese 
Protestants, such as Professor Suen Hanxu of the Nanjing Theological Seminary, warned 
that even prayer could be a “form of enmity” if western churches and Christians 
continued to think of Chinese Christianity as “sick.” Relaying such statements to 
evangelicals outside the PRC, the OMF intended to avoid prayerful intercession based 
upon the idea of “rescuing” Chinese Christianity. 
The OMF’s greater respect for Chinese spiritual sovereignty was most evident in 
the constant allusions made by the society and its members to learning from the 
“strength” or “vitality” of Chinese Christianity. In fact, contacts with Chinese 
Christianity in the PRC produced scathing critiques of evangelicals and churches in the 
West. The OMF contrasted the vibrancy of churches in areas like Shaanxi with “the 
deadness of the western church” and held up their unity against the divisions and 
arguments dividing Christians in countries like the U.S. 682 At other times the Pray for 
China Fellowship complained of the “surfeit of Christian literature, tapes, seminars and 
every kind of aid” used to promote Christianity and infatuation “with finance and big 
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programs” in western countries.683 These critiques reinforced the OMF’s belief that in re-
establishing ties to the PRC the international community was not only aiding Chinese 
Christianity but came to mainland China to “learn” from Chinese evangelicals, and OMF 
publications spoke of evangelicals traveling to the PRC being “revolutionized” in their 
faith through contact with house churches.684 
 “Secondary Roles”: China Watching, Tourism, and Human Rights 
There were also a number of secondary roles open to white evangelicals to be 
involved in missions to China that the OMF pitched as respectful of Chinese sovereignty. 
Organizations like OMF referred to white American evangelicals as a “helper in the 
background with a low profile,” and argued their role would be to provide “education” 
for Chinese in “theological grounding” and “insight into the techniques and means of 
communication.”685 Within the U.S. the OMF helped establish a consensus among 
Protestant evangelicals on the types of activities acceptable for white evangelicals. For 
example, OMF representatives such as Prayer Secretary Maurine Flowers, Midwest 
Regional Secretary Will Bruce, and USA Home Director Ernest E. Heimbach attended 
and participated in the Evangelical China Consultation held at Chinese Christian Union 
Church in Chicago in 1975.   
The evangelicals at the meeting recommended a number of ways for non-Chinese 
evangelicals to contribute to Christianity’s expansion in China. Beyond prayerful 
intercession, the activities included research on mainland and overseas Chinese groups, 
conducting regional seminars and producing periodicals on missiology to Chinese, and 
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direct ministry to groups from China traveling and living outside the mainland, 
particularly students and immigrants. Lastly, conference panels and discussions embraced 
the goal of sending Christian professionals and tourists as a form of Christian witness and 
source of critical information about the churches and status of Christianity.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many of these activities defined the OMF’s 
China Program and resumption of mission work in the PRC as a “creative access nation.” 
The OMF initiated a number of projects imagined as forms of aid to Chinese Christianity 
via radio, literature, and research. Since the 1950s, the OMF had partnered with the Far 
East Broadcasting Company to beam Christian programming to the PRC. Building on the 
partnership, the society devoted more resources to broadcasting Christian radio 
programming and a new partnership was established with Trans World Radio. By the 
mid-1980s, OMF programs were sent daily to the PRC from radio towers in Manila, 
Okinawa, Saipan, and Jeju. For non-Christians, the OMF began programming described 
as “pre-evangelistic” in both Mandarin and Cantonese designed to attract interested 
listeners, and laying the groundwork for understanding Christian theology. Already by 
1979, the Far East Broadcasting Company’s radio waves were powerful enough to 
penetrate China’s borders and reach listeners in Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. 
 The society’s role in China watching was expanded through a partnership with 
Christian Communications Limited in Hong Kong. Together the two organizations built a 
research institute on Chinese Christianity, the Chinese Church Research Center (CRCC). 
The CRCC collected newspapers, magazines, and books from mainland China and the 
rest of East Asia to facilitate research on and evangelism to Chinese. CRCC staff 
members also interviewed refugees from the mainland and other migrants to keep abreast 
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of changing social and political conditions inside China. In addition, the organization 
held study groups in the Hong Kong area to prepare Chinese evangelists for work in the 
PRC and developed Christian literature geared specifically to individuals born and raised 
in a communist society. Lastly, in the 1980s the CRCC produced a series of pamphlets 
for attracting Chinese converts that were used by the OMF and its supporters in the U.S. 
and the PRC. 
Radio and literature were increasingly critical to the OMF’s attempts to aid 
Chinese Christians and engage in discipleship training. Labeling the lack of Christian 
literature in the PRC a spiritual “famine,” the OMF offices in Hong Kong and Theodere 
Hsueh of the Christian Communications Limited the society sent Christian training 
materials and pastoral bible kits to mainland Chinese churches.686 By 1985 the OMF was 
sending thousands of study sets to Chinese pastors a year, and by the end of the decade 
the Christian Communications Ltd.  sent over 250,000 books and pamphlets, 90,000 
tracts, 9,000 bibles, and over 41,000 bible study sets to mainland Christians.687 And while 
the OMF still used radio to attract converts with the “Golden Age Radio Hour,” 
partnerships with Trans World Radio and the Far East Broadcasting Company allowed 
the OMF to sponsor and produce programs like “The Truth We Believe,” to provide 
spiritual training for existing believers and clergy.  
Outside of mobilizing Chinese evangelicals, the OMF played a more direct role in 
missions to China by capitalizing on tourism to further its activities in China watching. In 
1979, OMF senior leadership selected David Adeney to lead the OMF’s China Program 
in the U.S. Adeney had been an active voice in a number of fora in North America on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686	  Letter	  from	  David	  Adeney	  to	  OMF	  USA	  Home	  Council,	  July	  28	  1980.	  	  
687	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (January	  1985);	  Pray	  for	  China	  
Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (November	  1988).	  
	   351	  
prospect of the missionary’s return to China and one of the first OMF members to gain 
entry to the country in 1978. He returned from this first visit convinced of Christianity’s 
survival and hopeful of its revival. In setting the agenda for the OMF’s China Program, 
Adeney argued that the “greatest need is to understand what is going on in China and 
pray for intercession.”  Based upon his own visits to China in the 1970s and 1980s and 
the OMF communications with Chinese churches, Christian professionals, and travelers 
in China, Adeney developed a China Awareness Seminar for evangelicals outside the 
PRC. 
The China Awareness Seminars educated Christians on the topics deemed critical 
to understanding the PRC and Chinese Christianity, but also trained interested travelers in 
using tourism to advance the gospel. The seminars were pitched as training “for those 
wanting to get involved in evangelizing to Chinese,” and provided information on a 
number of topics.The basic core of the presentations included topics such as: the History 
of Christianity in China, Chinese Communism and China’s Religious Policy, The 
Development of the Chinese Church under Communism, and A Biblical Basis for 
Witness in a Totalitarian Society.688 An intensive study course, the China Awareness 
Seminar handbook was over 150 pages long, went through several editions, and was 
supplemented by numerous pamphlets, audiovisual materials, and films. Along with the 
seminars, the Pray for China Fellowship promoted awareness of relations between 
Chinese Christians and the state by recounting the travels of Christian tourists and 
expatriates, and reproducing letters from Chinese evangelicals inside the PRC.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688	  Pamphlet	  for	  China	  Awareness	  Seminar	  from	  Chinese	  World	  Mission	  Center,	  OMF	  Home	  Council	  
Papers,	  Billy Graham Evangelical Center, Wheaton, Illinois.	  
	   352	  
During the 1980s, Adeney and the China Awareness Seminars were a popular part 
of the OMF China Program’s outreach across the U.S. as well as internationally. Inside 
the U.S., Adeney and various members of the OMF China Program held China 
Awareness Seminars throughout the 1980s in cities such as Boston, Pasadena, Seattle, 
Palo Alto, Davis, San Francisco, Chicago, Indianapolis, Denver, Boulder, Philadelphia, 
Virginia Beach, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and Houston. By the mid-1980s, the OMF 
China Program held similar functions in Australia, Canada, Scandinavia, Germany, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Holland, and Hong Kong.689  
The allure of the China Awareness Seminars for evangelicals was that the OMF 
promised glimpses of another “reality” that was not accessible to “the average visitor to 
China from overseas.”690 More than just “understanding” contemporary China, the OMF 
trained evangelicals on how to find the “real” China hidden behind facades created by the 
TSPM, CCP, and even western media. Adeney accused foreign guests praising the CCP’s 
achievements with creating “a picture of the mythological China, failing to perceive the 
real China in which there is still a great mass of suffering and confusion.”691  But while 
the China Awareness Seminars taught Christians to see and find oppression in the PRC, 
the OMF also hoped to reveal the “hidden church” not accessible to most travelers and 
foreign visitors to the PRC. Beyond the TSPM and pathways of most tourism routes, the 
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OMF China program alerted Christian evangelicals to a “vibrant spiritual life found in 
many country churches” where many itinerant evangelists and bands “risk their own 
liberty in order to take the Gospel to unevangelized areas.”692  
Adeney and the OMF were far from alone in arguing that there was another side 
to China not available to groups following the itineraries set by the China International 
Travel Service (CITS), the official governmental body responsible for directing the travel 
of foreign guests in the PRC. In the 1970s and 1980s numerous American travelers and 
journalists pointed to the circumstances of travel in the PRC as barriers to “knowing” the 
“real” China or Chinese. The use of group tours and people-to-people exchange groups, 
limitations on the number of visas approved, the relatively low number of Chinese cities 
open to tourism, the necessity of travel with Chinese tour guides and interpreters, and the 
pre-eminence of the CITS in approving itineraries were all criticized by various writers as 
hindering the ability of foreigners to see the “real” China. Many Americans criticized the 
lack of direct contact with “ordinary citizens,” chafed at traveling in large groups, and 
especially resented the constant oversight of “minders,” official guides and government 
agents seemingly obsessive about accompanying travelers at all times.693  
These conditions produced growing resentment among Europeans and Americans 
guests with the circumstances of travel. In some cases groups expressed boredom or 
disappointment with group tours. The Washington Post’s headlines mocked “Just Like A 
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Class Trip: China, With All the Predictability of a Class Excursion,” and “The Package 
Deal is Predictable—But What Did You Expect?”694 Another effect, according to scholars 
like Tim Oakes, was for travelers to arrive in China on a “quest of debunking the tourist 
traps thrown at them and somehow maneuvering behind the veil to discover the real 
China.”695 In helping to find the “real” Chinese Christianity, or China off the script of the 
CITS, or outside the major cities, the OMF satiated critical desires for many Americans. 
These ideas about a “real” and “fake” China sustained American Cold War 
suspicions about the CCP’s manipulation of tourism and diplomatic exchanges. Foreign 
guests like Adeney suggested that the limits and restrictions on the tours showed the 
CCP’s intent to obscure the foreigner’s vision and direct contact with “real” Chinese. 
Such criticisms had been leveled at the CCP throughout the Cold War. For instance, in 
April of 1960 the Committee on House Un-American Activities Commission (HUAC) 
published an account of its hearings on tourism and foreign dignitaries in China entitled 
“How the Chinese Reds Hoodwink Visiting Foreigners.” In this report, a Chinese émigré 
to the U.S., Robert Loh, testified that the Chinese Communist Party created “showcase” 
cities, homes, and even religious services which were atypical in Chinese society in order 
to deceive foreign guests. One consequence of this “deception,” according to Loh, was 
that the CCP was able to hide severe persecution of religious groups such Buddhists, 
Catholics, and Protestant Christians from the international community.696  
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By disseminating these images Loh and HUAC charged foreign guests and 
dignitaries such as President Sukarno of Indonesia and the Dali Lama of being no more 
than pawns of the CCP. Loh suggested that through manipulating foreign dignitaries the 
CCP was able to mislead the international community about Chinese society. Hugh 
Trevor, Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, leveled similar accusations 
following his tour in 1965 with the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding. Trevor 
claimed that on his tour he encountered Chinese guides intent on keeping him from any 
“intelligent contact” with civilians and spent most of his time being “drenched daily with 
identical tabloid propaganda adapted to the minds of peasant children.” Such accounts 
left many travelers fearing the CCP’s total control and manipulation of tourism for its 
own ends. 
Similarly, Protestant evangelicals roundly criticized delegations of Christian 
clergy representing national church organizations in the U.S., Canada, Great Britain and 
the World Council of Churches visiting China from the 1950s through the 1970s. These 
groups were also condemned for painting a false image of religious tolerance and 
freedom enjoyed by Chinese Christians. Prominent OMF spokesman Leslie Lyall 
referred to an Australian delegation of Protestant Christians visiting the PRC in 1959 as 
“hoodwinked” in much the same fashion as Loh had said Sukarno had been by the 
CCP.697  
In the 1970s and 1980s as international media and Christian delegations spoke of 
greater religious liberty in the PRC, the OMF rallied evangelicals to contain this 
“misinformation” through prayer. For example, the May 1984 edition of Pray for China 
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reported on upcoming travels by delegations from the TSPM and CCC led by Bishop 
Ding to Australia and New Zealand with the note, “May these visits not be used to cloud 
the real situation of the Church in China.” In February 1989 the Pray for China 
Fellowship warned “an increasing number of books on the church in China published by 
Western Christian visitors to China deal very superficially with the situation, denying any 
governmental control of the churches.”698 The society was also adamantly opposed to 
journalists or Christians from the west who were effusive in their praise for the CCP or 
life in the PRC.  
By misleading the international community, the OMF charged, these groups were 
leaving the Chinese people, especially Christians, devoid of spiritual support from the 
international community. During his own journeys, Adeney told the OMF’s followers 
that “A Chinese university professor, who has now left China, told me that his friends 
cursed the American visitors whose glowing reports of the ‘New China’ were translated 
from English and published in Peking newspapers.” Conversely, traveling to China was 
not just about restoring fellowship for evangelicals’ it was also about seeing firsthand the 
persecution felt by Chinese Christians. As one visitor wrote in 1981, western Christians 
had “heard” of the “wound” inflicted upon Christians in the 1950s and 1960s, but after 
visiting the PRC many had now “seen and touched it.”699 
Alternatively, the OMF intended to use travel as a means to focus the attention of 
the international community on the continued abuse of Chinese Christians and invoked 
the sense that their accounts gave voice to the people “hidden” behind the scripted tours 
of official delegations. The OMF and its supporters traveling to China for then became a 
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contest over the “truth” about Christianity in the PRC. The OMF trained individual 
evangelicals to participate in revealing the “truth” about China through their own travels, 
and, in return, a steady stream of evangelicals going to and from the PRC kept the society 
informed on the relations between Christianity and the state across the country. Armed 
with cassette players and tape recorders by the OMF’s China Program, Christians 
traveled to document the experiences of Chinese evangelicals, as part of the OMF’s 
campaign to reveal the “truth” of the church’s situation in society. 
From these accounts and correspondence with Chinese evangelicals, the OMF’s 
China Program endeavored to balance out reports of the CCP’s achievements in 
modernization or growing tolerance of religion by focusing on its human rights record in 
a number of ways. First, the society hoped to “give voice” to hundreds of Chinese 
Christians who suffered persecution during the 1950s and 1960s, especially cataloging 
their trials during the Cultural Revolution. Further, OMF publications called attentions to 
pastors and clergy jailed in the 1950s or 1960s who remained in prison long after China’s 
“opening up.” 
Secondly, the OMF called attention to a wide range of Chinese Christian groups 
that suffered harassment, detention, or surveillance by governmental authorities. The 
OMF regularly reported on closures of house churches ordered by either the government 
or the TSPM, and the detention of evangelists and pastors.  At several points in the 
1980s, the Pray for China Fellowship warned several times that religious toleration and 
freedom was in danger. Rallying evangelicals to pray for the defense of the house 
church’s independence, the OMF drew attention to the detention of such leaders as Xu 
Yongze, leader of numerous churches in Central and North China, and Lin Xianggao of 
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the Damazhan church in Guangzhou. And in the fall of 1987, the Fellowship decried the 
arrests of Christians in Hebei, Shanxi, Jiangsu, and across Central China.700  
Lastly, the OMF rallied evangelicals to engage in China watching to call attention 
to the constraints placed upon the Chinese evangelical’s lack of rights that denied them a 
mobility needed to propagate and express their faith.  On an institutional level, the OMF 
monitored the TSPM’s reopening of churches, seminaries, and publishing operations, 
calling attention to the limited number of venues available to Christians for worship, 
training, and education and pushing for their expansion. The society was also 
vociferously critical of the lack of a right to Christians to offer many forms of religious 
education, especially for youth. 701 Conversely, no rights were more important to the 
OMF than the limits on the Chinese evangelical’s right to promote engage in evangelism. 
As a result, the society was especially critical of regulations limiting Chinese Protestants 
to “non-organized forms” of evangelism confined to church properties and their 
immediate neighborhoods.702  In the late 1980s, the OMF highlighted new regulations in 
Guangzhou, Henan, Anhui, Shandong, and Sichuan that denied non-registered Christians, 
those not officially members of TSPM churches, the right to engage in evangelism and 
itinerations across cities and provinces. 703 The overarching agenda of the OMF was to 
rally evangelicals to pressure the CCP into granting broad religious rights to Chinese 
evangelicals such as allowing for “wide and unhindered gospel proclamation” and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (November	  1987).	  
701	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (October	  1984).	  
702	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (October	  1981).	  
703	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (November	  1987).;	  Pray	  for	  China	  
Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  	  (July/August	  1988).	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resist any law which “confined” evangelism or evangelicals to “mud and brick 
buildings.”704  
A second critical issue to the OMF was discrimination felt by Chinese Christians 
in their lack of social mobility. Various reports from the OMF referenced the experiences 
of Christians denied educational or career opportunities seemingly because of their faith. 
Letters to the Pray for China Fellowship even recounted stories of Christians within the 
CCP or political institutions being expelled and reduced to menial labor.705 Open hostility 
to Chinese Christians was evident in many areas and not just from the party. In society, 
the OMF claimed non-Christians often mocked Chinese Christian for their beliefs, and 
knowledge of their faith caused them to suffer social isolation. The lack of the Christian’s 
social mobility was seen by the OMF as a critical obstacle to reaching society’s youth. 
Although the OMF saw evidence that “more and more college students turning to Christ,” 
the “costs of Christianity” to their professional and social ambitions forced many to avoid 
public fellowship or declarations of faith.706 As long as such problems existed, the OMF 
believed Christianity’s place in society would be tenuous, and its reach with elites and 
professional classes would continually suffer from the religion’s association with 
stigmatization as “superstition” and among the nation’s less educated.   
Thus, while the OMF espoused respect for the limits placed upon foreign 
missions in the PRC, the society intended to exploit tourism to expose the discrimination 
of Chinese Christians and rally the international evangelical community to their defense.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (November	  1983).;	  Pray	  for	  China	  
Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (November	  1983);	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  
China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (October	  1984).	  
705	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (April	  1986);	  Pray	  for	  China	  
Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July/August	  1987).	  
706	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July/August	  1987).	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Through activities like the China Awareness Seminars, the OMF played upon the familiar 
ideas of a “real” and “fake” China, and trained many Christian travelers how to move 
“behind the veil” of scripted tours by the CITS or contacts with the TSPM. By “giving 
voice” to past and current suffering experienced by Chinese Christians the OMF used 
opportunities created by rapprochement to keep Sino-American normalization focused on 
religion. Travel became a means for foreign evangelicals to advocate for greater religious 
tolerance and freedom for Chinese Christians in the PRC by attempting to bypass the 
“artifice” of official tours and relations with the TSPM and forge contacts with the house 
churches. Though the OMF promoted respect for Chinese spiritual sovereignty and the 
right of Chinese to lead evangelism in the PRC, the society’s acceptance of these 
positions was balanced by efforts to expand the Chinese Christian’s mobility and rights to 
propagate the faith.  In this particular dimension of the OMF’s China Program, the 
mission resisted the constraints placed upon foreign travelers and reasserted the idea of 
the foreigner’s freedom of access to all of Chinese civilization. 
Evangelism and the Four Modernizations  
Beyond China watching, by the early 1980s the OMF publicized a number of 
ways to exploit the developing networks of tourism and exchange between the U.S. and 
China to create opportunities to engage more directly in evangelism and “strengthening” 
the Chinese church. In the early 1970s, the OMF argued that missionary work for white 
evangelicals was only a “distant possibility” in the PRC, but counseled that in the future 
they could return to the PRC as “teaching elders.” Later in the decade, OMF spokesman 
Lyall predicted that in the near future, “China may one day welcome foreign lecturers, 
scientists, medical personnel, English teachers, musicians, artists, and research students 
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as well as businessmen,” which would allow the OMF and other agencies to send white 
evangelicals from the U.S., Canada, and Europe back to China in an unofficial capacity. 
By the 1980s, following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power the launching of reforms meant 
to achieve the Four Modernizations in the fields of national defense, agriculture, industry, 
and science and technology such opportunities existed with increasing regularity, and the 
society promoted their use by evangelicals.  
Through travel and cultural exchange, the OMF sent travelers, students, and 
professionals to the PRC armed with Christian literature to distribute and hopes to 
connect with Christians from house churches.707 While the OMF reiterated that there was 
“no room” for missionaries, there were ever more opportunities for thousands of teachers, 
scientists, and engineers to live and work in China while representing Christianity 
through their personal lives.708 With promotional materials like “Christian Professionals 
Think China,” the OMF advertised the various professions, sectors of the economy, and 
regions open to foreign experts and investment in the PRC. Similarly, China Awareness 
Seminars offered training in practices of evangelism suitable for the PRC.709 In addition, 
the society encouraged Christian businessmen to participate by referring to trade and 
foreign investment as “good boats” for the Christian message to travel on to enter the 
PRC.710  A second critical agenda of the OMF’s “creative access” missionary work was 
the CCP itself. Through these various avenues to the PRC the OMF urged evangelicals to 
both advance the gospel but also contribute to the “economic betterment” of the nation.711 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707	  Overseas	  Missionary	  Fellowship,	  Prayer	  Directory,	  (March	  1985).	  
708Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (February	  1984).	  
709	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (March	  1988).	  
710	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (March	  1984).	  
711	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (March	  1985).	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More directly, the OMF organized a small number of exchange programs in the 
1980s. By 1980, the OMF was already connected to Christian English teachers living in 
six different Chinese cities. The mission also facilitated professional exchange tours in 
the 1980s, for example, connecting Christian doctors and health administrators from the 
U.S. with health authorities in Shanghai. For college age evangelicals,  the OMF offered 
study abroad opportunities at Xiamen University in Fujian and at Teacher’s University in 
Qinghai. In other cases, the OMF served as a referral service for U.S. evangelicals putting 
them in touch with opportunities for service as Christian professionals with allies like 
Martha Chan and the Christian Service for China, the Amity Foundation to work as 
teachers in Jiangsu province, and also offered its assistance in enrolling interested U.S. 
evangelicals at other universities across China.712 
Within these currents of China’s opening up, the OMF promoted the use of 
“discreet” evangelism to advance the gospel and aid Chinese Christians. More than just 
promoting these activities, the OMF trained evangelicals in the techniques of “discreet” 
evangelism using professional or travel opportunities without antagonizing the 
government and society. The OMF’s various activities were devised to avoid the risks, in 
Adeney’s words, of the more “sensational promotional drives of some Caucasian 
groups.” Similarly, the Pray For China Fellowship promoted the idea that through the 
OMF, foreign experts and exchange groups could learn to evangelize in the PRC  “in a 
humble and sensitive spirit” without “being insensitive” to the position of Chinese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712	  The	  society	  was	  unable	  to	  be	  directly	  connected	  as	  part	  of	  the	  exchange,	  but	  it	  was	  allowed	  to	  
attach	  the	  Christian	  Medical	  Society	  as	  a	  sponsor	  for	  the	  trip.	  July	  28	  1980	  letter	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Christians and outlined forms of “discreet” witness that would not violate the bounds of 
this implicit agreement.713 
 While staying within the bounds of “appropriate” and “discreet” forms of 
evangelism, the OMF touted that Christian expatriates should win first the friendship and 
then later the hearts and minds of Chinese. The China Research Center encouraged 
Christians interested in evangelizing through tourism or exchange to study hermeneutics 
and books dealing with communist theory, but the organization was adamant that Chinese 
in the PRC would not be converted by philosophical arguments. It would not do well to 
approach Chinese through “stereotyped or confrontational witness,” and aggressive, 
public forms of propagating Christianity were clearly unwise and provocative in the PRC. 
Rather, the OMF encouraged evangelicals to capitalize on general curiosity about the 
world outside China and the opportunities afforded travelers and expatriates for 
socialization with Chinese to use “friendship” as the means to spread the gospel. 
Friendship as the key to evangelistic outreach informed the OMF’s approach to 
Chinese intellectuals and scholars traveling abroad as well. Focused on American 
universities and college campuses, the OMF encouraged Christians to work with foreign 
student offices, campus churches, and groups like the Inter-Varsity Fellowship to provide 
game, film nights, and other social events for visiting Chinese. The OMF China Program 
also produced and distributed pamphlets educating evangelicals on how to use friendship 
such as China at Your Doorstep: Christian Friendships with Mainland Chinese.714 And 
topics such as “Christian Friendships with Chinese” were featured in the China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July	  1981);	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  
Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (September	  1985);	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  
Bulletin,	  (April	  1986).	  
714Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (February	  1988).	  
	   364	  
Awareness Seminars.715The key to winning the interest of Chinese intellectuals, Dick 
Andrews of the China Program argued, was to start with offering friendship and 
socialization. Only once a relationship had been started was it wise to approach these 
visitors with more “direct evangelism.” Andrews also suggested it was best to avoid 
political discussion or any criticism of the PRC.  
Befriending Chinese was both “discreet” and a far more effective form of 
evangelism, the OMF argued. Interest in the west, especially the keys to its modernity, 
and curiosity in the lives and habits of westerners would provide the Christian ample 
opportunities to “discreetly” evangelize to Chinese. There was no need for overt, 
evangelist techniques since conversations about life and societies outside China easily 
transitioned into an opening for the Christian to talk about faith. For example, OMF 
writers noted that Chinese curiosity about foreign holidays and customs eventually 
wound up at the topic of Christmas, an entry point for talking about Jesus Christ, without 
much effort on the part of Christians.716  
Another element of winning friendship and “discreetly” evangelizing, the OMF 
claimed came simply by living “Christian lives.” The majority of students attracted to 
Christianity, the OMF reported, had first noticed the “Christ-like lives of Christian 
teachers.” Through these accounts, the OMF championed the idea that many in Chinese 
society had noticed the difference between foreign Christians and non-Christians. For 
instance, the OMF reported that the students of a Christian couple teaching in the PRC 
praised them for their friendliness and propriety, in contrast to a colleague’s frequent 
drunkenness, irritability, and sexual advances. A similar story was told of a young tour 
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  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (March	  1988).	  
716	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (December	  1984).	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guide eager to learn of Christianity after noticing differences between Christian and non-
Christian travelers.   
Other than “being Christians,” expatriates and travelers were advised to be as 
“Chinese” as possible in order to win the respect and openness of the people to the 
Christian message. Returning to the ethos of the society’s founder, the China Research 
Center advised Christian tourists and expatriates to live the Chinese “lifestyle” and be 
“100% Chinese.” Not surprisingly, mobility continued to be at the center of the OMF’s 
ideas about identification and fellowship with Chinese. Martha Chan of the Chinese 
Church Research Center encouraged foreign evangelicals to “share the same kind of 
dishes in the snack shops or small restaurants,” but also fundamentally to move as 
Chinese did, “we squeeze in the same jam-packed buses, we walk if we cannot get on a 
bus.”717 Moving as “Chinese” reaffirmed the OMF’s traditional ethos of identifying with 
the people through mobility, and yet also reinforced the society’s emphasis on 
demonstrating the foreign evangelical’s willingness to make accommodations with the 
PRC.  
Many of these notions about personal evangelism and friendship were taken as 
lessons drawn from the international Christian community from its renewed ties with the 
Chinese churches in the PRC. The OMF theorized that Chinese Christianity’s 
resurrection had been forged through the simple methods of personal evangelism without 
the use of institutions, wealth, or public influence. Chinese Christians attracted converts 
with “quality of their lives,” and their sacrificial lifestyle was their “powerful witness.”718  
Through contacts with Chinese Christian, the OMF condemned aspects of Christianity in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717	  Martha	  Chan,	  “Christians	  in	  Rural	  Areas,”	  China	  Research	  Center,	  (October/December	  1981).	  
718Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  	  (July/August	  1987).	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the West as over-civilized, bloated by its bureaucratic institutions and values, and 
“softened” by its material prosperity into a flabby faith. 
Conversely, throughout the 1980s, however, members of the OMF increasingly 
pushed the bounds of “discreet” evangelism. For instance, a few agents of the OMF 
widely distributed copies of the OMF’s “The Good News Reader,” a text used by the 
OMF since 1928 to teach literacy and introductory Christian concepts, via travel on trains 
and along highways.719 An account from 1986 of another Christian tourist affiliated with 
the OMF provided bible teaching to an audience on a train using bibles written in both 
English and Chinese. 720 Thus, for the OMF and its allies being “discreet” occasionally 
gave way to excitement to very public and mobile forms of evangelism that pushed the 
bounds of the limits placed on the foreign community’s involvement in spreading the 
gospel.   
Such accounts could be read as signs of the nation’s increasing tolerance and 
freedom for all Christians, but the mobility of OMF agents engaged in “creative access” 
missionary work also confused the distinctions between how missions in a “creative 
access nation” differed at all from the society’s approach in China’s imperialist past that 
it had hoped to transcend. It is interesting to note, then, how the OMF’s return to working 
in the PRC sometimes reproduced the pathways of the Protestant missionary’s initial 
penetration of China in the nineteenth century. As scholars such as John King Fairbank 
have noted, the areas most open to the foreign community in the 1980s, such as the 
Special Economic Zones in the Guandong Delta and along China’s southeast coast, were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (March/April	  1987).	  
720	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (May	  1986).	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mostly the former treaty ports opened following the Opium Wars.721 Stories circulated by 
the OMF in the 1980s of former China missionaries cycling the countryside while 
evangelizing, described a remarkably similar approach to missionary work to those found 
in the pages of China’s Millions in the 1940s. One missionary traveling across rural 
church networks in Central and South China in 1986 described their “conditions” as the 
same as they were a “hundred years ago.”722 Outside of evangelism, the return of former 
missionaries as tourists in the 1970s and 1980s saw thousands of requests to seek out 
former homes, schools, colleagues and fellow Christians, remote cities where they once 
worked, and the graves of lost loved ones and family members across the nation. These 
tours gave rise to campaigns to establish monuments, markers, or public 
acknowledgement of the “positive” role played by foreign missions in the Chinese past. 
Hoping to return to the PRC primarily to see “Old China” produced movements to make 
these memories visible again. Coupled with the desire to resume evangelism in some 
fashion and resist limitations placed upon the mobility of foreigners in the PRC as 
travelers, the foreign evangelical’s push for greater and greater access to Chinese 
civilization was in many ways an attempt to recover the mobility and by extension the 
missionary’s rights of the imperialist era.  
These ideas about friendship, discreet witness, and contributing to the PRC’s state 
building and modernization were the lynchpins of this aspect of the OMF’s “creative 
access” missionary work to the PRC in the 1980s. Unlike the OMF’s activities in China 
watching, evangelism through tourism and expatriatism promoted accommodation with 
the CCP and even encouraged evangelicals to earn their access through transferring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
721	  John	  King	  Fairank,	  China:	  A	  New	  History,	  Second	  Edition	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1992):	  p.	  413.	  
722	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July	  1986).	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technical expertise, investment, or education that would strengthen both the society and 
the state. Simultaneously, the emphasis on “friendship” helped revive the idea of a 
“special relationship” that brought goodwill between the PRC and the international 
community and spoke to the implied consent of Chinese authorities, spiritual and 
political, to the evangelical’s right to evangelize inside the PRC.  
The OMF created the sense that these opportunities to evangelize through tourism 
and exchange were critical to Christianity’s future in the PRC in two important ways. 
First, by working within the opportunities created by China’s modernization, evangelicals 
could reach key demographics in society. Especially as teachers, evangelicals could 
influence students and youth, groups keenly interested in both the west and Christianity. 
OMF writers like Chan claimed that current Chinese youth were at an ideological and 
spiritual “crossroads,” that teachers would play a pivotal role in helping them to navigate. 
Allies of the society like the BGC’s China Program similarly promoted the idea that the 
Cultural Revolution had destroyed China’s “superstitions” and “false religions” while the 
last three decades of “political upheavals, social injustices, and economic disasters” left 
most of the population “disillusioned by broken promises of the Communist leadership,” 
and “seeking an alternative ideology.”723 To promote Christianity, evangelicals could take 
advantage of Chinese individual aspirations and desires to improve their nation, 
especially among youth and intellectuals. Chinese learning English, obtaining western 
education, or otherwise engaging the west in the forms of tourism and foreign investment 
would all open avenues for the propagation of the gospel.724  
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  Billy	  Graham	  China	  Program	  Papers,	  Billy Graham Evangelical Center, Wheaton, Illinois	  
724	  Carl	  Armerding	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Intellectuals, college students, and various experts and technicians were all groups 
important to China’s political and economic future, and, yet, also groups far removed 
socially and geographically from the reaches of evangelists and leaders of Chinese house 
churches. The sending of Christian professionals reflected both the OMF’s desire to play 
a more direct role in evangelism, but also the belief that those Chinese evangelicals from 
rural and less educated backgrounds could not hope to convert elites. And without the 
backing of elites, Christianity and its followers were bound to remain a vulnerable 
minority in society. Despites it support for the house churches, the OMF feared the 
prevalence of spiritual gifts such as faith healing or prophesy within the house churches 
and a plethora of followers in rural areas amongst the uneducated and marginalized 
contributed to the stigmatization of Christianity as “superstition” with the CCP and elites.  
Sending Christian professionals from the west, especially those working in the 
sciences, as a means to rehabilitate the perception of Christianity in the eyes of elites and 
the state by combatting the idea that Christianity and science were incompatible. Proving 
the compatibility of Christianity with modernization,  and especially with scientific 
thought, influenced the OMF’s publishing agenda as well. As a result, the OMF 
published literature with the intent to “prove Jesus was a real person,” but also to “show 
Christianity can help nation and people.” Further, OMF publishers created literature 
designed for intellectuals and scientists on themes such as the basics of Christianity, but 
also apologetic literature proving the compatibility of Christianity and science.725 
Publications distributed to Chinese focused on Christian engineers or computer scientists 
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  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	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  for	  China	  Monthly	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  (August	  1985).	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such as the “Father of the Modern Computer” and highlighted the religious convictions of 
well-known scientists, intellectuals, and political thinkers.726 
By utilizing openings within the China’s modernization campaigns to approach 
elites the OMF hoped to solve the problem of Christianity’s social mobility. While the 
OMF praised the “new climate of freedom and respect Christian intellectuals are 
enjoying” and saw evidence of Christians using their professions to advance the gospel, 
the society was also acutely aware that the large majority of evangelicals were not of the 
professional and intellectual classes.727 If Christianity was indeed a barrier to social 
mobility in the PRC, then it was imperative that those already within the upper echelons 
be won to the faith. The great barrier to conversion, the OMF argued, for the non-
Christian Chinese elite was that it seemed to entail an abandonment of professional 
ambitions, rational thought, and the hope to play a role in their nation’s development. 
Secondly, Christians from the west were intended to be visual, object lessons in 
Christianity’s compatibility with both the nation’s modernization and the individual’s 
career and social aspirations.    
In return for making contributions to the nation’s reforms the OMF promoted the 
idea that the government, society, and the churches implicitly granted foreign 
evangelicals the right to “discreetly” engage in evangelism. The society referred to 
entering the PRC through programs to promote China’s modernization as the “service 
entrance,” and at other times advertised China’s call for foreign experts as an “invitation” 
for Protestant evangelicals to evangelize the PRC “on China’s terms.”  
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These ideas about the CCP’s implicit acceptance of foreign evangelism were 
reinforced by the OMF claims that the CCP preferred the foreign Christian to the non-
Christian professional. In the Pray for China bulletin, OMF representatives from Hong 
Kong claimed that because of China’s modernization the “door is wide open” for 
overseas Chinese and westerners to enter the PRC to help and even insisted that the 
government authorities preferred Christians to non-Christians.728 The advertisement 
stated, “The disciplined lifestyle of the Christian is fitting the idealism of China today!”729 
Conversely, the Pray for China Fellowship claimed that because of history and politics, 
the CCP could “never say publically they want Christians,” but secretly preferred 
Christian foreign experts and businessmen. The OMF claimed that the CCP recognized 
“their lifestyle, reliability, co-operation and willing, humbler service” exhibited a “deeper 
concern” to make contributions to the country.730  
In addition to gaining the right to evangelize, the OMF urged evangelicals that 
through contributing to the nation’s development, evangelicals could change the Party’s 
outlook on Christianity. As proof of this, the OMF pointed to the government and 
society’s growing willingness to acknowledge the contributions of Christians as signs of 
increasing tolerance and acceptance. For instance, in 1985 the OMF noted that in 
Chengdu over thirty local Christians had been publically commended for their societal 
contributions to the nation.731 There were also signs of flexibility in society’s perspective 
on missionaries past and present, too. Pray for China reported that a high official had 
recently told a delegation of foreign guests that Hudson Taylor was a “great man” and 
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  Pray	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  China	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that he hoped all Christians would express love for the nation. The OMF’s optimism was 
not so over-confident as to mistakenly think that the battle over public perception was 
nearing victory; the same issue noted that Taylor had been condemned as an imperialist 
in a series of lectures at Nanjing Theological Seminary.732  
This dimension of the OMF’s work in the PRC the society contributed to the 
sense that governmental attitudes toward Christians, while at many times still hostile to 
Christianity, were becoming more tolerant, and evangelicals hoped to demonstrate that 
Christianity was not “a threat” to the CCP but the “real answer to China’s needs.”733 
Evangelical hopes in this respect were boosted by the OMF’s reports that even “many 
other Party members are disillusioned and see communist ideals as unobtainable.”734The 
OMF circulated reports that within the CCP “some local cadres and even high-up 
officials are secret believers,” and one issue of the Pray for China Fellowship boasted, 
“even party members listen to the radio” but did so “secretly” with ear plugs.735 
There was also a notion created by the OMF’s missionary work through exchange 
programs that with modernization’s success would come more liberal policies toward 
religious freedom and also more “openness” to the international community. During this 
period, the OMF linked events related to internal party dynamics within the CCP and the 
prospect of political liberalization to the status of Christianity in society and its rights. 
Throughout the 1980s many requests asked OMF supporters to “pray unceasingly for all 
leaders.” Pray for China Fellowship brochures asked that on Fridays evangelicals pray for 
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government authorities, more specifically Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Deng Xiaoping 
as they tackled the “tremendous task” of a “billion people’s needs.”736 Indeed, the OMF 
invested much in the success of China’s reforms as led by the CCP with such prayer 
requests as “wise implementations of Four Modernizations.”737 The OMF found and built 
confidence in Christianity’s revival on the basis of proclamations from leaders such as 
Zhao’s statement that “China has opened its door and will never close it again.” 
 While also highlighting hundreds of cases of abuse against Christians, the OMF in 
the early 1980s praised the government “for the new freedom” experienced by Chinese 
Christians since the Cultural Revolution.738 Other leading evangelical institutions were as 
optimistic about the prospects for reform and Christianity as the OMF. In 1981, the 
BGC’s China Program at Wheaton College proclaimed “The China Challenge” presented 
evangelical Christianity with an incredible opportunity to bring the gospel to 1 billion 
people. In confronting the challenge, like the OMF, the China Program of the BGC was 
cautiously optimistic because “there has been a slow but positive transformation in her 
attitude towards human rights and religion.”739  
However, the realization that China’s “openness” depended on “liberals” within 
the CCP sparked constant efforts at prayerful intercession by the OMF toward the support 
of leaders and reformers identified at the forefront of change.  For much of the 1980s 
Deng Xiaoping was an especially popular target for prayer requests. Prayer reminders 
spoke of the leader as having “fought many battles” over his career to rise to the top of 
the party and carry out the current reform agenda. The OMF asked evangelicals to pray 
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that he continue this fight but also not “lose” the battle for his soul. In believing Deng to 
be the architect behind China’s open reforms, the society also prayed to protect his liberal 
agenda and position in the party.  
Various reports of crackdowns on Chinese Christians alarmed the OMF and 
prompted fears of a return to the Maoist years, and at times reignited the more militant 
and defiant rhetoric of the society to the CCP and TSPM. For instance, after a wave of 
arrests of Chinese Christians in 1983 and 1984 in cities like Beijing, Canton, Qingdao, 
and Xi’an, the OMF reminded prayer supporters “this is serious spiritual warfare. Let us 
allow the Holy Spirit to fire our prayers.”740 But they also inspired the OMF to rally 
evangelicals to the defense of “liberals” within both the CCP and TSPM. For example, in 
February 1987 the Pray for China Fellowship warned that Peng Zhen, Chairman of the 
National Party Congress, was leading a “veiled attack” on Deng and the reforms and 
elements with the party threatened a “return to the orthodoxy of communist principles 
and thoughts.”741  
An internal struggle within the TSPM going on simultaneously between “liberals” 
and their opponents was followed closely by the OMF as well. The Pray For China 
Fellowship reported that elements within the TSPM had recently submitted a number of 
“radical” proposals to “further liberalize religious policy” and had contested official 
rhetoric that religion was an “opiate and unscientific.” However, “leftists” within the 
TSPM had stymied these reforms in a fashion similar to the “old guard” of the CCP, and 
instead continued efforts to restrict the inflow of foreign materials sent to the churches 
and to limit contacts between Christians inside and outside China that were not routed 
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through official channels. And reports from across the OMF’s contacts in 1987 signaled 
that conditions were worsening for Christians. The OMF again urged supporters that the 
situation demanded “fervent” intercession to prevent “leftist” forces from gaining the 
upper hand, which could lead to a “disaster” for the churches.  
 By the late 1980s, however, the OMF’s China Program had begun redirecting 
hopes for continued reform toward Hu Yaobang. The OMF was enthusiastic about Hu’s 
apparent rise as Deng’s potential successor in 1986 after a meeting with various church 
leaders. During the meeting, Hu had allegedly stated his support for greater religious 
freedom, including the opportunity to freely and publically propagate Christianity. As a 
result, the OMF tied Hu’s rise in the mid-1980s to the possibility of an increasingly 
liberal attitude toward religion within the party. The OMF also invested hopes in the 
party’s “youth” or “younger generation” as the vanguard of reform. Members like Xu 
Qili were singled out by the OMF as agents of “greater ideological change” and the Pray 
for China Fellowship concentrated their prayers on the rise of the party’s “next 
generation” to replace the “old guard.”742 Praying for change, either in the conversion of 
party members to Christianity, or in their conversion to a liberal attitude toward religion, 
defined the Pray for China Fellowship.  
 Hu’s resignation in 1987 then prompted a sense of crisis among the international 
evangelical community. The OMF China Program reported that student demonstrations 
in favor of democracy and greater freedoms in nineteen cities throughout 1986 along with 
Hu’s rising popularity had made it “evident that there was strong support for complete 
Westernization of China.” But fears among the “last of the old guard” about the party’s 
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prestige and authority had forced Deng to initiate a “crackdown” on Hu, leading to his 
resignation, and campaigns against “bourgeois liberalism.” That intellectuals such as 
Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Banyan had been purged from the party’s ranks and 
that various news outlets were subject to tightening controls incited the OMF to fear the 
advent of another Hundred Flowers. Reports later that year also warned that the greater 
attention and praise for the People’s Liberation Army as the “bastion of old ideology” 
portended a rising threat to the nation’s liberal elements. 
 The late 1980s then were a “crucial time” wherein the OMF mobilized 
evangelicals to participate in China’s reforms and modernization through prayer, 
exchange, and tourism to propel the nation “going forward” by aiding “liberals” within 
the country against conservative forces. By early 1989 the OMF was increasingly 
uncertain about the fate of Christianity, or reform for that matter. In November of 1988, 
citing inflation, rampant corruption in the CCP, and signs of dissent among youth and 
intellectuals, the OMF claimed the nation was “headed for crisis.” A feature in the Pray 
for China Fellowship announced that after the “Deng Decade” from 1978 to 1989, 
progress in the economic, political, and religious realms had been achieved, but the 
question of “where to now” was left hanging in the balance. Optimism rebounded in the 
spring, however, as liberal elements across the nation seemed to surge ahead with the 
support of the international community. The tide had seemed to turn inside the TSPM, 
too. An interview by the New Network International in Los Angeles with Bishop Ding 
saw the TSPM leader declare the need for a more liberal religious policy and plans for the 
dissolution of the TSPM by as early as 1991. The OMF pointed to increasing 
international pressure from groups in Hong Kong and the U.S. on the TSPM and CCP, 
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including petitions from prominent evangelicals in the U.S. sent to Zhao Ziyang for the 
release of Xu Yongze. The society speculated that international attention helped pave the 
way for liberal elements to gain leverage inside the country. 
The sense of a liberal victory, and by extension a triumph for Christianity, rapidly 
collapsed then in the months following the events of June 4th 1989.  Materials for the 
July/August 1989 Pray for China Fellowship held out that the situation inside China was 
“changing hour by hour” and urged prayer for leaders and military officials with “justice” 
and “righteousness” to gain control of the country. Outside the PRC, the OMF 
encouraged special outreach programs and support for Chinese citizens in their hour of 
grief. But by the winter of 1990, reports from society members touring inside China 
described cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Suzhou as under strict control by military 
and party officials. New identification cards required for Chinese citizens limited their 
mobility across the country, and at various new checkpoints were pictures of fugitive 
dissidents and repeated baggage inspections. Regulations concerning foreign travel were 
as stringent as they had been in the 1970s.  While not expelled or completely isolated as it 
had been in the 1950s, the OMF’s ambitions crumbled as the currents of liberalism 
coursing throughout the country, symbolized by students, intellectuals, and the hopes 
placed in the rise of “liberal” elements within the CCP and TSPM were immobilized.743 
Conclusion 
The hopes of accommodation with the CCP and TSPM leading to greater access 
and freedom for Christians, foreign and domestic, collapsed in the summer of 1989. 
Instead, the OMF’s concern over the fate of Hong Kong in 1997 rose as the society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (April	  1989);	  Pray	  for	  China	  
Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (July/August	  1989);	  Pray	  for	  China	  Fellowship,	  Pray	  for	  
China	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  (January/February	  1990).	  
	   378	  
feared the loss of Christianity’s rallying point and gateway for missions to the PRC. 
Conversely, in the 1990s the currents of political, economic, and cultural exchange 
between the PRC and countries like the U.S. remained open and societies like the OMF 
continued to utilize them as the means to evangelize, train disciples, and advocate for the 
greater religious liberty of Chinese evangelicals. Any sort of promise, however, that 
through these programs evangelicals could hope to convert the CCP, either to Christianity 
or liberalism, seemed hollow after the events of June 4th. Thus, for the second time in the 
twentieth century, the CCP dealt a critical blow to the evangelical’s concept of divine 
sovereignty in world affairs by ruining the notion that with China’s opening up, the return 
of the foreign missionary, and the explosion of underground Christianity a golden age of 
Christianity in China had finally arrived.  
The end result of the OMF’s China Program was to create a very complicated and 
ambivalent perspective on the nature of Christian missions and Chinese spiritual 
sovereignty. At a political level, the society was willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
both the CCP and the TSPM to limit the scope of Protestant missions and even 
encouraged evangelicals to make contributions to the nation’s development. But it also 
framed this as an implicit “invitation” to engage in evangelism and other forms of 
ministry.  
Institutionally, the OMF’s ideas of discipleship training and desire to inspire 
Chinese to a missionary vision continued to be grounded in racial stereotypes that 
undermined Chinese equality and spiritual sovereignty. Further, class based fears about 
the lack of education and social background of the house churches reinforced these 
doubts about the sustainability of Christianity without foreign aid and influence. Overall, 
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these concerns reloaded the western evangelical’s tours of the PRC as travelers and 
expatriates with ideas about maintaining doctrinal integrity, expanding rights and 
religious freedom, and augmenting Chinese spiritual sovereignty. While doing so, the 
OMF moved much closer to the ideal of equality, and yet still relied on racialized tropes 
about the Chinese as the means to justify the evangelical’s movement across borders. 
In pointing to the experiences of the house churches, the OMF vindicated its 
legacy in China, seeing many of its traditional principles for missions and evangelism 
proven by the vitality of Chinese Christianity. The OMF in its search to recover its lost 
churches and contacts with Chinese evangelicals made constant allusions to its own 
ideological legacy as preserved by house evangelists taking up itinerations across borders 
and seeking out remote minority groups. Despite innovations in missionary work utilizing 
greater technology, Chinese Christianity’s revival proved the primacy of direct, people to 
people proselytization as the most effective means for promoting the faith. Yet as the 
OMF, in a contradictory fashion, sought to supply Chinese evangelicals with the “surfeit” 
of things such as literature it had argued Chinese Christianity had proven was 
unnecessary.  
  Simultaneously, there was a far greater sense of reciprocity and equality evident 
in these decades within the mission’s call to work in the PRC. Further, in this era Chinese 
evangelicals not only were theoretically sovereign in leading evangelism but also 
politically, economically, and socially in control of the churches and their expansion. For 
political and spiritual reasons, the OMF praised the Chinese evangelical, foreign and 
domestic, as the most dynamic and progressive vessel of the evangelical faith in the PRC. 
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Most importantly, white evangelicals were now propelled to China not just to save 
Chinese but also to learn from Chinese evangelicals. 
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Concluding Chapter 
 The Trajectory of Protestant Missions and Mobility Post-1989 
Despite the evaporation of the Overseas Missionary Fellowship’s (OMF) hopes for 
China’s continued “Opening Up” and modernization in 1989 the society carried on 
missionary work to the PRC as a “creative access nation” in the 1990s and 2000s. For 
Protestant evangelicals, in some sense June 4th,1989, was just another momentary 
setback, in line with the Boxer Rebellion or the Northern Expedition, to the missionary 
endeavor and Christianity’s steady global expansion. It certainly had nowhere near the 
impact that the spiritual crisis induced by the Chinese revolution and subsequent 
expulsion of missionaries during the Korean War had on missions and the international 
evangelical community. That the flows of exchange—cultural, economic, and political—
soon were moving back and forth between the PRC with missionaries again “discreetly” 
evangelizing and working with Chinese Christians recovered for evangelicals the sense 
that Christianity was on the “right side” of history.  
 Perhaps the most important impact of the Tiananmen Square Massacre on the 
OMF’s ministry was the heightened attention given to Hong Kong’s handover to Chinese 
authorities. Throughout the 1980s, the OMF invested in Hong Kong and its Christian 
communities as the entryway to evangelizing the PRC.  Chinese Christians in Hong Kong 
were able to travel inside the PRC with fewer restrictions than non-Chinese evangelicals 
and flowed to the mainland in large numbers during holidays such as Chinese New Year 
to visit relatives, forming a vital bridge between the house churches and the international 
community. 
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 However, as authorities from Beijing and London negotiated the handover of 
Hong Kong, the OMF raised the alarm over how Beijing’s sovereignty could bring the 
restrictions placed on Christianity in the mainland to Hong Kong’s Christian populations 
and threaten the city’s status as the hub for evangelism from the world outside the PRC. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the OMF kept evangelicals abreast of the negotiations 
and tried to mobilize prayers to protect the rights and freedom of Hong Kong’s Christian 
community. In the late 1980s the OMF warned that suffrage rights were no longer 
included in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 744 Following the events in June 1989, 
Hong Kong erupted in demonstrations of solidarity with the student movement in 
Beijing, and the OMF once again briefly employed the idea of “spiritual warfare” with 
the CCP as a means to protect not only mainland evangelicals but the “freedom” of 
groups in Hong Kong as well. However, in terms of the “New Fields,” following 
normalization with China the missionary’s value as a pioneer spreading containment and 
fostering integration with Japan, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
Laos, and later new countries such as Mongolia and Cambodia evaporated in the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
Studying the history of missions like the OMF after the exodus from China 
reveals the dramatic changes in the political notions expressed by missionary mobility 
and its complicated relationship to American foreign policy. Prior to 1943 as pioneers, 
CIM missionaries built a sense of spiritual conquest of the Chinese and the expansion of 
an international order of Christianity defined by whiteness and shared western values. 
After 1943, the mobility of missionaries was increasingly re-imagined as support for the 
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spiritual self-determination of groups in Asia and revised to reflect respect and equality 
with non-whites. Simultaneously, the emphasis on the activities of discipleship training 
reflected fears about the exercise of spiritual sovereignty by Chinese and how this might 
affect both Christianity and the rights of foreign missionaries.  
Following the mission exodus during the early Cold War, missionary mobility 
mapped the contours of spiritual warfare with the communism and spread of containment 
and integration to populations across East and Southeast Asia. Initially entering as 
pioneers, instead of spiritual conquest, the missionary’s mobility signified the 
pacification of populations such as overseas Chinese and the preservation of western 
influence within the context of decolonization. Abandoning pioneer evangelism once 
again amidst fears of the missionary’s irrelevance to Asian elites guiding the region’s 
future, missionary mobility once again symbolized spiritual aid given to help fulfill the 
spiritual self-determination of Asian Christianity.  By engaging in discipleship training 
and other forms of missionary work designed to “strengthen the churches,” the OMF 
continued to argue that missionaries enhanced the spiritual self-determination of Asians. 
Equally interesting, however, is how Sino-American normalization produced a 
missionary mobility that embodied both opposition, through the use of travel to advocate 
for the rights of Chinese evangelicals and foreigners in the PRC, and accommodation, 
contributing to reform and modernization as well as abandoning the moniker of 
missionary, to the Chinese Communist Party. Further, that “friendship” became essential 
to the OMF’s endeavors and western trade, professional exchange, and investment in the 
PRC were seen as vital aspects of Christian missions suggests how notions of a “special 
relationship” between Chinese and Americans were revived in the 1980s. Following up 
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on the work of scholars such as Michael Hunt, Christopher Endy, Christina Klein, and 
Sarah Ruble, how many ideas about foreign relations were worked out by the movement 
of non-state cultural figures such as missionaries, and took on new meanings according to 
the vicissitudes of the Cold War. 
Studying the OMF’s time in China and later redeployment also illuminates the 
struggle to distance the missionary movement from imperialism within the context of 
decolonization. Especially as Christianity in Asian nations grew, the OMF fought against 
the idea that sending white missionaries to Asia was a violation of the rights of Asians. 
Instead, the society advocated that any race or nationality could engage in evangelism as 
a human right held by all members of the international Christian community. In this 
respect, the missionary’s mobility defined freedom of movement and freedom of 
expression in evangelism as the expression of religious freedom. And while the OMF 
recognized the political sovereignty of nations like the PRC to bar evangelicals from 
entering as missionaries, the OMF adapted the methods of its work to advocate for the 
rights of all evangelicals to engage in “widespread and unhindered propagation.” 
In Hong Kong, the PRC, and the New Fields the OMF and its supporters understood 
the missionary’s mobility as a critical component of religious freedom, and central to 
human rights such as freedom of movement and freedom of expression. In addition, by 
focusing the missionary work’s toward advocacy of the rights of groups such as the 
Chinese evangelical in mainland China and later Hong Kong, the OMF conveyed the 
impression that the sending of missionaries promoted the spiritual self-determination of 
evangelicals in Asia by bringing international attention to and focusing prayerful 
intercession on the expansion of their freedom of movement and expression. By the late 
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twentieth century, notions about mobility and religious rights once created by 
exclusionary immigration practices targeting Chinese in the U.S. and the mobility 
enjoyed by Protestant missionaries given extraterroriality rights in China that were 
associated with “whiteness” were understood as religious freedoms held by all 
evangelicals regardless of race or nation.  
These notions of rights were reflected in the changing directional aspect of Protestant 
missions. Over the course of several decades the China Inland Mission evolved from a 
society sending missionaries solely to China and the Chinese into the Overseas 
Missionary Fellowship, an organization with a calling to bring the gospel to Asians 
everywhere around the globe. Training materials in the early 1970s advised junior 
missionaries to forge a spiritual identification with Asians by “being where people are. 
One cannot identify at a distance….endeavor to be where Asians are—in their homes, in 
schools, at work, in the market, or in stores.”745 While this material was intended for 
missionaries heading to fields in Asia, this statement was equally true of the OMF agenda 
in countries like the U.S. Being where Asians were in the U.S., (both citizens and foreign 
guests), governed the traffic of OMF representatives and supporters to propagate the 
missionary vision to universities, churches, and cities with large Asian populations. This 
decentering of missionary work from China and eventually from Asia, and the alteration 
of the directional flow of missionaries was a byproduct of the Chinese Revolution, the 
Cold War, decolonization, and Asian nationalism as well as the increasing recognition of 
the spiritual self-determination of Asian evangelicals.  
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Racial integration saved for evangelicals a sense that the missionary’s mobility was a 
dynamic source of spiritual progress in the world. Rerouted and expelled by political 
revolutions and implicated as the source of racial discrimination and imperialism in the 
1950s and 1960s, the society and its supporters struggled with doubts in the missionary’s 
dynamism and association with progress. Compelled to recognize the sovereignty of the 
national and local Asian churches and their rights within their borders, the OMF reacted 
by abandoning its western identity in the 1960s and pursuing integration with Asians as 
equals in the international community. OMF publications and training materials later 
touted, “We are not an American society, but rather we are an international family of 
brothers and sisters in Christ. We have much to learn from one another,” and advertised 
that the society included Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, Swiss, Dutch, German, and even a 
Maori member from New Zealand.746  Racial integration recovered for missions like the 
OMF its sense of being on the right sight of history by alleviating concerns that the 
missionary’s movement across borders was a violation of the self-determination of 
Asians and that Christianity was not a universal faith but the religion of white 
imperialists.   
Certainly, the notions of racial superiority that once created a racial dichotomy 
between the meanings of Chinese mobility and that of the white, missionary from 
countries like the U.S. faded over the course of the Cold War. For one, immigration 
reform in the U.S., the opening of pathways to full citizenship for groups like Chinese 
Americans, and American society’s enduring Civil Rights struggle after 1945 forced the 
mission to reconsider its own exclusion of nonwhites from membership. In the field, the 
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missionary’s struggles with the challenges posed by nationalism, communism, and other 
aspects transforming societies in Asia such as mass literacy and urbanization led 
members of the CIM-OMF to increasingly recognize Asians as their equals. More 
importantly, the sovereignty of regimes like the CCP and their ability to regulate or 
restrict the movements of foreign missionaries helped eradicate the sense that whites 
enjoyed mobility fundamentally different from that of nonwhites defined by its freedom 
and rights.  
In fact, from the 1950s onward the society’s members increasingly worried that the 
white western missionary’s signification of imperialism, exploitation, and racial 
discrimination in the field stymied its ambitions. In contrast, the growing inclusion of 
Asian evangelicals within the missionary movement and voices from within the CIM 
such as Chen Chonggui in the 1940s or Arnold Lea in the 1960s suggested that the future 
of Protestant missions belonged to Asian evangelicals. If the missionary symbolized the 
extension of American power, as scholar Sarah Ruble suggests, then the history of the 
CIM-OMF illustrates that the face of this power was increasingly imagined as non-white 
after the 1950s. Overall, the hopes of the mission and its supporters in countries like the 
U.S. were increasingly dependent on the incorporation of Asian allies, at home and 
abroad, into their fold and gradually entrusted more and more authority to Asian 
missionaries.  Against the backdrop of the Cold War and decolonization, the importance 
of propagating to Asian evangelicals the missionary impulse and its attendant mobility 
loaded with many different ideological meanings for the OMF’s supporters began to 
outweigh concerns for the souls of “unevangelized” Asians.     
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But the reality was that the organization’s western and white identity could not 
simply be shed overnight as evangelicals in North American and the United Kingdom 
continued to dominate the society’s interests, finances, and rank and file. Nor was the 
OMF suddenly swelled by Asian members and supporters; integration took decades to 
achieve and the mission’s first Asia General Director, Patrick Fung, was only named in 
2005. Although the OMF strove for more equal relations with Asians and an ideal of 
internationalism more inclusive of Asians, the size of Asian membership for much of the 
twentieth century belied the mission’s claims to being non-western. 
 In some ways there is any irony in the fact that in the 1930s the society employed 
thousands of Chinese Christian workers, evangelists, and colporteurs before the mission 
eliminated these positions and forced them upon local Chinese churches in light of the 
principle of self-support. While these employees were not officially missionaries of the 
OMF, their participation invites the question of whether or not the OMF moved closer or 
further away from integration with Asians in the second half of the twentieth century.  
Relations between white and Asian evangelicals certainly became more equitable within 
the Protestant missionary movement in many respects, but each group also tended to 
segregate into its own respective organizations. Indeed, OMF relied heavily on 
cooperation with organizations such as Chinese for Christ and churches run by Asian 
evangelicals to fulfill its ambitions in Asia.  
A byproduct of these developments was geographic and class-based hierarchies 
produced by missionary mobility. Groups such as the Lisu in northern Thailand and 
Southwest China continued to be represented as “heathens” to be pitied and saved, while 
urban Japanese and Chinese-Americans from California were elevated to the status of 
	   389	  
equals and incorporated into the fold of the OMF. In turn, fears that groups such as 
Chinese Christians in the People’s Republic of China would perpetuate the stigmatization 
of Christianity as “superstition” drove the OMF in search of candidates from the U.S. 
with higher professional and educational backgrounds than it had traditionally recruited. 
While the mobility of missionaries working with the OMF and its allies no longer 
marked nations or civilizations as inherently “superior” or “inferior” the directional flow 
of missionaries reified racial boundaries between Asian and white evangelicals. While the 
OMF now employed both Asians and white evangelicals as missionaries on an equal 
basis and the lines between “sending” and “receiving” nations were blurred, missionaries 
were still routed toward Asians, wherever they were located, but not toward whites in any 
country. Thus, the trajectory of the missionary’s mobility, whether Asian or white, was 
set by notions of race and the idea of the Asian’s greater need for the saving grace of the 
gospels.   
Fears of declension or heterodoxy remained central to the motivations constructed by 
the OMF for white evangelicals to go forth as missionaries to Asia or to their Asian 
neighbors. Doubts about the existence of a global missionary vision or suspicions of a 
wane in zeal for evangelism amidst rising affluence were associated with Asian groups in 
western countries like the U.S. or Chinese in Hong Kong. Similarly, fears about the 
absence of western theology and scriptural interpretations spurred the OMF to send 
agents to train groups in Asia, as did its concerns that Christianity’s association with 
impoverished or marginalized groups in countries like the PRC would continue to arouse 
the suspicions of elites and mobile, modern citizens.  
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And while the society often emphasized the rights and sovereignty of Asian 
evangelicals, by constantly justifying their inclusion by reference to the greater efficacy 
of Asian missionaries because of their cultural and racial backgrounds and allusions to 
the political necessity of embracing racial integration to free the missionary movement 
from charges of discrimination and imperialism the CIM-OMF directly undercut the idea 
of equality. In essence, racial equality was pursued less out of belief in its merits and 
more so because it enhanced evangelism and Christianity’s appeal. It was a practical 
necessity more than an ideal.  
 Certainly, scholars such as Lian Xi or Rebecca Nedostup concerned with the 
development of indigenous Chinese Christianity should consider how missions like the 
OMF interpreted the movement of Chinese as evangelists and missionaries as evidence of 
the universality of Christianity and expressions of solidarity and fellowship with the 
missionary movement. In periods such as the 1940s the CIM’s representation of Chinese 
evangelicals as pioneers spoke to their spiritual sovereignty and racial equality even if the 
missionary’s own mobility undermined such notions. Even more importantly, Chinese 
Christianity’s revival in the 1970s and 1980s validated the OMF’s belief in the 
missionary exodus as a “strategic retreat” leading to Christianity’s greater advance in 
Asia. For many evangelicals in the U.S. belief in ideas such as divine sovereignty or the 
universality of the Christian faith depended upon their perception of the ebbs and flows 
of the Chinese evangelicals in the PRC. The “domestic” life of Chinese Christianity has 
always had powerful spiritual and political reverberations on the “international” 
community beyond China’s borders.  
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Particularly, the OMF’s work in this period points to the ways in which Protestant 
missions tried to harness the power of transnational flows of Chinese to advance the 
Gospel and were concerned about its capacity to spread rival ideologies. Working outside 
the People’s Republic of China for over two decades, the OMF invested its hopes and 
that of its followers in the cultivation and training of a generation of overseas Chinese, 
especially Chinese Americans, would lead the return of the Protestant missionary. With 
the opening of the PRC to tourism, Chinese Christians from Hong Kong traveling to 
family in mainland and scholars, students, and professionals from the PRC visiting 
countries like the U.S. became critical to the society’s commission. While such flows of 
Chinese were seen as conduits of progress and uplift by the OMF, the mission’s own time 
spent pacifying overseas Chinese in nations like Malaysia in the early Cold War and 
constant fear of the Sinicization of Christianity suggests how Chinese mobility could still 
be seen as subversive and threatening.  
By following the same trajectory explored in the scholarship of historians such as 
Akira Iriye, Ian Tyrell, and Mary Dudziak, this study has demonstrated that notions of 
rights, race, and religion held by groups in the U.S. were produced transnationally by the 
movement of groups such as the missionary and overseas Chinese. The institutional 
spread of the OMF in the U.S. and its expansion and movement in Asia, however, 
displays the dissemination of an ideology produced by mobility through transnational 
networks connecting Christians across the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. Ultimately, 
what my research has shown is that what bound together these Christians in support of 
the OMF was an ideological belief that missionary mobility expressed fundamental 
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religious rights such as freedom of movement and expression, but did so by perpetuating 
racist notions about Chinese and other Asians. 
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